

SENATE

FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1962

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, and was called to order by the Vice President.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God and Father of all men, as in these glorious days we stand knee deep in the loveliness of the summertime, we thank Thee for every sacrament of beauty of which our enraptured senses drink, in all the wonder of petaled bushes aflame with Thee. May the glory of the earth which showeth Thy handiwork be but a parable of the things that are excellent, blooming in our quickened lives.

In all this holiness of beauty, lead us, we pray Thee, to the beauty of holiness. Lift us out of the bondage of fear and hate into Thy new day, whose dawning now gilds the sky, when, in a better order of human society, pity and laughter will return to the common ways of man and peace—even Thy peace—will breathe Thy benediction upon our strife-weary world.

We pray in Thy holy name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, August 2, 1962, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the following concurrent resolutions, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. Con. Res. 497. Concurrent resolution authorizing the Joint Committee on Printing to conduct a study of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD with a view to improving its format, index, typography, and so forth;

H. Con. Res. 500. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of parts 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the hearings held before the Committee on Education and Labor on the impact of imports and exports; and

H. Con. Res. 503. Concurrent resolution to authorize the printing as a House document the report of the Joint Committee on Arrangements To Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the First Inaugural of Abraham Lincoln.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS REFERRED

The following concurrent resolutions were severally referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

H. Con. Res. 497. Concurrent resolution authorizing the Joint Committee on Print-

ing to conduct a study of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD with a view to improving its format, index, typography, and so forth:

"Whereas the Congressional Record is established as substantially a verbatim report of proceedings of both Houses of the Congress; and

"Whereas Congress is the staging area for the discussion and resolution of the major national issues confronting the United States; and

"Whereas this 'national dialog' reaches a climax in the passage or the defeat of legislation; and

"Whereas thousands among the leaders of our country in both public and private stations depend upon the Congressional Record for details of these dialogs: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the Joint Committee on Printing, which is assigned control and supervision of the Record under sections 181 and 182 of chapter 6, title 44, United States Code, conduct a study of the Congressional Record with a view to improving its format, index, typography, organization of materials, and other aspects relevant to such a study; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Joint Committee on Printing, if it deems it provident, shall call upon experts in the communications media and possibly public spirited citizens, such as civic leaders, Government officials, and scholars, to sit as an advisory committee in order to render such help as may be needed; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Joint Committee on Printing shall, if it deems it advisable, be empowered to incur whatever expenditures are necessary to the proper carrying out of this study, but that in no event shall the sum exceed the amount of \$50,000; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Joint Committee shall report its findings to the Congress within one year after date of passage of this concurrent resolution."

H. Con. Res. 500. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of parts 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the hearings held before the Committee on Education and Labor on the impact of imports and exports:

"Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That there be printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor one thousand additional copies each of parts 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the hearings held by that committee on the impact of imports and exports on employment."

H. Con. Res. 503. Concurrent resolution to authorize the printing as a House document the report of the Joint Committee on Arrangements To Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the First Inaugural of Abraham Lincoln:

"Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That there shall be printed as a House document the report of the Joint Committee on Arrangements To Commemorate the One Hundredth Anniversary of the First Inaugural of Abraham Lincoln and that said report may include such illustrations as the joint committee may include. The preparation of material for printing and the selection of an appropriate binding shall be under the supervision of the subcommittee of the joint committee on arrangements for the commemorative ceremony, and said chairman shall cause to be printed seven thousand five hundred copies so as to furnish ten copies to the Vice President, each Senator, each Representative, and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico; and the remainder be equally distributed by the joint committee through its chairman to the various organized groups, associations, and such people who assisted the joint committee in the preparation and development of the program."

LIMITATION OF DEBATE DURING MORNING HOUR

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, statements during the morning hour were ordered limited to 3 minutes.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia, from the Committee on Finance:

Henry L. Giordano, of Maryland, to be Commissioner of Narcotics;

Howard A. Dawson, Jr., of Maryland, to be judge of the Tax Court of the United States;

Austin Hoyt, of Colorado, to be judge of the Tax Court of the United States; and

Raymond F. Huff, of Louisiana, to be collector of customs for customs collection district No. 20, with headquarters at New Orleans, La.

The VICE PRESIDENT. If there be no further reports of committees, the nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Norbert A. Schlei, of California, to be an Assistant Attorney General.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

POSTMASTERS

The Chief Clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations of postmasters.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these nominations be considered en bloc.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the nominations will be considered en bloc; and, without objection, they are confirmed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Committee on Government Operations was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN CARRIERS FROM MINIMUM RATE REGULA- TION IN TRANSPORTATION OF CERTAIN COMMODITIES—RESO- LUTION

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I have received a resolution from the Atchison, Kans., Chamber of Commerce, regarding Senate bill 3243, to exempt certain carriers from the minimum rate regulation in the transportation of certain commodities, which is pending before the Committee on Commerce.

Transportation is vital to our State, and I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed in the RECORD, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Commerce, as follows:

Whereas the shippers of the city of Atchison are desirous of having a dependable and a financially sound and growing transportation industry; and

Whereas the members of our community are firmly committed to the principle that transportation shall continue to be owned and operated as a part of our free enterprise system; and

Whereas, the members of our community believe that a strong national transportation system can best be promoted under the free play of competitive forces, and cooperation between forms of transportation, rather than by the compulsion of governmental regulation; and

Whereas there is now pending before the Congress of the United States measures which will partially restore competitive equality among the various modes of transportation: Now, therefore, it is hereby

Resolved, That the Chamber of Commerce of the City of Atchison, Kans., does by these presents hereby endorse and favor the enactment of S. 3243, H.R. 11583 and H.R. 11584 into law; be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of this organization furnish a copy of this resolution to Senators WARREN G. MAGNUSON, FRANK CARLSON, JAMES PEARSON, and Congressmen OREN HARRIS and WILLIAM H. AVERY.

C. B. McDONALD,
President.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia, from the Committee on Finance, without amendment:

H.R. 5139. An act for the relief of Helena M. Grover (Rept. No. 1824);

H.R. 10743. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide increases in rates of disability compensation, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1806); and

H.R. 11400. An act to continue for 2 years the existing suspension of duties on certain lathes used for shoe last roughing or for shoe last finishing (Rept. No. 1808).

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia, from the Committee on Finance, with an amendment:

H.R. 10928. An act to transfer casein or lactarene to the free list of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Rept. No. 1821).

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia, from the Committee on Finance, with amendments:

S. 3597. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to permit, for 1 year, the granting of national service life insurance to certain veterans heretofore eligible for such insurance (Rept. No. 1807);

H.R. 6413. An act to extend to fishermen the same treatment accorded farmers in relation to estimated income tax (Rept. No. 1819); and

H.R. 10852. An act to continue for a temporary period the existing suspension of duties on certain classifications of spun silk yarn (Rept. No. 1820).

By Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with amendments:

S. 892. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Arbuckle reclamation project, Oklahoma, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1809);

S. 3117. A bill to promote the coordination and development of effective Federal and State programs relating to outdoor recreation, and to provide financial assistance to the States for outdoor recreation planning, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1825); and

H.R. 10566. An act to provide for the withdrawal and orderly disposition of mineral interests in certain public lands in Pima County, Ariz. (Rept. No. 1810).

By Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an amendment:

H.R. 8134. An act to authorize the sale of the mineral estate in certain lands (Rept. No. 1811).

By Mr. MOSS, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with amendments:

S. 1878. A bill to add certain lands to the Wasatch National Forest, Utah, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1823).

By Mr. HARTKE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

S. 3013. A bill to amend the act of July 2, 1940, as amended, relating to the recording of liens on motor vehicles and trailers registered in the District of Columbia, so as to eliminate the requirement that an alphabetical file of such liens be maintained (Rept. No. 1815).

By Mr. HARTKE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, with an amendment:

S. 3317. A bill to amend provisions of law relating to personal property coming into the custody of the property clerk, Metropolitan Police Department, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1816); and

S. 3322. A bill to increase the jurisdiction of the municipal court for the District of Columbia in civil actions, to change the name of the court, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1812).

By Mr. HARTKE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, with amendments:

S. 3010. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for commitments to, maintenance in, and discharges from, the District Training School, and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1925, as amended (Rept. No. 1814); and

S. 3146. A bill to amend the act concerning gifts to minors in the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 1813).

By Mr. BEALL, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

H.R. 12547. An act to amend the act of August 7, 1946, relating to the District of Columbia hospital center, to extend the time during which appropriations may be made for the purposes of that act (Rept. No. 1817).

By Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

S. 3313. A bill to authorize an increase in the borrowing authority for the general fund of the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 1818).

By Mr. MORSE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

S. 3314. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Public School Food Services Act (Rept. No. 1822).

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. KEFAUVER:

S. 3598. A bill for the relief of James C. Hung and his wife, Sufenne Hung; and S. 3599. A bill for the relief of Claude Flavian Braganza; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HART:

S. 3600. A bill for the relief of Chao Hua-Hsin; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSTON:

S. 3601. A bill to establish a basic policy for the determination of statutory salaries and the annual review of the adequacy of the major statutory pay systems of the Federal Government; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

(See the remarks of Mr. JOHNSTON when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MAGNUSON (by request):

S. 3602. A bill to amend clause (2) (G) of subsection 309(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by granting the Federal Communications Commission additional authority to grant special temporary authorizations for 60 days for certain non-broadcast operations; and

S. 3603. A bill to amend section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to perfect certain provisions of the International Aviation Facilities Act; to the Committee on Commerce.

(See the remarks of Mr. MAGNUSON when he introduced the above bills, which appear under separate headings.)

By Mr. LONG of Missouri:

S. 3604. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Doris Wai Kam Yee; and

S. 3605. A bill for the relief of Berta I. E. Mann; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 3606. A bill to amend the Antidumping Act; to the Committee on Finance.

(See the remarks of Mr. HUMPHREY when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JACKSON (by request):

S. 3607. A bill to provide for the withdrawal and reservation for the use of the Department of the Air Force of certain public lands of the United States at Cuddeback Lake Air Force Range, Calif., for defense purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(See the remarks of Mr. JACKSON when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mrs. SMITH of Maine:

S. 3608. A bill authorizing modification of the project for Carvers Harbor, Vinalhaven, Maine; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. STENNIS (for himself, Mr. EASTLAND, and Mr. AIKEN):

S. 3609. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to encourage and assist the several States in carrying on a program of forestry research, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. (See the remarks of Mr. STENNIS when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself, Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts, and Mr. BARTLETT):

S. 3610. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct two modern stern ramp trawlers to be used for research, and for other purposes; and

S. 3611. A bill to amend the act of June 12, 1960, for the correction of inequities in the construction of fishing vessels, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. DODD:

S.J. Res. 212. Joint resolution to designate September 13 of each year as Commodore John Barry Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

RESOLUTION

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING

Mr. McCARTHY submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 370); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved, That (a) there is hereby created a special committee of the Senate to be known as the Special Committee on Residence Requirements for Voting, which shall consist of nine Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate as soon as practicable after the date of adoption of this resolution. The President of the Senate shall designate one such Senator as chairman of the committee. Six members of the committee shall be appointed from the majority party and three members from the minority party.

(b) Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments thereto are made.

(c) A majority of the members of the committee shall constitute a quorum thereof for the transaction of business, except that the committee may fix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony. The committee shall adopt rules of procedure not inconsistent with the rules of the Senate governing standing committees of the Senate.

(d) No legislative measure shall be referred to the committee, and it shall have no authority to report any such measure to the Senate.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the committee to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to the extent to which State and local residence requirements affect the right of citizens of the United States to vote in Federal elections. At the earliest practicable date, but not later than nine months after its establishment, the committee shall transmit to the Senate a report of its study and investigation together with its recommendations for any legislative or other measures which it considers to be required to prevent the deprivation of citizens of the United States of their right to vote in Federal elections through the application of such requirements.

SEC. 3. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is author-

ized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable.

SEC. 4. (a) The committee shall have power to employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it deems necessary in the performance of its duty, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1949 for comparable duties. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government to the extent that such services, information, facilities, and personnel, in the opinion of the heads of such departments and agencies, can be furnished without undue interference with the performance of the work and duties of such departments and agencies. The committee is authorized to procure, by contract or otherwise, the services of public or private organizations or institutions.

(b) Upon request made by the members of the committee selected from the minority party, the committee shall appoint one assistant or consultant designated by such members. No assistant or consultant appointed by the committee may receive compensation at an annual gross rate which exceeds by more than \$1,400 the annual gross rate of compensation of any individual so designated by the minority members of the committee.

SEC. 5. The expenses of the committee, in an amount not to exceed \$100,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

SEC. 6. The committee shall cease to exist at 12:00 post meridian, January 31, 1963.

POLICY FOR DETERMINATION OF STATUTORY SALARIES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the bill I am introducing is designed to provide a systematic method of reviewing each year the civilian statutory pay systems in the Federal Government so that Congress may receive from the President his recommendations in this important field.

More specifically, the bill provides for creation of an unsalaried Committee on Federal Pay not to exceed seven members appointed by the President, representing the public, the executive branch, employee organizations, and such other members as the President may designate.

Its annual review of the pay structure would be governed by these principles: Equal pay for substantially equal work; distinctions in pay based upon complexity and difficulty of work and quality of work performance; responsiveness of Federal pay rates with reasonable promptness to various factors contributing to our country's economic progress; and maintenance of Federal salaries on levels comparable with those in private industry for equivalent types of work.

The basic purpose of the proposed legislation is to insure regular, periodic

consideration of the need for general adjustments or necessary improvements in the salary systems.

Two fundamental points should be made clear. The bill does not dilute in any way the authority presently possessed by Congress to fix rates of pay for Federal classified and postal and other groups of employees. It does not disturb the existing system of establishing pay schedules for wage board employees for comparable work on a locality basis.

The proposal will enable Congress to have the benefit of a systematic examination of the Federal pay structure each year, and in that way facilitate its work in this important field. Where justified, salary adjustments can be approved by Congress before the pay problem of our Federal workers becomes a staggering one in terms of the billions of dollars required to make necessary adjustments.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3601) to establish a basic policy for the determination of statutory salaries and the annual review of the adequacy of the major statutory pay systems of the Federal Government, introduced by Mr. JOHNSTON, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

AMENDMENT OF CLAUSE (2) (G) OF SUBSECTION 309(c) OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, by request, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend clause (2) (G) of subsection 309(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by granting the Federal Communications Commission additional authority to grant special temporary authorizations for 60 days for certain nonbroadcast operations. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, requesting the proposed legislation, together with an explanatory statement.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter and explanatory statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 3602) to amend clause (2) (G) of subsection 309(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, by granting the Federal Communications Commission additional authority to grant special temporary authorizations for 60 days for certain nonbroadcast operations, introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON, by request, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

The letter and explanatory statement presented by Mr. MAGNUSON are as follows:

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., May 31, 1962.
The VICE PRESIDENT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: The Commission has adopted as a part of its legislative pro-

gram for the 2d session of the 87th Congress a proposal to amend section 309(c) (2) (G) of the Communications Act of 1934 to permit the Federal Communications Commission to grant special temporary authorizations for periods of 60 days in certain cases (47 U.S.C. 309(c) (2) (G)).

The Commission's draft bill to accomplish the foregoing objective was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for its consideration. We have now been advised by that Bureau that from the standpoint of the administration's program there would be no objection to the presentation of the draft bill to the Congress for its consideration. Accordingly, there are enclosed six copies of our draft bill and explanatory statement on this subject.

The consideration by the Senate of the proposed amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 would be greatly appreciated. The Commission would be most happy to furnish any additional information that may be desired by the Senate or by the committee to which this proposal is referred.

Sincerely yours,

NEWTON N. MINOW,
Chairman.

EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT TO PERMIT THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION TO GRANT SPECIAL TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PERIODS OF 60 DAYS IN CERTAIN CASES (47 U.S.C. 309(c) (2) (G))

Paragraph (2) (G) of subsection (c) of section 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 309(c) (2) (G)), now exempts from the public notice and 30-day waiting period requirements of subsection 309(b) those applications for "a special temporary authorization for nonbroadcast operation not to exceed 30 days where no application for regular operation is contemplated to be filed or pending the filing of an application for such regular operation, or".

The Commission believes that this subsection should be amended to permit it to grant special temporary authorizations (STA) for 60 days in those cases where the application for the STA is filed pending the filing of an application for regular operation. We are not suggesting any changes in the 30-day limitation on those STA's in cases not contemplating a subsequent application for regular operation.

The purpose of paragraph (2) (G) of subsection 309(c) is to permit short-term radio operation in the nonbroadcast field without the delay of a 30-day waiting period (as provided in subsection 309(b)) after the issuance of public notice by the Commission of the acceptance for filing of such application. The Commission has found that this purpose is frustrated by the 30-day limitation on STA's in those cases where the short-term operation relates to a radio system for which an application for regular operation is filed later. In those cases, the provisions of subsection 309(b) are applicable and a 30-day waiting period is required before the Commission can act on the application for regular operation. As a result, there is a hiatus between the expiration of the STA and the Commission's grant of the application for regular operation. During the period of the hiatus, the applicant would be unlicensed and would, as a consequence, be unable to operate his radio. This defeats the purpose for which Congress made special provision for granting special temporary authorizations. Moreover, it does not appear that the Commission has authority to remedy this statutory defect by renewing the STA until it can grant the application for regular operation.

The Commission believes that this deficiency in the statutory scheme can be corrected by its proposed amendment. There-

fore, we recommend that paragraph (2) (G) of subsection 309(c) be amended to give us this additional authority.

PERFECTION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION FACILITIES ACT

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, by request, I introduce for appropriate reference, a bill to amend section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to perfect certain provisions of the International Aviation Facilities Act. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, requesting the proposed legislation, be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 3603) to amend section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to perfect certain provisions of the International Aviation Facilities Act, introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON, by request, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

The letter presented by Mr. MAGNUSON is as follows:

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., July 31, 1962.

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the Senate,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed herewith is a draft of a bill "to amend section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to perfect certain provisions of the International Aviation Facilities Act."

This proposal is a part of the Federal Aviation Agency legislative program for 1962 and it is recommended that it be enacted by the Congress.

This proposal is in the nature of technical amendments to the International Aviation Facilities Act, designed to make the terms of reference in such act consistent with the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.

It would appear that at the time of enactment of section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 808, a section containing amendments of a perfecting nature to make the terms of reference in the International Aviation Facilities Act consistent with the provisions of the newly enacted Federal Aviation Act, certain obsolete references in the International Aviation Facilities Act to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 were overlooked and thus are perpetuated in the language of that act. Since subsection 1401(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 806, repealed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, references to that act in the International Aviation Facilities Act are no longer appropriate.

For this reason this proposal would amend section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by (a) substituting in section 3 of the International Aviation Facilities Act (49 U.S.C. 1152) the phrase "in section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958," and (b) substituting in section 5 of such act (49 U.S.C. 1154) the phrase "Federal Aviation Act of 1958" for the phrase "Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938."

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection from the standpoint of the administration's program to the submission of this proposed legislation to the Congress.

Sincerely,

N. E. HALABY,
Administrator.

AMENDMENT OF ANTIDUMPING ACT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Antidumping Act.

One of the principal purposes of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, set forth in section 102(2) of H.R. 11970, is "development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world." One form of discrimination in world trade—price discrimination leading to competitive injury—was recognized and condemned in the United States as early as 1921, when Congress enacted the Antidumping Act. Since then other nations have enacted comparable measures and, of course, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade expressly endorses member country action against injurious dumping.

Under our law, sales of imported products in the United States at prices below their foreign prices result in imposition of a special dumping duty if such sales injure the competitive domestic industry. This special dumping duty amounts only to the price differential—the price discrimination—involved and thus the act protects against only injurious price cutting and nothing else.

Administration of the act is in two steps: price differentials are investigated by Treasury which, if it finds differentials, then refers cases to the Tariff Commission to determine whether resulting competitive injury has occurred. Unlike the Tariff Commission, which must reach a decision within a statutory 3-month deadline, Treasury presently has no time limit within which to ascertain and price differentials.

Recent experience under the act demonstrates that Treasury's investigations consume inordinate amounts of time—far longer than the 90 days within which the Senate Finance Committee in 1954 stated it believed Treasury would thereafter act. These delays severely disrupt international trade and this bill therefore would require Treasury to make its decisions no later than 6 months after complaint is made. Six months is comparable to the time period within which the Tariff Commission now reaches decisions in escape clause cases and is believed to be wholly reasonable. If this period is considered too short in a particular case, provision is made therefor, upon report by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means.

In addition, this bill would require that foreign producers selling to the United States cost-justify quantity discounts in the same manner that domestic producers must justify such discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act. As presently administered by Treasury, foreign producers have escaped the burden imposed on the competitive domestic industry. In the interest of fairness, the Antidumping Act—essentially the international equivalent of the Robinson-Patman Act—should not permit this inequity.

Finally, this bill would remove any possibility of interpreting the Antidumping Act to allow the interposition of dummy intermediaries to mask what would otherwise constitute dumping prices. The possibility of such a loophole has only recently come to light and should be foreclosed promptly.

These three amendments to the Antidumping Act are all designed to insure effectuation of the intent of Congress in enacting and in subsequently amending that act. This bill is consistent with and, in view of more recent developments, goes beyond legislation introduced and widely supported in the House earlier in this session and not yet considered by the Committee on Ways and Means. It goes far to implement the purpose of the Trade Expansion Act and should be enacted therewith.

In view of the interest and concern that has been indicated by Members of the Senate in the present inadequacies of the Antidumping Act, I ask unanimous consent that this bill remain at the desk through August 8 so that any colleagues desiring to do so may join in sponsoring this measure, and that the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD, and will lie on the desk as requested by the Senator from Minnesota.

The bill (S. 3606) to amend the Antidumping Act, introduced by Mr. HUMPHREY, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act, 1921 (19 U.S.C. sec. 160(a)), is amended by inserting between the first and second sentences the following new sentence: "The Secretary shall make such determination, or shall make a determination that the merchandise involved is not being and is not likely to be sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, at the earliest practicable time after the date on which the question of dumping is first raised by or presented to him or any person to whom authority under this section has been delegated or, on the basis of the then existing record, not later than six months after such date, unless, within the said six months, he shall have submitted a report to the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate stating the reasons why a longer period is required within which to reach such determination, and the estimated extent of such longer period."

SEC. 2. (a) Section 202(b)(1) of the Antidumping Act, 1921 (19 U.S.C. sec. 161(b)(1)), is amended by striking out "the fact that" and inserting in lieu thereof "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the fact that."

(b) Section 202(c)(1) of such Act is amended by striking out "the fact that" and inserting in lieu thereof "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the fact that."

SEC. 3. (a) Section 202(a) of the Antidumping Act, 1921 (19 U.S.C. sec. 161(a)), is amended by inserting after the word "If" and before the word "the", in the phrase "if the purchase price or exporter's sales

price is less than —," the word "either" and by striking "a special dumping duty in an amount equal to such difference," and inserting in lieu thereof "a special dumping duty in an amount equal to such difference: *Provided*, That if both the purchase price and the exporter's sales price are less than the foreign market value (or, in the absence of such value, than the constructed value), such special dumping duty shall be in an amount equal to the greater difference."

(b) Section 204 of such Act is amended by striking "(2) the amount of the commissions, if any, for selling in the United States" and inserting in lieu thereof "(2) the amount of the commissions and profits, if any, for selling in or to the United States".

SEC. 4. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to all merchandise as to which no appraisal report has been made on or before the date of the enactment of this Act: *Provided*, That with respect to such merchandise as to which, on or before such date, the question of dumping shall have been raised by or presented to the Secretary of the Treasury or any person to whom authority under section 201 of the Antidumping Act, 1921, has been delegated, the Secretary shall determine within six months from the date of the enactment of this Act whether the merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value.

(b) The amendments made by this Act shall not apply with respect to any merchandise which—

(1) was exported from the country of exportation before the date of the enactment of this Act, and

(2) is subject to a finding under the Antidumping Act, 1921, which (A) is outstanding on the date of the enactment of this Act, or (B) was revoked on or before the date of the enactment of this Act but is still applicable to such merchandise.

WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN LANDS AT CUDDEBACK LAKE AIR FORCE RANGE, CALIF.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, by request, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for the withdrawal and reservation for the use of the Department of the Air Force of certain public lands of the United States at Cuddeback Lake Air Force Range, Calif., for defense purposes. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, requesting the proposed legislation, be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 3607) to provide for the withdrawal and reservation for the use of the Department of the Air Force of certain public lands of the United States at Cuddeback Lake Air Force Range, Calif., for defense purposes, introduced by Mr. JACKSON, by request, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

The letter presented by Mr. JACKSON is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Washington, July 17, 1962.

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to provide

for the withdrawal and reservation for the Department of the Air Force of certain public lands for the United States at Cuddeback Lake Air Force Range, Calif., for defense purposes.

This proposal is pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 85-337 and is part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1962. The Bureau of the Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Air Force has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

This proposed legislation would withdraw and reserve certain lands located in San Bernardino County, Calif., and described in the attached draft. It would withdraw this land from all forms of appropriations, including the restriction and the operation of the mining and mineral leasing laws, and disposals of materials under the act of July 31, 1947, as amended (61 Stat. 681; 30 U.S.C. 601-604). An application for the withdrawal and reservation of the lands, comprising approximately 7,546 acres, from the public domain has been submitted to the Department of Interior.

The lands involved are open desert lands covered by a sparse growth of desert vegetation. There are no springs or water resources within or available to the area which is proposed to be withdrawn.

The Departments of the Army and Navy have ranges in the Southwest; however, those ranges do not have the capability of supporting the bombing and gunnery activity that is presently conducted on the Cuddeback Range. These ranges are extensively used for tank and artillery practice by the Army and for air-to-air and air-to-ground activities by the Navy and cannot adequately accommodate the requirements of the Air Force mission. The Nellis Air Force Range in Nevada and the Luke-Williams Air Force Range in Arizona are 160 and 230 miles, respectively, from George Air Force Base and are located beyond the economical limit for a fighter base bombing range. In addition to the foregoing reasons, the Air Force has been using the Cuddeback Range since 1956, and it would cost approximately \$350,000 to duplicate present buildings, targets, and scoring facilities plus an additional estimated \$21,000 per mile for road construction to any new site. Also the latter two named ranges are almost completely saturated and could not accept the additional 50,000 range sorties per year presently conducted on Cuddeback Range.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

As the land area involved is currently in use by the Air Force, there will be no increase in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely,
JOSEPH S. IMIRIE,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force.

PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLIC LANDS AT CUDDEBACK LAKE AIR FORCE RANGE, CALIF.

The following information is pursuant to section 3 of H.R. 8783:

1. Name of requesting agency is the Department of the Air Force.

2. The agency having administrative jurisdiction over the land together with a statement concerning current or previous uses including withdrawal, reservations, restrictions, leases, dispositions or appropriations made or pending:

(a) The Department of Interior has administrative jurisdiction.

(b) The area covered by the proposed withdrawal has been used as a weapons range since 1956 and continued use of the range for this purpose is required.

(c) The Department of the Air Force made application for the withdrawal and reservation of the area to the Department of Interior on October 21, 1954. This application was supplemented by letter dated October 28, 1959, pursuant to Public Law 85-337, and on January 25, 1960, a Notice of the Proposed Withdrawal and Reservation was published in the Federal Register.

(d) Prior to the current Air Force use of this area as a bombing range, the land was used for grazing. The three grazing leases covering 7,546 acres were extinguished in 1955 at a cost of \$2,910.

In addition to the 7,546 acres covered in the proposed withdrawal, the range includes 38 acres, located in the southwest corner, which was acquired in fee in 1955 at a cost of \$950. Air Force interest in the 38-acre tract excludes mineral rights; however, these mineral rights were subordinated to exclude exploring, developing, or extracting minerals. The Air Force has the unrestricted use of the surface of the land.

3. Purpose for which area is proposed to be used: The land is required and is presently used as a weapons range on which low and high level bombing, strafing, and simulated weapons delivery tactics are accomplished. The project is not classified.

4. Location and description of area involved: This land is located in the northwestern part of San Bernardino County, Calif., approximately 43 miles north of George Air Force Base. The area is described as follows: Approximately 7,546 acres, more or less, within the Cuddeback Lake Air Force Range, San Bernardino County, Calif., and more fully described as follows: Sections, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 20, 29, 30, 31 (except the south half of lot 2 in the southwest quarter of section 31), and 32, township 30 south, range 43 east, Mount Diablo Meridian, San Bernardino County, Calif., a total of 7,546 acres, more or less.

There are no excepted private or public tracts within the exterior boundary of the area.

5. The period of use: The period during which the proposed withdrawal, reservation or restriction will continue in effect is 10 years with an option to renew for an additional 5 years.

6. Whether, and if so to what extent, the proposed use will affect operation of the public land laws and laws and regulations relating to:

(a) Mineral resources: Mineral rights have been temporarily suspended since 1955. There are no known minerals of commercial value in this area—66 mineral claims that were filed have been invalidated by the Bureau of Land Management (33 in January of 1961 and 33 in August of 1961). As of now there are no validated mining claims or other interests of record existing on the public domain area.

(b) Timber and other material resources: There is no timber on the land. The proposed use would not affect other material resources.

(c) Grazing resources: The grazing potential is limited and dependent upon seasonal rainfall. There were three leases in effect when a right of entry was granted by the Department of Interior pending withdrawal of the range from public domain. These leases covering the 7,546 acres afore described were extinguished in 1955.

(d) Fish and wildlife resources: The wildlife on and adjacent to the range consists of Gambel quail, Chukar partridge, doves, jackrabbits and other desert birds, animals, and reptiles. During open season considerable hunting activity is engaged in on areas adjacent to the range. Hunting on the range

is not permitted at the present time. However, joint use of the range is currently being negotiated with the California Fish and Game Department to permit the State to develop wildlife conservation measures and to possibly permit weekend and scheduled seasonal hunting on the range. As there is no water area within the range, fishing is not involved.

(e) Water resources: There is no water covering any part of the area and no spring is known to exist.

(f) Scenic, wilderness, recreation and other values: The scenic value is that of the open desert with sparse desert plants. Joint use of the area will be limited for safety reasons. It has little recreational or other value.

7. Whether the proposed use will result in contamination of any or all of the area covered by the application and, if so, whether such contamination will be permanent or temporary. As there will be no chemical, radioactive or fragmentation devices used, the lands will not be contaminated except for unexploded miniature spotting charges. The majority of the bombs to be dropped are practice weapons. These practice bombs will be equipped with a miniature spotting charge containing black powder to assist the range personnel and air crews in bomb scoring. The range will be decontaminated periodically. The using command has personnel assigned to do this decontamination on a scheduled basis.

8. Effect of withdrawal, reservation or restriction of State water rights: None, as indicated above, there is no water covering any part of the area and no spring is known to exist. Any water which may be used will be from drilled wells and used for potable purposes only. The laws of the State of California do not require an application for such use of water.

9. Whether the use of any nonpublic lands within the exterior boundaries of the area has been or will be acquired and, if so, the basis thereof. As there is no nonpublic land within the exterior boundaries of the range no such acquisition is required.

ASSISTANCE TO STATES IN CARRYING ON PROGRAM OF FORESTRY RESEARCH

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, heretofore, during this session, I introduced on behalf of myself, the senior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], and the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], a bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to encourage and assist the several States in carrying on a program of forestry research, and for other purposes.

A similar bill was introduced in the other body by Representative McINTIRE. That bill has already been considered by the House committee, and a clean bill rewritten and reported to the House. The revised bill has my support.

Mr. President, for myself, the senior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], and the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], I introduce a bill identical to the bill reported in the House of Representatives.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3609) to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to encourage and assist the several States in carrying on a program of forestry research, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. STENNIS (for himself and other Sen-

ators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

DESIGNATION OF COMMODORE JOHN BARRY DAY

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in the history of the U.S. Navy, few officers were more brilliant, more resourceful, more patriotic than John Barry.

Born in Ireland in 1745, he went to sea as a young boy, as was the custom in his day. At the age of 15 he came to Philadelphia, which he called home for the rest of a life devoted almost entirely to the American Navy.

At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, he immediately offered his services to his country. As commander of the brig *Lexington*, he captured the British tender *Edward* on April 17, 1776. In that same year he was, by resolution of Congress, placed seventh on the list of captains, and placed in command of the *Effingham*. With four small boats, he isolated a British schooner from a superior enemy naval force in the lower Delaware, at the same time capturing a number of transports and substantial supplies intended for the British Army, without the loss of a man.

In 1781, in command of the *Alliance*, he boarded and captured the British vessels *Atalanta* and *Trepassy*, and the next year carried the Marquis de Lafayette to France, continuing the capture of enemy vessels during the crossing.

In 1794, he was placed in command of the *United States*, the flagship of six frigates built to deal with Algerine pirates, and in 1798 was put in command of the American ships in the West Indies during the hostilities with France.

John Barry, born to poor Irish parents at a time when famine and strife beset that island, thus became an American naval hero second only to John Paul Jones.

It is fitting therefore that September 13, the birthday of Commodore Barry, be remembered by the American people as an important date in our long and illustrious history. I consequently introduce a joint resolution for appropriate reference, and I ask unanimous consent that this joint resolution be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 212) to designate September 13 of each year as Commodore John Barry Day, introduced by Mr. DODD, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized and requested to issue annually a Proclamation designating the 13th of September of each year as Commodore John Barry Day in commemoration of the life and service of Commodore John Barry, Father of the American Navy and calling on the people of the United States to observe such day with appropriate ceremonies and exercises.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ACT OF 1962—AMENDMENT

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I send to the desk, for consideration when the Senate again considers H.R. 12391, the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, an amendment to be proposed to that bill. The amendment was in the House version of the bill, and it provides that for 1964 the support price for feed grains shall be 80 percent of the market price for the previous 3 years.

All of us know that the program on a voluntary basis is not working and is very expensive.

In my opinion, Congress will not write into the law the original Senate bill. If that be true, I hope that when the Senate votes again on the farm bill, it will accept the provision which is in the House bill, but was eliminated—for reasons which I do not understand—from the bill which was reported by the Senate committee, when it adopted the voluntary provision.

Mr. President, we have spent over \$3 billion in an unwise effort to subsidize the producers of feed grains. Our farmers do not want the strict regimentation that would be involved in the Senate bill, and that is the reason why the House refused to accept it.

My information is that, even though we may send it back to them again, they will not accept it. So it is very important, if we are to control this matter beyond the present year, when the support price is 65 percent for corn—and that brings it to \$1.04, which makes it profitable to raise corn and sell it to the Government—we are going to have tremendous surpluses, at great expense to the taxpayers which we cannot justify.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point a further statement concerning the technical effect of the amendment which I send to the desk.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERTSON

This proposed amendment to H.R. 12391 if adopted by the Senate would restore to the bill an important provision which was included in the bill as passed by the House. The amendment deals with the price support level for corn for 1964 and subsequent crops. It does not affect the price support level for the 1963 special feed grain program provided for in this bill.

In the Agricultural Act of 1958 it was provided that, beginning with the 1959 crop, price support would be made available to producers for each crop of corn at 90 percent of the average price received by farmers during the 3 preceding calendar years, but with a proviso to the effect that the support price level would be not less than 65 percent of the parity price for corn. The operation of that provision of law has been interrupted by the special 1962 feed grain program and, if the pending bill becomes law, will be interrupted for the 1963 crop of corn.

My amendment would, as proposed in the House-passed bill, strike out the 90-percent figure and insert 80 percent and strike out of the law the 65-percent floor. The Department of Agriculture indicates that it is esti-

mated that this would result in the 1964 crop of corn being supported at approximately 52 percent of the parity price therefor or at about 84 cents per bushel.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. COOPER:

Two statements by himself concerning tax reduction and the need for reduction of Federal expenditures.

NOMINATION OF THURGOOD MARSHALL TO U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to express my great disappointment and deep concern at the delay in confirmation of the nomination of the Honorable Thurgood Marshall to be a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals—Second Circuit. The failure of the Committee on the Judiciary to act on this appointment is, frankly, unpardonable.

Judge Marshall was nominated on September 23, 1961, and since last October has been serving under a recess appointment. He was renominated on January 15, 1962; but so far the Senate has neither given nor refused to give its advice and consent. There can be no justification for this procrastination on a matter of such importance.

The State of Connecticut falls within the jurisdiction of the court on which Judge Marshall is serving. I am sure I speak for the overwhelming majority of my constituents when I declare my complete confidence in the merit of this appointment and in Judge Marshall's ability to meet, with outstanding legal skill and great human wisdom, the challenge of the position.

I must deplore the dilatory manner in which this nomination has been handled. Such behavior in the Senate does not detract from the stature of the nominee. It only reflects upon the Senate itself, and especially upon the Senators responsible for the unnecessary delay in coming to a decision.

It is my understanding that, although previously scheduled hearings have been canceled, the subcommittee will meet on August 8 to consider the Marshall nomination. Under no circumstances should there be any additional postponements.

We should have immediate action on Judge Marshall's nomination. Should there be valid reasons for disapproving the appointment, let them be made known. Otherwise, let us put an end to this disreputable treatment of a distinguished American.

If a decision is not promptly reached in the Judiciary Committee, I shall be compelled to make every effort to obtain the discharge of the committee from the further consideration of the nomination and immediate consideration of the nomination by the full Senate. I sincerely hope such drastic steps will not prove necessary.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. Yes, I am happy to yield to my distinguished and beloved friend.

Mr. KEFAUVER. As a member of the full Judiciary Committee, but not a member of the subcommittee in charge of this nomination, I have not followed the subcommittee's hearings. But I believe that, in fairness, the hearings should be completed expeditiously and the nomination should come before the full Judiciary Committee, and it should have an opportunity to act on it, and then the Senate as a whole should have an opportunity to act on the nomination of Thurgood Marshall.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am very happy that the great Senator from Tennessee has made that statement. It is characteristic of him; and of course he knows, from what I have said, that I agree completely with him.

OPPORTUNITY FOR YOUTH

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I earnestly believe that in the closing weeks of this session the Senate should certainly legislate in order to give additional opportunities to our underprivileged youth.

Our Nation is immensely rich in the raw materials which have enabled us to become the foremost Nation of the world. Over the years, legislation has repeatedly been enacted to protect and conserve these vital natural resources—our land, our farms, our rivers and lakes, and our forests.

From these we have derived the means by which we have achieved the highest standard of living in the world. However, the true wealth of our country is in our most basic human resource—the boys and girls who tomorrow will follow us as the trustees of our natural wealth.

It is our duty not only to preserve these resources for them, but also to protect and aid our youth so that they can wisely preserve this inheritance and pass it on to future generations in an even better state than that in which they received it.

One way in which this can be done is by a program which will give firsthand knowledge and love for our forests, streams, and wildlife to young people who might otherwise never know them.

On the calendar of business at the present time is a bill to authorize the establishment of a Youth Conservation Corps for young men from 16 to 21 years of age. Its purpose is to provide healthful outdoor training and employment for young men and to advance the conservation and development of our natural resources and recreational areas. By 1965, the enrollment would be 150,000 youths annually.

Mr. President, the author of this bill, the distinguished assistant majority leader [Mr. HUMPHREY], is to be commended for his tireless efforts to make the Youth Conservation Corps a reality. During the previous administration, the Senate passed similar legislation, but it failed to pass the House of Representatives. Today, this concept has the support of President Kennedy and the administration; and I hope that the bill, S. 404, reported by the Labor and Public

Welfare Committee, will be enacted before this Congress adjourns.

We accommodate our surplus in agriculture. We subsidize certain vital industries. Certainly, we should legislate to conserve our youth.

Boys who drop out of school and cannot find jobs find it all too easy to end up in trouble—not only for themselves, but also for society. Every day the newspapers report an appalling waste of young lives. The crowded dockets of juvenile courts further demonstrate this waste.

It is estimated that by 1965 there will be almost half a million unemployed young men between the ages of 16 and 20. The jobless rate for this age group is more than twice the national average. Recently, an official of the Ohio State Employment Service in Cleveland reported that 8,000 inquiries he made for jobs for high school graduates resulted in the discovery of only 175 openings. The number of persons under 21 years of age is growing, while jobs are scarcer. The high school graduate or dropout is in competition with the older, more experienced worker who also is seeking a job.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the 3-minute limitation, the time available to the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Without objection, the Senator from Ohio may proceed for an additional 3 minutes.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, these statistics add up to trouble—a shocking waste of our youth and a scandalous waste of taxpayers' money in efforts to correct the ill effects to society which result from this situation. At the same time, our natural resources are sorely in need of attention. Eroded land, fire-ravaged forests, muddied and polluted streams, and neglected recreational facilities mock the tourist brochures. The amount of work to be done in restoring our natural resources staggers the imagination. It must be done sooner or later. The longer it is put off, the more expensive it will become.

For example, only one-third of the Nation's farmlands are protected by soil-conservation measures; 50 million acres of forest land need replanting, and another 275 million need improvement; two-thirds of our western grazing lands suffer from erosion.

We must not tolerate this tragic waste of both human and natural resources. The Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930's gives us the blueprint for what is needed today. As Congressman at large for Ohio, I supported that great national experiment. It was one of the most successful projects of the New Deal era, acclaimed by both political parties. Brains and raw muscle, willing and enthusiastic, became available, almost overnight, for the work of forest fire prevention, erosion control, new outdoor recreational facilities, and earth dam reservoirs. Hundreds of thousands of youths were physically and mentally rehabilitated by reason of the outdoor activities of the CCC. Today, many of them are scattered throughout the leadership of American industry, govern-

ment, and education—testimony to the social values of this great experiment.

A giant step toward the prevention of delinquency and the improvement of physical fitness, as well as the physical improvement of the Nation, will be accomplished if the bill providing for a Youth Conservation Corps is passed by us.

This proposed Youth Conservation Corps will be smaller and more flexible than the CCC. It is designed to meet the needs of today. For thousands of boys in city slums, this will be the only chance for living and working in the open, their only chance to enrich the land and strengthen their lives. It will provide a new sense of purpose for young men growing up in a society in which the opportunity for creative accomplishment is becoming rarer each year. Most of all, it will constructively channel the restless energies which today are leading thousands of underprivileged boys in the direction of delinquency, violence, and self-destruction.

Mr. President, this meritorious proposal will bring untold dividends to our Nation. Many will be tangible, in the form of protected and preserved natural resources. The greatest dividend will be the conservation and enrichment of our youth.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. YOUNG of Ohio in the chair). Is there further business in the morning hour?

MARKETING OF DRUGS

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, the President in his press conference the other day pointed out the urgency of legislation to prevent near disasters such as occurred with reference to the drug, thalidomide. The distinguished Senator from Minnesota, chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, has just held informative hearings pointing up the urgency of doing something about such problems, so that unsafe drugs will not get on the market, so that the Food and Drug Administration will have better controls over testing, and so that tests will be made on animals larger than mice and more resembling man before a drug is distributed to physicians for testing.

As we all know, there is pending on the calendar Senate bill 1552, which was reported by the full Committee on the Judiciary. Some provisions were weakened and some were eliminated from the bill, as reported by the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Nonetheless, both the Judiciary Committee bill and the Harris bill contain some improvements over the present law. However, in order to come up to the criteria set out in the President's letter to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], of April 10, 1962, supporting the bill of the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, and the criteria set out in the President's press conference, the bill will need amendments.

About most of those amendments there should be little controversy. They are described in the individual views of Senators CARROLL, DODD, HART, LONG of

Missouri, and myself on S. 1552, which as I said, is on the calendar.

I know that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is particularly interested in an amendment making clear and precise the protection of the public against drugs which caused a near disaster, like thalidomide. We are all interested in that objective.

I want to commend the President, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], and others who are interested in getting corrective legislation for the protection of the health of the people of the Nation to correct serious abuses in the prescription drug field passed as soon as possible.

The experience with thalidomide only points up the problem in a very dramatic way. Other drugs have not been sufficiently tested. Many drugs have been put on the market and then withdrawn when it was found they were causing serious, sometimes fatal, side effects.

The individual views contained in the report on Senate bill 1552, beginning at page 43, contain a list of some of those drugs. I think the public would be interested in knowing about some of them. Unlike thalidomide, which by a series of fortuitous events, was kept off the market, these products did reach the market and then, after the American people had served as guinea pigs, had to be withdrawn.

For example, Mer-29, put out by William S. Merrell, caused cataracts, and was taken off the market.

Catron, put out by Lakeside as a potent tranquilizer, caused Parkinsonianism.

Marsilid, put out by Hoffmann-La Roche as a psychic energizer, caused jaundice.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 more minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Chloromycetin, which is a trade name for the drug chloramphenicol, put out by Parke, Davis is the drug of choice for a few diseases, such as Rocky Mountain spotted fever, but it causes aplastic anemia resulting in death in a significant number of cases. The required warning, which was not followed by the company, has been recently strengthened following hearings by the Antitrust Subcommittee.

All of these abuses would be corrected by S. 1552, if strengthened by the amendments which are discussed in the individual views, and an amendment dealing directly with animal testing. This latter amendment the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] will discuss later, and he has shown fine leadership on it. If so strengthened, the bill would meet most of the objectives called for by the President in his letter of April 10.

I know we have been tied up in the Senate for some time, and the policy committee has not met on the bill, but I hope and feel that the measure will be given consideration for early action by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The amendments proposed by the majority members of the Antitrust Subcommittee are the results of a 2½-year investigation of the vital prescription drug industry.

The tragedy involving thalidomide, horrible though it is, has served the useful purpose of dramatizing some of the abuses in the drug industry and has underscored the urgent need for laws to insure that drugs like thalidomide never get to the American public.

I am glad that the President has pointed up the urgency of this matter. I wholeheartedly agree with him that the Congress should act at once.

The Harris bill, like the Senate Judiciary bill, would require several amendments in order to deal effectively with the thalidomide situation and other serious problems revealed by the drug investigation. We have these amendments prepared for introduction in the Senate when S. 1552 is called up.

In view of the President's plea for speedy congressional action, let me again point out that S. 1552 is pending on the Senate Calendar, and let me urge the Senate leadership to bring up this bill immediately.

If we do nothing—or if we do not write effective legislation—everyone in this country, expectant mothers included, will be courting tragedy with every trip to the medicine chest.

NASSAU COUNTY AMERICAN LEGION RESOLUTION ON SUPREME COURT PRAYER DECISION

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I present, for appropriate reference, a resolution adopted by the Nassau County Committee of the Nassau County American Legion, Department of New York, with regard to the Supreme Court's school prayer decision.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the resolution be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NASSAU COUNTY AMERICAN LEGION RESOLUTION, JULY 27, 1962

The Nassau County Committee of the Nassau County American Legion, Department of New York, hereby approves and adopts the following resolution:

"Whereas the American Legion is dedicated to God and country and by its preamble is committed to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States, to maintain law and order and to promote peace and good will; and

"Whereas the American Legion proudly numbers among its members veterans of every religious faith; and

"Whereas Nassau County American Legion believes that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the so-called 'Regent's Prayer Case' has been widely misunderstood and misinterpreted; and

"Whereas said decision has created a state of alarm, anxiety and uncertainty among our citizens which militates against the unity and tranquility of our Nation at a most perilous time in its history; and

"Whereas it is incumbent upon all citizens and upon every branch of government, in a spirit of good will and with all possible

speed, to resolve the issues created by said decision: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the decision of the Supreme Court is the 'law of the land' and must be complied with; that all citizens study not only this decision but the Constitution it interprets; and be it further

"Resolved, That it is the position of the Nassau County American Legion that the law of the 'Regent's Prayer Case' is merely that a State violates the 1st amendment when it (1) writes a prayer (2) sponsors, promulgates and puts the stamp of authority upon that prayer throughout the public school system and (3) authorizes a teacher officially to lead the pupils in the recitation of that prayer and, be it further resolved that it is the position of the Nassau County American Legion that the Supreme Court did no more than to declare that a State may not constitutionally establish the above procedure; and be it further

"Resolved, That it is the position of the Nassau County American Legion, therefore, that neither the Constitution of the United States nor the decision of the Supreme Court in the 'Regent's Prayer Case' prohibits our public school children, on their own initiative and voluntarily, praying together a prayer acknowledging our faith in and dependence upon almighty God of their own or their parent's choosing albeit while in school and under the mere technical control and supervision of a teacher; and be it further

"Resolved, That it is the position of the Nassau County American Legion that the foregoing alternative method complies with the first part of the amendment which says 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,' and, at the same time, gives full effect to and protects the rights of our children under the second part of the amendment which says 'nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof'; and be it further

"Resolved, That this resolution be widely promulgated for the information and guidance of all citizens and divisions of our Federal and State Governments concerned herewith to the end that the right of our children freely to exercise religion while in school under the foregoing method might be implemented without delay in the public schools of the State of New York."

ROTC PROGRAMS

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the requirements of national defense necessitate the maintenance of adequate ROTC facilities at our colleges and universities. Faced with ever-increasing student enrollment, many of our institutions, both public and private, are finding it more and more difficult adequately to meet this need.

Because the ROTC is in effect a part of our overall defense program, and because of the pressures of enrollment in our colleges, the executive committee of the Association of NROTC colleges has recently adopted a resolution calling for the endorsement by Congress of Federal financial support for the establishment of an expansion program and the development of physical facilities for ROTC instruction at both private and State universities and colleges.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have included in the RECORD at this point the resolution adopted by the executive committee of the Association of NROTC colleges, forwarded to me with the endorsement of the University of Rochester.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the requirements of national defense necessitate the maintenance of adequate ROTC facilities in training at universities throughout the United States; and

Whereas the increasing pressure of student enrollment taxes the resources of private and public institutions to meet the demands made upon them to provide adequate facilities for officer training: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives from States in which ROTC facilities exist be requested to actively advocate and support legislation directed toward complete Federal financial support of the establishment expansion program and development of physical facilities for ROTC instruction at private and State universities and colleges in order that the essential training of military officers may be adequately and efficiently advanced; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives concerned and to the Chairman of the ROTC Advisory Committees of the Department of Army and Air Force; and

Whereas it appears that legislation providing for ROTC facilities has been shelved: be it further

Resolved, That the Department of the Navy be requested to push for action on the part of the Department of Defense in behalf of such appropriations.

THE SOVIET OIL OFFENSIVE

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, as we all know, the United States is now engaged in a cold war economic rivalry with the Soviet Union. This rivalry involves many factors, and includes both maintaining and increasing the economic strength of the Western bloc of nations, and promoting the economic development of the emerging nations. One part of this struggle involves competition in such crucial items as oil. No one needs to be reminded of the great economic and strategic importance of oil and oil products. It is vital that the free world should sustain its dominant position in this market, and that it use these oil products and the revenues therefrom to develop the economies of the countries in which the oil is found.

Recently there has been increased competition in this field from Soviet oil interests. They are slowly wedging their way into markets ordinarily controlled by Western oil companies, and are receiving contracts for oil prospecting and refining in countries where similar Western concerns are already well established. This competition is politically motivated on the part of the Soviet Union, which sets prices without regard to costs in order to undermine private enterprise.

Mr. President, testimony just yesterday before the Finance Committee on the trade expansion bill pointed up the dangers of the Russian oil offensive. There is a real need for Government cognizance of the threat and for official action.

For that reason, it is a matter of gravest concern to me that a vital report, prepared by the National Petroleum Council and the Interior Department, has been completely blocked by a

conflict of interest dispute that has developed between the Justice Department and the Interior Department. Although officials of the Interior Department have publicly denied any holdup, it is common knowledge on the part of all concerned that, unless the Justice Department will revise its present unrealistic attitude toward advisory bodies, this study will be held up for months and appropriate Government policymaking or action will be delayed accordingly.

Mr. President, it is amazing to me that the Government is still choking over its own bureaucratic procedures and has not been able to enunciate a firm statement either of fact or of policy, in spite of the numerous indications of awakening public anxiety.

An excellent study of the problem recently appeared in an article in the Reporter magazine by Dr. Leon Herman of the Library of Congress. As Dr. Herman demonstrates, the Soviets are not in the oil business for economic motives but in a deliberate attempt "to get some of the leaders of the developing nations committed to an active struggle against the West."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include Dr. Herman's articles following my remarks in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SOVIET OIL OFFENSIVE

(By Leon M. Herman)

The determined Soviet drive to crash the exclusive international petroleum club, now underway in many parts of the world, has all the characteristics of an enterprise designed to achieve far-reaching foreign policy objectives. Over the past few years this campaign has become more ambitious as it has proceeded to gather momentum. Whether we like it or not, there is more here than meets the eye.

To begin with, the amount of oil actually exported by the Soviet Union to date has been relatively small, no more than about 3 percent of total world exports. Yet the effect of these modest shipments has been anything but peripheral. They have left their mark most tellingly on the prevailing price level and, as a consequence, on the annual earnings of the big oil companies. Furthermore, the world oil market into which the Soviets entered in force in the late 1950's was manifestly "soft," depressed by excessive supplies. Still, the Soviet oil trust seems to have had considerable success in expanding its marketing operations. The volume of its exports of crude oil outside the Soviet bloc increased more than sixfold between 1955 and 1960, from 3 to 19 million metric tons.

From their recent encounters in the world market, the Western oil-exporting firms have learned the bitter lesson that the Soviet oil trust is no ordinary competitor. As part of a large state trading monopoly, it is a commercial organization with a difference. It seems to be able to increase its sales, for example, in a "soft" market, one in which supply is outrunning demand. Moreover, it can sell without necessarily making a profit. Under the terms of its charter, the oil trust has to show a profit on its activities as a whole, but not necessarily in all markets and not on all transactions. There are times and markets in which the state agency can engage in deficit operations for as long as it may consider necessary. Whatever may be the state of its balance sheet in the mean-

time, there are no stockholders to demand an accounting.

As a practical matter, too, the marketing position of the Soviet oil trust is highly favorable. In its own backyard, it has a secure market extending over the entire territory of the Soviet bloc. In this market the Soviet export agency sells roughly half of its oil surplus. Owing to the nature of this market, furthermore, the Soviet Union enjoys all the old-fashioned advantages of a monopoly producer and seller.

(The Soviet Union accounts for 90 percent of all the oil produced in the bloc.) In the first place, this vast marketing area is, by definition, its own proper Socialist preserve, off limits for the Western oil firms. Secondly, in the absence of competition, the Soviet oil trust is able to raise its prices in the captive market as a kind of insurance against the hazard of financial loss in the competitive parts of the market.

According to the findings of a recent U.S. oil mission to Russia, the Soviet Union sells its crude oil to the satellite countries at \$2.82 per barrel and distillery products at \$5.40 per barrel. Customers outside the bloc get a discount. They pay \$1.75 and \$2.44 per barrel, respectively, for these two categories of petroleum bought from the Soviet Union.

By virtue of these attractive marketing devices, the Soviet oil trust has been able to expand its sales outside the bloc in short order. Soviet oil has already achieved a commanding position in a number of markets, most of them small, such as Iceland, Finland, Afghanistan, Egypt, Greece, and Cuba. On the basis of these successes, the Soviet oil-export trust has raised its sights toward bigger and better markets. Some notable results have already been achieved in three major oil-consuming countries, namely Japan, Italy, and West Germany. In 1960, these three countries accounted for 35 percent of total Soviet crude-oil exports. In the same year, Italy emerged as Russia's largest customer, taking nearly 4 million tons of crude oil.

MOSCOW'S LOSS LEADER

The tactic of price cutting has paid off in volume sales. Invariably, where the price was cut most deeply the flow of exports followed suit. In Italy, for example, the Soviet Union has sold its crude oil at the price of \$1 a barrel, f.o.b. a Black Sea port. According to testimony recently presented by a spokesman of the U.S. oil industry to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, this is equivalent to 75 cents a barrel for Middle East oil shipped from a Persian Gulf port. Such a price would not even cover the taxes and royalties the oil companies have to pay to the governments of the countries where the oil is extracted on concession terms.

As a result of this concentrated drive, Soviet oil is now supplying 9 percent of Western European demand, and western companies fear the increasing flow will reach 11 percent by 1965. The Soviet official in charge of petroleum exports has intensified their concern by setting his target for Europe still higher. According to E. Gurov, manager of Soluznefteksport, the oil export trust, his agency intends to "recapture its former position" in the European oil market, which he placed at 19 percent of all sales.

In one market after another, western firms find themselves hard pressed by the piratical pricing tactics and other aggressive commercial devices in the arsenal of the Soviet monopoly trading system. But there is plenty of evidence that selling oil is not seen as an end in itself by the Russian manipulators. To be sure, the oil export trust, like any other trading agency of the Soviet Government, is always on the lookout for large and dependable sources of foreign exchange.

As viewed from the Kremlin, however, petroleum is not just another commodity. It is a unique natural resource capable of stirring strong national emotions. And the big western oil companies are not just commercial firms, but the symbol of western wealth and power. As such, they are representative at once of the economic strength and the political vulnerability of the western position in the less developed regions of the world.

Because their activities in the oil-rich but economically poor countries help to bring a taste of the fruits of modern productivity into these countries, the Soviet Government feels its own revolutionary aims threatened. Furthermore, because the western oil companies are symbolic of the contrast between the poor and the rich countries, the Soviet leaders are strongly tempted to do what they can to incite resentment against them. By doing so, they hope eventually to erode the economic position of the companies at the production end, and they assume that the forces of economic nationalism are working in their favor. An article in the Soviet journal, *International Affairs* (July 1960), expresses Russia's great expectations, particularly in the Middle East:

"It should be borne in mind that oil concessions represent the foundation of the entire edifice of western political influence in the [less developed] world, of all military bases and aggressive blocs. If this foundation cracks, the entire edifice may begin to totter and then come tumbling down."

Incitement alone is not enough. For years, until quite recently, Soviet spokesmen have been using all possible occasions to urge the less developed oil-rich countries to nationalize their oil industries and to drive out the foreign interests and technicians. What finally induced them to go beyond mere incitement was the fact that the verbal appeals had failed to alter the practical situation.

Within the past 2 to 3 years, the Soviet leadership has shifted to a policy of encouraging economic nationalism in the sphere of petroleum. To that end, it has made available its own considerable capability in the petroleum industry, ranging from geological surveys to the construction of pipelines and tankers. When Soviet agents promise to train native personnel in the skills of the oil industry, the offer is both plausible and enormously appealing. The political dividends are expected to be fabulously high.

SOIUNEFTEKSPORT GOES NATIVE

The appeal, however, seems to find a strong response in many quarters regardless of the stage of economic maturity or political sophistication of the developing country involved. This may be seen from the record to date. The countries that have accepted Soviet offers of economic assistance in petroleum range all the way from semi-nomadic Afghanistan on Russia's southern border to Argentina in our own hemisphere. In all instances, the offer is specifically tailored to fit the local situation, based on close knowledge of the circumstances in each country surrounding the magic goal of "building a national oil industry." In this kind of local garb, the offer becomes well-nigh irresistible.

In Afghanistan, for example, the emphasis is on prospecting. Under a contract with the Soviet Union, the local authorities have received a team of Soviet geologists who are prospecting for oil in the northern regions of the country. By the terms of this contract, Russia has pledged itself to help develop a modern oil industry. In two other oil-deficient countries, Ethiopia and Pakistan, the Soviet Union has contracted to carry out a program of prospecting. These programs are to be carried out by Soviet geologists, equipment, and financial credits.

In a country like Egypt the program is distinctly more ambitious. There the stress is on building a domestic oil-processing industry consisting of five refineries and some related installations. Again, the Soviet Union provides the technicians, the equipment, and the credit. When these projects are completed, according to the official Soviet press, "Egypt will be wholly independent of foreign interests as far as its requirements for oil products are concerned."

In India, by all odds a prime target, the Soviet Union has committed itself not only to prospecting for oil and gas but to refinery construction as well. For many months now, Soviet geologists have been prospecting over an area of more than 50,000 square miles. Some deposits of oil and natural gas in commercial quantities have already been found. The two refineries now under construction, one at Nunmati and another at Barauni, will be capable of producing nearly 3 million tons of finished products a year. The first of these two new refineries began operation on January 1. Since then, a contract for a third refinery, to be covered by a Soviet credit valued at \$21 million, was reported signed on February 12.

In the Western Hemisphere, three countries are involved in one kind of arrangements or another. The State Oil Company of Argentina has accepted a Soviet credit of \$100 million to cover the cost of oilfield equipment to be supplied by the Soviet Union. More recently, one of the Soviet agencies for technical assistance, Tiazhpromeksport, signed an agreement to design and build a gas-and-shale plant for the Brazilian firm CIRB. In this industry, the Soviet Union claims to have technical experience as a result of developing its own shale production near Tallinn, Estonia. And according to a news dispatch from Santiago, Chile, dated February 22, 1962, the Finance Minister of that country reports that Russia has agreed to study the possibility of building an oil refinery in Chile.

Even in a country like Iraq, which is anything but a have-not nation in petroleum, the Soviet Union has recently succeeded in getting a foot in the door. On April 4, 1960, it signed a contract to conduct seismic research for oil deposits over an area of 400 square miles. The soundings are to be taken in a region adjacent to the fields now covered by a Western oil concession. To Soviet officialdom, this arrangement is a major breakthrough, installing their own operation alongside the established oil interests they are so anxious to discredit and ultimately to displace.

But there is another side to this apparent success. The economic interest of the Soviet Union has recently come into direct conflict with that of the oil-exporting countries of the less developed regions. In Europe in particular, the increased flow of Soviet petroleum has taken place at the expense of oil from the Middle East. The serious concern of the Arab countries on this score is unmistakable. They are not convinced by Soviet assurances that the market is big enough to absorb all present and future supplies. This is one of the stubborn facts of commercial life that cannot be swept under the rug of "friendship and the common cause of anti-imperialism." It is reasonable to assume that overt signs of a clash of interests in oil marketing will constrain Moscow to counteract this evidence with a show of financial and technical support under the slogan of "helping the former colonial peoples to build a national oil industry."

It is extremely important that we consider this particular form of economic collaboration between the Soviet Union and the emerging nations with all the seriousness it deserves. What has motivated the less developed nations to accept collaboration? What is the nature of the discontent that has impelled them to seek assistance from

a new and untried source at a time when most of them have longstanding agreements, in production or distribution, with the experienced oil companies of the West?

With respect to oil production, more than any other economic activity, the answers should not be hard to find. Both the countries that are now exploiting oil deposits and others that merely hope to strike oil are understandably concerned that this resource should be so employed as to provide not only current income but economic progress as well. To them, a good commercial arrangement no longer seems to be enough. They want to see some visual proof that this essential resource is also helping to advance their own technical competence, their economic self-reliance. The fact that they are responding to Soviet blandishments in this sphere is a warning. At the very least, it should help to sharpen our awareness that there is a strong feeling among these sensitive nations that their economic partners from the West, whose skill and enterprise have helped to raise their current material wealth, have not displayed enough imagination or devoted enough effort to the all-important job of supporting their aspirations for economic self-reliance.

It is easy to demonstrate with facts and figures that the Soviet Union is long on the means of incitement and short on the kind of resources that are needed to displace the West in the economic life of the less developed countries. This is as true in the case of petroleum as it is in any other phase of the economic rivalry against the West.

However, it is important to remember that this onslaught against the West does not depend for its success on the ability of the Soviet Union and its allies to match the economic wherewithal of the older nations. The strategists in charge of this operation on behalf of Moscow are basing their plans on a calculus which assumes that the economic nationalism of the emerging countries is working on their side. Accordingly, they are deploying their resources in such a way as to condition the political climate in the less developed nations, by injecting along with their practical support strong doses of resentment, envy, and hatred against the Western monopolists and anyone associated with them. For their purposes, all that has to be accomplished is to get some of the leaders of the developing nations committed to an active struggle against the West. Once this is accomplished, all normal economic considerations are expected to fly out of the window.

FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL PARKS

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I am pleased to report to the Senate that the First World Conference on National Parks, held in Seattle, Wash., June 30-July 7, was attended by 167 official delegates from 71 countries. Africa was represented by some 20 countries, Latin America by 15. Asia and Europe were well represented, and there was strong representation from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition to the foreign representation, more than 200 invited delegates and observers were present from practically every State. Members of Congress, natural resources administrators, and conservationists and other park supporters were among those in attendance from the United States.

This historic meeting was an outstanding success, and the Congress has every reason to be proud of its action earlier this year, which authorized the Department of the Interior to become a partici-

pant in the World Conference on National Parks. As a result of our action, the conference was sponsored by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources with cosponsorship of UNESCO and FAO in association with the National Park Service and the Natural Resources Council of America.

More than half of the Conference program was open to floor discussion in order to give all those in attendance an opportunity to comment on park matters, seek advice, and to provide information on the many topics that were under consideration. Simultaneous interpretation in French, Spanish, and English was provided for all presentations and remarks. The conferees also had a special tour of the Mount Rainier National Park prior to the meeting. Many also visited the Olympic and Yellowstone National Parks after its close.

U.S. delegates report that while it is clear that this country leads the world with the first national park, Yellowstone, in 1872, and it is the acknowledged leader in national park planning and management, several countries have truly outstanding park programs.

The Conference adopted 28 recommendations. Many of them will be helpful guides to the officials of the newer countries around the world as well as to our more progressive park executives in this country.

I ask unanimous consent that the following recommendations be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the recommendations of the First World Conference on National Parks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL PARKS, SEATTLE, WASH., JUNE 30-JULY 7, 1962

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

Whereas the preservation of natural areas for parks and reserves is inseparable from the conservation of wildlife and its habitat, the First World Conference on National Parks supports the World Wildlife Charter; endorses the efforts being undertaken in various countries of the world to implement the purpose and objectives of the charter; and welcomes the establishment of the world wildlife fund.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

Whereas this Conference has learned with satisfaction of plans for an international biological program, and of the recognition thus given by international science to problems created by man's impact upon natural communities of living organisms, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that IUCN work closely with the IBP to bring into existence a series of natural reserves providing permanent examples of the many diverse types of habitats, both natural and seminatural, so as to preserve them permanently for world science.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

Whereas there is an urgent need to constitute on a world scale a systematic collection of type habitats, as varied and representative as possible, which could be permanently protected and so serve as standards for the future, and believes that the appropriate status for these type habitats where possible should be that of strict nature reserves, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that: (1) A working group be

set up within IUCN to study this project with a view to establishing for each main bioclimatic region a preliminary list of the most representative habitats, which should be included in an official world list; and

(2) This project be brought to the attention of the scientific authorities responsible for the establishment of the international biological program, and in particular to the International Union of Biological Sciences and UNESCO, so that examples of such habitats may be selected and legally established at an early date.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

Whereas the draft recommendation concerning the safeguarding of the beauty and character of landscapes and sites which the Director General of UNESCO intends to submit to its forthcoming General Conference; and

Whereas as stated in this recommendation, the beauty and character of landscapes and sites are necessary to the life of man, provides a powerful physical, moral, and regenerative spiritual influence, and contribute to the artistic and cultural life of peoples, the First World Conference on National Parks (a) notes with great satisfaction the UNESCO draft recommendation, (b) underlines the importance of national parks and equivalent reserves for this purpose, and (c) recommends that participants in the First World Conference on National Parks urge their respective countries to support the adoption and implementation of the UNESCO recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

Whereas proper interpretation of the features and values of national parks and equivalent reserves is an integral and important part of adequate park programs and can contribute materially to a nation's total educational effort, the First World Conference on National Parks draws the attention of participating governments to the importance of developing national park interpretive or presentation services as integral parts of conservation education programs, with attention to persons of all ages, and recommends that the Education Commission of IUCN stress the importance of international regional education committees as a means of providing both counsel and materials needed in developing conservation education programs in all countries.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

Whereas National Parks and equivalent reserves afford exceptional opportunities for research in undisturbed biotopes, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that such research be carefully planned and coordinated on an interdisciplinary basis and be correlated between institutions and agencies on a national, and where necessary, on an international scale.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7

Whereas few of the world's parks are large enough to be in fact self-regulatory ecological units but are more likely to be ecological islands subject to direct or indirect modification by activities and conditions in the surrounding areas; and

Whereas management based on scientific research is not only desirable but often essential to maintain some biotic communities or to achieve a desired successional stage in these communities in accordance with the conservation plan of a national park or equivalent area, the First World Conference on National Parks believes that the need for management, the feasibility of management methods, and the evaluation of results must be based upon current and continuing scientific research; that both research and management should be undertaken only by qualified personnel; and that research, management planning and execution must take

into account, and if necessary regulate, the human uses for which the park is intended.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8

Whereas there are inherent in national parks and equivalent reserves ethical and esthetic values which must always remain separate from political expediencies; and

Whereas continuity of purpose is necessary to protect such values, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that, wherever appropriate, the executive administration and control of national parks and equivalent reserves be vested in a statutory organization charged with the duty of permanent trusteeship.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9

Whereas it is recognized that in densely populated countries national parks of considerable size do not exist and cannot be set aside because of the existing shortage of land, the First World Conference on National Parks acknowledges the efforts being made in such countries by creating nature reserves, landscape reserves, natural areas, and other substitute areas, and commends such efforts in view of their valuable potentialities in areas where the creation of extensive national parks is not practicable.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10

Whereas many sanctuaries and reserves throughout the world are owned outright by non-Government institutions and by private individuals but are nevertheless dedicated in perpetuity to the conservation of wildlife and of natural resources, and whereas it is desirable to increase the number and diversity of such areas, and to contribute to their long range stability and management, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that such areas, provided they are secured to their basic purposes by irrevocable deeds of trust and are controlled and administered by representative boards of trustees, shall be considered to be as important as statutory National Government-owned parks and equivalent reserves; and it further recommends that such individuals and institutions who have already taken such action are to be commended for their activities and that others are urged to do likewise.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 11

Whereas national parks are important nature reserves, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that structures such as dams and reservoirs for hydroelectric and other purposes which would be in any way prejudicial to the purposes of a park should not be allowed in a national park, and that buildings and other tourist facilities should, wherever possible, be made available outside of the parks, in order to preserve those values for which the parks were established.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

Whereas the present and future preservation, development, and appropriate use of national parks, equivalent areas, and park systems are all vital to the economic and cultural progress of the countries of the world and to the welfare and enjoyment of people everywhere; and

Whereas the planning of new and existing parks and the proper management and preservation of areas which together make up a comprehensive system of parks and nature reserves are essential to this objective, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that IUCN study the need to establish a Committee on Park Planning (this planning to include nature reserves, scientific areas, prehistoric, historic, and cultural sites, wildlife sanctuaries, outdoor recreation areas, and other natural areas) for the purpose of assisting countries to develop programs with emphasis upon:

1. An advisory service available to all countries to aid in the planning of parks and park systems, and

2. A research program for collecting park planning data, for conducting studies on the development and use of parks and park systems, and for other activities relating to the purposes, policies, and practices of park planning.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 13

Whereas present economic development involving renewable natural resources is proceeding at a very fast rate, particularly in young emerging nations using bilateral or international aid funds or on national budgets; and

Whereas too much emphasis is now laid on immediate financial returns frequently with little or no consideration for real long-term economic values such as water and soil conservation and recreational, cultural, and scientific values, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends to governments of developing and advanced countries and to international organizations that they (a) include in their national or aid development programs specific conservation measures such as the creation and development of national parks and equivalent reserves, (b) include conservation specialists in all technical teams planning, appraising, or executing national or aid development projects and (c) seek advice of international bodies specialized in conservation such as IUCN.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

Whereas the human population of the world is increasing at a rapid rate and renewable natural resources are being depleted, often by irrational exploitation, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that all governments, particularly recipients and donors in bilateral technical aid programs, and all international organizations and agencies rendering or executing technical aid, give fuller regard than has hitherto been given to conservation principles and practices in their programs, especially the protection of forests and other habitats, with their native animals.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 15

Whereas it is recognized that the oceans and their teeming life are subject to the same dangers of human interference and destruction as the land, that the sea and land are ecologically interdependent and indivisible, that population pressures will cause man to turn increasingly to the sea, and especially to the underwater scene, for recreation and spiritual refreshment, and that the preservation of unspoiled marine habitat is urgently needed for ethical and esthetic reasons, for the protection of rare species, for the replenishment of stocks of valuable food species, and for the provision of undisturbed areas for scientific research, the First World Conference on National Parks invites the governments of all those countries having marine frontiers, and other appropriate agencies, to examine as a matter of urgency the possibility of creating marine parks or reserves to defend underwater areas of special significance from all forms of human interference, and further recommends the extension of existing national parks and equivalent reserves with shorelines, into the water to the 10-fathom depth or the territorial limit or some other appropriate off-shore boundary.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 16

Whereas concern has been expressed for the future of the life and environment of the Antarctic, the First World Conference on National Parks, sponsored by IUCN, UNESCO, and FAO, notes with appreciation the current international cooperation of the Antarctic Treaty Powers in matters of conservation, but recommends the adoption of more positive measures to prevent the exploitation of the marine life of this habitat on which the entire Antarctic ecosystem depends.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 17

Whereas the unique wildlife of the Galapagos Islands is of the highest scientific and historical interest to the whole world; and

Whereas the Charles Darwin Foundation, with the assistance of UNESCO and other agencies, has established an important research station on the island of Santa Cruz for the use of scientists of all nations, the First World Conference on National Parks warmly congratulates the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the legal and administrative measures already taken to create nature reserves in the islands, and affirms its belief that the cooperation of the Ecuadorian authorities, with the conservationists of all nations, will succeed in preserving the Galapagos Islands and their wildlife in perpetuity for the inspiration of all mankind.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 18

Whereas it is of worldwide significance that the national parks of the Congo (Leopoldville) should be preserved intact not only for their great scientific, cultural, and recreational value, but also as outstanding examples of areas with high biological productivity, the First World Conference on National Parks herewith expresses its great satisfaction that the national parks of the Congo have been maintained in spite of the difficult circumstances that have existed during the past 2 years.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 19

Whereas several African delegates to this conference have expressed the need for training in wildlife management and its relation to land use, the First World Conference on National Parks applauds the work accomplished in the field of wildlife management; endorses the several proposals for wildlife management schools in Africa and elsewhere; and calls upon the nations of the world to provide assistance, both technical and financial, for the furtherance of such training programs throughout the world as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 20

Whereas independence came to Rwanda and Burundi at the time the First World Conference on National Parks was convened, the First World Conference on National Parks extends the new nations every good wish, including success with the conservations of their inherited natural resources, and further draws attention to two of Rwanda's natural riches, namely the Kagera National Park and the volcanoes of the Albert National Park, and expresses the hope that these strict nature reserves retain their status and that the Governments of Congo and Rwanda cooperate in the administration of their respective portions of the Albert National Park.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 21

The First World Conference on National Parks warmly applauds the steps which have been and are being taken by the Government of Fiji and the Fiji Society to create a national park on the island of Taveuni and a nature reserve on the island of Kadavu and to extend the existing nature reserve on Mount Victoria.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 22

The First World Conference on National Parks recommends that for every kind of animal or plant threatened with extinction an appropriate area of natural habitat be provided in a national park, wildlife refuge, wilderness area, or equivalent reserve to maintain an adequate breeding population, and takes the view that any species so threatened which is not accorded such official sanctuary proclaims the failure of the Government concerned to recognize its responsibility to future generations of mankind.

sponsibility to future generations of mankind.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 23

The First World Conference on National Parks recommends the early examination by IUCN of a project to create within the natural range of certain gravely threatened species—rhinoceroses, orang-utan, Arabian oryx, caribou, and others—one or more special reserves into which individual animals can be moved so as to promote increased reproduction of the species, and further invites the governments concerned and other appropriate agencies to give sympathetic consideration to the project.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 24

Whereas the best available estimates indicate that the total world populations of the five species of rhinoceroses approximate the following numbers: Black Rhino, 11,000 to 13,500; White Rhino, 2,500 to 3,000; Great Indian Rhino, 600; Sumatran Rhino, 100 to 150; and Javan Rhino, 24 to 50; and

Whereas many of these animals exist in small isolated pockets; and

Whereas all five species are threatened by the erroneous belief in the magical properties of rhino horn and the consequent killing to meet these demands, the First World Conference on National Parks warmly welcomes and endorses the proposed world campaign for rhinoceroses sponsored by the World Wildlife Fund and the Fauna Preservation Society in cooperation with the Survival Service Commission of IUCN, and recommends that the governments of the nations concerned consider the establishment of additional parks or reserves to incorporate areas in which rhinoceroses still survive.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 25

Whereas three of the most remarkable mammals of the South American Andes are threatened with extinction, and are so cataloged, due to the rapid and extensive destruction of their forest habitat; the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that those Andean countries which have them within their boundaries establish, wherever possible, parks or reserves to preserve these mammals; namely, Mountain tapir (*Tapirus pinchaque*); Spectacled bear (*Tremarctos ornatus*); and Pudu deer (*Pudu pudu* and *P. mephistophilus*).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 26

The First World Conference on National Parks recommends to the Pan American countries which have not done so, the immediate ratification and implementation of the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Washington, D.C., 1940), and the formation of a Latin American Committee of IUCN which shall work in close liaison with existing international bodies.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 27

Whereas the centennial of the establishment of Yellowstone Park in the United States occurs in 1972; and

Whereas the establishment of Yellowstone Park was the first such park in the world and created widespread response throughout the world, the First World Conference on National Parks recommends that this centennial be celebrated by publicizing the occasion, especially with appropriate publications in the various countries urging the formation and development of national parks, and by a conference to be held in Yellowstone Park and attended by representatives of all countries.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 28

The First World Conference on National Parks expresses its appreciation of arrange-

ments for holding the conference with the aid of the facilities extended by the Seattle World's Fair, as well as the generous hospitality of many individuals and organizations in the Seattle area.

S O S: SAVE OUR STREAMS

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, a letter to me from the publisher of the Salt Water Sportsman, Mr. Henry Lyman, of Boston, Mass., tells a tragic but hopeful story. It is a story of water and of fish, of wildlife and birds. It is the story of polluted water caused from neglect in the past, and of hopes to make that water clean again, to restore what nature created and to give to future generations a refuge from urban life in the beauties of nature. It is the story of efforts to restore Neponset River Reservation being thwarted by construction of route 95 in Massachusetts, and of construction turning into destruction.

My bill, S. 2767, introduced on January 30, 1962, would make it necessary to consider possible damage to natural resources and wildlife before undertaking construction of a Federal highway.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD, excerpts from Mr. Lyman's letter of July 18, 1962.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Let me make it clear at the outset that the Neponset River in its present condition has little to recommend it from the recreational water use point of view. Heavily polluted where it flows through the towns of Norwood, Canton, Westwood, and Milton, it oozes its slow way through a marsh that was formerly known as the Fowl Meadows because of the numbers of waterfowl found there.

Plans have been drawn by the metropolitan district commission to deepen the river channel and to straighten it in some areas. This will have the effect of speeding up the current flow. In addition, industrial pollution * * * is gradually being lessened. * * * The river is fed by various unpolluted streams in this area, some of which are now stocked with trout by the Massachusetts Division of Fish and Game.

Present plans for construction of route 95 call for a limited access expressway running in a northerly direction toward Boston. These plans at the moment terminate at route 128. * * * The marsh area south of route 128 is zoned for industry * * * is privately owned and is undeveloped. Wildlife * * * is found in this valley despite the effects of the polluted river. * * * Marsh birds of all kinds and most of the marsh flora and fauna common to * * * New England * * * are * * * found throughout the Neponset Valley.

The line of route 95 * * * would destroy most of this marsh habitat. An alternate route * * * which would not only save the marsh, but would also be more economical to construct, has been disregarded by the highway engineers.

* * * The importance of the Neponset River Reservation * * * cannot be over-emphasized. * * * It is easily reached by a large number of people from the metropolitan area. The metropolitan district commission * * * had plans for improvement of the area in coordination with the river channel work. Now that the highway is aimed through the center of the reservation, such improvement is impossible.

* * * Any action taken on your bill (S. 2767) may be too late to save the Neponset River Reservation but it certainly will prevent such destruction of public lands in the future.

AUTHORITY FOR "MAIL COVERS"

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, recently it came to my attention that the Post Office Department has available to law enforcement officials an espionage procedure which may be used to interfere with the privacy of the American people. This procedure is commonly referred to as a "mail cover" and consists of recording the name and address of the sender, the place and date of postmarking, the class of mail and any other exterior data on all mail going to a certain address or addressee.

Several weeks ago, I sent a letter to the Postmaster General requesting a report on this practice. I asked him to cite the statutory authority for conducting mail covers. Mr. Louis J. Doyle, General Counsel of the Post Office Department responding for the Postmaster General, readily conceded there is no statute specifically dealing with mail covers. Instead, the Department relies on the fact that the practice dates back at least to 1893. Section 462 of the Postal Laws and Regulations, 1893, provided instructions to postmasters concerning mail covers. Further, it is the Department's position that mail covers may be carried out under the general authority of the Postmaster General. To quote from Mr. Doyle's letter:

Aside from custom and usage, we believe paragraphs (1) and (5) of present section 501 of title 39, United States Code, which authorize the Postmaster General to prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to accomplish the objectives of title 39, United States Code, and to execute all laws relating to the Department, confer authority to issue the pertinent regulations authorizing mail covers.

In the Postal Policy Act of 1958, Congress set out as one of its findings that "the Postal Establishment was created to unite more closely the American people, to promote the general welfare, and to advance the national economy."

Historically, there has existed a very special relationship between the Post Office and the American people. In 1877, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a letter while in the mails is entitled to the same protection as a person's papers in his home. Thus, a search warrant which satisfies the requirements of the fourth amendment must be obtained to open a letter in the mail.

Part 113 of the Postal Manual provides—and I read:

Sealed first-class mail while in the custody of the Post Office Department is accorded absolute secrecy. No persons in the postal service, except those employed for that purpose in the dead-mail offices, may break or permit the breaking of the seal of any matter mailed as first-class mail without a legal warrant, even though it may contain criminal or otherwise unmailable matter, or furnish evidence of the commission of a crime.

It is the effect of mail covers on this special relationship that deeply concerns me. Should the Post Office Department without specific congressional authority handle a letter for a purpose completely unrelated to its job of delivering the mail? The Post Office Department states categorically that the mail is not delayed and is delivered to the recipient at the same time it would have been delivered irrespective of the institution of a cover. However, a Senate subcommittee report filed in 1954 based on an investigation of a mail cover placed on a Member of the Senate said in part:

D. H. Stephens, Chief Inspector for the Post Office Department, testified that never are the contents of the mail inspected and further that the mail must not be delayed or withheld as a result of the cover. Nevertheless, it is obvious to your committee that some delay in the mail is unavoidable if the request for coverage is complied with.

The use of mail covers is another instance where the full power of the Government is brought to bear on the individual. Information is obtained about the individual which is none of the Government's business. It reminds one of the tactics used in a police state where the government wants to know who is corresponding with whom. A mail cover also appears to be in conflict with the principles of section 1702 of title 18, United States Code, which makes it a crime to take a letter out of a post office or from a letter carrier with design to pry into the business or secrets of another.

Postmasters are authorized by postal regulations to institute mail covers on the request of officers of the law to aid in the apprehension of fugitives from justice and on the request of postal inspectors. Mail covers are used in investigating mail frauds, use of the mails for pornography, and income tax violations in addition to locating fugitives.

When used for investigative purposes, the privacy of the individual can be invaded by the Government on mere suspicion alone. It should be noted that the person whose privacy is affected is not the one who placed the information on the envelope but the one who receives the letter. Therefore, he in no way has waived his right to be left alone. In fact, he may have in no way invited the intermeddling of the Government.

When the cover is used to locate a fugitive, the individual whose privacy is affected is usually only someone close to the fugitive and may not be suspected in the least of any wrongful act. This smacks clearly of guilt by association, a concept completely foreign to American justice.

While mail covers may not run afoul of the Bill of Rights, they certainly come close, and, in my opinion, are repugnant to our free society.

Mr. Doyle in his letter stated:

I believe that we should make it clear to you that mail covers are infrequent and are used only where there is good reason to believe that they may be instrumental in the solution of a crime.

However, he goes on to say later:

You have inquired as to the number of such covers in existence as well as the total of such covers conducted in 1961 and in 1960. I regret that we do not have records which would enable us to respond to your inquiry. However, I have instituted a current inquiry which indicates that the total number of such covers runs between 500 and 750.

This latter comment would certainly lead one to question the control which is indicated by the first comment.

The letter from Mr. Doyle attempts to uphold the legality of mail covers based on two Federal court decisions. The first, U.S. against Costello, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is claimed to uphold explicitly the legality of mail covers. Actually, the decision held that mail covers do not violate sections 1701, 1702, and 1703 of title 18. The second decision, U.S. against Schwartz, held that postal regulations are not violated when information obtained from a mail cover is turned over to the Justice Department.

Therefore, neither of these decisions meet directly the question of the basic legality of the practice.

It is my hope that the Post Office Department will completely reevaluate this matter. If they find mail covers absolutely necessary to law enforcement, then enforceable regulations should be put into effect to limit their use and assure control. The present system is completely unsatisfactory. If the Department fails to act, it will be necessary, in my opinion, for the Congress to provide appropriate procedures.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD my letter to the Postmaster General and the reply I received from the General Counsel of the Post Office Department. Also, I ask unanimous consent to insert the present postal regulations which are related to this matter.

There being no objection, the letters and regulations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUNE 14, 1962.

HON. J. EDWARD DAY,
The Postmaster General,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL DAY: It has come to my attention that the Post Office Department conducts a practice to help law enforcement officers commonly referred to as mail covers.

In my opinion, this practice constitutes a violation of the individual rights of the American people as it involves a seizure though only momentary from the normal course of the mail. Also, I do not see how such covers constitute a necessary operation in the proper handling of the mail.

Would appreciate a report as soon as possible specifying the statutory authority relied on by the Post Office Department to conduct such mail covers. Also would appreciate the inclusion of any and all rules and regulations promulgated by the Department with respect to this matter. In addition, I would appreciate receiving a report concerning the number of such covers presently in existence as well as the total number of such covers conducted in 1961 and in 1960.

Kindest regards.
Sincerely,

EDWARD V. LONG,
U.S. Senator.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
Washington, D.C., July 17, 1962.

Hon. EDWARD V. LONG,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR LONG: The Postmaster General has asked me to reply to your letter of June 14, 1962, relating to mail covers. You indicate that it is your opinion that this practice constitutes a violation of individual rights, and you ask for the statutory authority relied upon by the Department in this connection.

As you know, a mail cover simply consists of noting the name and address of the sender, the place and date of postmarking, and the class of mail. Mail is not delayed and the contents of first-class matter are not examined. Only the material appearing openly on the wrapper is noted. Since the sender is in noway obligated to place on the outside his name and address, and since he does so with the full knowledge that this may well be read by anyone having possession of the mail, it is difficult to understand in what respect his rights have been violated. Indeed, he places this material on the outside of the envelope with the intention of its being read by postal authorities—at least for certain purposes—and with the knowledge that it may be read by others.

There is no statute specifically dealing with mail covers, but the practice dates back at least to 1893. Section 462 of the Postal Laws and Regulations, 1893, provided in pertinent part:

"Postmasters may, however, when the same can be done without interference with the regular business of the post office, furnish to officers of the law, to aid them in discovering a fugitive from justice, information concerning the postmarks and addresses of letters, but must not delay or refuse their delivery to the persons addressed."

In a case decided in 1833, involving a situation in which the action was neither authorized by nor prohibited by a specific statute, but was based upon custom and usage, the Supreme Court of the United States stated in pertinent part:

"It is insisted, that as there was no law which authorized the appointment of the defendant, his services can constitute no legal claim for compensation. * * *. That usage, without law, * * * can never lay the foundation of a legal claim. * * *. A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of the Government, must convince every persons, that, the head of a department, in the distribution of its duties and responsibilities, is often compelled to exercise his discretion. He is limited in the exercise of his powers by the law; but it does not follow, that he must show statutory provision for everything he does. No government could be administered on such principles. To attempt to regulate, by law, the minute movements of every part of the complicated machinery of government, would evince a most unpardonable ignorance on the subject. Whilst the great outlines of its movements may be marked out, and limitations imposed on the exercise of its powers, there are numberless things which must be done, that can neither be anticipated nor defined and which are essential to the proper action of the Government. Hence, of necessity, usages have been established in every department of the Government, which have become a kind of common law, and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within their respective limits. * * *. Usage cannot alter the law, but it is evidence of the construction given to it; * * *." (*United States v. Macdaniel*, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 1, at pp. 14 and 15; 32 U.S. 1, at pp. 9 and 10.)

Aside from custom and usage, we believe paragraphs (1) and (5) of present section 501 of title 39, U.S. Code, which authorize the Postmaster General to prescribe the rules

and regulations he deems necessary to accomplish the objectives of title 39, U.S. Code, and to execute all laws relating to the Department, confer authority to issue the pertinent regulations authorizing mail covers. Those regulations are presently contained in sections 311.7 and 831.44 of the Postal Manual. See also section 311.6 of the Postal Manual. These regulations are reproduced on attachment "A."

The legality of mail covers was explicitly upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in *U.S. v. Costello*, 255 Fed. (2d) 876, decided May 20, 1958. See also *U.S. v. Schwartz*, 283 Fed. (2d) 107, decided October 6, 1960, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that mail covers were authorized by the postal regulations. The Supreme Court of the United States has never directly passed upon the question. However, it did deny certiorari in *Costello*, 357 U.S. 937 and in *Schwartz*, 364 U.S. 942. Further, in the case of *Ex parte Jackson*, 96 U.S. 727, in which it was established that sealed letters were protected by the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court strongly indicated it would be proper to examine the outside of sealed letters and to take cognizance of what appears thereon.

As you are aware, this Department is concerned with the enforcement and execution of certain laws. Section 1718 of title 18, U.S. Code, makes nonmailable any matter containing libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, etc. matter on the outside wrappers or envelopes. Any matter containing obscene matter on the outside covers is made nonmailable by section 1463 of title 18, U.S. Code. This Department is also charged with the responsibility of preventing the circulation through the mails of obscene, lottery and fraudulent material, even though such facts may not appear on the outside of the envelope. See sections 4005 and 4006 of title 39, U.S. Code.

The use of such covers has been of considerable assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Fugitive felons often communicate with their relatives and, by use of a mail cover, the search may be narrowed either to a return address or to a particular locality. In one recent case a mail cover was successful in bringing about the deportation of a dangerous murderer from a foreign country to which he had fled. It has also been useful from time to time in connection with espionage and subversion. In addition, it has been used to locate and identify victims who can testify in cases involving use of the mails to promote a fraud or sell obscene material, but who might not otherwise be known. In one recent case a mail cover resulted in locating a warehouse of a publishing company producing obscene literature and in turning over to local authorities \$90,000 worth of obscene publications.

I believe that we should make it clear to you that mail covers are infrequent and are used only where there is good reason to believe that they may be instrumental in the solution of a crime. We will institute mail covers upon the proper request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or, occasionally, at the request of State or local law enforcement officials. We believe, as a matter of comity, that the Federal Government should cooperate with such State and local law enforcement officials to the extent permitted by law, but we institute mail covers only in those instances where a crime has been committed and there is reason to believe that the mail cover would be useful in its solution.

You have inquired as to the number of such covers in existence as well as the total of such covers conducted in 1961 and in 1960. I regret that we do not have records which would enable us to respond to your inquiry. However, I have instituted a current inquiry which indicates that the total number of such covers runs between 500 and

750. You will see, therefore, that when compared with the vast volume of mail delivered daily to millions of recipients the number is small indeed.

It has been suggested by some that the institution of covers results in delay in the delivery of the mail. This is not true. I can say categorically that mail is delivered to the recipient at the same time it would have been delivered irrespective of the institution of a cover.

I hope this letter is helpful to you and that it will serve to allay some of the misinformation, as well as misgivings, which occasionally surround this practice. I particularly want to reemphasize that no inquiry is made as to contents and that the only information acquired is that which is openly, and voluntarily, put upon the envelope by the sender or by postal officials in the course of business.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS J. DOYLE,
General Counsel.

EXCERPT FROM POSTAL REGULATIONS

311.6. Mail matter: Furnish information concerning mail or mailing permits to postal inspectors and to the sender, the addressee, or the authorized representative of either on proper identification. Do not give such information to others. See 123.5 and part 312 regarding correction of mailing lists.

311.7. Concerning fugitives: Furnish to officers of the law, on proper identification, information regarding the addresses, return cards, or postmarks on mail to aid in the apprehension of fugitives from justice. Report the action immediately to the postal inspector in charge.

831.44. Mail cover: Requests by postal inspectors in charge and postal inspectors for information regarding the addresses, return cards, or postmarks on mail must be treated in strict confidence and compiled with carefully and accurately. In obtaining the information, do not delay delivery of the mail. (See 311.6 and 311.7.)

MUCH NEEDED AID FOR SMALL BUSINESS THROUGH IGA FOOD STORES

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, for over 28 years it has been my privilege to watch the development of that segment of our national economy known as little business. We, as Members of this honorable body, the Senate of the United States, have an exceptional vantage point for observing the plight, the problems, and the progress of the small independent. And many of us do much more than merely observe; we take active interest in seeing that the little man enjoys all the advantages that our great Republic offers.

One of the biggest problems faced by independent grocers, for example, has been the matter of financing. The grocer with unquestioned ability, with the sort of aggressiveness that responds to challenge, with a potential for service that is far greater than his facilities afford—such a grocer traditionally has been condemned to frustration, because he has never had an opportunity of financing a bigger, better store—in a more competitive location. Now, at last, the small independent grocer can finance his future—and the news is so significant to our national economy, that I regard it as well worth the telling to this body, the U.S. Senate. In fact, I regard it as my duty to submit this as a further

evidence that the American way is still operating—that there is still an opportunity for the individual conducting a commercial enterprise to compete successfully against the huge corporations which might seem to overwhelm him.

For the little fellow is the biggest business in our economy—once he unites in common purpose. Don R. Grimes, as president of the Independent Grocers' Alliance, the IGA, as it is familiarly known, supplies living proof of this truth. A generation ago there was no such alliance. There were only scattered, unorganized independents—and huge, corporate chains. Today, Don R. Grimes heads a voluntary food store chain that is the world's largest. It comprises over 5,000 independent grocery stores, in 46 States and in 8 Canadian provinces.

As this organization grew in size, it grew in service, service supplied by the wholesaler to the retail grocer, and in turn by the retailer to the public he served. As the general public began to appreciate the cleanliness, the brightness, the convenience, the packaging, the higher quality, and the lower prices, the IGA grew in size and scope. And the grocers composing it grew—individually—in size and service. Yet there was always the stone wall: financing.

But now, through the aggressive leadership of IGA, even that stone wall has been breached. Now the independent can grow to any limit his ability dictates, and note this: still stay independent. The little fellow can grow big without losing his identity; and without giving up his individuality by becoming an employee of a huge corporation. Now he can grow, for it is traditional with the small individual enterprise that profits are "plowed back into the business" to form a sounder, solidier, broader based enterprise.

Out in Wisconsin, where the corner grocer, like the crossroads cheese factory is symbolic of the independence we cherish so highly, we find this news particularly stimulating. Now a grocer has no limitations to growth, except his own abilities and efforts.

This plan permits a grocer of proved ability to invest as little as \$22,500. He gets a new supermarket of 6,440 square feet, all superbly equipped, scientifically planned, completely stocked; it has the parking space so necessary to the modern food mart. Most important, it is located on a site chosen only after exhaustive market and traffic study by experts in those fields. No longer need the independent watch the big chains step in and take a site he would like to have but could never before afford.

So, for a \$22,500 investment, the small independent can turn the key in the door of such a store. He also has: a working capital sufficient to conduct his business, a stated personal weekly income, life insurance on himself through the duration of the transaction, all the services of merchandising, mass buying, advertising, publicity, promotion already associated with the IGA—and in 5 years, the business is his. It is his without obligation and the profits are all his own.

All he has to do is to maintain 50 percent of the conservatively rated sales volume potential.

But this is not the full story, nor does it disclose the full significance of the program. For this plan is expandable. At any time, the grocer may increase the size of his store—the stores are planned so that such increase can be made quickly, easily, economically. Truly, there is no limit to the growth of the independent.

Under the leadership of Don R. Grimes, president of the IGA, whose offices are at 131 South Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Ill., this plan is now ready. It has proven highly successful during a 5-year trial period. It already has helped men break through the final barrier that has always hemmed in the independent grocer: financing.

Here, I submit, is a worthy model for other industries to follow. It is our American democracy working at its highest potential. It gives the lie to the charge that democracy is on the downgrade, that the day of the rugged individualist is over. It gives new hope to the little fellow in his struggle with the corporation. It gives new hope to all of us—to all of us who believe in the unshakable permanence of our American principles.

SPACE COMMUNICATIONS EXPERIMENT INDICATES NEED FOR NEW STUDY

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, since the taxpayers of America have already spent billions of dollars on research making it possible to put communications satellites into space, it would be a grave mistake to transfer the product of this research into the coffers of a monopoly private corporation.

Even now, research is continuing under Government contract to advance worldwide communications by television, radio, wireless telegraph, and telephone.

In Los Angeles, Calif., the Hughes Aircraft Co. is working on synchronous high-altitude communication satellites where reportedly three alone can relay more than one television program around the clock. These three satellites would be 22,300 miles above the earth, and if successful, would make the low-level Telstar system obsolete even before it was installed.

In my opinion, this kind of research is still another reason why the space communications program should remain under Government ownership and guidance, at least for this experimental stage, because at this point it is not known what competing industry will develop the best system.

The potential for improved world relations and peace is so great that certainly the American taxpayer is entitled to the best system, and a continuing voice in the direction our space communications efforts take us.

It is far too early in the new frontier of space communications to give away the product of tax-financed research to domination by a private monopoly which would run it solely for private gain.

An infant requires close attention and years of guidance before it is put out into the world on its own. The infant of space communications should not be abandoned on the doorstep of a monopoly, where its true parent, the taxpayer, will forever mourn its loss.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD the following article from the Washington Post of Friday, August 3, 1962, captioned "Hughes Firm Planning 'Parked' TV Satellite."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HUGHES FIRM PLANNING "PARKED" TV SATELLITES

(By Marvin Miles)

LOS ANGELES, AUGUST 2.—Synchronous communication satellites that can relay one or more television programs the clock around are being developed under Government contract by Hughes Aircraft Co. here.

The high-altitude orbiters, called advanced syncoms, will permit 24-hour-a-day telecasting. Only three syncoms could blanket the earth, whereas 40 to 50 satellites of the Telstar type would be required for the same purpose, Hughes scientists said.

The company reported some time ago it was developing three smaller communication satellites under Project Syncom for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Hughes is also working on the advanced syncom for NASA, developing subsystems and an engineering structural model to determine the final design for a commercial system.

The smaller syncoms, weighing 72 pounds each, will be launched early next year as experimental models and will operate only a single two-way voice channel.

Advanced syncoms, according to Allen B. Puckett, Hughes vice president and head of the aerospace group, will weigh approximately 500 pounds and probably will carry four radio signal repeaters.

Each could provide up to 300 two-way telephone channels or one TV channel. Hence the 5-foot orbiters will be able to relay 1,200 phone calls simultaneously, or four TV programs, or combinations such as 600 phone calls and two telecasts.

Both syncom types will be orbited at an altitude of 22,300 miles where their speed will be the same as that of the earth's rotation. Thus they will be stationary in relation to a point on earth and will appear to hang motionless.

A single syncom over the Atlantic would be sufficient to link four continents—North America, Europe, South America and Africa.

ARTICLE ON CHRISTIAN LIVING SHOWS HUMANITARIAN INSIGHT OF SENATOR JENNINGS RANDOLPH

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, on Wednesdays when the Senate is in session, I attend a Senate prayer group breakfast with a number of my colleagues, including the distinguished Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH, Democrat, of Randolph County, W. Va.

Senator RANDOLPH, one of the most accomplished orators in the Senate has long been a leader in religious, civic, and educational fields, as well as in politics and government. I have been acquainted with him for about 5 years and cherish his friendship.

A former newspaper editor, author of several books, former professor in two different colleges and universities, former dean of a school of business administration, and now a trustee of an institution of higher learning, it is not strange that JENNINGS RANDOLPH is an outstanding advocate of better educational opportunities for all the youth of America.

Senator RANDOLPH recently published in the Sabbath Recorder an article on Christian living, which will be of particular interest to Members of the House and Senate because of his thoughtful and searching study and comments. This article gives an insight into the philosophy and humanitarianism of JENNINGS RANDOLPH.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an article captioned "How Can Committed Christian Living Impel Me To Take Vital Constructive Action in Today's Troubled World?" by Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH from the Sabbath Recorder of February 1962.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOW CAN COMMITTED CHRISTIAN LIVING IMPEL ME TO TAKE VITAL CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION IN TODAY'S TROUBLED WORLD?

(By Hon. JENNINGS RANDOLPH)

ARTICLE 1

"Each for the other and both for God."

Those words, inscribed by my mother in the Bible she gave me as a graduation gift strengthened the meaning which the book had earlier for me. In this brief treatise she crystallized in my thinking its two most basic teachings—the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. The Bible has supplied this understanding since I first came to it in my youth.

The day my mother penned those beautiful and reassuring words was a memorable one.

I recall when the certain guidance in the Bible heightened my consciousness of life and the application of the scriptures to living. It was unfolded, when reading the proverbs as a young man, in the truth of the passage—

"Pleasant words are as an honeycomb, sweet of the soul, and health to the bones" (Prov. 16: 24).

I believe this and attempt to apply it in my life. We should search out the worthwhile qualities in our fellow citizens, rather than play the role of detractor and fault-finder. This does not imply a surrender of one's values to mere flattery, nor deny the existence of injustice that must be redressed. The truth of these thoughts has been confirmed many times during my service in Congress.

At 12 noon, when the U.S. Senate meets in regular session, the doors leading onto the floor and into the galleries are closed—all talking and motion ceases and a hushed quietness settles over the Chamber and in the galleries.

At this moment, the rostrum of the U.S. Senate becomes a national altar of prayer to God, as the Vice President announces: "The Senate will be in order and the Chaplain will offer prayer." All the sessions of Congress are opened by prayer. We are inspired and encouraged to find strength and understanding for the day before we become preoccupied with pressing public business.

The 537 Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with the exception

of 5 (2 in the Senate and 3 in the House) have publicly announced their religious affiliation as follows:

Religious affiliations of Members of 87th Congress (summary as of Mar. 22, 1961)

	Senate	House	Total
Protestant:			
General.....	4	19	23
Apostolic Christian.....	0	1	1
Baptist.....	13	48	61
Central Schwenkfelder.....	0	1	1
Christian Church.....	0	3	3
Christian Scientist.....	0	4	4
Church of Christ.....	0	5	5
Congregational Christian.....	7	18	25
Cumberland Presbyterian.....	0	1	1
Disciples of Christ.....	2	8	10
Episcopal.....	13	53	66
Evangelical and Reformed Church.....	0	2	2
Evangelical Free.....	0	2	2
Evangelical and United Brethren.....	0	1	1
Latter-day Saints (Mormons).....	3	3	6
Latter-day Saints (Reorganized).....	1	0	1
Lutheran.....	4	17	21
Methodist.....	19	77	96
Presbyterian.....	11	60	71
Reformed Church in America.....	1	0	1
Seventh-Day Baptist.....	1	0	1
Society of Friends.....	1	1	2
Unitarian.....	5	4	9
United Presbyterian.....	0	1	1
Protestant, total.....	85	329	414
Roman Catholic.....	12	88	100
Jewish Congregation.....	1	11	12
Sikh.....	0	1	1
Not given.....	2	3	5
Vacancies.....	0	5	5

Source: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service from Congressional Quarterly No. 14, Apr. 7, 1961.

These Members of many faiths deepen their conviction often by using the Prayer Room in the Capitol.

Members of Congress meet weekly when it is in session in Senate and House prayer breakfast groups. One of their own Members leads, the Scriptures are read, there is discussion, sharing of problems and prayer. The searchlight of God's word is turned on motives and activities. These groups have been meeting without intermission for 18 years.

Probably the most forceful and direct way to take constructive action in today's world is by sponsoring and supporting purposeful and humanitarian legislation in the national interest and for the public good.

The theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, executed in a concentration camp, expressed the Christian objectives which we in the Congress are trying to achieve by enacting laws which are meaningful.

The hungry man needs bread, and the homeless man needs a roof; the dispossessed need justice, and the lonely need fellowship; the undisciplined need order, and the slave needs freedom.

To allow the hungry man to remain hungry would be blasphemy against God and one's neighbor, for what is nearest to God is precisely the need of one's neighbor.

It is for the love of Christ, which belongs as much to the hungry man as to myself, that I share my bread with him and that I share my dwelling with the homeless.

If the hungry man does not attain to faith, then the guilt falls on those who refused him bread.

Justice for the dispossessed; order for the undisciplined; freedom for the oppressed; surely these are motives which we as a democratic and peaceful nation are morally obligated to support. The challenge is urgent.

I was privileged to sponsor and support the measure which established our Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security and seeks to give impetus to the goals for a world which is free from the scourge of

war and the dangers and burdens of armaments.

Dag Hammarskjöld worked tirelessly and courageously for this ideal. His mission was in part—as he wrote to a friend shortly before his death—in response to the need for a " . . . deep sense for the spiritual basis—and responsibility—" of the United Nations.

At such times as now, when the United Nations is riven by the disruptive tactics of the Soviet Union it is difficult for us to maintain the vision of this spiritual ideal to which Hammarskjöld was so fully committed. Yet, we must, if we are to avert the unparalleled disaster of nuclear war, maintain the vision of what the U.N. must become—an effective agency for bringing the rule of law into international affairs.

As a member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, I am particularly concerned with programs to aid our senior citizens by providing medical care based on the social security system and other desirable measures to assist them in obtaining suitable housing and to remain or become valued, appreciated members of our society.

My strong personal support of legislation to assist the handicapped has been constant.

There are many ethical and vital problems facing Congress. Of enduring significance is that of preserving inviolate the wall of separation between church and state. There are many areas in which this wall may be breached—at local, State, and Federal levels—though the one in which the most pressure is currently being generated is that involving Federal assistance to education.

The clearest expression of the intent of Madison, who authored the first amendment, and of the other founders of the Constitution who adopted it, was offered by one of America's distinguished jurists, Jeremiah S. Black, in his essay, "Religious Liberty."

"The manifest object of the men who framed the institutions of this country, was to have a state without religion, and a church without politics—that is to say, they meant that one should never be used as an engine for any purpose of the other. Our fathers seem to have been perfectly sincere in their belief that the members of the church would be more patriotic, and the citizens of the state more religious, by keeping their respective functions entirely separate. For that reason they built up a wall of complete and perfect partition between the two."

In Mark 5:19, we find the admonition: "Go home to your friends and tell them how much the Lord has done for you, and how He has had mercy on you." Many opportunities are provided to us to "Go home to . . . friends and tell them . . ." through speaking and counseling in our official capacity as representatives of our States. I am conscious of this personal responsibility.

SUMMER CAMP FOR IOWA'S CRIPPLED CHILDREN—THEY DONATED THEIR ABILITIES TO HELP KIDS WITH DISABILITIES

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, when it comes to doing good works and helping the unfortunate, the notion has become all too prevalent that government is "George," the only one to let do it. This attitude can have an adverse effect on the spirit of charity, which we like to think is a hallmark of the American people.

Of course, many good works are done privately, as opposed to those done by

government. But private charity has tended to be overshadowed by official programs of public charity.

An excellent example of what I mean by private good works is Camp Sunnyside for Crippled Children and Adults, which was opened in my State of Iowa this summer. Iowa crippled children and adults now enjoy a summer camp because Iowans, particularly Iowa labor union members gave their time, skill, and money.

In so doing, these volunteers not only provided a social agency of incalculable value to Iowa, they demonstrated anew that the public can meet the challenge of social needs without leaving it to be done by government. It is difficult to say which is the greater monument—the camp itself or the demonstration of non-governmental good works which it represents.

The details of the services donated by these volunteers are set forth in an article published in the summer issue of the *Iowan* magazine. It is an inspiring story of doing good, in the finest sense of that maligned phrase. I salute the volunteers cited in the article.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the *Iowan's* report on their good works be printed at this point in the *RECORD*.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

THEY DONATED THEIR ABILITIES TO HELP KIDS WITH DISABILITIES

(Today Iowa crippled children enjoy a summer camp because Iowans, particularly Iowa unions, gave not only money, but time.)

With the opening of Camp Sunnyside for Crippled Children and Adults this summer, the 3,000 men and women who voluntarily donated over 18,000 hours of labor to complete its construction north of Des Moines, will have a permanent record of their efforts.

Conceived and planned by the Iowa Society for Crippled Children and Adults (the Easter Seal Society) several years ago, the camp received its first big boost with the financial pledges of \$75,000 for a main lodge by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of Iowa and \$15,000 for a health and therapy lodge by the Elks Clubs of Iowa. But it took the skill, knowledge, experience, and determination of volunteers from all the crafts organized under the Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, and contacted through the State Building and Construction Trades Council to accomplish the dream of a camp designed exclusively to provide handicapped children and young adults opportunity to enjoy the benefits of a program which otherwise would have been denied them.

A recent accounting of the workers who gave up their leisure time, some traveling many miles to work on the project, showed 25 classifications in the building trades, representing approximately 75 organized union locals in the State. These included asbestos workers, bricklayers, carpenters, concrete masons, cement finishers, electrical workers, glaziers, iron workers, laborers, operating engineers, painters, pipe layers, roofers, sheet metal workers, plumbers and steamfitters, teamsters, tile setters helpers, municipal workers, State and municipal workers, over the road and city transfer, upholsterers, industrial unions, contractors, tree men, and economy forms supervisors. They came from across the State—Ottumwa, Dubuque, Cedar Falls, Waterloo, Cedar Rapids, Sioux City, Mason City, Des Moines, Ames, Fort Dodge, Davenport, Marshalltown,

Council Bluffs, Burlington, Muscatine—traveling at their own expense to spend at least one weekend and most of them for two or three weekends.

Their intense interest is exemplified by one work crew from Fort Dodge who planned to send 10 plumbers and steamfitters for a weekend but arrived with only 9. Their spokesman explained that the absentee was detained by something very important and would be unable to make the trip. However, he continued "this fellow felt so bad about having to go back on his promise, that he asked me to give you this." It was a check for a plumber's wages for a day to make up for his absence.

Another volunteer crew of plumbers who were running the last 200 feet of clay pipe ran into quicksand which called for special equipment. Since it was Sunday, it was impossible to get the equipment before Monday when the volunteers would be gone. After discussions with the president of the Iowa State Pipe Trades, it was decided to hire the work completed which would spoil the 100-percent donation record of that trade. A short time after the work was finished, a check covering the full amount involved in that particular job was sent by the State Pipe Trades Association which kept their donation record intact.

The number of hours donated by the various locals ranges from several hours to several thousand hours depending on the need for their services. Setting the pace has been local 33 of the Des Moines plumbers and steamfitters which has donated nearly 3,000 hours of labor. Another outstanding number of hours, over 2,000, has been donated by local 234, Des Moines operating engineers. Carpenters representing several locals spent 2,752 hours on the project, and electrical workers throughout the State donated over 1,160 hours. Industrial unions provided 1,355 hours of labor while the State's plumbers and steamfitters spent almost 5,300 hours on the camp.

In addition to their labor, these volunteers were also able to help obtain a great number of donated materials, tools, and even equipment. Besides that, organized labor pledged \$80,000 in cash plus more donated labor for the construction of a large, heated swimming pool. Measuring 50 by 70 feet and adjacent to the main lodge, the pool has a special area 25 by 25 feet which will be 1 foot in depth for use by the severely handicapped.

In spite of a snowy winter, a crew of operating engineers working with equipment furnished by a group of excavating contractors, hauled 40,000 cubic yards of dirt in January in the excavation of the 3-acre artificial lake. With good weather it is expected that the lake will be ready for boating and fishing this season.

Reaping the benefits from all this dedicated effort will be an estimated 500 handicapped persons who will attend camp this summer. According to the camp director, Rolfe Karlsson, Camp Sunnyside's second season will get underway June 24 with a 2-week period for youngsters aged 8 to 11. There will again be five camping periods divided among the various age groups, children, teenagers, and adults. Many of these will be able to attend only because of contributions by organizations and individuals throughout Iowa.

Each cabin at Sunnyside will accommodate 16 to 20 youngsters which brings approximately 100 campers at a time during each camping period. For each four children there is a special counselor assigned. Therapists, nurses, and specially trained personnel will be on hand at all times to provide for the special needs of these youngsters. With the assistance of counselors, program directors, craft directors, nature study leaders, and waterfront directors, the handicapped campers will take hikes and excursion

trips, go horseback riding, boating, and fishing. Instruction in ceramic tile, leather and woodworking, clay modeling, stone cutting, painting, photography, block printing, and even ham radio operation will open up new hobbies for them. Other camp activities include nature study, cookouts, all kinds of table games, swimming, and such unusual events as wheelchair square dancing, and the staging of a carnival, complete with sideshows and games.

In addition to the recreation and relaxation, the camp gives youngsters a chance to overcome the feeling of "aloneness" and being "left out." Many receive therapy treatments which are often unavailable in their homes or towns.

Camp Sunnyside is constructed with all the latest conveniences for the crippled including ground-level entrances, wide doors, low windows, indoor ramps which add to the safety and comfort of the campers.

The camp is located on a beautifully wooded 37-acre tract abounding with native birds and small animals and many varieties of Iowa plants, grasses and flowers. These not only add to the beauty of the camp but provide a natural setting for classes in nature study.

Clarence Yarn of Des Moines donated 10 acres of natural woodland which established the location of the camp in Polk County. The society purchased an additional 10 acres from Polk County and leased another 17 acres on a long-term lease at \$1 a year.

WE MUST LEARN FROM MISTAKES

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, recently a settlement was reached in Laos which, in effect, leaves the fate of that country in the hands of the three ruling Princes. One of them, Prince Souvanna Phouma was a recent visitor in this country and is now in Tokyo for talks with the Japanese Government regarding economic assistance.

We have all shared the deep concern over the problems facing that country and have carefully watched the developments arising there. Some dispatches at least, give reason to believe that the Geneva agreement may ultimately achieve less than we would have hoped. Richard Starnes has been covering the situation in Laos for some considerable time, from a vantage point, directly on the scene. In his dispatch dated July 28 he says that: "In numbed disbelief one learns that W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has returned from Geneva proclaiming that the agreement on Laos is a 'good' one—one that will work if Khrushchev keeps his word, as Mr. Harriman says he believes he will. Thus another fable is added to the dangerous mythology that is the foundation for much of what passes for American policy in southeast Asia."

There is no question of the seriousness of the situation in all of southeast Asia. I wonder whether the Geneva agreement will ultimately come to be no more than a Pyrrhic victory. It cannot come to that. I trust that the often criticized State Department has not, again, merited the displeasure of the American people. These two dispatches from Laos by Mr. Starnes certainly raise the question. I ask unanimous consent to insert them into the *RECORD* at this point.

There being no objection, the dispatches were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WE MUST LEARN FROM MISTAKES

(By Richard Starnes)

VIENTIANE, July 24.—Good loserismanship has never been a tradition of American arms and it's a quality notably missing among U.S. personnel here in Endsville on the Mekong River.

The United States—to borrow a phrase from the late Gen. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell—has taken a hell of a licking in Laos.

True, it was a licking once removed—in that our military people were involved only in training and advisory roles. But it was a resounding and humiliating defeat nonetheless.

The Royal Lao Army was trained, organized, paid and equipped (reequipped), advised, and wetnursed by our best military brains. But every time it came to the payoff the royal army turned out to have the same raw instinct for battle as "Fainting Phil" Scott, the celebrated horizontal heavyweight of years ago.

Apart from the affront to American pride, which always holds that one Yank soldier is worth a dozen or so of any other troops, our painful lesson in Laos is important for two big reasons:

First is that it gives substance to Communist radio Hanoi's scornful "paper tiger" propaganda directed against the United States. What happened here wasn't a remotely fair test of American fighting prowess, but it's too much to expect the unsophisticated southeast Asian peasants to understand this.

Second, it's terribly important because the sad truth is that the United States (if it isn't to file a quitclaim to the whole Indochinese peninsula) must employ native troops or be resigned to committing large U.S. forces here.

For these reasons the post mortem that is now being conducted on the corpse of our military policy here is motivated by more than morbid curiosity. Unless we can learn from our mistakes here, the same disaster could as well befall us in South Vietnam and, when its turn comes, Thailand.

One of the men most deeply concerned with learning why we failed here is Maj. Gen. R. H. Tucker, who heads the U.S. military advisory group in Laos. Tucker is candid, blunt, and forthright.

He took command here just before the final rout of the tame Royal Lao Army by numerically inferior Communist forces, so his appraisals are not likely to be colored by any considerations of personal prestige.

Basically his position is that the U.S. Army advisers here did a "marvelous" job—in the circumstances. Of course, if a marvelous job fails to accomplish the mission, the inference is that the mission itself was impossible.

"If we had only been dealing with a 'manana' attitude on the part of these people it wouldn't have been so difficult," he told me. "But in this country it isn't 'tomorrow.' It's next year, or even never. There's just no ability, no understanding of the need of planning for the future."

To begin with, much of the military hardware we poured into Laos simply remained in warehouses. One reason for this was the lack of a supply organization.

Another was the royal army bosses' sure knowledge that once it was passed on to the troops they'd never regain possession of it.

Safely stored in a warehouse, the equipment was theirs and was, so to speak, insurance against a sudden attack of good sense by the Americans—an event that undoubtedly would have meant a cutoff of all military aid.

"To give an example of their concept of logistics," Tucker continued, "after one

battle I asked their headman what he would need to get ready to fight again. He said 'Seven thousand of everything.'"

We tried to lift these people from primitive feudalism into the 20th century—and failed.

Unless we learn from our failures here, the prospects of saving what's left of southeast Asia are profoundly gloomy.

A SENSE OF FOREBODING

(By Richard Starnes)

VIENTIANE, LAOS, July 28.—A departing visitor, assuming he is neither blind nor deaf, cannot help but leave this strange, ominous little noncountry with a profound sense of foreboding for the future of Western man in southeast Asia.

Crossing the broad, turgid Mekong River, at this time of year almost blood-red with the tons of topsoil seasonal rains have swept into it, one feels he is traveling not through space but through time—that he is leaving behind an area where somehow evolution stopped with feudalism, that he is trying desperately to regain a foothold in the 20th century.

This is a land of myths and devils, of evil spirits and demonology. But it is with a sudden shock that one realizes that there is a Western mythology surrounding Laos (and the rest of southeast Asia) that is no less grounded in superstition and foolishness than the folkways of these primitive people.

In numbered disbelief one learns that W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has returned from Geneva proclaiming that the agreement on Laos is a "good" one—one that will work if Khrushchev keeps his word, as Mr. Harriman says he believes he will. Thus another fable is added to the dangerous mythology that is the foundation for much of what passes for American policy in southeast Asia.

The Geneva agreement on Laos is of the same sorry lineage as the accord establishing (and, mark well, "policing" with an international control commission) the boundary between North and South Vietnam. To believe, as Mr. Harriman says he believes, that the Geneva agreement is good and has a chance of working, one must ignore the history of Communist conquest in Indochina, and one must forsake all logic as well.

To believe the Communist world means to keep the peace in a neutral Laos, one must first believe Communist policy has undergone a sharp and total reversal since the disgraceful rout of the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Army at Nam Tha in May. This was the final disaster for the West in Laos, the ultimate proof of the bankruptcy of our policy, and it was a Communist victory as decisive as Dienbienphu.

Now our State Department's licensed soothsayers ask us to believe (Indeed, blandly assert that they themselves believe) the Communists are going to abandon the fruits of their victory, that having perhaps fatally breached our defenses in southeast Asia they are suddenly going to pack up and go home and permit the three clown princes to misrule in peace.

This bit of mythology would be difficult for any sane man to believe, even in the face of compelling evidence. Lacking any evidence (other than the wholly unsupported fable that somehow Russia now wants a truly neutral Laos, which it clearly did not want as recently as May), the myth Mr. Harriman brings home from Geneva is incredible nonsense.

It is easy enough to demolish this bit of mythology, but it is not so easy to understand why American policymakers who must know better are so busily trying to sell it.

Are the political consequences of the loss of all southeast Asia (a possibility Americans must begin to adjust to) so grim that truth and reality must be cast aside and

some cynical dementia substituted? It is not difficult to fool the American people over the short term, but it is historically impossible to fool them indefinitely. What myths will be hastily fabricated when the current folklore of Laos is exposed for the tawdry patchwork of falsehood that it is.

Is all this artful stagecraft being done so that 6 months or a year hence, when Laos is an overtly Communist state, when South Vietnam can no longer be saved, when Thailand may herself have begun the dance of death, that our State Department can point to this place in the past and say, "Who could have foreseen this? We had every reason to believe the Geneva agreement on Laos would work."

If indeed this is the rationale for the happy talk we now hear regarding Laos, then we are confronted with a historical conspiracy containing the seeds of unbounded mischief. For the truth is that the Geneva Pact on Laos is not a good agreement, that it can't and won't work, that it may well mark the turning point at which all southeast Asia was lost to the free world.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, adding a further disquieting note is a dispatch from Tokyo. Prince Souvanna Phouma was asked about the presence of 10,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos. Assistant Secretary of State Harriman allegedly declared that this number was in the country. This morning's New York Times carries an article on this subject, describing the situation.

We must continue to watch the progress in this area of the world very closely.

I ask unanimous consent to insert this article in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LAO CHIEF TACITLY ADMITS RED VIETNAM AID—HINTS HE HAS BEEN ASSURED ON TROOPS' WITHDRAWAL—SOUVANNA PHOUMA IN TOKYO, HALLS U.S. EXAMPLE

TOKYO, August 2.—Prince Souvanna Phouma, Premier of neutral Laos, tacitly acknowledged today the presence of North Vietnamese Communists in his country.

The Lao Premier, who has been holding talks on economic aid with Japanese officials, was asked at a news conference here to comment on a statement by Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman that the North Vietnamese had had 10,000 men in Laos. The leftist Pathet Lao, now represented in the neutral government, had denied that the North Vietnamese entered Laos to help them.

Prince Souvanna Phouma said that "according to contacts I have had with the North Vietnamese Government I am convinced that the 75-day period laid down in the Geneva agreement on Laos for the withdrawal of foreign troops would be respected."

U.S. EXAMPLE HAILED

"I am very glad that the United States has given an example in withdrawing its troops and hope that this example will be followed by others," he added.

It was not clear whether the Premier was alluding to the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Thailand or Washington's plans to recall U.S. military advisers in Laos.

The Prince also made it clear that he did not think any plan to rotate control of the Lao Army among the leftwing, neutralist and rightwing elements of the government could last long.

"Our intention is to arrive as soon as possible at the unification of the three forces into one single army," he said. "Then we shall proceed with demobilization suitable to our needs. This unification and partial demobilization will be completed within a year."

RELATIONS QUESTION STUDIED

Prince Souvanna Phouma, who arrived here yesterday after talks in Washington with President Kennedy, said his government was still studying the question whether it could have diplomatic relations with South Korea as well as North Korea, North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam and Communist China as well as Nationalist China.

But he said that the acceptance of the credentials of the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador was carried out under the previous rightist government and would have to be reviewed.

After talks with Premier Hayato Ikeda and other Japanese officials, the Lao Premier left Tokyo by plane for Hong Kong.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

CONVEYANCE OF CERTAIN PROPERTY IN THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, CALIF.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

THE LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 1108) authorizing the conveyance of certain property in the city of San Diego to the regents of the University of California.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services, with amendments, on page 2, at the beginning of line 20, to strike out "for a period of twenty years after the date of such conveyance for educational purposes; (b) if at any time during that period" and insert "so long as the property conveyed shall be used for educational purposes; (b) if at any time"; on page 3, line 6, after the word "therefor," to insert "Such deed of conveyance shall be subject to such other conditions as the Secretary of the Navy may deem appropriate to protect the interests of the United States."; and, in line 19, after the word "conditions", to strike out "established in section 3" and insert "prescribed in the first sentence of section 3"; so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy, or his designee, is authorized and directed when he determines that the following described land at Camp Matthews, California, is available for conveyance to the regents of the University of California for educational and related purposes, to convey said land, together with all improvements and appurtenances, to the regents of the University of California by quitclaim deed without monetary consideration therefor but upon the conditions set forth in this Act.

SEC. 2. The property to be conveyed comprising approximately 544 acres of land is more particularly described as follows: The easterly half of pueblo lot 1300; all of pueblo lot 1309; all of pueblo lot 1310; all of that portion of pueblo lot 1311 lying easterly of Pacific Highway and southerly of Miramar Road; all that portion of pueblo lot 1314

lying southerly of Miramar Road; all that portion of pueblo lot 1315 lying southerly of Miramar Road; all that portion of the westerly half of pueblo lot 1316 lying southerly of Miramar Road; said pueblo lands being according to the map thereof made by James Pascoe of 1870, a certified copy of which is filed as miscellaneous map numbered 36 in the office of the county recorder of San Diego County, California; excepting therefrom any property previously conveyed to the State of California or the city of San Diego for highway purposes.

SEC. 3. The deed of conveyance executed pursuant to this Act shall include the conditions that (a) such property shall be held by the regents of the University of California so long as the property conveyed shall be used for educational purposes; (b) if at any time the Secretary of the Navy determines, upon advice received from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, that the property so conveyed, is not held for such purposes, title thereto shall immediately revert to the United States; and (c) in the event of any such reversion, title to all improvements made thereon by the regents of the University of California during its occupancy shall vest in the United States without payment of compensation therefor. Such deed of conveyance shall be subject to such other conditions as the Secretary of the Navy may deem appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

SEC. 4. The regents of the University of California may exchange portions of the property described in section 2 for other adjacent lands of approximately equal value in order to develop such property boundaries as may be best suited for the purposes of the University of California.

SEC. 5. Section 3 shall be applicable in all respects to any land received by the regents of the University of California under the exchange provisions authorized in section 4, and any land conveyed by the regents of the University of California pursuant to such exchange shall be received by the grantee thereof free and clear of the conditions prescribed in the first sentence of section 3.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

MR. DODD obtained the floor.

MR. KEATING. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Connecticut yield to me briefly with the understanding that he shall not thereby lose his right to the floor?

MR. DODD. Mr. President, I shall be most happy to yield to my friend with the understanding that I shall not lose my right to the floor.

MR. KEATING. I appreciate that very much.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Connecticut yields to the Senator from New York.

NOMINATION OF JUDGE THURGOOD MARSHALL

MR. KEATING. Mr. President, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary has scheduled a hearing next week on the nomination of Judge Thurgood Marshall.

The hearing is scheduled for 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 8.

This will be the third hearing on this nomination, even though not a single witness has appeared in opposition to confirmation of the nomination of Judge Marshall. At the last hearing, the subcommittee was advised by committee counsel that a maximum of 2 or 3 hours

was required to complete his questioning of the nominee. However, the chairman of the subcommittee indicated that he could not estimate how long the questioning would go on.

Judge Marshall was first nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals on September 23, 1961. When the Senate adjourned shortly after that without action on the nomination, Judge Marshall was given a recess appointment by the President, and his nomination was again submitted to the Senate on January 15, 1962. He actually has been sitting as a Federal judge for more than 9 months.

It would be shocking if the Senate adjourned without confirming the nomination of Judge Marshall. No one familiar with his record can doubt his superb legal ability. Nothing has been presented at any of the subcommittee's hearings raising any question as to his character or judicial temperament. He record of actual service on the court already has won him the high praise of the chief judge.

Under these circumstances, there is no justification for the delay which has already occurred in acting on this nomination or for any further delay in acting on it. Whatever the intentions of the chairman of the subcommittee or the leadership, it is apparent that the longer we wait before completing action, the more vulnerable the nomination will be to any stalling tactics which may be tried. At the end of the sessions, as we all know, even the best laid plans and agreements—if there are any in this case—can go awry. I do not intend to permit this nomination of this distinguished New Yorker to be placed in such jeopardy.

Yesterday, after the date was set for the hearing, I made an effort to make certain that the next subcommittee hearing, scheduled for August 8 at 10:30 a.m., would be the last, and that a report would be made by the subcommittee upon the conclusion of that session. I secured the consent of the leadership on both sides of the aisle, who were very cooperative, to a proposed unanimous consent agreement which would have permitted the subcommittee to continue its hearing beyond noon on next Wednesday even if the Senate were in session. This would have enabled the subcommittee to meet for the maximum of 2 to 3 hours which counsel estimated was necessary to complete the record.

After obtaining the agreement of the leadership, the unanimous consent agreement was discussed with the chairman of the subcommittee. I regret to report that the chairman objected to the proposed request and indicated that he would not sit past noon on Wednesday. It was then suggested that the subcommittee meet at 9 a.m. on Wednesday, which would allow sufficient time under the counsel's estimate. This request also was turned down.

Now, since the action to permit the subcommittee to sit can only be taken by unanimous consent, even though the chairman of the subcommittee is not at the moment in the Chamber, I shall of course not propose a unanimous consent request, in the light of his statement.

These events of yesterday, considered in the light of the previous delay on the nomination, make it evident that there is no intention of completing action on this nomination on next Wednesday. Indeed, in view of the months of stalling with which this nomination has been confronted, I do not consider it out of order to question whether there is any intention to report this nomination at any time. I have been hopefully looking for some evidence that, after a reasonable period of inquiry, action would be forthcoming. But nothing has happened to justify the slightest optimism on this score.

I indicated earlier that I would move to discharge the subcommittee if it did not proceed with action on this nomination by August 1. Thereafter, a hearing was scheduled on August 1. This hearing was canceled because of objection to a unanimous consent request that the subcommittee be allowed to sit on August 1 while the Senate was in session. At the time the request was made it was assumed that the Senate would meet early on August 1, as it had been doing generally during the filibuster on the space satellite communications bill. As it turned out, the Senate did not convene until noon on August 1, but no effort was made to reschedule the hearing on that date.

Because the cancellation of the August 1 meeting was in no way the fault of the subcommittee, I indicated that I would wait until after the August 8 hearing, next Wednesday, before pursuing my discharge motion in the Committee on the Judiciary. In the light of the discussion with the chairman of the subcommittee yesterday, I wish to say, with utter frankness, that I shall feel it necessary to pursue my motion to discharge the subcommittee if it has not completed action on the nomination before the next meeting of the Committee on the Judiciary after August 8.

I serve notice that at the first meeting of the Committee on the Judiciary after August 8, if action on the nomination has not occurred, I shall ask for recognition for the purpose of moving to discharge the subcommittee from further consideration of this nomination and having it reported favorably to the Senate. I am confident that a substantial majority of the committee would support the nominee if given the opportunity to vote. I am equally confident that the Senate would vote to confirm overwhelmingly if given the opportunity to vote.

Furthermore, I have seen the staff memorandum which will be the basis for further questioning of the nominee if his hearings are prolonged, and I can say without reservation that there is nothing in the memorandum which would affect any Member's decision as to whether or not to support the nominee. Indeed I would have no objection, if the chairman of the subcommittee so desires, to having the staff memorandum included in its entirety in the record of the subcommittee's hearings in the event that questioning is not concluded at its August 8 hearing. The memorandum is a shotgun attack against the nomi-

nee which is loaded, however, with blank cartridges.

I am not naive enough to believe that it will be an easy matter to obtain recognition for my motion in the full committee and to have it brought to a vote. The same stalling tactics which have been used in the subcommittee can be used in the full committee. At the same time, I expect the cooperation of many members of the full committee and a determined effort to bring this matter to a head must be tried.

If it becomes obvious that the full committee will not be allowed to dispose of the matter, then the only recourse we will have will be to move in the Senate that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of the nomination.

While, as a member of the committee I would take this step with extreme reluctance, I refuse to stand by helplessly and permit this nomination to die. I believe in orderly procedure, but I do not consider the dilatory proceedings on this nomination to date an example of orderly procedure. There is ample precedent for a motion to discharge a committee from further consideration of a nomination and such a motion is expressly provided for in the rules of the Senate. Certainly, there will be every justification for invoking these rules and precedents in this case if that is the only way of giving the Senate an opportunity to express its will on this nomination.

I wish to express to my distinguished friend from Connecticut my deep appreciation for allowing me to intrude on his time. I shall necessarily be off the floor of the Senate during part of his address. I have read the address. It shows a great, deep study of the problem which the Senator will discuss. We all know that he speaks from a depth of sincerity on this or any other subject to which he addresses himself. I shall listen to as much of his address as possible. We owe him the gratitude of the Senate for having made the deep study which he has on the subject of the Congo and giving us the benefit of his enlightened views.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I appreciate the kind remarks of the distinguished Senator from New York, who is my dear friend as well. I was happy to yield to him. Before I came to the Chamber I had discussed the subject of the confirmation of the nomination of Thurgood Marshall with the Senator from New York and the plight of the nomination in the Committee on the Judiciary. I wish him to know that I share his views. I think it is an outrageous situation, and I shall support him in any effort he makes on the question at the time he undertakes such an effort.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. KEATING. I thank the Senator for his statement. I know the views which the Senator entertains about Judge Marshall and his being named to the court in whose jurisdiction the State of Connecticut falls. I am confident

that we will have the complete support of the Senator in our efforts to get the nomination confirmed.

Mr. DODD. Indeed, the Senator will have my support.

THE CONGO CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR CONCILIATION

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in the conduct of foreign policy, it sometimes happens that policies which have been conceived with care and soul searching and the best of intentions, demonstrate their futility at the point of implementation. When this happens, our policy can pursue one of two courses.

It can persist along the course whose futility has been demonstrated; or it can seek a new approach, while frankly explaining the alteration of course to the American people. The American people do not expect infallibility. They are, I am sure, wise enough to understand that, in the complex conduct of foreign policy, flexibility and alterations of course are sometimes essential.

Mr. President, I believe that the time has come for such an alteration of course in the conduct of our Congo policy. I believe that, unless we face up to this fact frankly, we court disaster in this strategic area of the world.

When I last spoke about the Congo situation in the Senate on January 25, I purposely limited my remarks. I said that I felt that a frank and detailed presentation might have an adverse effect on the delicately poised political situation in the Congo and on the critical discussions then in process between the Central Government and the Government of Katanga. I pointed out that, for the same reason, I had taken the stand that the hearings then in process under the separate auspices of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, should be held in executive session.

Despite my own grave misgivings about our policy in the Congo, I believed that, so long as bloodshed was avoided, this policy should be given an opportunity to prove itself. Although I made no public statement, I communicated at length on several occasions with the Department of State to ask clarification on certain points and to express misgivings on other points.

But since our policy is now clearly at an impasse, and since we seem to be headed in the direction of another round of bloodletting, I feel that the time has now come to speak out and to tell the American people the incredible story of how and where our Congo policy went off the tracks. I plan to tell this story in some detail, because it is only thus that it can be properly understood.

In the Congo situation to date, we have sought to use the U.N. not as an essential vehicle of our foreign policy, which it is, but as a substitute for a foreign policy of our own, which it is not. We have supported the dangerous precedent of using military forces under U.N. command for the purpose of bringing about the reunification of the Congo or, to be more exact, for the purpose of

forcing the submission of the Province of Katanga to the Central Government in Léopoldville.

Our Congo policy has been a product of the utopian tendency to regard the U.N. as a kind of neutral and benevolent international organism, which by its nature, seeks to compromise conflicting national interests in a manner that best benefits the international community. This utopian concept of the U.N. has led us, in a number of situations, to submit passively to the will of the massive Afro-Asian bloc.

In reality, the U.N. is an organization with no policy of its own; its policy in any given situation is something that emerges from a contest between contending interests. If, in concert with our allies, we fight hard for our own point of view, and if we do our utmost to mobilize support for it, then the action taken by the U.N. may serve to promote our national interests and the interests of freedom. But if we show less determination than the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs, if we show ourselves willing to compromise on our principles, the U.N. may pursue a course that runs counter to our interests and undermines the cause of freedom.

We cannot expect our point of view to prevail in every situation. But to a very large degree it depends on the great nations of the free world whether the U.N., in any given situation, serves as a force for good or for evil.

It should now be clear to all that the U.N. policy in the Congo is not paying off. The consequences of this policy, in fact, run completely counter to our stated objective in the Congo.

We seek unity in the Congo. But, with force and threats of force as our chief instruments, no formula has yet been found for regulating the relationship between Katanga and the Central Government. For that matter, it is generally admitted today that the authority of the Central Government barely exists outside Léopoldville.

We seek to encourage the forces of moderation. But our policy has thus far only served to encourage the extremists in the Central Government who desire nothing less than the total submission of Katanga; while, on the other side, it has only served to inflame the spirit of nationalism among the peoples of Katanga and to harden their resistance.

We seek economic stability for the Congo. But the Congo, outside Katanga, is still spiraling down and down and down in the direction of total economic chaos. Industries are not operating; revenues are not being collected; unemployment is massive; the budget is more than twice as great as the Government's anticipated income; and the corruption and inefficiency of the Léopoldville government have now become an international scandal.

We have committed ourselves to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of civil war as prime objectives in the Congo. But there has in recent weeks been talk in the press of the possibility that the U.N. will take military action against Katanga, or else will support an invasion of Katanga by the National

Congolese Army, or alternatively, will seek broad economic sanctions against Katanga.

I do not believe there is a single person in the Department of State who relishes the prospect of another round of military action against Katanga or of committing the U.N. forces to the support of the Léopoldville government in a civil war with Katanga. They know that U.N. military action in Katanga has thus far achieved no positive results. They know that, in consequence of these actions, many European technicians and businessmen have left Katanga. They know how undisciplined and how untrustworthy the National Congolese Army is, and of the terrible atrocities perpetrated by certain units of this army at Kindu and Kongola and Albertville and other points.

Civil war between Léopoldville and Katanga would not be a simple civil war, but a civil war superimposed on a tribal war and a U.N. war. Such a war might conceivably destroy whatever vestige of order still remains in the Congo, and turn the country over, first to chaos, and then to communism.

But, in the face of all these things, those in charge of our Congo policy are, according to the press, so frustrated by the stubborn refusal of the Congo situation to respond to their ministrations, that they are now thinking in terms of an all-out military action to crush Tshombe and Katanga, or else of economic sanctions—which might very well lead to military action.

I submit, Mr. President, that in the case of the Congo it is the diagnosis and the treatment that have been at fault rather than the patient. If we cannot find the candor to face up to this fact, if we persist in the treatment that has thus far only aggravated the condition, then we may very well wind up by killing the patient.

Mr. President, in order to understand what is happening today in the Congo, and where we have gone wrong, it is necessary to go back to the beginning and examine the sequence of events since July 1960, when the Congo received its independence.

COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN THE CONGO

In evaluating the Congo crisis, there are three basic background facts that should always be kept in mind.

The first fact is that the free world and the Communist world are playing for enormously high economic stakes in the Congo.

Control of Katanga would place the Soviets in a position to completely dominate the world's greatest complex of mineral resources.

Katanga is enormously rich in its own right. It provides 8 percent of the world's copper, 70 percent of the world's cobalt, 80 percent of the world's germanium—from which transistors are made—and large quantities of other precious minerals. But beyond this, it is the heartland of the vast mineral wealth of the African Continent.

Most of this mineral wealth is contained in one large oval cluster, about

500 miles in width and 800 miles in depth. Within the perimeter of this oval, in addition to the mineral wealth of Katanga, there are the diamond mines of South Africa and Rhodesia, the gold mines of South Africa, bauxite, asbestos, manganese, platinum, chromium, iron, and many other minerals.

The second basic fact is that the Congo is also the center of what might be described as a belt of political vulnerability stretching across the southern portion of the African Continent. If political vulnerability were indicated by shadings, Portuguese Angola on the west of the Congo, Northern Rhodesia on the south, and Portuguese Mozambique on the east, would have to be depicted in dark gray. The establishment of a Communist regime in the Congo would enable the Kremlin to take over all of the countries within this band of political vulnerability, and this with very little effort or delay.

Once this were done, the Kremlin would have bases on both the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Having bisected the African Continent, it would then be in a position to push north and to push south, to complete its conquest of the African Continent.

The Congo, therefore, is the key to the control of the African Continent, economically, politically, and militarily. This is basic fact No. 2.

Basic fact No. 3 has to do with the strategy of political conquest which the Kremlin has designed for this portion of Africa. This strategy is incredibly simple, incredibly cruel, and has proved itself incredibly effective. It seeks to drive out the white people by violence and terror, thus creating a vacuum which only the Communists can fill. Indeed, I am informed that the Communists are offering large sums of cash to African nationalist leaders for "delivered" acts of violence against whites.

There is no large Communist Party in the Congo, as there is in Italy or in Indonesia, or other countries. In terms of formal membership, the Communist Party in the Congo may appear to be nothing to worry about. But the Communists do not need a mass party to take over in a backward country like the Congo, where there is no coherent or sophisticated political opposition, where primitive passions can easily be inflamed, and where a single agitator, with little schooling, can produce a fantastic amount of disorganization and chaos.

To the extent that the Congo is held together economically, it is dependent on the core of white technicians who work in its mines, its plantations and its industries, to the white teachers who staff its schools and universities, to the white doctors who will have to staff its hospitals for many years to come, to the missionaries who have done so much to bring peace and order and civilization to the Congo. A single incident, however, is sufficient to persuade thousands of white people to leave the Congo, taking with them their families and a critical portion of the fabric of order and civilization.

Before the massacre of the 13 Italian airmen at Kindu last November, there

were approximately 1,000 white technicians in the city, most of them associated with Kindu's great river port facilities. After the massacre, I was told, only 50 of these white technicians remained.

Such is the terrible price of the violence fanned by Lumumba and the agents of Moscow.

THE CONGO GETS ITS INDEPENDENCE

The Congo got its independence on June 30, 1960. On July 6, 1960, as if at a given signal, soldiers throughout the Congo mutinied against their white officers, and berserk demonstrators rampaged through the residential areas of Congolese cities in a national orgy of murder, mayhem, rape, and pillaging. Even medical doctors and missionaries, who had lived on the friendliest of terms with native communities in the bush, found themselves attacked by savage bands of drunken natives.

Instead of attempting to restrain his countrymen and restore order, Patrice Lumumba, as Prime Minister, fanned the flames and incited his people with demagogic appeals to black racism. He placed himself completely behind the mutiny of the soldiers and rewarded them by promoting each man at least one rank and by establishing the highest rate of pay in the world for the Congolese Army, a rate of pay, in fact, that is more than twice that of the American GI.

The reaction to the July events was a mass flight of Belgian technicians, administrators, and medical men. For more than a week, Sabena Airlines diverted its entire fleet to the Congo to remove the terrified refugees.

To protect Belgian lives and property, the Belgian Government sent several units of paratroops back to the Congo. It was at this point that Lumumba appealed to the U.N., requesting the urgent dispatch of U.N. military assistance to protect the Congo against Belgian military intervention. Meeting on the night of July 13 and 14, the Security Council adopted a Tunisian resolution calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorizing the Secretary General to provide such military assistance as might be necessary until the Congolese security forces were in a position to fully meet their tasks. The first troops of the U.N. force arrived in the Congo 2 days later. And this was the beginning of the U.N. Congo army which today numbers some 15,000 men.

Meanwhile, on July 11, President Tshombe had proclaimed Katanga an independent country, after moving resolutely to put down a mutiny among the troops stationed in Elisabethville and to restore public order in the Province. In explaining his action, President Tshombe pointed to the disorders that were rampant throughout the northern Congo. "I am seceding from chaos," he said.

The United Nations did not recognize Katanga's secession. On the other hand, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld refused Lumumba's demand for U.N. intervention and took the stand that the U.N. force could not become a party to internal conflicts in the Congo. Dr.

Ralph Bunche, U.N. representative in the Congo during the first 2 months, announced on August 4, after speaking to Tshombe, that the entry of U.N. troops into Katanga had been suspended.

In the free world, the Katanga secession met with a mixed reaction. The general desire was to see the Congo both free and united. But with the rest of the Congo in the grip of violence and anarchy, with the Lumumbaists running berserk, with Communist influence at the danger point, there were many people who felt that there was much to be said for the Katanga secession; and there were many more, I know, who felt that judgment on the action should be suspended until we knew where the rest of the Congo was heading.

During the months of July and August, Soviet and Czechoslovak and other Communist bloc technicians poured into the Congo by the hundreds. At the height, there were some 600 of these experts in Léopoldville, attached to the Communist embassies. Western intelligence agencies were also able to trace the influx of fantastic sums of Communist money. Communist arms and trucks and planes began to arrive, most of them through Stanleyville.

It seemed as though nothing could save the Congo.

We have been told repeatedly over the past year that the U.N. saved the Congo from communism. The U.N. did no such thing. The Congo was saved by the courageous action of two men, President Tshombe of Katanga, and Colonel Mobutu. As Colonel Mobutu—now General Mobutu—told me personally when I was in the Congo last November, the U.N., under Rajeshwar Dayal, did everything in its power to undercut his position and to impede his operations against Lumumba and the Lumumbaists. Indeed, Dayal, until the very end of his term, refused to recognize the legality of the new government. These are facts.

Recognizing Tshombe as an arch-enemy, Lumumba attempted to invade Katanga in the month of August. He suffered a disastrous and humiliating defeat, which weakened his hold on the government and facilitated his overthrow.

In mid-September, 1960, Colonel Mobutu overthrew the government of Lumumba, ordered the Communist embassies and technicians out of the Congo, and set up the so-called College of High Commissioners, consisting of young university graduates, to administer the country on an interim basis.

But the damage wrought by Lumumba before he was overthrown was so great that, even given the most favorable developments, it will take years and conceivably decades for the Congo to recover. The fabric of social order in a primitive country like the Congo, once it is shattered, is about as difficult to put together again as Humpty Dumpty's fragile shell.

When I was in the Congo last November, I was told that the Congolese National Army had remained in a state of chronic mutiny and banditry ever since the uprising of July 6, 1960. The condition of the army has not improved in recent months. Instead of being a

source of security, the army remains the chief source of insecurity in the country. There are possibly several thousand soldiers in the army who may be considered reasonably disciplined. The rest of the 25,000 men, while receiving their pay, are terrorizing the populace and defying every effort to bring them under control. To my mind, there has probably never been a more preposterous situation. On the one hand, the American taxpayer is being called upon to subsidize an army of bandits and mutineers whose GI's get paid at the fantastic rate of more than \$180 per month, compared with \$85 per month for the American GI. On the other hand, the American taxpayer is being called upon to pay the lion's share of the bill for a U.N. army whose prime function, in the Congo north of Katanga has been to defend the Congolese people against their own army. It is high time that an end was called to this nonsense.

When Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake arrived in the Congo in early July 1960, it was immediately apparent to him that the restoration of discipline in the Congolese Army took precedence over everything else, and he made repeated representations to this effect. A disciplined army would contribute to social and political stability. An undisciplined army was bound to make an already chaotic situation every more chaotic.

The U.N. might have brought the situation under control when it first came into the Congo had it acted resolutely and immediately to disarm the mutineers, disband the worst units, and restore order in the others. But the U.N. could not make up its mind that it had the authority to take such action; and, under the regime of Rajeshwar Dayal, who became U.N. director for the Congo on August 20, 1960, the U.N. seemed to be far more interested in supporting Lumumba and undermining Mobutu than it was in restoring discipline in the Congo Army.

The result was that nothing was done.

Today, no one has a solution for this situation. Among the people with whom I spoke, there was agreement that the mutineers are beyond retraining; it was also agreed that the 5,000 or 6,000 U.N. troops thinly scattered through the vast area of the Congo outside Katanga, cannot possibly undertake to disarm these soldiers turned bandits.

In any country which has only recently emerged from the jungle, the maintenance of order is the beginning of everything. In the absence of order and effective government, the once-rich Belgian Congo has become an economic wasteland. The production of staple crops like cotton and rice has fallen to one-third and one-fourth of preindependence level. In the city of Léopoldville almost half the labor force is out of work. Government revenues are not being collected. Even with the massive subsidies from the U.N., from Belgium, and from the United States, the Congo Government stands on the brink of insolvency and breakdown.

For much of this mess in the Congo, Patrice Lumumba and his racist and Muscovite cohorts are to blame. But frankness demands that at least a por-

tion of the blame be assessed against the ineptness of a U.N. policy that has made the forced submission of Katanga its prime objective rather than the restoration of order in the rest of the Congo.

THE QUESTION OF CONGOLESE UNITY

We have talked about unity in the Congo. But the word "unity" can have many meanings.

When the Kremlin talks of unity, it means unity under Soviet control.

When Nehru and Krishna Menon speak of unity, they mean unity that corresponds with their neutralist philosophy and serves their own interests.

Left to themselves, the people of the Congo would have a concept of unity that corresponds neither to the Soviet concept nor to the Indian.

As for ourselves, I hope that when we speak of unity, we mean the kind of unity that is freely acceptable to the peoples of the Congo, with no foreign intervention or a minimum of such intervention, limited to friendly assistance and advice.

What has happened since the first part of last year can be understood only in the light of the conflict between these differing concepts of Congolese unity.

Left to themselves, or given a decent minimum of encouragement and assistance, I earnestly believe that the Congolese leaders could have achieved an agreement on reunification that would have been acceptable to all sides. Indeed I believe that the Congolese leaders were several times on the verge of achieving such unity when their efforts were scuttled by the Afro-Asian extremists in the United Nations, who wished to see unity on their terms only.

The overthrow of Lumumba encouraged the Congolese leaders, in Katanga and Kasai, as well as in Léopoldville, to think again in terms of national unity. They were further encouraged to think of unity because of the threat posed by Antoine Gizenga's rival government, which had been established in Stanleyville in mid-November with Soviet bloc support, and because of their grave dissatisfaction with United Nations policy under Dayal.

THE TANANARIVE CONFERENCE

On March 6, 1961, on the prime initiative of President Tshombe, a conference of Congolese leaders convened at Tananarive, the capital of Madagascar, or Malagasay, as it is now known. Only Gizenga, among the top-ranking leaders was absent. The conference terminated in an agreement—the so-called Tananarive Agreement—proposing a loose confederation of states, under the presidency of Mr. Kasavubu. There was to be a council of states composed of President Kasavubu and the heads of the member states; and there was to be an executive coordinating body, appointed by the member governments, to carry out the council's decisions. The agreement was signed by Kasavubu, Tshombe, Kalonji, and other leaders.

I know there are some who say that the Tananarive Agreement, had it been implemented, would have paved the way to the Balkanization of the Congo, with secessionist states springing up all over the place. But there are others who be-

lieve that the 2-page document was couched in such vague and general language that it could have been interpreted in a dozen different ways, for better or for worse.

For my own part, I feel that the Tananarive Agreement had unique possibilities precisely because it was achieved voluntarily, and on the basis of Congolese initiative. I believe that had we taken the Tananarive Agreement as a starting point, and had we used our influence in a friendly way, to urge tightening up where we felt it needed tightening up, Tananarive might have led to a viable and enduring arrangement.

Tananarive was bitterly attacked by the Afro-Asian extremists and by the Communists. They attacked with particular virulence Tananarive's proposal to bypass or ignore the Lumumbaist-dominated Parliament. But I have reason to believe that there were in our Department of State those who looked upon Tananarive with an open mind, who felt that we should accept it as a point of departure, rather than reject it out of hand. In this connection, I should like to quote a passage from the New York Herald Tribune of April 6, 1960:

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru feels that the United States and other Western Powers have accepted too willingly the decisions of the Congolese leaders at the Malagasay conference, which, in the Indian view, are invalid unless they are ratified by a meeting of the Congolese Assembly. And from Delhi a meeting of that assembly looks as far off as ever.

This was a period of bustling and mysterious activity on the question of the Congo. The Congolese Government had publicly and repeatedly demanded the recall of Dayal as chief United Nations representative. On April 4, 1961, for example, the New York Times reported:

Last Tuesday, Mario Cardoso, Congolese representative at the United Nations, charged that a solution of the Congo problem had been prevented by what he termed the refusal of Mr. Dayal to consult with officials of President Kasavubu's regime.

It was no secret, either, that the relations between Ambassador Timberlake and Rajeshwar Dayal had been embittered from the beginning. Ambassador Timberlake is a man who believes profoundly in the United Nations, and he was one of the first to urge that the U.N. be brought into the Congo. But he felt that the U.N., in many respects, had failed to perform its essential functions, and that Dayal had perverted the intent of the U.N.'s intervention in supporting Lumumba and undercutting Mobutu.

The public record indicates that Prime Minister Nehru and his foreign policy adviser, Krishna Menon, bitterly resisted the demands that Dayal be recalled. In dealing with this matter, the New York Times said in the article of April 4, 1961, from which I have already quoted:

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru warned today that activities to oust Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian who heads the United Nations mission in the Congo, could have "some effect on the maintenance of our forces there."

It is to be noted that in making this statement, Nehru was, in effect, threatening blackmail; he was saying that if Dayal were not retained, the Indian forces serving the U.N. might be recalled. Since India appeared to be the only major source of Afro-Asian troops for the Congo operation, the recall of these troops would have had a crippling effect on the entire military operation in the Congo.

THE COQUILHATVILLE CONFERENCE

On April 24, shortly after Prime Minister Nehru made the statements I have quoted—and I ask that this sequence be carefully noted—the Congolese political leaders convened at Coquilhatville, for the purpose of pursuing the discussions initiated at Tananarive in March.

What had happened in the interim period, I, of course, do not know. But it is clear that President Kasavubu, Foreign Minister Bomboko, and the other Léopoldville conferees had, for some reason, decided that the loose confederation to which they had agreed at Tananarive was no longer adequate. In addition, they had decided in favor of reconvening the Lumumbaist-dominated Parliament, which the Tananarive agreement had proposed to bypass. President Tshombe was imprisoned for 6 weeks, until he accepted the terms of a new agreement, calling for a more centralized form of government and for the reconvening of Parliament.

On May 13, President Kasavubu announced that Parliament would be reconvened in July. Nehru's basic demand had now been met.

On May 25, Rajeshwar Dayal's resignation as U.N. Congo representative was announced by the U.N.

THE RECALL OF TIMBERLAKE

In the June 5, 1961, issue, Newsweek's "Periscope," reporting on the resignation of Dayal, stated that Dayal's chief critics, United States Ambassador Timberlake and British Ambassador Ian Scott, would be recalled within several weeks, as a sequel to Nehru's acceptance of Dayal's resignation.

What happened then? In early June, without any explanation, other than the questionable explanation that he needed a rest, Ambassador Timberlake was recalled. His recall, in my opinion, marked the turning point in our Congo policy. It marked a victory for those officials and advisers in the Department of State who attach transcendent importance to the conduct of our foreign policy to the task of pleasing Nehru. Since Nehru believes in coalition governments with pro-Communist elements in Laos, the Congo, and other points, these advisers apparently also believe in the viability of such governments.

The recall of Timberlake raises many questions.

Here was an outstanding State Department officer, with a record of more than 30 years of service in many countries, an Ambassador who was worshipped by his staff and who commanded the admiration and affection of every American correspondent in the Congo, an Ambassador who had not

hesitated to stand up to the U.N. representative when he felt that this representative was violating the intent of the U.N. or failing to carry out this intent. After spending 11 months in the Congo, he has mastered the incredible intricacies of its politics, and had reached the point of maximum utility. And yet, for some mysterious reason it was decided to recall this Ambassador without any explanation—and to recall him so hurriedly that no replacement was available to take over at the point of his recall. Ambassador Gullion, who replaced Ambassador Timberlake, did not arrive in the Congo until early September, 3 months after Timberlake's departure.

Ambassador Timberlake's unceremonious recall was all the more perplexing because it coincided with one of the most critical periods in the history of the Congo. At the Coquilhatville Conference it had been decided that the Congolese Parliament would be reconvened at the University of Louvanum in Léopoldville toward the end of July. To this Parliament, with its heavily Lumumbaist majority, was to be entrusted the task of electing the future government of the Congo.

There was a serious danger that the Louvanum Conference might result in the election of a government headed by Gizenga or some other pro-Communist. It was obviously in our interests to use our influence—with propriety, but nevertheless with energy—to help assure the election of a middle-of-the-road government. Our interest at least demanded that during the critical weeks preceding the Louvanum Conference, we have on the spot a senior political officer of superior ability, possessing an intimate knowledge of the Congo situation. But the fact is that during this entire critical period our Embassy remained without an Ambassador.

The State Department is a complex organization, and I do not pretend to know who in the Department was responsible for Ambassador Timberlake's recall. But from the sequence of events, it would almost appear that whoever was responsible was so determined to get Ambassador Timberlake out of the country before the Louvanum Conference, that they were untroubled over the prospect of leaving the Embassy without an Ambassador.

I want to repeat to the Senators that the recall of Ambassador Timberlake raises a most serious question. As I have pointed out, Newsweek's "Periscope," several weeks in advance of Ambassador Timberlake's recall, forecast that he would be recalled as a sequel to the recall of Dayal. In short, it appears to have been a horse swap.

I cannot state with certainty that the Newsweek account was accurate. But I can state with certainty that it is believed to be accurate by many American correspondents who have followed the Congo situation closely. Indeed, one of the most universally respected political editors in this country told me that he would stake his personal reputation on the fact that Timberlake was horse swapped for Dayal. I can also state with certainty that, despite many inquiries,

I have thus far not heard any other explanation of the Timberlake recall which makes sense.

As my final observation on the Timberlake matter, I find it disturbing that this senior and respected officer, upon his recall from the Congo, was assigned to an obscure position as State Department representative to the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Ala.

Perhaps it was all a matter of coincidence. Perhaps it was also a matter of coincidence that Mr. Jerome Lavallee, the U.N. adviser to the Office of Central African Affairs, who had originally been assigned the task of maintaining friendly relations with the Katanga representative in this country, was transferred to the Commerce Department.

Perhaps it is also a matter of coincidence that within the past few days, Mr. Lewis Hoffacker, the American Consul in Elisabethville, has been transferred to another post. Mr. Hoffacker had performed the incredible diplomatic feat of maintaining a friendly relationship with Tshombe, while faithfully representing a State Department policy which Tshombe felt opposed him at every point. Indeed, at the present time, Hoffacker is probably the only member of the American Foreign Service who commands Tshombe's personal respect and for whom he has feelings of friendship.

I am constrained to ask whether this is the reason why this outstanding consular officer, after less than 10 months in Elisabethville, has been transferred to another post.

THE CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES AT LOUVANUM

I am not revealing any secrets when I say that during the period preceding the Louvanum Conference, and even during the Conference itself, there was considerable jockeying for influence by the U.N., by ourselves, by the Afro-Asians, and by Soviet agents. Indeed, anyone who has knowledge of such things would take it for granted that the interested nations and agencies did not sit on the sidelines, in a condition of complete neutrality and passivity, waiting to see what kind of government the Congolese Parliament would elect.

As I see it, the positions of the interested parties in the period preceding the Louvanum Conference were approximately as follows:

The Soviets were aiming for a Moscow-oriented government under Gizenga as Prime Minister, as their first choice. As a second choice, they were willing to consider a coalition in which the pro-Soviet and neutralist elements were "properly" represented.

Nehru and the Afro-Asian extremists were aiming for an Adoula-Gizenga coalition—and they might even have been willing to go along with a Gizenga-Adoula coalition, that is, a coalition with Gizenga in the No. 1 spot, had such a thing come into being. To Krishna Menon, I am certain, the emergence of such a government would have been a cause for delight. The one variant all the Afro-Asian extremists would have found completely unacceptable was a moderate pro-Western coalition cen-

tered around the personalities of Adoula and Tshombe.

The U.N. representatives, whose position and philosophy require that they attempt to satisfy all sides—the Communist bloc, the Afro-Asians, and the West—favored the creation of an across-the-board coalition containing pro-Communist elements, neutralists, moderates, conservatives, and some pro-Western elements. In short, they favored an Adoula-Gizenga coalition, and in this sense their policy ran parallel to that of Nehru and the Afro-Asian extremists.

The position of the State Department was somewhat more complicated. An Adoula-Gizenga coalition was acceptable to it, although I know there were members of the Department who had grave reservations about the viability of such a coalition. On the other hand, a government with Gizenga in the No. 1 position was completely unacceptable; if it appeared that the only choice was between a Gizenga government and an Adoula-Tshombe coalition, then despite the sensitivities of the Nehru bloc, the preference of everyone in the Department was clearly for the latter variant.

THE STRUELENS MISSION

At this point, we come to another part of the untold story of the Congo.

The fact is that, for several days' time, when there appeared to be a serious possibility that Gizenga would emerge the victor at the Louvanum Conference, the State Department seemed to be veering in the direction of an Adoula-Tshombe government. It made strenuous efforts to persuade President Tshombe to send his Parliamentarians to Louvanum and it even asked Mr. Michel Struelens, director of the Katanga Information Service in New York, to leave for the Congo on several hours' notice in an effort to effect an agreement with President Tshombe.

The State Department has on several occasions denied that Mr. Struelens went on a mission for it. These denials are evidence of how seriously the responsible heads of the Department can sometimes be misled by faulty information from their subordinates. I should like to tell the story of the Struelens mission briefly because I consider the Struelens mission to be another turning point in the evolution of our Congo policy.

On July 28, 1961, Mr. Struelens visited the Department of State in the company of Jean-Marie Pwetto, Vice President of the Katanga Parliament, Mr. Henri Kambolo, President of the Kona-kat Party, and Mr. Thomas Tshombe, brother of the President.

Mr. Struelens had enjoyed a friendly and cooperative relationship with the Department since he arrived here in October 1960. He and his party were received by Mr. Vance, director of the Central African desk, and Mr. Jerome Lavallee, United Nations adviser to the Office of Central African Affairs. Mr. Vance and Mr. Lavallee stated that they had just received news indicating that the Lumumbaists enjoyed a dangerous degree of influence in the Parliament and they were seriously concerned over the possibility that Gizenga would be elected

Prime Minister. They stated that it was extremely important to have the Katanga Parliamentarians go to Léopoldville in order to prevent a Gizenga majority.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the New York Times, on July 27—that is, the day before Mr. Struelens' conference with the State Department—carried a dispatch from its Congo correspondent, Henry Tanner, which stated that, in the election of officers of the Chamber of Deputies:

The followers of Antoine Gizenga, head of the Soviet-backed Congo regime in Stanleyville, won an impressive victory yesterday. * * * The extent of the victory by the Gizenga forces came as a surprise to Congolese political observers here. It caused speculation that Mr. Gizenga might have a better chance than was commonly expected to become Premier of a national coalition government.

Mr. Vance suggested that Struelens, together with his three Katangan visitors, try to work out the text of an agreement between the Department of State and President Tshombe that would make possible the immediate dispatch of Katanga Parliamentarians to Léopoldville. Mr. Struelens dictated the text of the suggested agreement to Mr. Lavalée in French. In essence, it covered the following points:

First. Tshombe would send the Katanga Parliamentarians to the Louvanium Conference forthwith.

Second. The Department of State would undertake to assure United Nations protection for the Katanga delegation.

Third. With the participation of Katanga in the Louvanium Conference assured, the United States would not take a stand prejudicial to Katanga in the further political discussions that were bound to ensue.

Fourth. The State Department would issue a statement commending President Tshombe for his decision to participate in the Louvanium Conference.

The text of the agreement was sent upstairs to a higher office, where it received approval. Whereupon, using Mr. Lavalée's telephone, and with Mr. Lavalée standing beside him and checking the text as he read it, Mr. Struelens dictated the proposed agreement to his secretary in New York for immediate transmission to President Tshombe via telex. The State Department representatives had a call put through to Dr. Ralph Bunche of the United Nations; and before Mr. Struelens' departure that afternoon they were able to assure him that the U.N. would guarantee the safety of the Katanga Parliamentarians in Léopoldville.

On the morning of July 31, Mr. Struelens received a call from Mr. Lavalée. Mr. Lavalée told him that the State Department had not yet received a reply to the telex of July 28, and that time was running out. He asked Mr. Struelens whether he could leave that afternoon for the Congo in an effort to persuade President Tshombe to accept the agreement and to dispatch his Parliamentarians to the Louvanium Conference.

Mr. Struelens agreed to go, and he left that afternoon by Air France. He paid for the roundtrip ticket out of the funds of the Katanga Information Service.

Stopping at Brazzaville, capital of the former French Congo, Mr. Struelens had a meeting with Mr. Wilton W. Blancke, the American Ambassador, and with Mr. Robert Eisenberg, deputy director of the Office of Central African Affairs, who happened to be in Brazzaville at the time because he was returning from a conference in Lagos. That afternoon, Mr. Struelens left Brazzaville in the company of Mr. Eisenberg and flew directly to Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga.

I want to point out that at the time Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Struelens arrived in Elisabethville, Tshombe had his Parliamentarians already assembled and ready to leave for Léopoldville as soon as a decision was made.

Mr. Struelens met several times with President Tshombe and arranged for several meetings between President Tshombe and Mr. Eisenberg, who was accompanied by William C. Canup, American consul in Elisabethville.

Each time I saw President Tshombe in advance—

Said Mr. Struelens—

I asked him to drop any other matter. I told him that he had to see these gentlemen first, and he did this.

Finally, on August 3, President Tshombe accepted the proposed agreement without reservation.

But that afternoon the radio brought the news that the Louvanium Conference had elected a Government with Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister and Antoine Gizenga as Vice Premier.

President Tshombe had since charged that this coalition was a product of a desperate effort by the U.N. to head off the prospect of an Adoula-Tshombe coalition. I believe there is something to this charge, since the U.N. Secretariat could not help but be sensitive to the fact that an Adoula-Tshombe coalition would have been bitterly opposed not only by the Communist nations, but by Nehru and Sukarno and other Afro-Asian leaders. I believe it is a matter of record, too, that Mr. Linner has accepted personal credit for persuading Gizenga to enter into a coalition with Adoula in the No. 2 slot.

At the moment that the formation of the Adoula-Gizenga coalition was announced, both Mr. Struelens and Mr. Eisenberg believed that the agreement with Tshombe still could and should be acted on. It was agreed that Mr. Struelens, despite the personal danger to himself, should leave immediately for Léopoldville for the purpose of discussing the situation with Mr. Linner. Mr. Eisenberg gave Mr. Struelens a letter to Ambassador Blancke; Ambassador Blancke, when Mr. Struelens arrived in Brazzaville, put through a telephone call to the American Embassy in Léopoldville; and a few hours later, Mr. Struelens was met at the Léopoldville end of the Congo ferry by two members of the Embassy staff who got him past the river guards by pretending that he was an American consular officer.

Struelens was then driven in the Embassy car to U.N. headquarters, where he met with Mr. Linner. He told Mr. Linner that President Tshombe wished to meet with Prime Minister Adoula promptly in an effort to settle their differences, but that the meeting would have to be set up in some other place than Léopoldville. He said that President Tshombe could not agree to Léopoldville because of his imprisonment by the Léopoldville authorities at the time of the Coquilhatville Conference.

To this, Mr. Linner replied that the meeting would have to take place in Léopoldville, and he confirmed this with a telephone call to Prime Minister Adoula in Mr. Struelens' presence.

When Mr. Struelens returned to the United States, he was thanked by the State Department for the job he had done. According to Mr. Struelens, however, the State Department officials now took the stand that Tshombe would have to bow to the accomplished fact of the Adoula-Gizenga government, and that if he did not bow, force would have to be used against him.

It would appear that the State Department performed this drastic about-turn because it felt that it no longer needed Tshombe to offset the threat of a Gizenga takeover in Léopoldville. An Adoula-Gizenga coalition was acceptable to us. It was highly acceptable to Nehru and the Afro-Asians. It was highly acceptable to Moscow. Everyone was happy.

Since I am primarily concerned today with what happened in the Congo, I do not wish to go into the lamentable story of how the State Department, after thus using Mr. Struelens, 2 months later revoked his visa, and of the pointless and unjust vendetta it conducted against him. This is a separate story and it will, I believe, be told to the American people in due course, I hope very soon.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOUVANIUM

There is still a tendency in official circles to defend the Louvanium Conference as a great triumph for American policy. It was no such thing. On the contrary, if it was a triumph for anyone, it was a triumph for Nehru and Krishna Menon and the anti-Western neutralists. And the Communist press for the period indicates that the Communists at least regarded it as a step in the right direction.

We must accept the situation that exists today as a starting point for any future efforts. The Louvanium Conference cannot be completely undone, and I do not propose that we attempt the impossible task of turning the political clock back to the situation that existed prior to Louvanium. But I think it is important to be honest with ourselves in evaluating its consequences.

It was not a triumph for the free world when Adoula and Gizenga traveled together to the Belgrade Conference and voted for all of the malicious anti-Western resolutions adopted by the conference.

It was not a triumph for Western policy when Prime Minister Adoula, in deference to the desires of his government, invited the Soviet bloc to reopen their

Embassies in the Congo—the very Embassies, I wish to point out, that had almost succeeded in converting the Congo into a Soviet satellite 1 year previously.

It was not a victory for the free world when, just before the September action in Katanga, the Adoula government appointed Egide Bochely-Davidson, one of the most notorious pro-Communists in the Congo, as Administrator for Katanga. Let me state at this point, that while there are some politicians in the Congo about whose political views doubt exists, I have yet to meet a single person who will challenge the statement that Bochely-Davidson is one of the most confirmed and dangerous leftists in the Congo. Had the September military action succeeded in overthrowing the government of President Tshombe, and had Bochely-Davidson, backed by U.N. bayonets, been installed in power as Administrator for Katanga, the great mineral wealth of Katanga might today be a Soviet asset.

Nor was it a victory for the free world when the Louvanium Conference, in its attempts to satisfy everyone, established a cabinet of 44 members, of whom the great majority had neither competence nor integrity nor the most elementary experience. No one has spoken more eloquently about this situation than Prime Minister Adoula, when he addressed Parliament on June 14, on the subject of the corruption and inefficiency of his government. The New York Times quoted Prime Minister Adoula as saying:

That if the government was corrupt, unwieldy and incompetent, it was the fault of the Parliament that had forced the government on him.

"Every one of you wanted to become a minister," he said. "To satisfy these ambitions we have been forced to constitute a government of dishonest and incapable persons, chosen by you or by every political party."

To Prime Minister Adoula's credit, he has taken energetic measures to reduce and reorganize his cabinet, even though in doing so he has risked the survival of his government.

THE SEPTEMBER ACTION

Now we come to another untold portion of the Congo story—the true story of the September military action. It has been told in Europe. But, for some strange reason, it has not yet been told in this country.

The United Nations and the Department of State at the time defended the military action against the Government of Katanga in September as a matter of principle, necessity, and conformity with the U.N. resolution of February 21, 1961, which called for the removal of mercenaries and foreign advisers from Katanga. But there is now conclusive evidence that the September action was not ordered by U.N. headquarters and was, in fact, repudiated by Dag Hammarskjöld.

The so-called September action was preceded on the early morning of August 28 by a surprise action directed against the 500 white officers and NCO's then openly serving with the Katangese armed forces. As a result of this operation, which was officially known as "Op-

eration Decapitation," the majority of the non-Katangese military personnel were apprehended and deported.

I think it of interest, in this connection, that this action violated the terms of the plan for the replacement of European personnel in the Katanga gendarmerie drawn up by the Norwegian chief of U.N. intelligence, Col. Bjorn Egge, only several months prior to "Operation Decapitation." The Egge plan, as it became known, was reported to have had the approval of Secretary General Hammarskjöld, Foreign Minister Spaak, and the Department of State. I want to quote from the text of this plan:

The time phasing of the removal of personnel must be considered carefully in order to secure full control over troops in the period of transition. A decrease in discipline could lead to unrest and disorder in Katanga and would be contrary to the spirit of the resolution of February 21, 1961.

But apparently after the Louvanium Conference, somehow, somewhere, it was decided that the European officers and NCO's had to be removed from the Katangese armed forces forthwith, and not in stages, even at the risk of creating the kind of indiscipline against which Colonel Egge had warned.

On the early morning of September 13, the U.N. forces in Elisabethville moved to seize the post office, the radio station, and a number of other key points. That morning, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, the head of the U.N. mission there, went on the air and announced to the world that the Katanga secession had ended. According to the New York Times, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien told the press:

The U.N. motive in complying with the request was to avoid the alternative—invasion of northern Katanga by Central Government troops and a prolonged civil war.

Commenting on the situation editorially, the New York Times said on September 16:

In Korea, the United Nations went to war to check outright aggression. In Katanga it seeks to avert civil war by removing a potential belligerent, and not the one threatening to attack.

The bloody fighting which erupted lasted for more than a week and resulted in many hundreds of casualties.

When I first rose in the Senate to criticize the U.N.'s action in Katanga, it was not yet clear whether the action had been taken with the approval of the Security Council and the Department of State. But on September 15, the State Department issued a statement supporting and justifying the U.N. action.

How the September action came about, however, has been described with amazing frankness by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, at the time chief U.N. representative in Katanga, in two articles written for the London Sunday Observer in December 1961, subsequent to his separation from the U.N. I would like to quote several paragraphs from Dr. O'Brien's account:

On September 10, Mr. Mahmoud Khilari and Mr. Vladimir Fabry arrived in Elisabethville with instructions for General Raja, commander of U.N. Forces in Katanga, and for myself. Mr. Khilari, a Tunisian, was nominally head of U.N. civilian operations in the

Congo, but Dr. Linner had entrusted, or relinquished, to him great authority in the political field, in which he had shown enormous ability. He was mainly responsible for the successful meeting of the Congolese parliament, for the Adoula-Gizenga rapprochement, and for the emergence of a well-balanced Central Government.

Mr. Khilari gave us our instructions in the drawing room of Les Roches, my residence in Elisabethville. Those present at the main meeting at which the instructions were given included, as well as General Raja and myself, and Mr. Khilari and Mr. Fabry, Col. Jonas Waern, the Swedish officer commanding South Katanga; Col. Bjorn Egge, the Norwegian intelligence officer; and my deputy, Michel Tombelaine.

The instructions were as follows: to take over the post office, the radio studio and the transmitter; to raid the Sureté and Ministry of Information offices; to arrest any European official found there, and seize their files; and to arrest Godefroid Munongo, the Minister of the Interior; Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, Vice President and Minister of Finance, and Evariste Kimba, so-called Foreign Minister. Tshombe also was to be arrested, if absolutely necessary. Mr. Fabry, who was then legal adviser to the ONUC at Léopoldville, and who was to die in the crash at Ndola, produced from his briefcase mandats d'amener—roughly equivalent to warrants for arrest—for Tshombe, Munongo, and the others. These warrants bore the seal of the Central Government.

When I went to Léopoldville, several weeks after the close of hostilities, I found to my bewilderment that neither General MacKeown nor Mr. Linner knew of the instructions I had received. In New York I found that neither Dr. Bunche nor General Rikhye—the military adviser—knew about them either. Dr. Bunche believes that Mr. Hammarskjöld did not know about them at all.

In his first article, Dr. O'Brien recounted certain details indicating a major alienation between himself and Mr. Hammarskjöld over the September action. Dr. O'Brien spoke of "the thunderous cloud of disapproval which I knew was over me in Mr. Hammarskjöld's mind." And when Dr. O'Brien proposed that he accompany Hammarskjöld to Ndola for the meeting with President Tshombe, "the answer came back, polite and cool. The Secretary General proposed to deal with this matter outside the framework of the ONUC. There was no need, therefore, for the representative in Elisabethville to join the flight to Ndola."

What emerges from all of this is that the military action of the U.N. in Katanga in September 1961 was the product of neither principle nor necessity; it was the product rather, of incredible recklessness, or irresponsibility, or worse.

It is my understanding that Mr. Khilari has denied that he gave Conor Cruise O'Brien any such instructions as he described in his article. But whether one believes O'Brien on this point or Khilari does not alter the situation one iota. The hard fact still remains that the September action was not ordered by Dag Hammarskjöld or Ralph Bunche or General Rikhye or any one else at top level in the U.N.; that this sweeping attempt to overthrow the government of Katanga and impose a U.N.-sponsored directorate was renounced by Hammarskjöld immediately on his arrival in the Congo; and that Dag Hammarskjöld

lost his life in attempting to repair the damage wrought by Conor Cruise O'Brien, and his deputy, Michel Tombelaine, and conceivably by Mahmoud Khari. And the fact must also be faced that, in defending the September action, the State Department was indulging in a misguided effort to protect the U.N. from what might have been a highly damaging disclosure.

I would ask my colleagues, further, to ponder the significance of the fact that, of the two men primarily responsible for the September action, one man, Michel Tombelaine, was known to our intelligence community as a pro-Communist; while the other man, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, has recently been entrusted by Kwame Nkrumah, the most Stalinoid of all the so-called neutralist leaders, with the task of shaping the minds of Ghanaian students as vice chancellor of the University of Ghana.

The September action inflamed passions on every side and probably made the December action inevitable.

Among the peoples of Katanga, the action produced a sense of unity founded on common action against alien forces. Having fought this action to a standstill, and having achieved an agreement which was widely interpreted as a victory over the U.N., the government of Katanga was probably less disposed to compromise than it had been previously. And the voices of the outright secessionists became louder.

The U.N. forces in Katanga, having been humiliated in the first round of battle, itched for a second go, to reestablish their prestige and authority.

The Léopoldville government and the Nehru-Nkrumah faction in the U.N., having seen the U.N. forces depart from Hammarskjöld's assurance that they would not be used to settle internal conflicts, began to clamor for more military action against Katanga.

THE FAILURES OF THE U.N. IN THE CONGO

In the Congo, more than one American commentator has made the observation that the United States was footing the bill for the operation but that U.N. policy, in effect, was being determined by Nehru. To be more precise, it was being determined by Nehru's guiding genius in the field of foreign affairs, Mr. Krishna Menon, who has, in my opinion, justly come to be regarded as the personification of cryptocommunist.

Certainly Nehru has enjoyed tremendous leverage in the Congo situation by virtue of the fact that India has supplied the bulk of the troops for the operation. And it can be taken for granted, too, that Rajeshwar Dayal, in the apparently arbitrary manner in which he directed U.N. policy in the Congo, was acting under instructions from the Nehru government.

The Nehru-Krishna Menon influence has been the source of the many weaknesses of U.N. policy in the Congo. If we are to make the U.N. a more effective instrument than it is today, I believe we must discuss these weaknesses frankly rather than denying their existence or sweeping them under the rug, as some of those who hold that the U.N. can do no wrong would have us do.

I shall mention only a few of these errors and weaknesses, all of which can be documented.

First. There was the fact that the U.N., despite the urgings of Ambassador Timberlake, did not take the necessary measures immediately after the general mutiny of July 6, 1960, to reestablish discipline in the Congolese Army.

Second. There was its failure to prevent civil war, when the forces of Patrice Lumumba invaded the provinces of Kasai and Katanga in August 1960. These invasions resulted in the massacre of many thousands of tribesmen.

Third. There was the refusal of the U.N. to recognize the legitimacy of the Kasavubu-Mobutu government and its failure to prevent the establishment of the rival government of Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville.

Fourth. There was its failure, or at least partial failure, to prevent the influx of Communist bloc arms to Stanleyville via the United Arab Republic.

Fifth. There was the flagrant intervention of the U.N. forces to prevent the expulsion of the Ghanaian Embassy when the government of President Kasavubu unearthed evidence that this Embassy was supporting the restoration of Patrice Lumumba. I would point out here that the U.N. forces were in the Congo only by the invitation of the government and that, in moving to expel the Ghanaian Embassy, the Congo Government was exercising its sovereign right.

Sixth. Forgetting about the origins of their presence in the Congo, the U.N. in March of 1961 rejected the pleas of President Kasavubu and President Tshombe and other leaders that the projected dispatch of Indian troops to the Congo be called off because of the traditional hostility of the African peoples for the Indians.

Seventh. There was the incredible blunder of the September action in Katanga, which indicates, at the very least, the need for serious improvements in the mechanism and structure of command within the U.N.

Eighth. There was the artificial establishment of the Baluba refugee camp in Elizabethville by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien and his deputy, Michel Tombelaine in the month of August 1961, just before the September action. Missionaries, newspapermen, and other people in Katanga with whom I discussed the problem, all told me that the camp made no sense at all, and that O'Brien and Tombelaine had panicked the Balubas into seeking refuge in the camp so that they could use the situation as a club over President Tshombe's head. It is a tribute to Mr. Gardiner, the present U.N. representative in the Congo, that he has taken energetic measures to liquidate the O'Brien-Tombelaine refugee camp.

Ninth. There was the terrifying precedent which the U.N. established in arresting and deporting European civilians in the Congo without due process or appeal of any kind. Many of those who were thus summarily deported had lived in Katanga most of their lives; they had their homes, their families, their busi-

nesses, and personal roots there. But at the point where Conor Cruise O'Brien or Michel Tombelaine decided that a European was a mercenary or political adviser, his fate was sealed.

There was no hearing of any kind before these cruel deportations took place. And there was no habeas corpus. There was no right of appeal to a reviewing body. And finally, because the U.N. is the U.N., and because there is no legal precedent for a suit for redress against it, there was absolutely no way in which its victims could seek redress for the grave personal and material harm they had suffered at the U.N.'s hands.

I have been deeply disturbed to see an organization that is supposed to be founded on respect for the rights of man conducting itself in a manner which so gravely violates the rights of the individual. And I have even been more disturbed to see this phase of U.N. policy in the Congo either applauded or ignored by people who would spare no effort to assure that an accused person in this country is accorded the full protection of the law or to assist an individual seeking redress against the state.

I say that if we close our eyes to such transgressions against the rights of man, we are not assisting the U.N.; we are paving the way to its ultimate destruction. I note here that the Belgian branch of the International League for the Rights of Man, an organization which enjoys consultative status with the U.N., has taken up the cases of a number of Belgian civilians who claim that they were wrongfully expelled from the Congo, and is exploring the entire question of the right of redress against the United Nations.

In summarizing these failures of the U.N. in the Congo I do not mean to imply that the U.N. has no role in the Congo or that its entire record in the Congo is a negative one. The U.N. has a place in the Congo, and, despite its shortcomings, it has done much good in helping to maintain order and social services in the northern Congo. But how well its presence there serves the Congolese peoples and the larger cause of freedom depends on the policy it pursues; and the policy it pursues in turn, depends on how vigorously we defend our principles and fight for our point of view and rally political support within the U.N.

If I have found so much to criticize in the U.N.'s policy in the Congo, it is because, for all practical purposes, this policy has been the policy of Nehru and Krishna Menon, and because we have accepted this policy and made it our own.

THE DECEMBER ACTION

The U.N. has charged that the Katanga government was responsible for the fighting that occurred in December of 1961; and the Katanga government has charged that the U.N. was responsible.

According to the U.N. version, their forces went into action only after the Katanga gendarmerie had severely beaten two senior U.N. officials, abducted and killed several U.N. soldiers, and erected a roadblock on the road to the airport. The U.N. said that it considered

the roadblock, which was erected on December 1, an intolerable interference with its freedom of movement. On December 4, the U.N. succeeded in clearing the roadblock after a brief but bloody battle with the Katanga gendarmerie unit stationed there. This was the signal for an all-out war that lasted until December 19, when the U.N. units succeeded in taking over the heart of Elisabethville.

The Katanga government has charged that the U.N. action was premeditated and that it was the intended product of the Security Council resolution of November 24. There is no question but that the November 24 resolution was interpreted by the world press as a green light for all-out military action against Katanga; and, in the light of this, the government and people of Katanga can hardly be blamed if they placed the same construction on the U.N. resolution.

I want to point out in this connection that the Security Council resolution of November 24 had originally been opposed by Ambassador Stevenson because it was directed exclusively against Katanga and said nothing about the problem of Gizenga and Stanleyville or of secessionism elsewhere in the Congo. Ambassador Stevenson, indeed, endeavored to amend the resolution so that it would be directed equally against all secessionist activity in the Congo. But when this amendment was vetoed by the Soviets, Ambassador Stevenson, after asking for a recess, returned to the Security Council and voted for the original Afro-Asian resolution which he had previously described as unsatisfactory. According to press accounts, he explained his actions with the words that he could not send Bomboko home emptyhanded.

This, incidentally, is a prime example of what I meant when I spoke of submitting passively to the will of the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N. rather than fighting militantly for our own position.

In Léopoldville on the night of Sunday, November 26, Mr. Sture Linner, the chief U.N. representative, assured me categorically that the U.N. was not planning another military action against Katanga. If this was so, then the U.N. erred seriously in not giving this assurance publicly; because a public declaration was the one thing that might have allayed the tension and anxiety of the people of Katanga.

The December fighting did not produce as many casualties as the military action of September. But there was far more destruction in terms of physical damage to private property, to hospitals and other public institutions, and to industrial and business establishments. The damage in Elisabethville was particularly heavy. For weeks after the fighting was over the city remained without electricity or water. According to newspaper accounts, an odor of death and putrefaction hung over the city like a pall.

On-the-spot observers agreed that the use of mortars as primary weapons by the U.N. forces resulted in much indiscriminate killing and damage. It was also agreed that the U.N. forces had in several cases shelled and strafed clearly marked hospitals and had been guilty

of atrocities against individual residents, both white and Congolese.

The charge has been made that the stories of U.N. atrocities which appeared in the American and European press were a product of Tshombe propaganda. I do not see why anyone should be at all surprised that atrocities did occur, given the tenseness of the situation, the bitterness on both sides, and the primitive nature of the Ghurkas, Ethiopians, and other units serving with the U.N. forces in Katanga. The fact that such atrocities did take place was confirmed by Smith Hempstone, liberal correspondent of the New York Post, Chicago Daily News; by the entire European medical corps in Elisabethville in a joint statement; and by Lord Russell, of Liverpool, one of Britain's most distinguished jurists, who served on the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg, and who conducted a detailed on-the-spot investigation into the charges of U.N. atrocities.

The December fighting, like the September action, resulted in the total isolation of the United States from its Western allies on the question of the Congo. On December 14, for example, the Baltimore Sun carried a dispatch headed "United States and NATO Disagree on Congo Policy." This dispatch said:

The United States appears to be isolated from all 14 NATO Allies tonight in its support for U.N. military action in Katanga.

When Britain formally appealed to the United Nations for an immediate ceasefire in Katanga on December 13, the Department of State supported the U.N. in the position that the Katanga action could not be terminated until the U.N. had achieved its military objectives.

Those responsible for advising the administration on Congo policy were apparently so convinced of the rightness of their course that our virtually total isolation from the opinions of our allies did not cause them to pause or reconsider. Nor did our Congo policy advisers appear to be disturbed by the incongruity of a situation in which Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington were joined in applause of a U.N. action, which was opposed by London, Paris, and Brussels.

In my opinion, in the protracted argument as to who was responsible for the December action, we lost sight of fundamentals and concerned ourselves with the effects rather than with causes. The fighting of last December erupted in part because of provocative actions by both sides, in part because of the Security Council resolution of November 21. But the single most important contributing factor was the presence in Katanga of a U.N. army of 8,000 men. This force was doing nothing to maintain public order. It was obviously in Katanga for purposes of political pressure. And it was regarded by the people of Katanga as an alien invading or occupation force.

Such a situation is bound to produce tensions and incidents. Attempting to assess the blame for each individual incident would be a task as meaningless as it is impossible. The one sure way to avoid incidents and to avoid further bloodshed would be to eliminate the source of the tensions; to reduce the

U.N. units in Katanga to the point where they no longer can be regarded as an army of occupation.

THE KITONA AGREEMENT

The December action resulted in the Kitona Agreement of December 21 which was hailed at the time as a vindication of the U.N.'s action and of our entire policy in the Congo.

Under the terms of this agreement, President Tshombe accepted the application of the so-called loi fondamentale of May 1960; recognized President Kasavubu as chief of state; recognized the indivisible unity of the Republic of the Congo; recognized the authority of the Central Government over all parts of the Republic; and agreed to place the Katanga gendarmerie under the authority of the President of the Republic.

Speaking about the Kitona Agreement at the time, I stated that it could serve as a starting point for an agreement that would have validity and durability because it was based on the voluntary assent of both sides. On the other hand, I warned that if this agreement, imposed by military action were interpreted as a document of unconditional surrender, if it were interpreted as a "Carthaginian peace" intended to lead, step by step, to the total destruction of those who had signed under duress, then the consequences would be disastrous.

I said that such an unconditional surrender could only be enforced if we were prepared to keep a U.N. army of occupation in Katanga for a period of decades. Since this is clearly impossible, we had no alternative, as I saw it, but to take Kitona as a starting point, and, using all our powers of suasion with both sides, strive for a formula for the unification of the Congo that reflected a genuine mutuality of interests.

What was called for, in short, was a supreme effort at conciliation, by the United States, by the other Western Powers, and by the United Nations.

THE FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY

It is an elementary rule of diplomacy as well as of human relations, that, where there are two sides to be conciliated, those who are attempting to conciliate must display tact and restraint and, above all, friendship to both sides.

There is a tendency now to damn Tshombe and the Katanga government because the 7 months that have elapsed since Kitona have produced no final agreement for the reunification of Katanga with the Congo. I am prepared to concede that at certain points in the negotiations, Tshombe has shown himself stubborn; and it is clear to everyone who has followed events in the Congo that, in the absence of an agreement, the situation has deteriorated seriously. But I believe that if this critical situation has refused to respond to our ministrations, it is because there has been a total failure of diplomacy in our relations with Tshombe, which has vitiated the efforts made to bring the two sides together. Indeed, I believe that the story of our relations with President Tshombe since the September military action of last year might very well be captioned "How To Lose Friends and Antagonize People."

The State Department has said on numerous occasions that it bears no malice toward Tshombe and that it believes that he has an important role to play in a unified Congo. These words are all to the good. But despite these words, during the period in question there has not been a single concrete manifestation of friendliness toward Tshombe by higher officials in the Department of State. Instead, Tshombe has been the target of abuse and threats and ridicule, and of actions he could only interpret as unfriendly.

Our relations with Tshombe over the past year seemed to be governed by an unwritten rule that no ranking American official was to visit him or have personal contact with him.

Ambassador Timberlake, when he was in the Congo, visited Tshombe in Elisabethville, and spent 2 whole days in discussions with him. The discussions were sometimes sharp in tone, but Tshombe and Timberlake parted company on the friendliest terms.

Ralph Bunche, as first U.N. representative in the Congo, also visited Tshombe in Elisabethville.

Ambassador Gullion, however, whose prime task in the Congo is to effect a reconciliation of Tshombe with Adoula, has to this day never visited Elisabethville. His personal relations with President Tshombe are indeed so embittered that I fear he lacks the personal leverage essential to a serious effort at conciliation.

Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, during the course of his two trips to the Congo, visited minor cities, such as Stanleyville and Coquilhatville—but he studiously avoided Elisabethville.

Dr. Sture Linner, the previous chief of the U.N. operation in the Congo, also never visited Elisabethville after his appointment.

And when President Tshombe, on three separate occasions applied for a visa to visit the United States, he was on each occasion refused. When he asked to be permitted to come to the United States while Prime Minister Adoula was here, so that he might discuss with him, this, too, was refused.

I want to point out to my colleagues that Dag Hammarskjöld, as Secretary General of the United Nations, did not consider himself too big to be willing to meet Tshombe in Ndola, in an effort to put an end to the tragic September action in Katanga. He undertook this trip, indeed, despite the opposition of some of his subordinates, such as Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, who spoke of the Secretary General's action as a "journey to Canossa." I would point out, too, that the present U.N. representative in the Congo, Mr. Robert Gardiner, has traveled to Elisabethville several times for discussions with Tshombe, and has, in fact, succeeded in establishing with him a personal friendship that is one of the few positive elements in the present situation.

But the State Department has remained rigid and unbending, apparently on the theory that Tshombe should be treated as some kind of political un-

touchable until he signs the desired agreement.

Surely no effort at conciliation in all history has ever been conducted in quite this manner.

The aloofness of the State Department to Tshombe by itself would be bad enough. But the situation has been further aggravated by repeated threats of U.N. military action against Katanga, by abusive statements issued by U.N. press officers, and by U Thant's historic contribution to diplomacy in the Congo when he recently described the Katanga leaders as "clowns."

Given this background, who can blame Tshombe and the other leaders of Katanga for feeling embittered? Who can blame them if their attitude has stiffened and if they have shown themselves less tractable in the recent negotiations?

I say in all frankness that I have considered several of President Tshombe's remarks about the State Department and U.S. capitalism most regrettable. But who can blame Tshombe if he has sometimes lost his temper and said rash things? I would point out that Prime Minister Adoula has said rash things with far less provocation or no provocation at all. I would point out that Prime Minister Adoula voted for a lot of rash anti-Western statements at the Belgrade Conference, and that he made the wild charge that Western imperialists were somehow responsible for the death of Hammarskjöld. I cannot accept a standard of judgment which forgives Adoula all his rash statements and rash actions, but holds Tshombe fully accountable, in perpetuity, for every intemperate statement he has made in moments of stress, and with considerable provocation.

Madam President (Mrs. NEUBERGER in the chair), we are dealing with human beings, not with robots, and not with clowns. I think that all of those who have had contact with Tshombe will agree that he is a man of rare intelligence and considerable personal warmth. He is, in short, a man who responds affirmatively to friendship when it is offered. But by the same token, he is also a man who responds negatively to hostility or aloofness or abuse.

Tshombe has publicly charged that when Ambassador Gullion came to escort him from Ndola to Kitona, Gullion at one point replied to his remonstrations with the warning: "Beggars can't be choosers." I have also heard from an allied source that when an allied diplomat pleaded with Gullion to "go easy on Tshombe," Gullion replied with the very same words: "Beggars can't be choosers." Whether or not Ambassador Gullion actually employed these words, I believe that they aptly describe our attitude toward Tshombe for a period of at least several months after the Kitona agreement.

THE "LOI FONDAMENTALE"

During the first few months, the Adoula government, apparently speaking with our encouragement, insisted on nothing less than an absolute adherence to the loi fondamentale, as prescribed by the first clause of the Kitona agreement. When Tshombe came to Léopold-

ville for his first round of discussions with Prime Minister Adoula in March of this year, one of Adoula's spokesmen told the press:

If Tshombe is prepared to accept the loi fondamentale, there is nothing to discuss. If he is not prepared to accept it, there is nothing to discuss.

I should like to say a few words on the subject of the loi fondamentale, because it has done so much to bedevil the negotiations and to poison relations.

The loi fondamentale was drafted by the Belgian Government as a provisional constitution for the Congo, to remain in effect only until the Congolese Parliament had had an opportunity to adopt a constitution of its own. In this interim period it provided for a highly centralized form of government.

However, I know of no one who today believes in the possibility of a highly centralized government, at least in the early stages, for a sprawling, heterogeneous, loosely knit country such as the Congo. In such a country, at least for some time to come, a loose federation of member states or provinces is the only conceivable basis for the maintenance of unity. Centralization is something the Congo will have to grow into.

This, essentially, was the position taken by the U.N. Congo Conciliation Commission in its report of March 21, 1961, which specifically rejected the loi fondamentale as unsuitable for the Congo. And I believe the wisdom of this position is recognized by the State Department, by our allies, and by a great majority of the political leaders in the Congo.

It is true that, from the outset of negotiations, Léopoldville has talked about a new constitution based on a large measure of state or regional autonomy. If they truly intended to go through with such a constitution, then the insistence on the loi fondamentale made absolutely no sense. The only point to this insistence, as I see it, was the apparent determination of some of the Léopoldville leaders to force Tshombe to "eat crow."

Beyond the pointless insistence on the loi fondamentale, the attitude of Prime Minister Adoula and of the Léopoldville authorities during the first round of negotiations left much to be desired. Prime Minister Adoula pointedly and insultingly absented himself from Léopoldville on the day when Tshombe arrived. After several weeks of negotiations, he announced that he was taking off for an indefinite rest, leaving Tshombe to twiddle his thumbs at U.N. headquarters. And when President Tshombe sought to return to Elisabethville, in accordance with the guarantee that had been given him by the United Nations and the central government, the central government units, on higher orders, refused to permit his plane to take off until, after more than 12 hours' delay, the U.N. cleared the runway with a show of force.

I have received the impression that in the second round of negotiations which terminated on June 21, Prime Minister Adoula and his colleagues were more moderate and less insistent on the so-called loi fondamentale. I have also

received the impression, from a distance, that on certain points President Tshombe's position seems to have hardened. All accounts are agreed that a kind of impasse seemed to have developed between the two leaders.

THE POINTS OF IMPASSE

It is in the interests of Katanga, it is in the interests of the Congo as a whole, and it is in the interests of the entire free world that a way be found to break the present impasse. I believe that it can be broken, because I believe that both Tshombe and Adoula really do want to get together.

I had this impression when I was in the Congo; and I still retain this impression today, despite the sometimes discouraging political fencing that has gone on between the two leaders.

I would not be prepared to say that everyone around Tshombe desires unity. I have heard it said, and it may be true, that there are members of his cabinet who will be satisfied with nothing less than complete secession. But from a day and a half of conversations with Tshombe, I am convinced that he is wise enough to realize that if the rest of the Congo ever went under, and if the Kremlin established operational bases in Léopoldville and Stanleyville, an independent Katanga could not long survive. He is wise enough and moderate enough in his views to realize that, ultimately, the fate of Katanga is bound up inextricably with the fate of the Congo.

I do not underestimate the difficulties that stand in the way of a solution.

Personal attitudes have hardened on both sides as negotiations have gone on, week after week, with little to show for them.

The attitude of the Katangese leaders had hardened particularly—and for this, I believe the U.N.'s repeated threats of military action against Katanga, the cheap abuse of Katanga and the Katangese leaders by U.N. officials up to the rank of Secretary General U Thant, and our consistent unfriendliness and total lack of contact or rapport with Tshombe, are largely to blame.

But, to a far greater degree than is commonly realized, I believe that the present impasse is due to the ineptness and corruption of the Léopoldville government; its complete failure, even with the massive assistance it is receiving from the United States, from Belgium, and from the U.N., to establish economic order; its fiscal insolvency; its lack of control over its own army; its lack of political control over the greater part of what is supposed to be the territory of the Léopoldville government; and, in general, the bickering and division and lack of authority that characterize the central government.

As I have pointed out previously, Prime Minister Adoula, whose personal integrity no one questions, has had occasion himself to castigate his own parliament for saddling him with an unwieldy, inept, and corrupt cabinet.

The scale of economic, fiscal, and political chaos in the northern Congo is almost incredible, even by African standards. Despite the help of nearly 3,000 Belgian and U.N. technicians and

advisers, despite \$86 million in U.S. aid over a 2-year period, and despite more than \$200 million in grants and loans from Belgium and from the World Bank, the railroads are not running in most of the Congo, two-thirds of the nation's trucks are reported idle for lack of spare parts, and many of the roads have become impassable. Exports have fallen off 75 percent from preindependence level. Some reports say that one-third of the labor force in Léopoldville is unemployed; other reports have it that one-half the labor force is unemployed.

A major source of revenue for the government should be the export of gems and industrial diamonds from the south Kasai fields. The Washington Post of June 21, 1962, reported that of about 17 million carats of industrial diamonds produced by south Kasai over the year ending June 1962, only 125,000 came into the legal market. According to this article, the balance was disposed of by smugglers. The United Nations estimates that these smugglers have netted about \$36.5 million, while the government collected the tax on a mere \$814,000 worth of diamonds. In addition, it was estimated that some \$10 million worth of gem stones had been smuggled out of the country, without tax. In commenting on this situation, the Washington Post article said:

Congolese imports cost \$120 million yearly, of which half is an American subsidy. Checking smuggling would raise currency earnings by more than 80 percent and economize on U.S. import aid in the same proportion.

The budget approved by the Léopoldville government in mid-June called for \$382 million in expenditures. Against this figure, its estimate of revenues—and I believe it is generally conceded that this estimate is optimistic—was \$150 million. This leaves an estimated deficit of \$232 million for 1962.

The outrageous demands of the political parties which compose the Léopoldville government have forced Prime Minister Adoula to maintain a vastly inflated civil service. The total failure to date of the U.N. and of the Léopoldville authorities to find any solution for the problem of the Congo's bandit army, has, in addition, saddled the Adoula government with an exceedingly onerous and unjustified outlay. The base pay of the 25,000-man army, which consists for the most part of mutineers and bandits, is, as I have pointed out previously, the highest in the world—\$180 per month. Between them, the army and the civil service eat up 80 percent of the annual budget.

There has been a whole series of rifts and crises within the government. President Kasavubu and other members of the government are reported to have demanded the resignation of Foreign Minister Bomboko, on grounds of grave personal scandal. Prime Minister Adoula has succeeded in retaining Bomboko, according to these reports, only by offering major concessions to Kasavubu's powerful Abako Party.

There was another crisis over the parliamentary decision to neutralize the city of Léopoldville along the lines of the District of Columbia. According to the

Washington Post of July 1, 1962, President Kasavubu and the Abako Party called upon the people of the capital to ignore the independence celebrations, in protest against that decision.

In a lengthy article in the Washington Post on July 7, Russell Howe had the following to say about the diminishing authority of the Adoula government:

Adoula's own political position is weakening. His writ runs strong in the capital, uncertainly in Equator and Léopoldville Provinces, only nominally in Kasai and Eastern Provinces, barely at all in Kivu. Katanga of course is in open rebellion.

Business confidence continues to sink, and many of the Belgians who flocked back to Léopoldville last year are now cutting their losses and setting their sights on Brussels or South Africa. The 16,000 European population of Léopoldville is falling by more than 100 monthly.

Within recent weeks, Prime Minister Adoula has taken energetic measures to improve the situation. The Washington Post reported on July 12 that he had fired more than half of his ministerial team including three top members of the cabinet. Out of 43 ministers and secretaries of state, he kept only 14. To these he added 13 new names, making a government of 28 instead of 44 members.

In relating all these facts, I do not mean to imply that all is disorder in the Léopoldville Congo, while all is order and integrity in Katanga. The Katanga government, like every new government, anywhere in the world—and I am afraid that these phenomena are not altogether confined to new governments—has its quota of ineptness and corruption. But as the scholarly Methodist missionary, the Reverend James Brouwer wrote to me last year:

To be sure it is far from being a perfect government. But you are not going to get a better government in any newly independent African country for many years to come, and you may get far worse.

The one thing even Tshombe's bitterest critic cannot take away from him is the fact that he has succeeded in maintaining a very large degree of order, he has kept race relations on an even keel, he has kept his people working, he has increased his exports, and he has, by and large, efficiently administered his government. And he has done these things despite almost incredible difficulties—despite the early troubles with the northern Balubas, despite the harassments of the United Nations and the two United Nations military actions, and despite the enervating conflict with the U.N. Secretariat and the Department of State and the Central Government.

In contrast with the fragmentation and lack of authority in the rest of the Congo, Tshombe has been able to extend and consolidate his authority in Katanga.

Critics of Tshombe are fond of pointing out that his party, the Konakat Party, received only a minority of the votes in the elections held under Belgian auspices prior to independence. But they do not challenge the basic fact that he was able to put together a coalition of parties which gave him a majority in Parliament and, therefore, gave him the government.

All of this, however, was a long time ago. There is no question in the mind of anyone who has spent time in Katanga that Tshombe's influence and prestige have grown enormously over the intervening 2 years. It was never true, as some of the critics pretended, that all of the Balubas, who constitute more than 40 percent of Katanga's population, were anti-Tshombe. Even at the time of the September military action, as the newspapers reported, there were many Baluba chieftains and even great chiefs who fought alongside Tshombe's forces. When I was in Katanga at the end of November of last year, missionaries with whom I discussed the matter told me that, according to their estimate, Tshombe had at least one-third of the Balubas behind him.

According to two Methodist missionaries with whom I have recently discussed the situation, the Reverend Howard Brinton and the Reverend Paul M. Alexander, Tshombe today has overwhelming popular support. In southern Katanga where the economic wealth is concentrated, this support is near unanimous. But among the northern Balubas, too, there has been a dramatic shift toward Tshombe's side, so that chieftains who were previously loyal to Jason Sendwe and the Balubakat Party are now openly pro-Tshombe. In part, this shift is due to the understandable resentment on the part of all the natives of Katanga against the army of foreigners which has invaded their territory.

I am convinced that to a very large degree the obvious hardening in the attitude of the Katangese leaders in recent months has been due to their concern over the growing economic and political chaos in the northern Congo and the self-confidence that stems from the knowledge that they have been operating a viable government, maintaining a prosperous economy and consolidating their authority among their own peoples. This is an aspect of the impasse for which, I must confess, there is no easy solution.

I can understand the position of the Central Government when it says that there can be no serious national unity, even a unity based on a loose federation, without an integrated currency and without the integration of the armed forces of the member states under a single national command. Unquestionably this is the ideal that we must strive for.

But I can also understand the position of the Katangese leaders when they say that the integration of the Katangese currency with the currency of the Congo Republic would today make no sense; that it would not save the Congolese currency from disaster; and that it might, on the contrary, destroy Katanga as a source of possible economic and financial support by undermining the Katangese currency and fiscal system.

This is a most complex problem, as I have pointed out, and it would be presumptuous to suggest a solution without the most detailed information. It is, however, conceivable to me that the Katangese may moderate their stand if we and our Western allies are prepared to

give them an ironclad assurance of our determination to restore economic order in the Congo and of our willingness to underwrite the Congolese currency and to take whatever measures may be necessary to prevent its collapse.

I also believe that the Katangese leaders have an argument with much validity when they say that it will not serve the Congolese peoples if they, today, dissolve the relatively well-disciplined Katangese army into the horrendously undisciplined mass of the National Congolese Army. Their resistance on this point may require the concession of a carefully phased operation, rather than overnight integration.

There is another element to the impasse between Tshombe and Adoula, which probably began as a byproduct effect, but which has now achieved the status of a cause.

Immediately after their arrival in Léopoldville, the Katangese parliamentary deputies voted rather consistently with the Adoula government against its critics in the Parliament. In the past few months, however, they have, on several issues, voted with the opposition and against Adoula.

The opposition is a mixed crew. It includes some of the Balubakat deputies and other deputies who do not have any precisely defined ideology, one way or the other. But it also includes people like Christophe Gbenye, the former Minister of the Interior and until recently Vice Premier, whom I have had occasion to criticize in previous statements; and it includes followers of Lumumba whose attitude toward communism and the Soviets bears no relationship to the attitude of Tshombe.

The fact that the Tshombe deputies have voted the same way as the Lumumbaists on one issue or even on several issues, by itself, certainly does not prove that Tshombe has gone over to the side of the Soviets or that he is playing a serious game of footsie with them, as State Department spokesmen have implied. How strained this logic becomes apparent when it is recalled that, on at least several issues in the United Nations—including the issue of the Congo—we have voted with the Communist bloc and against our allies.

Indeed, I can understand the attitude of the Tshombe deputies in voting against the motion to deprive Vice Premier Gizenga of his parliamentary immunity. I am positive Tshombe has no sympathy for Gizenga or Gizenga's politics. But the worst criminal is entitled to due process. From the standpoint of legal procedure, the arrest of Gizenga before he had been deprived of parliamentary immunity and before he had been indicted on any charges raises very grave questions. Tshombe cannot be blamed for believing that if such arbitrary legal procedures were given the status of a precedent, no provincial leader could feel certain about his personal security in visiting the territory of the Central Government.

I cannot understand the double standard which some people in the State Department apply to Adoula on the one hand and to Tshombe on the other hand.

If Adoula goes to Belgrade with Gizenga and votes for all the anti-Western resolutions, if he accepts Gizenga as Vice Premier, appoints Gbenye Minister of the Interior, and appoints the notorious leftist Bochely-Davidson Administrator for Katanga, these things are ignored or are accepted as matters of necessity. But if the Tshombe deputies vote once or twice alongside the Gbenye deputies, this is construed as proof of some sinister plot with Moscow, or at least as proof of a total lack of principle on the part of Tshombe.

If Adoula's Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko only 1 month ago threatens to invoke Soviet military assistance to subdue Katanga, Adoula assures the West that this is not the foreign policy of his government and the matter is forgotten. But if Tshombe's Minister of the Interior Godefroid Munungo, in Tshombe's absence, threatens to turn to the Soviet bloc if the United States persists in its unfriendly attitude, and if Tshombe promptly and firmly repudiates his subordinate, 1 year later the incident is still used as proof of Tshombe's political unreliability.

I believe that, if we want to get anywhere in the Congo, we have to be prepared to make some allowances for both sides. Adoula and the people around him have had far more frequent contacts, and far more significant contacts, with Congolese in the pro-Soviet orbit than have Tshombe and his followers. But knowing the facts I have here listed about Adoula, I still consider him one of the best of the available political elements in the Congo, and I favor supporting him and collaborating with him. I do not think it is too much to ask reciprocal tolerance toward Tshombe's side from Adoula's supporters in the State Department.

While I do not believe that there is any evidence of a hard trend or confirmed understanding between the Katanga Parliamentarians and the Lumumbaists, I must state in all frankness that I find several events of recent months disturbing. I find it disturbing, in the first place, because temporary accommodations with Communists and pro-Communists are always dangerous.

I find it disturbing in the second place, because, as I have stated, I am convinced that Prime Minister Adoula remains the best and ablest leader on the political scene. If Adoula falls, no one knows who will take over. But I think virtually everyone who is familiar with the situation agrees that it would result in a change for the worse; it might even bring a much more Moscow-oriented government. For this reason, I have the gravest misgivings about any action which might contribute to the toppling of the Adoula government.

IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE?

When I was in Léopoldville, one of the senior members of the Embassy staff stated that he found the situation so vexatious and difficult that there were times when he paced the floor for most of the night, trying to think of which way to turn the following day.

There is no easy way out in the Congo—and there may be no way out at

all. But I feel that the history I have recorded here points to certain things that should not be done and indicates certain courses of action which may still be open to us.

We must not permit ourselves, out of impatience and frustration, to be maneuvered into another military action against Katanga. This we must avoid at all costs, because there is no course that could more certainly destroy the Congo.

Needless to say, there is nothing the Soviets would applaud more than another military action, because the Soviets wish to see the Tshombe government destroyed and the European experts and technicians driven out of Katanga.

I am convinced that there is no one in our State Department whose intentions vis-a-vis Tshombe parallel those of the Soviets. They do not wish to see Tshombe destroyed; at the worst, our own partisans of war in Katanga simply wish to cut Tshombe down a notch or two. The game they are playing, however, is an exceedingly risky one, because military actions, once they are initiated, cannot be controlled with precision. If they initiate another action, they may find that it goes much further than they have intended; they may find it winding up with Tshombe dead or supplanted by Katangese extremists, and most of the European personnel out of Katanga. And if Tshombe were ever eliminated from the scene, I can assure you that we will find no substitute leader of comparable wisdom and moderation and understanding of world affairs.

We must choose between two alternatives: force and conciliation.

If we choose force, then let us have no illusions about the dangers or the cost. At the worst, the use of force to crush Katanga may very well destroy the Congo. At the best, it will require maintaining a U.N. army of occupation in Katanga for many years to come.

If we are not prepared to maintain a U.N. army of occupation in Katanga for the next decade or more, then we must turn toward conciliation as the only realistic alternative. There is no third alternative. These are the two choices before us.

Since I reject the policy of force as dangerous and futile, I believe that the U.N. operation in the Congo must be completely reoriented.

We must abandon the disastrous negative diplomacy that has characterized our recent relations with Tshombe; and, while pressing our point of view, we must offer him our hand in friendship.

I believe that if we all concentrate our efforts and our assistance programs on the reestablishment of order in the Léopoldville Congo rather than on the military subjugation of Katanga, we will in the long run best be serving the ultimate cause of the unity of the Congo.

There are too many soldiers in the Congo—too many U.N. soldiers, too many soldiers of the National Congolese Army, too many Katangan soldiers. If we are to make conciliation and economic rehabilitation our chief objectives, it is essential that all three forces be substantially reduced.

I would point out that the 8,000-man U.N. army of occupation in Katanga alone is costing almost \$70 million a year—a figure, incidentally, almost double the \$40 million revenue which the Katanga government receives from the Union Minière's operation.

I believe that the U.N. forces in Katanga should be cut back to one-half of their present size, in return for comparable reductions in strength by the National Congolese Army and the Katanga armed forces.

In this first phase, the U.N. forces withdrawn from Katanga should be kept on a standby basis in the northern Congo while the least disciplined units of the National Congolese Army are being disarmed and disbanded.

In the second phase, when the task of disarming and disbanding these units has been completed and when a measure of order has been restored, I believe the U.N. forces should be drastically reduced in size with a view to a rapid phasing out of the entire United Nations military operation in the Congo.

There are several instruments we can use in attempting to bring both sides together.

Prime Minister Adoula, in a conciliatory statement issued on Monday of this week, indicated that he was willing to agree to a loose federation, in which the Central Government controlled foreign affairs, defense, customs, and currency, while the member states controlled their own internal security and remained free to make their own economic arrangements. With these important concessions from the side of Adoula, I believe that it may now be possible to conciliate between the contending factions, and somehow compromise the still outstanding differences.

As a military operation in the Congo is reduced in size, I would like to propose that, in concert with our NATO allies, we work out a program of economic assistance and development covering the whole of the Congo and designed, among other things, to promote a tighter economic integration of its sprawling territory.

But, above all, in seeking a successful consummation of the Adoula-Tshombe negotiations, we must strive to substitute friendship for force as the essential instrument of suasion. Who can blame Tshombe when he says:

I cannot negotiate with a Gurka knife on one side of my throat and a Malayan knife on the other.

The substitution of friendship for force and threats of force is all the more imperative because, in the light of Prime Minister Adoula's offer of concessions to Tshombe and Tshombe's affirmative response to Adoula's proposal, a negotiated settlement now appears more probable than ever.

If we are prepared to thus reorient our course, I am confident that peace and prosperity can be brought back to the Congo, and that the Congolese peoples can take their rightful place in the community of free men and free nations.

Madam President, I have only ventured to speak at such length because of

the critical importance I attach to the issue of the Congo.

We have learned from Czechoslovakia and Korea and Vietnam and Laos that we cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in strange and faraway countries, that in the world of today no country can remain an island unto itself.

What is happening in the Congo today affects the security and the future of the American people in many ways.

The Congo's great mineral wealth, so long as it remains at the disposal of the free world, can be an incalculable boon to mankind. But if it were ever to fall into the economic arsenal of international communism, this great mineral wealth would become a potent weapon for the destruction of freedom.

The Congo is of the greatest strategic significance to the free world. Its position in the heart of Africa, and at the center of the band of political vulnerability to which I have previously referred, makes it the key to the control of Africa. And if the free world were to lose Africa, on top of its already very serious losses in Europe and Asia, the balance would be so heavily tipped against us that our very survival would be called into question.

The Congo also has many-sided implications for the conduct of our foreign policy. Here, within a single capsule, you can find three major phenomena that have plagued our foreign policy in recent years. First, there is the tendency to rely excessively on the United Nations—to use it as a substitute for a national foreign policy or as an excuse for having no foreign policy of our own. Second, there is the excessive deference to that fallen idol of liberalism, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his neutralist companions. Third, there is the tendency to believe that the conflict with communism can be frozen, or that communism can most effectively be resisted by setting up coalition governments with the Communists. It is not surprising that these three phenomena should coexist within the single capsule of the Congo, because these phenomena are organically interrelated; indeed, they constitute a kind of trinity of the philosophy of conciliation with the Communist world.

It is in the light of these considerations, Madam President, that I would urge my colleagues and urge the American people to study the problem of the Congo with all their earnestness. What I have said here constitutes the thinking of one man who has sought to find the thread of truth in the tangled pattern of the Congo. If I have criticized certain aspects of our policy in the Congo, I have done so without rancor. And if I have urged a fresh approach to the problems of the Congo, I have done so in the belief that honest criticism can only be helpful, and in the hope that certain of the remarks I have here made will help to give Congress and the American people a clearer understanding of the complexities of the Congo situation.

It is my fervent hope, Madam President, that my remarks will be received in this spirit.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in

the RECORD several newspaper articles which touch upon and document the problems I have been discussing.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, April 6, 1961]

U.N. WARNED BY NEHRU ON CONGO TREND
(By Rowle Knox)

NEW DELHI, April 5.—India has expressed its concern to United Nations Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld at the way things are shaping in the Belgian Congo Republic.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru feels that the United States and other Western powers have accepted too willingly the decisions of the Congolese leaders at the Malagasy conference, which, in the Indian view, are invalid unless they are ratified by a meeting of the Congolese Assembly. And from Delhi a meeting of that assembly looks as far off as ever.

Mr. Nehru's statement to Parliament that if Rajeshwar Dayal does not return to his Congo post as Mr. Hammarskjöld's personal representative, India may have to reconsider the use of its troops there, is the public threat that backs the Indian message to Mr. Hammarskjöld.

Mr. Nehru's belief that the removal of Mr. Dayal "would inevitably militate against the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution" of February 21 means that he was not at all sure that other countries share India's interpretation of the resolution. It authorized the use of force as a last resort to prevent civil war in the Congo.

Though Mr. Dayal is now assigned to the United Nations—as Indian officials here are quick to explain—it is clear that Mr. Nehru expects him to work for the execution of the U.N. resolution as New Delhi sees it.

ABOUT 2,300 MORE TROOPS

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 5.—United Nations sources said today that about 2,300 Indian troops for the Congo Command will arrive in Tanganyika this weekend to be airlifted in U.S. planes to the Congo.

U.S. planes will carry the troops and supplies from Dar-es-Salaam to Kamina, the former major Belgian air base in the Congo. It was estimated that 33 sorties, involving flights of 3 to 4 hours, would be required to transport the troops.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 4, 1961]

NEHRU WARNS U.N. ON OUSTING DAYAL
(By Paul Grimes)

NEW DELHI, INDIA, April 3.—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru warned today that activities to oust Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian who heads the United Nations mission in the Congo, could have "some effect on the maintenance of our forces there."

The Prime Minister gave his approval, however, to the use of force by the Indian troops if deemed necessary by the United Nations command. But he declared:

"If we feel that they are not being properly utilized as we intended them to be, it is for us to reconsider what to do. But I hope that will not happen."

[From the New York Times, Apr. 4, 1961]

U.N. COMPLETING AIRLIFT

KAMINA, THE CONGO, April 3.—The United Nations was completing the airlift of nearly 1,000 Indian troops to this big military base in Katanga Province today in defiance of a warning by President Moïse Tshombe that the move could mean war.

The commander of the soldiers, who are Gurkhas, declared one bullet fired at his men would mean prompt retaliation with "many heads lost."

[From the New York Times, Apr. 4, 1961]

DAYAL ATTACKED BY CONGOLESE

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 3.—Mr. Dayal has been under almost continual attack by members of the Congolese Central Government, who have called repeatedly for his replacement.

Last Tuesday, for example, Mario Cardoso, Congolese representative at the United Nations, charged that a solution of the Congo problem had been prevented by what he termed the refusal of Mr. Dayal to consult with officials of President Kasavubu's regime.

[From Newsweek, June 5, 1961]

LÉOPOLDVILLE.—Now that India's Rajeshwar Dayal has been forced out of his post as top U.N. official in the Congo, look for a general diplomatic shuffle. Dayal's principal critics, Ambassadors Clare Timberlake of the United States and Ian Scott of Great Britain, also are due to leave. Timberlake is returning to Washington on home leave and then will get another embassy.

[From the Washington Post, May 25, 1962]

CONGO HEADING FOR SHOWDOWN
(By Russell Howe)

LÉOPOLDVILLE, May 24.—Despite the absence of fanfare, the current talks here between Congolese Premier Cyrille Adoula and Katanga President Moïse Tshombe are regarded as the most crucial yet held to solve the Katanga crisis.

The talks which began this week, have got off to a bad start, with both sides bad-tempered and reluctant to make serious concessions.

Diplomatic and high United Nations sources have probably never been more doubtful of the chances of reunifying the Congo peacefully.

Diplomatic circles believe Premier Adoula cannot much longer survive the slow erosion of his prestige caused by his failure to deal with Katanga. Adoula calculates that he must conquer or collapse, it is said. If Adoula falls, his successor is likely to be someone like Cleophas Kamitatu, more radical both in methods and ideology.

Politically battered, Adoula now also faces a new payments crisis.

Foreign exchange reserves today skidded to \$4 million—enough for 3 weeks of imports under new super-austerity measures.

Western and U.N. representatives and the African ambassadors here are urging Adoula to prove beyond all possible genuine international doubt his reasonableness and patience in negotiations with Tshombe.

But sources here say that if Tshombe refuses to compromise or signs an agreement and reneges, Adoula would probably attack Katanga, using his embryonic European-crewed air force, which he has refused to exchange for an all-Congolese air force under U.N. instructors.

If Adoula takes military action, U.N. support would at first be limited to such police work as protecting civilian populations and controlling airfields. But U.N. officers assume that U.N. forces would be drawn into the fray on the government side if civil war broke out.

Katangese Army roadblocks in Elisabethville indicate that Tshombe, who has acquired new weapons and officers in recent months, is planning to challenge the U.N. to "round three" in Katanga soon.

The present talks also probably represent the furthest the United States can go toward encouraging negotiations. Ambassador Edmund Gullion is still plugging for a peaceful solution, but he recognizes that Adoula cannot use kid gloves on Tshombe much longer.

The Communist embassies are playing a discreet waiting game, convinced that governmental disintegration is just around the corner. They are telling Congolese leaders that the United States and its wholly owned subsidiary, the U.N. Congo operation, are really on Tshombe's side.

U.N. circles say that if Tshombe again challenges the international force, its units will not stop fighting anywhere short of the Rhodesian frontier.

Tshombe is worried but not desperate. While he spins out the palaver, his aides are trying to firm up the present loose parliamentary alliance with the supporters of leftist Antoine Gizenga.

It is reasoned that he may have wider long-term ambitions such as the conquest of copper rich Northern Rhodesia, due for independence about 1964. Or Tshombe might try for a separate eastern Congo—Oriental, Kivu, and Katanga Provinces—with a common bond in the Ki-Swahili Lingua Franca. This line has been used in conversations with the Gizengists.

Tshombe's present domain of Katanga is dangerously small and his present rail outlets through Portuguese Africa might be cut by Rhodesian nationalist leaders or the Angolan rebels in return for Congolese arms aid or by the U.N. itself.

In official American eyes, one of the most disturbing and unaccountable features of the Congolese crisis remains the failure of Britain, Belgium, and France to give Adoula their full backing and exert pressure on the rebels' backers. The power of colonial business lobbies in these countries seems disproportionate, in the American official view.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, June 14, 1962]

TSHOMBE CALLS ADOULA TOO ADAMANT

LÉOPOLDVILLE, CONGO.—Moïse Tshombe, Katangan leader, charged Tuesday that the Congolese Central Government apparently is unwilling to make concessions to his break-away province "because they are confident that the United Nations will help them take Katanga by force."

Mr. Tshombe, now negotiating with Congolese Premier Cyrille Adoula on Katanga's reintegration with the rest of the nation, made his accusation at a reception which also heard some strongly anti-American remarks by Mr. Tshombe and his entourage.

Robert Gardiner, host at the informal gathering and U.N. Congo chief, appeared pessimistic about the 3-week-old negotiations in talking to reporters.

"If the Congolese aren't ready for us to help them along, then there's no reason why we shouldn't pull out of the Congo," he told newsmen, according to the Associated Press.

Katanga Finance Minister Jean Baptiste Kibwe declared: "If I became Prime Minister, the first thing I would do would be to chase all Americans from the Congo."

Mr. Tshombe and other members of his delegation attacked the United States, charging that the United States had instigated and materially supported U.N. military action against Katanga last year.

Katanga Public Works Minister Gabriel Kitege declared: "At least the Communists do not throw bombs on us like the Americans."

One Katangan argued that the United States is preventing a solution of the Congo crisis through "constant interference" and would back the U.N. to "reduce" the mineral-rich province by force as attempted last year when bitter U.N.-Katanga fighting flared in the provincial capital of Elisabethville.

He declared Katanga alone could easily stand up against all of the Congo. "We are warriors . . . in fact, we could conquer the whole Congo in 1 month."

Mr. Kibwe maintained that Katanga had nothing to gain from joining the Congo—"they need Katanga but Katanga does not need the Congo."

Mr. Tshombe, answering reporters' questions, said Mr. Adoula and his side still insisted on integrating Katanga on the basis of the nation's fundamental law. "Let us remember," he said, "that this law was imposed on us by the Belgians" (the former colonial power here).

He said Katanga's delegation had come here "prepared to give up certain sovereign rights, but we want to keep internal control." Mr. Tshombe said the Adoula government was unwilling to make concessions to Katanga's viewpoint, adding: "They are negotiating with the conviction that if the talks fail, the United Nations will pass a resolution to integrate Katanga by force."

For instance, Mr. Tshombe said, Katanga is unwilling to sacrifice its independent currency to the inflated Congolese franc. "We can help the Congo better by keeping our own money intact," he added.

The monetary problem is under discussion in the Adoula-Tshombe talks to end the province's secession, which dates almost from the start of the Congo's independence from Belgium in 1960.

In a recent unity move the two delegations agreed to set up a commission to define measures for integrating the Katanga gendarmerie with the Central Government Army.

Mr. Tshombe declared at the reception that this commission or any other such publicity panel will have no executive powers and "will be purely technical and consultative."

[From the Washington Post, July 1, 1962]

KASAVUBU HINTS ACTION ON KATANGA SECESSION

LEOPOLDVILLE, Congo, June 30.—President Joseph Kasavubu said today the Congo may have to seek new ways of solving Katanga's secession.

In a speech marking the second anniversary of the Congo's independence, the President said: "We desire the return of Katanga in peace. At the moment when we could have expected concrete results from the talks between M. Adoula and M. Tshombe, the latter broke them off."

"Faced with this new development, the Government will have to consider a new course of action."

Kasavubu has been known in the past for his conciliatory attitude toward Katanga and its secessionist leader, Moïse Tshombe, while a firmer line has been taken by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula.

Kasavubu reviewed a march-past of several thousand Congolese troops during today's celebrations.

A new Garde Republicaine in powder blue uniforms and white fezzes decorated with red plumes drew applause from the crowd.

Observers noted that Kasavubu—whose car was escorted for the first time by outriders on new American motorcycles—had trouble getting out of his vehicle, and used a walking stick to mount the reviewing stand. Congolese sources said he was suffering from a blood clot in his leg.

Later he failed to appear at a diplomatic reception he gave at his residence.

The crowd lining the streets for the parade appeared thinner than last year and applause generally was feeble.

Kasavubu's powerful Abako Party Friday night called on the people of the capital to ignore the independence celebrations in protest against a parliamentary decision this weekend to neutralize the city along the lines of the District of Columbia.

The Abako sees in this an attempt to weaken its political power, since its followers—the Bas-Congo tribe—are in a majority in Léopoldville.

[From the New York Times, July 1, 1962]
CONGO TALKS FAIL, STATE CALM ON SECOND ANNIVERSARY BUT STILL FACES KATANGA PROBLEM

(By David Halberstam)

USUMBURA, BURUNDI, June 30.—There is an old and honored Congo folk tale about a frog and a scorpion that goes like this:

There was a large pond and the scorpion, which could not swim very well, wanted to get across, so it asked the frog, a fine and graceful swimmer, for a ride. The frog thought about it and said, "No I don't think I'd better do that—you'll kill me with your tail and I'll die."

"Don't be silly," said the scorpion, "why should I do that? You're a fine Congolese brother, besides which, if you die I'll drown, too."

The frog thought again and acknowledged that the scorpion made a lot of sense. The scorpion got on the frog's back and off they went. Halfway across the pond the scorpion stung the frog. As they both started to sink into the slime, the frog asked: "Why did you do that, old buddy? Now both of us will drown." The scorpion nodded wisely and said: "Well, that's the Congo."

TALE WITH FEELING

The man who tells this story with particular feeling is Robert K. A. Gardiner, a Ghanaian charged as United Nations chief in the Congo, with the fantastic task of putting the Congo back together and making it work. He told the story the other day at a social gathering designed to bring together President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga and Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Central Congo Government. President Tshombe showed up, charming and ebullient as ever but Premier Adoula never appeared. Apparently he was talking to his Parliament about a budget. Mr. Gardiner was not very happy about his absence.

That luncheon looks in retrospect like a high point in the Tshombe-Adoula talks. This week the talks, which began in mid-March, seeking to end Katanga's secession, ended in a traditional Congolese rupture. M. Tshombe went off to Elisabethville—to be out of Léopoldville when the Congo's independence is celebrated and to be in Elisabethville to celebrate the second anniversary of Katanga's independence on July 11—pointing out that he had signed nothing. Mr. Adoula watched him go and said that this was the definitive proof that there was no peaceful way to deal with him.

Mr. Adoula said the United Nations had got him into the talks, and the United Nations could now get him out and end the secession by force.

The Congo thus approaches the anniversary of her second independence this weekend with a veneer of calm and flimsy stability in the cities, but with two major and interlocking problems—Katanga and the unwieldy and always dangerous Congolese Army—still unsettled. It is a bitter lesson of 2 years that bad soldiers led by ill-trained soldiers do not become good soldiers. Similarly it is a bitter lesson that the longer a secession exists de facto, the more difficult it is to end, the more likely the secessionists are to want to hold on to their own country, and the greater the sense of nationalism throughout the secessionist province.

Six months after the agreement at Kitona that settled the Katanga secession on paper and three and a half months after the tortuous Adoula-Tshombe talks began, the issue of Katanga is still unresolved. There is still a separate army in the province, one still needs a visa from the local government to enter and the Katangese have finished the second printing on their own money.

There are peripheral issues impeding the talks, of course—money, transportation,

communications, and so on—but the basic and persistent issue is this: the deep and intense desire of the Katanga government to remain an independent nation, recognized as such, and the equally deep and intense desire of the Léopoldville government to end the secession, to have the rich copper mines to bolster its fractured economy and to achieve that almost mystical result, national unity.

It is not really the men who are terribly important any more. Behind Mr. Adoula there are many Congolese who are even more strongly committed to the idea of crushing Elisabethville; behind Mr. Tshombe there are ministers even more unyielding in their feelings about Léopoldville. Once again the outlook is grim.

For the Léopoldville government it is relatively simple. Mr. Adoula will turn to the United Nations, but should there be any hesitation there he will be shopping around for new friends. They will not be hard to find.

For the Katangese it is a bit more complicated. Mr. Tshombe would like to avoid another round of fighting in his city, particularly one that, if his army should be unsuccessful, might land him in jail. Thus he may attempt another session of prolonged talks, feeling strongly, as he has said, that the Congolese Government is unyielding in the talks because it feels it can always call on the United Nations for aid.

For the United Nations, and also the United States, the Congo will once again become deeply divisive. Once again the issue will cut to the core of the discord within the United Nations (angry but weak African nations, disdainful but powerful European ones) and once again endanger the relationship between the United States and its allies.

HEART OF CONFLICT

Nothing cuts to the heart of the conflicting ambitions of U.S. policy—support for its allies and yet tangible support for new African aspirations—than the Katanga secession. Perhaps nothing since the Suez conflict has divided the United States from its allies as much as its support and part in the last United Nations action in the Congo. Similarly, nothing may have gained more for the United States on the African Continent than this role.

"Until December in Katanga we always thought of you as just another imperialist nation," the Nigerian Ambassador to the Congo told an American recently, "but now we see you as something else."

The Africans and Asians seeking a radical solution in the United Nations will have the support and the enthusiastic encouragement of the Eastern bloc, for this is the kind of African situation the Russians like best. Their own policy is muddled and uncertain, and on the few occasions when they have taken a positive role their fingers have been badly burned. They are at their best in the role of the man who goes to the auction with no intention to buy but with every intention of raising the price for the ultimate buyer.

[From the New York Times, July 4, 1962]
U.N. GROUP HEARS OF CONGO THREAT—DRASTIC MEASURES URGED TO EXPEL MERCENARIES

(By Sam Pope Brewer)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., July 3.—Justin Bomboko, the Foreign Minister of the Congo, spent all day today in conferences with United Nations officials and Asian and African delegates on the new crisis caused by the collapse of talks to end the secession of Katanga Province.

Talks in Léopoldville between Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo and President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga were broken off last Tuesday.

Mr. Bomboko told a meeting of the powerful Asian-African group this afternoon that the United Nations must take drastic measures if the remaining foreign mercenaries were to be expelled and the unity of the Congo restored.

As he left the meeting, Mr. Bomboko said that he favored a peaceful solution to the Congo problem, but that some people might want war. Apparently he was alluding to the Katanga government.

The Acting Secretary General, U Thant, was understood to have arranged Mr. Bomboko's talks on the eve of Mr. Thant's departure tomorrow for a 16-day European tour. A delegate who has been in close touch with developments said Mr. Thant wanted to have an Asian-African consensus in mind when he talked with European leaders, including Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle.

Mr. Thant will visit Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, and France and speak at the summer meeting of the Economic and Social Council in Geneva before returning here July 20.

Mr. Bomboko, who arrived last night, had a breakfast meeting today with the chief United Nations representative in the Congo, Robert K. A. Gardiner, who also arrived yesterday.

Mr. Bomboko also had a 90-minute conference at headquarters here with Mr. Thant. He was accompanied by his Minister for Internal Affairs, Cleophas Kamitatu. Also present at the meeting was Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs.

During the afternoon, Mr. Bomboko conferred with 52-member African-Asian group and then had another meeting with Mr. Thant.

The whole range of Congo problems was discussed, Mr. Bomboko said. The Congolese official said he considered that the Security Council had given the Secretary General adequate powers to settle the Katanga question and that he did not believe further action by the Council was necessary.

Mr. Thant told his 19-nation advisory committee on the Congo last Friday that he might have to ask for a meeting of the Security Council to review the situation and "consider the advisability of clarifying and strengthening existing mandates and providing certain new ones."

A member of the committee said later that Mr. Thant considered it important to end the secession of Katanga before successive delays by Mr. Tshombe allowed him to confirm his independence by a sort of squatters' rights.

Plans by Mr. Tshombe to hold celebrations in his capital, Elisabethville, July 11, to mark the second anniversary of Katanga's secession from the Congo were said to be of special concern to Mr. Thant.

Besides the danger of disorders, the celebration would emphasize the secession movement that the United Nations has been trying to end.

The Congo Advisory Committee is composed of delegates from Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Malaya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. They are the countries that have contributed contingents to the United Nations Forces in the Congo.

[From Time magazine, July 6, 1962]

CONGO AFTER 2 YEARS

Trumpets blared and drums rattled as the proud procession moved down Léopoldville's broad Boulevard Albert I to celebrate the Congo's second anniversary of independence. President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Cyrille Adoula took the salute from the black soldiers of the new Garde Républicaine, who were decked out in powder-blue uniforms

with black lace trimming and red feathered hats. Along the route, 20,000 Congolese added their cheers to the festive occasion.

The panoply was welcome relief from the drabness of life in the Congo today. Six months after the end of the bloody fighting between the U.N. forces and Katanga, the new nation lies exhausted in the equatorial sun, a battered giant unable to make productive use of the freedom its black leaders fought so hard to win. Even with the help of nearly 3,000 Belgian and U.N. technicians and advisers and \$86 million of U.S. financial aid, the railroads are not running in most of the Congo, two-thirds of the nation's trucks are idle for lack of spare parts, and the roads are almost impassable.

PAPER SOLACE

The result is that some areas of the vast Congo interior are at a virtual standstill; last year coffee and cotton exports yielded only fractions of their normal revenue, and much of the big palm-oil output is lost to smugglers. Unemployed workers upcountry now flock to Léopoldville, where 100,000 of the normal 300,000 labor force are already out of work. Organized gangs, ignoring the barred windows and the bright floodlights around homes of the well to do, creep up at night to saw off the bars and steal what they can. The U.N. is bringing 64 judges from abroad to build a judiciary system for the country. One of the first judges to arrive lost his briefcase to a thief on his first day in town.

Except for locally made beer and cigarettes, Leo's shops are virtually empty of consumer goods, and prices for the items still available have soared. No end to inflation is in sight, since Adoula's Central Government simply prints more and more paper money to make up for its hideous deficits (April revenue: \$14 million; April expenditure: \$36 million).

Soft-spoken Premier Adoula, by far the ablest of the Congo's leaders, is as exasperated as anyone else at this state of affairs, but he is hamstrung by Léopoldville's nightmarish political mess, which forces him to spend 80 percent of his budget on salaries for civil servants and the 25,000-man army, which is vastly overpaid (\$180 base pay per month for privates) to keep it loyal. To retain the support of the myriad political factions, he has 41 men in his Cabinet, perhaps the world's biggest.

LOST FUNDS

Adoula must also cope with widespread corruption among his highest ranking officials. In recent weeks, two Congolese ambassadors in major world capitals have "lost" a total of some \$50,000 in Embassy funds, have advised Léopoldville that the money just vanished. It is widely believed that some Cabinet Ministers have secreted large sums of Government money in bank accounts in Europe. Last week, when the Congolese Parliament tried to censure Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko for allegedly doing just that, Bomboko surrounded the legislature with gendarmes, produced his own list of foreign money transfers, got the investigation called off.

There is a huge smuggling trade in illicit (and mainly industrial) diamonds from the big South Kasai fields. Millions of dollars are lost by the Government in this way alone: of some 17 million carats produced in South Kasai during the past year, only about 124,000 carats came onto the market legally.

Even with these handicaps, Adoula can boast some progress toward stability. Some Belgian technicians and businessmen are returning; many intend to stay for only a short period, but others have even brought their wives and children back, and a few black nannies are again seen in the parks with their white charges. Adoula has de-

posed and jailed the worst regional extremists, notably erratic Antoine Gizenga, who almost made Eastern Province a Communist preserve last year, and zany "King" Albert Kalonji of South Kasai. But Adoula still has not rid himself of the biggest headache of all, stubborn President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga Province, who has a firm grip on the Congo's copper-rich southeast corner and refuses to share its \$50 million annual revenue with the rest of the nation.

GAINING REPOSE

For months, Adoula and Tshombe have been negotiating bitterly in Léopoldville on schemes intended to bring Katanga back into the Congo. U.N. officials have pleaded, cajoled, and threatened the two sides to find common ground for a deal. Wearily, Adoula offered repeated concessions, such as a revised constitution to give Katanga greater local autonomy in a federal Congo. But Tshombe wanted all or nothing: virtual independence for Katanga, his own gendarmery, and a corps of foreign mercenaries to run it. While he still would not agree to divvy up the copper profits with the Central Government, Tshombe announced a \$2 million gift to the Congo, "to ease the catastrophic position and especially aid the poor and unemployed."

In the latest 6-week round of talks, the only thing Tshombe would agree on was formation of four advisory committees to discuss specific ways to reunify Katanga with the Congo in the military, economic, monetary, and communications fields. With that, Tshombe declared he was tired and wanted to stop talking. "I am going home to gain repose," he declared, as he and his entourage headed for the plane back to Elisabethville.

Shocked and bitter, Central Government Premier Adoula gestured toward the broad Congo waters outside his window as he told newsmen, "Gentlemen, 6 weeks of patient negotiations have just gone down the river."

HINTS OF FORCE

In Elisabethville, Tshombe blithely made plans to celebrate Katanga's own independence day—July 11, marking the date in 1960 when the province seceded. The U.N.'s Congo chief, patient Robert Gardiner, is increasingly exasperated at the deadlock, has dropped strong hints that his units will put down Tshombe and take over Katanga by force if the wily Moïse breaks off negotiations entirely. In Manhattan the U.N.'s Acting Secretary General U Thant declared that his Congo commanders "have been told to be very much on the alert."

The U.N. may or may not be able to accomplish it, but sooner or later, the preposterous, protracted Adoula-Tshombe deadlock will have to be broken. The inert Congo giant cannot be allowed to lie there indefinitely.

[From the Washington Post, July 7, 1962]

SEEKS ANGLO-FRENCH BACKING—U THANT IS SPENDING WINDUP IN CONGO

(By Russell Howe)

LÉOPOLDVILLE, Congo, July 6.—The current London-Paris trip by U Thant, the United Nations Secretary General, is designed to rally French and British cooperation in the Congo, beginning with the speedy reintegration of secessionist Katanga Province.

Informed sources here say U Thant was delighted with the invitation from French President Charles de Gaulle, whose opinions in the past have been a liability to the United Nations. U Thant will also visit Geneva, but has so far refused to see Katanga's President, Moïse Tshombe there.

Tshombe's uncooperative approach to the Léopoldville talks with Congo Premier Cyrille Adoula has cost him some of the foreign

support won by his active public relations machine. U Thant hopes that Tshombe's star has waned enough in London and Paris to insure Anglo-French support for any U.N. military action in Katanga.

If fighting starts, U Thant wants unanimity in the U.N. Security Council for mandate his troops can work with, one insuring that the "third round" between U.N. and Katangese forces leads to knockout.

NEW EFFORT SCHEDULED

U.N. Congo Chief Robert Gardiner, Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, and Interior Minister Cleophas Kamitatu are in New York for discussions with U.N. officials and delegations about the failure of the Adoula-Tshombe talks.

When he returns, Gardiner will try to bring the two men together again. Senior U.N. sources hold out little hope of a real agreement, but the U.N. seeks to show that if the "third round" takes place it will not be for want of trying for a peaceful solution.

Tshombe has announced second independence anniversary celebrations for Katanga next Wednesday. He has also appointed some names to joint Central Government-Katanga commissions on finance, economy, transport, and military integration.

This apparent good-will move appears to be merely a public relations device because Tshombe has refused to sign the commission's mandate. "But Gardiner will take Tshombe's gesture at its face value and see whether integration can start from the branches instead of the roots," a source close to Gardiner says.

Tshombe and his finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, have been in Salisbury for talks with their friend, Premier Sir Roy Welensky of the Central African Federation. Evariste Kimba, the Katangese foreign minister, is in Geneva hoping to see U Thant.

ADVISER MAKES STUDY

U Thant's chief military adviser, Brig. Indarjit Rikhye of India, is here to review the military situation. The U.N. has about 17,000 troops, more than half of them in Katanga. Some countries, including Nigeria, are anxious to reduce or withdraw their forces.

Contrary to Belgian news reports, there has been no buildup of the U.N. force in Elisabethville; new Ethiopian arrivals are replacements for departing Congo veterans.

The U.N. bond issue only covers Congo costs up to March next year. U Thant hopes by then to be able to phase down the military operation considerably.

Fighting in Katanga may begin with a Congolese "police" operation. Joseph Mobutu, who plans to disband 3,000 of his 15,000 Central Government soldiers, believes that the remaining 12,000, including more than 300 officers, trained in Europe, could tackle Tshombe's 11,000-man army. But responsible military observers are skeptical.

In reserve would be Gen. Victor Lundula's 7,000-man force, officered by self-promoted leaders of the 1960 mutiny. The autonomous 2,000-man South Kasai force, which has some Belgian-trained officers, might rally to Mobutu.

Adoula's own political position is weakening. His writ runs strong in the capital, uncertainly in Equator and Léopoldville Provinces, only nominally in Kasai and eastern provinces, barely at all in Kivu. Katanga of course is in open rebellion.

EUROPEANS LEAVING

Business confidence continues to sink, and many of the Belgians who flocked back to Léopoldville last year are now cutting their losses and setting their sights on Brussels or South Africa. The 16,000 European population of Léopoldville is falling by more than 100 monthly.

Adoula is fighting to get legal amendments through Parliament to permit adoption of a constitution without consulting the provincial assemblies or giving them a constitution of their own. His aim is to weld the Cabinet parties into a single movement and, under a constitution of his choice, stage a general election.

But Adoula knows that South Katanga is the crux (Parliament is about to make loyal North Katanga a separate Province). If Tshombe is not dealt with, the government could be overthrown by a groundswell in Parliament, where the left is restless.

This knowledge pushes Adoula toward a military solution. He knows Gardiner, an African himself, would have less compunction than his predecessors about employing U.N. forces to help the government crush Katangese dissidence.

Western and African Embassies here would regret Adoula's fall. But with hopes of a negotiated end to the Katanga conflict seemingly more remote than ever, the Premier's political fate may well lie in the fumbling hands of the Congolese soldier or may depend on London and Paris reactions to U Thant's mission.

[From the New York Times, July 8, 1962]

FIRM CONGO ACTION IS VOWED BY THANT—CALLS FOR DEBATE BY COUNCIL ON CRISIS OVER KATANGA

LONDON, July 7.—U Thant served notice today of a firm new United Nations bid for a final settlement of the Congo crisis involving secessionist Katanga Province and the Central Government of Léopoldville.

The Acting Secretary General of the United Nations said at a news conference that he wanted the Security Council to debate the worsening situation in the next month or two and perhaps give him fresh orders.

He also announced that the stalled Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on the future of Netherlands New Guinea were being resumed next week.

Mr. Thant attempted to allay British concern that the United Nations might resort to force.

"It has never been my intention—and never will be my intention—to use any military initiative," he said.

AUTHORITY FOR DEFENSE

But, if attacked, United Nations forces will have his authority to retaliate in self-defense, he added grimly.

The Burmese statesman said he expected to have about \$165 million to carry the United Nations operations in the Congo through to December—or to next February with economies. About \$95 million will come from the United States if Congress gives approval next week to President Kennedy's plans for the purchase of United Nations bonds. The rest will come from 40 other member-states.

[From the Washington Post, July 8, 1962]

U THANT WEIGHS NEXT U.N. STEPS IN CONGO (By Arthur Gavshon)

LONDON, July 7.—U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, served notice today of a firm, new U.N. bid for a final settlement of the Congo crisis involving secessionist Katanga Province and the Central Government at Léopoldville.

He told a news conference he wants the Security Council to debate the worsening situation in the next month or two and perhaps give him fresh orders.

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But, if attacked, U.N. Forces will have authority to retaliate in self-defense, he added.

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U Thant outlined two key elements of his approach toward a solution:

He is trying to get the giant Union Minière combine to divert some of its huge mining revenues in Katanga to the central Léopoldville government. Union Minière, dominated by Belgian and British interests, has not paid a cent to Léopoldville since the Congo became a state 2 years ago. This was in breach of the 1960 independence agreement, U Thant said. Belgium and Britain have promised to consider ways of securing "a more just and equitable distribution of revenues in the Congo," he added.

He is planning to strengthen the U.N. guard over certain Union Minière installations in Katanga because followers of independent-minded President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga have threatened to blow them up. Leaders of breakaway Katanga Province evidently figure the threat of sabotage will induce the mining combine to go on paying them rather than Premier Cyrille Adoula's government.

U Thant, ending a 3-day stay as part of a European tour, also announced U.N. readiness to help the big powers carry out any Berlin settlement they may reach. But any transfer of U.N. institutions to the divided city, and any U.N. role in a settlement, must depend on prior agreement by the Big Four occupying powers—the United States, Britain, France, and Russia.

He disclosed also that Indonesia and Holland have responded to his appeal for a resumption of negotiations to settle the West New Guinea dispute.

Indonesian and Dutch envoys early next week will travel to the United States, he said, to discuss again at a meeting place outside Washington a compromise plan drawn up by American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker.

U Thant flew on to Geneva later in the day to attend a meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council. In the next few weeks he is due to visit Oslo, Paris, Helsinki, Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow, where he will discuss not only problems relating to the Congo and U.N. financing but also next fall's slated election by the Assembly of a permanent Secretary General. He is expected to offer himself for the post.

[From the Washington Post, July 12, 1962]

ADOULA BOLSTERS HIS POSITION, FIRES HALF MINISTERIAL TEAM

(By Russell Howe)

LÉOPOLDVILLE, Congo, July 11.—Coalition Premier Cyrille Adoula moved today to consolidate his weakened position by firing more than half his ministerial team, including three top Cabinet critics.

Out of 43 Ministers and Secretaries of State he kept only 14; there are 13 new names. Including Adoula himself, the Government now numbers 28 instead of 43 persons.

Adoula's continued uncertainty about his position is reflected in his decision not to face a parliamentary confidence vote on the

composition of the new Cabinet, after saying last night that he would.

Fired were:

Vice Premier Christophe Gbenye, leader of the late Patrice Lumumba's National Congolese Movement, the largest single party.

Vice Premier Jean Bolikango, leader of the Puna Party of Congo Valley moderates.

Information Minister and former Premier Joseph Ileo, rather inept conservative who is replaced by Michel Colin of the moderate Abako Party.

Finance Minister Arthur Pinzi, who was reportedly dismissed for incompetence, not for political reasons. He is replaced by a fellow member of the Abako, Emmanuel Bamba.

FAVORED GIZENGA RELEASE

Gbenye and Bolikango favored releasing former Vice Premier Antoine Gizenga, former president of the African Solidarity Party and the country's best-known Marxist. Now interned on an Atlantic island, Gizenga is due to go on trial for rebellion.

The trial has been delayed by the absence of suitable judges and the unwillingness of Belgium to comply with a request for two senior magistrates. Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak believes the case is too political for Belgian judges to touch.

The firing of Gbenye and Bolikango makes it fairly sure that Gizenga will in fact face trial. Although the political heir to Lumumba, Gbenye is regarded by Western Embassies as a man of reason and he has been invited to the United States.

The reshuffle strengthens the position of solidarity Party President Cleophas Kamitatu, Minister of the Interior, who emerges as the country's most powerful figure on the radical side. He wants party rival Gizenga out of the way.

ELECTION AIM SEEN

It also strengthens the impression that Adoula is preparing for a general election and that he wants to forge an all-party Adoula movement grouping present parties or sections of parties. It appears that he is doing this by firing critics and rewarding loyal group leaders. The bias in the new Cabinet appears slightly more moderate than that of the former one.

Observers believe the downgrading of Gbenye will split his party into pro-Gbenye and pro-Adoula factions. Surprise is being expressed at the omission from the new Cabinet of Charles Badjoko, who occupies Lumumba's Stanleyville seat in Parliament and is regarded as the up-and-coming leader of the moderates in Lumumba's old party.

The party has only two ministries and two secretaryships of State in the new list, and no well-known names are among the four.

There is now only one vice premier instead of three—North Katanga Leader Jason Sendwe, leader of the Balubakat Party.

BOMBOKO REMAINS

The ouster of Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, which Western Embassies were expecting with mixed feelings, has not taken place. Bomboko has been a member of all Congolese Governments since self-government was introduced in 1960.

Bomboko is opposed by the Abako Party, which appears to have agreed to tolerate him in return for more Abako representation in the Cabinet.

Two interesting new appointments are Jerome Anany as Defense Minister and Leon Delvaux as Public Works Minister. Anany, a moderate, takes on a portfolio that Adoula has so far jealously kept for himself. Delvaux, a mulatto, is regarded as the most forceful member of the right-wing section of the lower house.

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1962]
WEST MAY FORCE END OF CONGO RIFT—UNITED STATES SAID TO FAVOR ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON TSHOMBE—WILLIAMS IN BRUSSELS

WASHINGTON, July 18.—The United States and some of its allies were reported today to be evolving a program of economic pressures to compel President Moïse Tshombe of secessionist Katanga Province to accept federation with the central Congo Government.

The administration was aware of the danger that Katanga might react to such pressure by staging a military attack on United Nations forces, particularly if President Tshombe had reason to believe that his position continued to enjoy support in some quarters in Europe.

High-level negotiations being conducted by the United States are aimed at forming a united front on the Katanga question, thus depriving Mr. Tshombe of any important backing.

BELGIAN SUPPORT FORESEEN

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is in Brussels for 2 days of talks with Belgian officials to determine the extent of their readiness to apply what would amount to sanctions against Katanga if the province refused to accept the next in a series of proposals for unity from the Congo Government.

Officials here believed that the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was prepared to support fully any policy of pressuring Katanga into agreeing to a union with the Central Government and thereby ending the 2-year-old dispute.

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1962]
LISBON HEARS OF ATTACK PLAN

LISBON, PORTUGAL, July 18.—European diplomatic circles here have received reports indicating that plans have been prepared in the United Nations Secretariat for a military operation to crush the regime of President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga.

According to these reports, the U.S. State Department has recently given the United Nations approval of a military effort to integrate Katanga by force into the central Congo Government.

The U.S. official chiefly responsible for the policy of seeking to bring Mr. Tshombe to heel through force is said here to be Harlan Cleveland, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization affairs.

Another U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, G. Mennen Williams, who is responsible for African affairs, went to Brussels from London today to seek the Belgian Government's support for an anti-Katanga operation. Mr. Williams is viewed in diplomatic quarters here as a close ally of Mr. Cleveland in an effort to end Katanga's secession by any means.

The attack plan was understood to have been disclosed during a recent visit paid to Britain by U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. British Government circles are said to have been extremely hostile to the idea.

The reports here indicate that the attack is being planned in a three-phase operation:

First, to seal off the borders of southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Angola to prevent an alleged "infiltration of mercenaries"; second, to seal off key internal economic facilities including Union Minière installations; third, to counter as a "provocation" the anticipated violent reaction of the Katangese gendarmerie and civilian population.

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1962]
BRITISH OPPOSE FORCE

LONDON, July 18.—Diplomatic sources said today that Britain remained unalterably opposed to any new military operation in the Congo aimed at ending the secession of Katanga Province.

An official said that while integration remained vital for the Congo, the exercise of military measures was no solution. Such conflict would lead only to the economic destruction of Katanga and of the Congo, he said.

It was understood that when Acting Secretary General Thant conferred here with British leaders 2 weeks ago, he referred to a "military solution" as one means out of the vexing stalemate.

The suggestion of new military operations had "terrified" the Earl of Home, British Foreign Secretary, it was said. Lord Home was said to have told the United Nations chief in the strongest terms that such a policy would be disastrous.

British officials believe that the only solution to the Katanga problem lies in an eventual compromise between President Tshombe and Premier Adoula.

One official said: "Tshombe will have to give up a share of the Union Minière's income, possibly 50 percent, for a share of the Central Government's operations."

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1962]
WILLIAMS CONFERS IN BRUSSELS

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, July 18.—G. Mennen Williams, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, conferred with Belgian officials today about the Congo.

Mr. Williams, who arrived from London, is making a quick trip around European countries concerned with African affairs. He also has visited Paris and Bonn and will go to Rome tomorrow.

It seems likely that Mr. Williams heard an expression of two opinions much discussed here.

One is that the Congo's financial problems cannot be solved at a single stroke by recovering for the Central Government the revenue from Union Minière du Haut Katanga that now goes to Katanga Province.

Belgian political and business figures feel that officials of the United Nations and some American officials are putting too much stress on the problem of the mining company's taxes to the exclusion of the greater problem of Congo Government expenses.

The other point is that financial and technical aid will have only limited value until order is established in regions where the Government has little authority.

[From the New York Times, July 19, 1962]

GARDINER VISITS KATANGA

(By David Halberstam)

ELISABETHVILLE, THE CONGO, July 18.—Robert K. A. Gardiner, the United Nations chief in the Congo, arrived today for talks with President Moïse Tshombe of separatist Katanga.

Yesterday a throng of angry Katangese women stormed a United Nations roadblock in a 3-hour anti-United Nations demonstration in which three Katangese were killed, allegedly by United Nations personnel. About 14 persons, 9 of them from the United Nations force were injured.

(United Nations sources in New York charged Tuesday that the incident and the casualties had been staged.)

Some sources said that Mr. Gardiner, a Ghanaian, was likely to give Mr. Tshombe a warning that unless progress was soon made toward unification of the Congo the

pressure in the United Nations in New York toward the use of force was likely to increase. The city was calm today.

DEAD TERMED HEROES

Mr. Tshombe termed the three persons killed in the riots "heroes of Katanga and martyrs of liberty." There will be a service for them tomorrow. One was said by the Katangese to have been bayoneted.

The United Nations force continued to disclaim responsibility for the deaths. A United Nations spokesman said the force, made up of Indian troops, fired only into the air. United Nations officials said that an investigation had been begun.

At the roadblock, the United Nations moved up another company of Rajputana Rifles. The Indians also have strung barbed wire and several armored cars have been moved up.

Mr. Gardiner was accompanied by Gen. Kebede Gebre, an Ethiopian, who is the commander of the United Nations Congo force. Mr. Gardiner's visit was welcomed by Katangese, both white and black. There has been a considerable campaign here against the local United Nations chief, Jean Back. According to official Katangese statements, he is responsible for all the present difficulties.

[From the New York Times, July 22, 1962]

WHITE ADVISERS IN KATANGA SAY THEIR ROLE IN REGIME DECLINES—BLACKS NOW MAKE THE KEY DECISIONS, OFFICIALS ASSERT—GOVERNMENT SAID TO PRESSURE UNION MINIERE

(By David Halberstam)

ELISABETHVILLE, THE CONGO, July 19.—African officials in secessionist Katanga Province are increasingly asserting themselves in dealings with their many white advisers, according to Belgian and other consular officials here.

These officials insist that while Katanga might once have been described fairly as a "white man's country," the Africans now make the essential decisions.

This picture of Katanga, which broke from the Republic of Congo 2 years ago, is at odds with its reputation elsewhere in Africa. To other Africans Katanga still is dominated by whites.

"All the so-called political advisers here keep coming to me and complaining that the Africans no longer listen to their advice and that you can't talk to the Africans any more," said one Western consul here.

NO UNION MINIERE PAWN

Consular officials assert that while many people feel that the Katangese Government is the pawn of Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, the international mining enterprise with vast interests here, the reverse, if anything, is true.

"At the time of independence it was hard to tell who pushed who into the succession," one consul said. "But now the Katangese are afraid that Union Minière is going to work some deal with the United Nations and make an arrangement with Léopoldville."

"So the Katangese started putting considerable pressure on the Union Minière, letting them know that they had better not switch to Léopoldville without permission of this Government here."

Most observers here feel that this Africanization was inevitable over a 2-year period. Some Belgians say it was accelerated nearly a year ago by the United Nations when it rounded up most of the Belgian officers still serving with the Katangese forces.

USE MORE INITIATIVE

"The Africans became afraid at that point that the United Nations would take away all their advisers and that they would be

unprepared to make their own decisions," one Belgian here said. "So they started using their own initiative."

He added that the September and December military clashes gave the Katangese far more self-confidence. In September hostilities erupted when the United Nations sought to disarm white mercenaries in the Katanga forces after riots and attacks on United Nations soldiers. The December clash resulted from United Nations action after Katangese troops seized 11 members of the United Nations mission in Elisabethville.

After the United Nations roundup of Belgian officers, President Moïse Tshombe said he could never replace his young African officers with the former white officers even if he wanted to. The Africans would mutiny, he said.

More recently Col. Roger Faulques, a former French officer who was the unofficial Katangese military chief, was discharged from the Katangese forces, largely, according to sources, because of friction with the African commanding general, Norbert Muke.

APPROVES OF ADVISERS

Mr. Tshombe believes that whites should be called in for advice as long as there are no Katangese who equal their technical efficiency.

"On anything touching on politics in the economic field," an economic adviser said, "I always give them several alternatives, not just one." He added, "If you give them one choice and it turns out to be wrong then you will not be around here very long."

"It gets harder to be an adviser here all the time. They are getting more and more sensitive," this official said. "The President trusts me and so far they have needed me and I have stayed strictly out of politics—or as much as it is possible. But if it weren't for the President himself I think I would have been shipped out of here some time ago."

[From the New York Times, July 22, 1962]

TSHOMBE BRIDLES AT THANT REMARKS—KATANGA LEADER OBJECTS TO INSULT BY U.N. CHIEF

(By David Halberstam)

ELISABETHVILLE, THE CONGO, July 21.—President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga Province reacted sharply today to U Thant's remark that he and his government were "a bunch of clowns."

Mr. Tshombe termed the remark by Mr. Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, an insult and denied the charge.

"Just yesterday Mr. Gardiner, a high U.N. official, proposed to me that I become Vice President of the Congo—me, the clown," Mr. Tshombe said.

Robert K. A. Gardiner of Ghana is the United Nations chief in the Congo.

Mr. Thant's remark was made at a news conference in Helsinki, Finland yesterday. The United Nations chief called Mr. Tshombe and other Katangese officials "unstable" and criticized them for not negotiating with the Central Congolese Government.

"I don't know what I can do with such a bunch of clowns," he added.

U.N. APPOINTMENT PRAISED

Mr. Tshombe welcomed however, the appointment of Elind Wambu Mathu of Kenya as the United Nations' special representative in Katanga. Mr. Mathu replaces Jean Back of France.

"The nomination of Mathu will be much welcomed by the Katangese population," Mr. Tshombe said. "As an African he will understand our problem better than others before him such as Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien

of Ireland and Back, even though he is a servant of the United Nations."

M. Back, who remains deputy United Nations chief in the Congo, left today for Léopoldville, the Congolese capital. The U.N. said the change was made so that M. Back could be in Léopoldville in the absence of Mr. Gardiner, who is leaving tomorrow for consultations at United Nations headquarters in New York.

The United Nations said M. Back, who has been subjected to bitter political and personal criticism in Katanga, would continue to work on questions concerning the secessionist province.

Mr. Mathu is the sixth United Nations special representative in Katanga in 9 months. The frequent changes in its top personnel are one of the United Nations major problems here.

SECESSION IS ISSUE

The United Nations mission in the Congo is under a Security Council mandate to seek the country's unity. Katanga declared itself independent soon after the Congo gained its independence here in 1960. Taxes on mining operations in the province, which previously was one of the Congo's main sources of income, have since gone to Katanga.

In a news conference last night, Mr. Tshombe attacked the U.S. State Department and President Kennedy for the U.S. threat Thursday to use "all possible measures" short of military action to end the Katanga secession. He criticized Mr. Kennedy "because we are to him only Africans, Negroes can be reduced by force."

"If the State Department continues its stupidities in Africa, all Africans will join together to make a bloc against the Americans," he said.

He also charged that Premier Cyrille Adoula of the central regime lacked the support of the Congolese people and the chamber of deputies. Mr. Adoula cannot control his home province of Equateur and cannot extend his authority to Kivu, Eastern, and Kasai Provinces, he said.

"Why the people boo him," Mr. Tshombe asserted. "If they ever booed me I would understand what it means and I would resign immediately."

This attack on the central government was considered significant, as it was his first public statement since a visit by Mr. Gardiner earlier this week. Mr. Gardiner is believed to have attempted to find out whether the Katangese Government really wanted to integrate with the central government.

Mr. Tshombe said he wanted to negotiate with Mr. Adoula but added, "I cannot do this with a Ghurkha knife on one side of my throat and a Malayan knife on the other." The reference was to the nationality of United Nations forces in Katanga.

Mr. Tshombe agreed to discuss unity with Mr. Adoula after clashes between United Nations and Katangese troops last December, but a series of talks between them broke down June 26.

Mr. KEATING. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield to my distinguished colleague from New York.

Mr. KEATING. Madam President, our distinguished colleague from Connecticut has performed a great service for us and for the Nation in his extremely thorough and careful analysis of the events in the Congo and in Katanga in the past 2 years.

Although he makes no charges against individuals, he does document a tendency on the part of our own Government to support the Congo policies of India's Defense Minister, Khrishna Menon, and a tendency to use threats and force rather than conciliation in dealing with Katanga Premier Tshombe.

Madam President, what concerns me very deeply in the treatment of the Congo situation from the very start has been the double standard that has been applied in defining what self-determination shall be and who shall be allowed to practice it. In the Congo—and, I may add, also in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world—the United States has more and more taken the line of immediate expediency and less and less a clear and reasoned position. We know very well what the Communists have done to render the concept of self-determination completely meaningless within their territories. For the Communists, there can be only one kind of self-determination by the proletariat—and they define the proletariat simply as those people who would choose a Communist form of government. Even though they represent a small minority in any country, for the Communists their will, and their will alone, represents self-determination.

For many of the newly independent nations, self-determination means something else—it means the right to oppose, to massacre, drive out, and to expropriate the property of all Europeans. It also means the right to take over any other neighboring people who are weak enough to let themselves be conquered. In fact, to put the matter in its bluntest terms, colonialism in many areas is defined purely in terms of color and race—if white men rule white men, as in the Soviet satellites, it is not colonialism. If black men rule black men, it is not colonialism, even though in both cases, different nationalities or tribes of people may be wholly deprived of any say in their own government and may be brutally exploited in their political and economic rights.

Madam President, let me hereby register in the strongest terms my opposition to these distorted concepts, originally fathered by the Soviet Union. If self-determination be measured by these adulterated Communist standards, it will ultimately emerge as deformed and crippled as those unfortunate infants whose mothers took thalidomide.

In the Congo the United States has come perilously close to adopting this distorted view. From the start, we have wholly disowned the idea that the people of Katanga, black or white, could be permitted to choose their own destiny. We have reviled in the strongest language their efforts to do so. The Secretary-General of the U.N. has, in one of the most unfortunate statements ever made by a world leader, referred to Premier Tshombe and his advisers as a bunch of clowns.

Let me make it perfectly clear that I am not advocating independence for Katanga. For political and economic reasons I think it would be very much

in the long-term interests of Katanga and of the Congo to form a loose confederation in which Katanga's interests and those of other provinces and tribes would be protected. I believe the United States should use the peaceful tools at its command to urge that confederation and to seek the realization of the proposals made earlier this week by Congolese Premier Cyrille Adoula, when he asked the U.N. to draft a constitution permitting provincial self-rule. I believe we have learned from our own Civil War that disunity is weakness. But at the same time, the principle is clear that the people of Katanga are as much entitled to run their own affairs as the people of any other African area. They have the right to self-determination and self-expression as much as the members of the other provinces of the Congo.

Madam President, if our Government would keep more firmly in mind the fact that self-determination refers not only to the independence from domination by Europeans but also independence from any alien tribes or peoples, we would be in a much better position to undertake the difficult role ahead in the Congo. Our influence would be greater. Our policies would be more consistent. And our objectivity would in the long run be more effective than continued parroting of Soviet semantics. As the Senator from Connecticut has pointed out, conciliation, not force, should be the basis of our approach. An understanding and appreciation of the rights of all the people in the Congo and Katanga would serve in much better stead at this point than the continuing one-sided and deformed outlook we have adopted with regard to self-determination in the Congo.

Madam President, I repeat my gratitude and admiration for the deep study which the distinguished Senator from Connecticut has given to the problem. There might be a sentence here and there in his remarks with which I would not find myself in complete agreement, but in general and overall he has approached the problem from a calm and dispassionate point of view, and has given us, indeed, a great deal to think about in the study of which he has given us the benefit.

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I should be very happy to yield the floor, since I must catch an airplane to Connecticut. However, I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, the Senator from Connecticut has performed a most valuable service to the country, and particularly to his fellow Senators, by providing for us this comprehensive and revealing analysis of the Congo situation. His remarks have confirmed what many of us, I am sure, have suspected, but have been unable to verify. I am particularly pleased that it is the Senator from Connecticut who made this analysis, for we have been confronted with conflicting reports on the Congo situation, and from experience I have

learned to place great reliance on the accuracy of the reports on various overseas matters which the Senator from Connecticut makes from time to time.

This analysis of the Congo situation is particularly timely. As the Senator from Connecticut has stated, it is our obligation and duty to study this matter as our ultimate survival may depend on our understanding the situation. Unfortunately, neither official nor unofficial sources of information on the Congo, as has been the case with respect to other critical foreign situations, can be wholly relied on for accuracy. It seems incredible that we should not be able to rely on our own State Department for accurate information on foreign matters, but repeated instances have illustrated that reliance placed on information from the State Department is not well grounded. The Senate is indebted to the Senator from Connecticut for his painstaking and exhaustive study of the Congo.

I have listened carefully to the address of the Senator from Connecticut, and I am of the opinion that he has been most restrained in stating his conclusions. I would like to take the liberty of listing, and wholeheartedly endorsing, several principal inferences I gathered from the Senator's scholarly address, although I might paraphrase these points somewhat more bluntly than has the Senator from Connecticut.

First. The United States must stop filling the vacuum left by an absence of U.S. policy with whatever happens to be the U.N. policy for the moment;

Second. The United States should adopt a foreign policy that protects and advances its own interests, and then seek to bring the U.N. policy into accord with U.S. policy, rather than submitting passively to U.N. policies dictated by the Afro-Asia bloc and/or the Communist;

Third. That those members of the State Department who are so enamored with hero worship of neutralist Nehru and his Red-favoring, dog-wagging tail, Menon, should either disabuse themselves of this infatuation or be dismissed;

Fourth. That the United States should send someone to the Congo as ambassador who can think, speak, and act objectively and responsibly, and thereby advance both harmony and the interest of the United States and the free world; and

Fifth. That our own State Department should be made to understand that the Senate of the United States will no longer tolerate evasions and misrepresentations of facts in response to its inquiries.

Madam President, I would again like to congratulate the Senator from Connecticut on the splendid service he has rendered his country and the cause of freedom today.

Mr. DODD. I am grateful to the distinguished Senator from South Carolina for his generous remarks.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware obtained the floor.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President, will the Senator from Delaware yield to

me before the Senator from Connecticut leaves, so that I may make a brief statement of only 1 minute?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield briefly to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President, since I know the Senator from Connecticut must leave, in a spirit of fairness I wish to inform the Senator that it will be my intention later in the day to make some comment relating to certain portions of the Senator's address.

Mr. DODD. I should like very much to hear the Senator from Minnesota. I know I shall miss a worthwhile address by not being present.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is my intention to make a statement on Monday next relative to policy in the Congo. I feel that Senators owe it to one another, when there are differences, to inform one another about when such statements will be made. I have high regard for the Senator from Connecticut. I know he has spoken with great sincerity. We have some differences of view on the subject.

Mr. DODD. I am sure the Senator from Minnesota knows my great respect and, indeed, my affection for him. I know of no man, either in the Senate or in private life for whom I have greater admiration than I have for the Senator from Minnesota. I am sorry I cannot remain. I should like to hear what he has to say. I shall read with great care his remarks in the RECORD. I shall then perhaps reload my guns and return.

WINDFALL PROFITS FROM SUGAR IMPORTATIONS

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Madam President, today I wish to discuss a \$663,854 windfall which accrued to the sugar importers as the result of the President's failure to sign the Sugar Act extension bill until July 14, or 2 weeks after the old law had lapsed.

The Sugar Act expired June 30, 1962, and Congress was under pressure to see that the 1962 Sugar Act extension was enacted and on the President's desk for his signature prior to this expiration date. The conferees had reached an agreement on Friday, June 29. The House of Representatives held a special Saturday session in order to approve this conference report on the thirtieth. The leadership of the Senate was standing by ready to have a similar Saturday session to expedite the approval of this conference report; however, the leadership of the Senate and the Senate Finance Committee were advised that with the conferees having reached an agreement on the bill which was acceptable to the administration and with the House scheduled to approve it on Saturday there was no necessity for a Saturday session of the Senate provided that the bill would be approved early Monday and put on the President's desk on that date.

With that clear understanding from the executive branch, the Senate approved the conference report on Monday, and it was sent to the President on that same day. For some unexplained reason, however, this bill, upon which

there had been placed so much emphasis as to its urgency, was pigeonholed at the White House and was not signed by the President until nearly 2 weeks later on July 14.

Recognizing the danger of such a delay in that it would extend a golden opportunity to certain importers to make tremendous windfall profits, I called for a complete report on all imports during this period. While we had been given assurance that during the lapse of this law the Government could fully protect itself by refusing admission of the sugar, I could not understand this argument. I saw nothing to prevent these windfall profits.

I have just received this report which I shall later place in the RECORD. This report shows that based upon the Department's own computation during this 2-week lapse of the law, the importers had a field day. They harvested a windfall profit totaling \$663,854 on the 58,075 tons that were rushed in during this interval.

I shall incorporate in the RECORD this report which gives a complete breakdown showing the country of origin, the name of the importer, the port of entry, the tonnage involved, and the total windfall profits on each shipment.

From this report it will be noted that the country of origin is in many instances not a producer of sugar. Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and so forth, are not producers, nor do they have any quota. It is therefore reasonable to assume that sugar which was brought into this country from them during the 2-week interval represented sugar which the exporters had in turn purchased in the world market. It has been strongly suggested that some of this sugar which was dumped into the United States during this 2-week interval was Cuban sugar.

It should be pointed out that while in computing these windfall profits they are shown as accruing to the importer, there is a possibility that the importer did not keep all of this easy money but may have divided it with the refineries or others involved in the transaction. But in any event the windfall profit was there and all they had to do was to divide it up. The American consumers and the taxpayers were the losers.

Some explanation should be forthcoming as to why this law was allowed to lapse, especially in view of the great urgency which had been placed upon congressional action prior to June 30.

I now list these windfall profits. The American Sugar Refining Co. brought in approximately 23,000 tons through the ports of Boston and New Orleans upon which a total windfall profit of \$152,409.60 was reaped.

The H. H. Pike & Co. brought in a series of shipments through the ports of New York, Buffalo, Champlain, Niagara Falls, and Rouses Point upon which total windfall profits of \$102,720 were realized.

The M. Golodetz & Co. brought in a series of shipments through the ports of Baltimore, New York, and New Orleans upon which windfall profits of \$134,010.80 were reaped.

The Godechaux Sugar Co. brought in four shipments through the port of New Orleans with a windfall profit of \$92,174.40.

Christman & Co. brought in four shipments through the ports of Philadelphia and New York upon which were picked up \$86,688 in windfall profits.

Olavarria & Co. brought in two shipments during this period, one through the port of Buffalo and one through Detroit, upon which \$56,256 in windfall profits were picked up.

Farr, Whitlock Dixon & Co. brought in over 5,000 tons through the port of Boston upon which were picked up windfall profits of \$28,267.20.

The J. Aron & Co. unloaded a shipment through the port of New Orleans upon which windfall profits of \$9,984 were picked up.

Various other small importers picked up windfall profits of \$1,344.

This brought the grand total of the windfall which fell to the importers and their friends to \$663,854, all of which resulted from an unnecessary and thus far unexplained delay on the part of the White House in signing the bill.

The basis of these windfall profits arises from the fact that the importation of sugar in the United States operates under a protected market condition. The price of sugar in our domestic market is maintained at a level substantially higher than the world price of sugar.

Both under the previous law and under the 1962 extension of the Sugar Act importers can bring sugar which has been purchased at the world market into this country only after they have paid as a special tax representing the differential between the world price and the fixed price in the U.S. domestic markets.

During the 2 weeks in which these shipments were dumped into the country, as the result of there being no law in effect, the importers did not have to pay this differential tax. Had the law been in effect, there would have been an import tax of \$48 per ton.

In computing the windfall profits which accrued to these companies this \$48 figure was used in all instances except in the cases of where the sugar came from a country which under the 1962 act would have had a quota. Had the law been in effect these countries could have imported the sugar with the payment of only 10 percent of this \$48 tax, or \$4.80 per ton. These factors were taken into consideration in the computation of the windfall profits; therefore, the \$663,854 figure which I present here today represents the amount of the windfall profits resulting from the neglect of the White House in signing the bill. These windfall profits to the importers and their friends were at the direct expense of the American consumer and taxpayers.

Any argument by the administration that some of these windfall profits may have been passed on to the consumers through the generosity of those harvesting them is merely wishful thinking.

I ask at this point unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a

breakdown of these imports by company, country of origin, port of entry, and the dollar amount of the extra profits.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Sugar released from customs control during lapse of quota provisions of Sugar Act, July 1-13, 1962

QUANTITIES IN CUSTOMS CUSTODY OR AT PORT OF UNLADING ON JUNE 30, 1962

Country of origin	Importer or person who received sugar	Port of entry	Date released	Quantity of short tons raw value	Import fee at global rate or applicable quota rate	
					Cents per pound	Total amount
Canada	Christman & Co.	Philadelphia	July 2	32	2.40	\$1,536.00
Do	Olavarria & Co.	Buffalo	do	48	2.40	2,304.00
Belgium	Christman & Co.	New York	do	307	2.40	14,736.00
Do	M. Golodetz & Co.	Baltimore	do	91	.34	618.80
Do	do	do	do	493	2.40	23,664.00
Netherlands	Christman & Co.	New York	do	1,074	2.40	51,552.00
Do	do	Philadelphia	do	393	2.40	18,864.00
Do	M. Golodetz & Co.	New York	do	802	2.40	38,496.00
United Kingdom	do	New Orleans	do	1,484	2.40	71,232.00
Hong Kong	Various	San Francisco	July 1-13	15	2.40	720.00
Do	do	New York	do	12	2.40	576.00
West Germany	Lansen-Neeve Co.	do	July 11	1	2.40	48.00
Brazil	Godechaux Sugar Co.	New Orleans	July 2	1,143	.24	5,486.40
Colombia	J. Aron & Co.	do	July 3	2,080	.24	9,984.00
Dominican Republic	Godechaux Sugar Co.	do	July 2	5,090	.24	24,432.00
Haiti	do	do	July 5	3,051	.24	14,644.80
Subtotal				16,116		278,894.00

QUANTITIES IMPORTED SUBSEQUENT TO JUNE 30, 1962

Peru	Godechaux Sugar Co.	New Orleans	July 2	9,919	0.24	\$47,611.20
Dominican Republic	American Sugar Refiners	Boston	July 9	10,586	.24	50,812.80
Do	Farr, Whitlock Dixon & Co.	do	July 10	5,889	.24	28,267.20
French West Indies	Godechaux Sugar Co.	New Orleans	July 12	11,316	.24	54,316.80
Do	American Sugar Co.	do	do	985	2.40	47,280.00
Canada	Olavarria & Co.	Detroit	July 1-13	1,124	2.40	53,952.00
Do	H. H. Pike & Co.	New York	do	257	2.40	12,336.00
Do	do	Buffalo	do	171	2.40	8,208.00
Do	do	Champlain	do	1,434	2.40	68,832.00
Do	do	Niagara Falls	do	171	2.40	8,208.00
Do	do	Rouses Point	do	107	2.40	5,136.00
Subtotal				41,959		384,960.00
Total				58,075		663,854.00

AT THE CROSSROADS IN THE CONGO

Mr. MOSS. Madam President, I listened with great interest to the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut concerning Tshombe and Katanga. However, unlike the Senator from New York and the Senator from South Carolina, I do not agree with many parts of the analysis. I commend the Senator from Connecticut for his scholarly observations, but I believe that there are many points that deserve different emphasis. I should like to address myself briefly to the subject that he discussed.

All the evidence points to the conclusion that we are at the crossroads with respect to the incredibly complex situation in the Congo. I deliberately choose this phrase rather than say that the situation is now critical. For the rejoinder to the latter term would, of course, be the question, When is the Congo not in a period of crisis? My point is that we are in a special period—and undoubtedly a relatively brief one—when the storm clouds are moving in rapidly but while there is still an opportunity to dispel them.

I say in all seriousness that this may well be the last chance that will be offered the leaders of the Congo to avoid chaos and for ourselves as well to help hold back chaos there, and the certain

penetration of that vast area in the heart of Africa by Communists and Soviet agents.

A little noticed but immensely important development has just taken place in Léopoldville. In the days since Mr. Tshombe interrupted his talks with Prime Minister Adoula and returned to Elisabethville, Mr. Adoula has made a wholesale change in the Cabinet of the Central Government. In bolstering the forces of moderation, he has aroused substantial opposition in the Congo Parliament. Mr. Adoula and his Ministers are under violent attack as being too pro-American. And among the attackers are found the supporters of both Mr. Tshombe and the deposed Gizenga.

Adoula's new Cabinet is a remarkably clear demonstration of his basically moderate outlook. There is not a single known extremist politician in the list of eight new Ministers and three state secretaries. In fact, nine of these gentlemen are clearly identifiable as noted moderates and conservatives.

Why is this development so important? Because this Government surely is the most responsible and most moderate one that could be created in the Congo under present as well as foreseeable circumstances. It is just such a government which could best negotiate an agreement to bring the Province of Ka-

tanga back into the fold. Mr. Adoula has placed himself in jeopardy in an effort to create an atmosphere of moderation which could encourage speedy accommodation between the Republic of the Congo and its secessionist elements. Now, if ever, there has been created an opportunity to put the past behind, to relinquish feelings of suspicion and resentment, and to make immediate arrangements for the creation of a reunified Congo.

But how has Mr. Tshombe responded to this opportunity? By celebrating the second anniversary of Katanga's secession from the Republic of the Congo with an independence day military parade of 2,500 Katangese troops, despite promises to United Nations officials that such numbers would not be involved. By permitting 10,000 women and children to hurl sticks, stones, and abuse at United Nations soldiers, Tshombe's government put the lives of hapless civilians in danger. Apparently this was a cynical attempt to goad the U.N. soldiers into becoming involved in a massacre. Happily, the discipline of those troops prevented a disaster.

These are developments that have hit the headlines. However, there are even more important but scarcely noticed trends since the beginning of this year which give much cause for concern about the attitude and behavior of Mr. Tshombe.

The fact is that since Tshombe's Conakat Party supporters resumed their seats in the Léopoldville Parliament in January, they have voted with the Gizenga faction against the Adoula government on virtually every major issue. In the key election of March 6 for the Representatives, the Conakat deputies voted for the Gizengist candidates. In the election of the Secretary General of the Chamber on April 7, Tshombe's party backed the candidate of the Gizenga wing of the African Solidarity Party and the Gbenye wing of the old Lumumba party. In the past month, the alliance between the Conakat deputies and the Gbenye supporters was employed to introduce a motion of censure against the pro-Western Foreign Minister, Justin Bomboko. Finally, just a few days ago, Tshombe's deputies again joined with the extremists to contribute to the 44 votes in the chamber opposing Adoula's new and moderate cabinet. Also, Mr. Tshombe's parliamentary leader subsequently gave a joint press conference with members of the pro-Gizenga element, including Gizenga's former Ambassador to Communist China, in order to call for Adoula's resignation.

If further evidence is required of this tacit Tshombe-Gizenga alliance, let it be noted that Tshombe's youth group on March 14 publicly demanded Gizenga's release from detention. Perhaps the American public has forgotten that Mr. Gizenga—claiming to be Lumumba's heir—tried to create a secessionist state in the Congo's eastern province with Soviet bloc assistance.

I must say that the alliance of Tshombe and Gizenga supporters against

the pro-Western Adoula government comes as no great surprise to one who has never accepted what the noted columnist, Marguerite Higgins, has called the Tshombe myth. I have always felt that the contest in the Congo must be regarded primarily as one between moderates and extremists: between those trying to build a nation under incredibly difficult circumstances, and those ready to sacrifice the popular welfare to the pursuit of personal power.

In attempting to examine the disturbing situation in that distraught country, I think my text could be a sentence written by New York Times correspondent, David Halberstam, reporting from Elisabethville on July 15. Mr. Halberstam—who, incidentally, has done a superb job of covering developments in the Congo—wrote as follows about Mr. Tshombe:

He has been convinced by advisers that American public opinion backs him and his cause and that President Kennedy and Ambassador Edmond A. Gullion stand almost alone in opposing him.

If Tshombe has in fact been thus advised, I wish to assure him that this information is dead wrong. I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of the American people and their representatives support President Kennedy in the policy that he and former President Eisenhower have pursued in seeking to return law and order to the Congo and maintain the viability of that nation, as a nation, for its own sake and so as to avoid a pit of bloody anarchy that the Communists and Soviets can exploit in the center of Africa.

At the same time, I consider it true to say that most of our officials believe that Mr. Tshombe can still make a valuable contribution to the future of the Congo. It is clear that he is a capable political leader.

Obviously, then, Mr. Tshombe has been badly advised on important matters, and there is little question that he has both good and bad people around him. In the latter category there are at least two high officials in his government who have been revealed as antiwhite racists willing to stir up the mob to violence at every opportunity.

Presumably it is the advice of such people which has caused Tshombe several times to accuse American capitalists of trying to do him in. For example, he told the Katanga Assembly that—

The State Department is under the thumb of voracious financiers who will not rest as long as the Congo is not a colony under their economic domination and as long as Katanga copper is not eliminated from world competition.

Again, a year ago this month, the Katangese women's group controlled by Tshombe's political party feigned astonishment in a letter that—

A man like Kennedy, who calls himself a Christian and a Catholic, would play the game of unscrupulous financiers.

Mr. Tshombe ought to be told that this is the kind of nonsense which they write in Moscow.

Mr. President, it has been stated that not enough effort has been devoted to giving Mr. Tshombe personal reassurances and contacts with high-level officials of the United Nations and Western governments. It is conveniently forgotten that President Kennedy personally replied to Tshombe's appeal for help last December in arranging a truce with the United Nations force, which easily could have overwhelmed Katanga at that time had it wished to do so. It is forgotten, too, that Ambassador Gullion, at our President's request, personally escorted Mr. Tshombe to Kitona and stayed with him for a number of days. It is easily overlooked, too, that the United Nations assured his safety and departure when he returned to Léopoldville for negotiations this last spring.

What seems to be totally ignored is how difficult Tshombe makes it for anyone trying to meditate between him and the central government. For example, there is wide agreement that Special U.N. Representative Robert Gardiner has performed admirably in this task. Yet a few days ago Tshombe's own journal in Elisabethville quoted him as follows:

I believe that the high U.N. command has lost confidence in Gardiner, who is an African like us and who does not want to see Negro blood spilled. The game of the U.N. is to use men without scruples who can carry out plans regardless of the consequence to the civil population. The life of a Negro is of less importance in the eyes of Mr. Kennedy and his State Department who pay for the U.N. The political motivation of the U.S. President is more important than the lives of individuals, especially Africans.

That is the irresponsible statement of a man who tries the patience of even those here who may have wanted to help him.

Similarly, if the Katangese Government expects understanding in this country, it would do well to reconsider its refusal last month to allow the opening of a USIS cultural center there. Apparently, Tshombe's government fears dissemination of the truth about the United States. It is worth noting that we do not, on our side, prevent weekly broadcasts by the so-called Katanga Information Service on a New York radio station.

Mr. President, there is no need to continue listing such items. I do not want to believe that they are representative of what Mr. Tshombe really thinks. For, if I do so, I would have to conclude that the leader of Katanga is a crafty, conscienceless opportunist who cares far more for his personal position than for the lives and fortunes of the Congolese people. I must prefer to believe that Mr. Tshombe has been accepting bad advice.

In conclusion, Mr. President, indirectly I want to offer Mr. Tshombe some good advice. I want to emphasize again the opportunity that now exists—and which may disappear within a matter of weeks or even days—for Tshombe to meet moderation with moderation.

Prime Minister Adoula has just elaborated a set of constitutional principles which provide a most reasonable basis

for the settlement of the Katanga problem. The federal constitution which he has asked the U.N. to help his government in drawing up would parallel our own—giving certain designated powers to the Federal Government but reserving to the member states all powers not expressly given to the Federal Government. The Central Government would exercise powers in the fields of national defense, foreign affairs, customs, money, exchange control, fiscal policy, interstate and foreign commerce, citizenship and immigration and posts and telegraphs.

Mr. Tshombe has expressed satisfaction with this proposal. Let him for once back up his words with deeds. Now is the time for him to abandon secession and join with his brothers in building a strong and prosperous united Congo. Unless he can, in this late hour, behave like the statesman which we believe he can be, only the jackals that follow closely behind chaos, will profit from the situation in that troubled land.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Utah yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PROXMIER in the chair). Does the Senator from Utah yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. MOSS. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I compliment the Senator from Utah for his splendid remarks in reference to the Congo situation. I am very much disturbed by some of the statements which have been made today by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] and the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] in relation to our foreign policy as it affects the Congo.

The U.S. Government has pursued a policy of strengthening, stabilizing, and aiding the Central Government in the Congo, because this is the only policy that can keep that part of the world out of Communist hands.

The Adoula government, as the Senator from Utah has so ably pointed out, has successfully, thus far, fought off the so-called Lumumba elements, which were pro-Communist, and the Gizenga elements, which are pro-Communist. Premier Adoula's cabinet is made up of moderates and is a cabinet which has sought to chart a course of independence and freedom for the Congo.

It is most unfortunate and regrettable that Mr. Tshombe's deputies, who serve in the Congolese Parliament, have been doing everything possible to topple or overthrow the established Adoula government. Also, it should be noted that those deputies have worked with anti-democratic, pro-Communist forces in an effort to embarrass the Adoula government.

One does not need to praise Mr. Adoula in order to speak forthrightly and, I hope, forcefully and accurately about the policy of the U.S. Government. I do not say that everything this Government has done in reference to the Congo has been perfect, because the situation in the Congo at times has been so uncertain, so confused, so filled with violence and disorder, that it has been very difficult to know what to do.

But the United States has rightly supported the Central Government. We have rightly supported the activities of the United Nations in the Congo. It is a fact that without the support of the United States and the United Nations in the Congo, there would have been civil war. It is a fact that the area known as the Congo would have been in leftist hands or Communist or pro-Communist hands.

I think Mr. Tshombe needs to be told that the American people and the Government of the American people are not in sympathy with his activities. I am speaking of the duly elected Government of the United States, a Government which has the support of the American people. The President of the United States is in charge of our foreign policy. One of the central aspects of the foreign policy of the United States has been our Congo policy. This Government has made a determined effort to prevent the spread of revolution, violence, and disorder in Africa. It is a known fact that the Kremlin has had its eyes on Africa for decades and that since 1960, in particular, the Kremlin has had as its primary aim the subversion of the African Continent, and following Communist subversion the taking over of the government and the domination of vast areas of Africa.

The policy of the United States has been an attempt to find ways of reconciliation, to promote a more workable system of parliamentary government.

We have sought to support the United Nations in its activities to preserve the peace. We have done this through financial outlays. Other nations have done it through their manpower.

I have the feeling that the new attack upon the Adoula government and upon our own Congo policy is related to our activities in the United Nations. We still have the United Nations bond issue to pass during this session of Congress. One of the reasons for favoring the United Nations bond issue as a means of helping finance the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations is the importance of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Congo. If that bond issue is not passed by our Congress, the United Nations cannot continue its activities in Africa, and particularly in the Congo. If the United Nations is withdrawn from the Congo, then—mark my words, Mr. President—there will be wholesale slaughter.

In recent days the Central Government, the Adoula government, has offered a new constitution for the Congo, one providing for a good deal of autonomy for provinces such as Katanga. There is real hope that this new proposal can lead to a substantial degree of reconciliation. But I do not think reconciliation will be made any easier if groups and individuals in the United States support the principle of secession.

What this situation really boils down to is that the province of Katanga is rich in mineral resources which provide a great deal of the revenue which is needed for the operation of the Central

Government of the Congo. If the province of Katanga can secede as either an independent state or nation or if Katanga can drive such a tough bargain that its revenues will not go to the Central Government, then the Central Government of the Congo will be forever weak and incapable of giving any kind of responsible government to this vast area in Africa.

So, Mr. President, I feel that the remarks of the Senator from Utah are timely, and I desire to associate myself with them.

Let me point out some of the misunderstandings and lack of accurate reporting that seem to color some of the thinking and the comments about the Congo and, in particular, about our policy there. I wish to comment on some points I noticed in the speech delivered today by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd]. One of the reasons why I asked the Senator from Delaware to yield to me, some time ago, was so that I could inform the Senator from Connecticut that I had some disagreement with some of his comments. This is only common courtesy among Senators; if one is about to speak about one of his colleagues and his remarks, I believe he should be notified.

It is my intention next week to speak about this matter and to review it in a prepared speech. But I do not have it ready now. Today, I am making only informal remarks about developments in this area of the world.

I noticed, for example, that in his speech the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] said:

I want to repeat to the Senators that the recall of Ambassador Timberlake raises a most serious question. As I have pointed out, *Newsweek Periscope*, several weeks in advance of Ambassador Timberlake's recall, forecast that he would be recalled as a sequel to the recall of Dayal. In short, it appears to have been a horse swap.

What does that mean, Mr. President? It means that an accusation has been leveled against the State Department and against this Government that it recalled one of our able Ambassadors—Ambassador Timberlake—on the basis that the United Nations representative in the Congo, an Indian national, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, would likewise be recalled—in other words, that a "deal" was made.

But, Mr. President, what are the facts?

Well, Mr. President, they are not to be found in *Newsweek Periscope*. *Newsweek* happens to be a weekly magazine which gives a good deal of news; but it does not have access to the files of the State Department—I hope. It so happens that Ambassador Timberlake had been in that area for 4 years, without any home leave; and he wanted to come home. He was exhausted, for he had undertaken unbelievably heavy responsibilities. He, himself, chose the date of his departure; he was not ordered back. He chose to leave because the daughter of one of his best friends, a man who had been killed in an automobile accident, was getting married. Ambassador Timberlake had acted for years as un-

official guardian of this young lady, so he had a natural and wholly understandable desire to be present at her wedding.

So Ambassador Timberlake left. But because he happened to leave and to return home—at his own request, and on his own volition—at about the same time when the United Nations representative, Mr. Dayal, was taken out of the Congo, someone says there was a deal. But, Mr. President, as I have said, such an assertion is nonsense.

In the interval before our new Ambassador arrived in the Congo, our chargé there, the man in command of our Embassy, was Mr. Godley, one of the most capable officers in our Foreign Service. He was very effective in assisting moderate forces to prepare for the parliamentary session. The Department of State frankly, openly, and unqualifiedly denies the charge or allegation that any deal was made or that there was any connection between the removal of the United Nations representative, Mr. Dayal, and the return of the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Timberlake. In fact, today Mr. Timberlake is in the State Department, working openly with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. McGhee, who is in overall charge of the Congo policy; and Mr. Timberlake works closely with the Congo task force in the State Department. It may be hard to understand his previous assignment to Maxwell Air Force Base, but now his talents are being used as they should be. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] failed to mention this important point. So no discredit was cast upon Mr. Timberlake, who stood his ground, and who may have had some differences of opinion with others there. After all, the situation in the Congo is about as fluid as mercury; and one never knows, from day to day, what will happen there. The Congo was never prepared for self-government. But independence was granted it; and the Congo was a happy hunting ground—or perhaps I should use the word "unhappy"—for the forces of disorder and for the most extreme forces of leftism and communism.

The miracle is that today the Congo is not a Communist satellite. The miracle is that today the Congo has a government that is friendly to freedom and independence and is jealous of its own national sovereignty. Let us remember that the same government booted out, lock, stock, and barrel, the Communists who used their diplomatic privileges to agitate against the legally constituted Congolese Government in Léopoldville.

I do not understand why there is such vast interest in the United States over the province of Katanga—so much so, Mr. President, that today a full-page advertisement appears in the *Washington Post* and other papers, and states in substance, "Get the United Nations out of the Congo. Leave the Congo alone to us. Defeat the U.N. Bond Issue in the House of Representatives."

I wish to say that when Mr. Tshombe picks his friends a little better, I shall

be more interested in leaving it to him. But so long as Mr. Tshombe is going to walk arm in arm with the Communists, and is going to sleep in the same bed with the forces of Lumumba, and is going to fool around with Gizengists, all of whom are the opponents of free government in the Congo, I do not think the United Nations should leave the Congo.

Let us remember that the Soviet Union does not want the United Nations to remain in the Congo or anywhere else to preserve the peace. The Soviet Union wants disorder, and wants to see this part of Africa—the heart of Africa—in utter turmoil, because if there is enough turmoil, through this kind of boiling up of social forces, the hammer and sickle of communism will rise to the top.

What amazes me is how people who have fought communism all their lives can all at once get sucked into a situation where they want to kick out the very force—namely, the United Nations—that stands there as the one force to prevent the takeover by communism. Communism comes after disorder, violence, chaos, confusion. Mark my words, if the forces of the United Nations are withdrawn, chaos will follow, and out of chaos will come a Gizenga, or someone even more leftist or more of a Communist, for the real Gizenga is finished as a political force.

The critics of our Congo policy have attacked the United Nations and the Secretary General of the United Nations. They even say the Secretary General of the United Nations is determined to use force in the Congo without any further consultation.

Apparently the critics of our Congo policy have an insight into the mind of the Secretary General of the United Nations that goes beyond human understanding. The record is crystal clear that the U.N. forces in the Congo have used force only in self-defense, and they were ordered to use force in self-defense, and this Government asked them to use force in self-defense, and the Soviet Union did not want them there.

I repeat, the Soviet Union has never accepted the idea of a U.N. presence in the Congo.

I repeat: Mr. Tshombe, from Katanga is acting perhaps out of desperation. I do not know. I do not know what his motives are. I do not know what his reasons are. But this I do know: He walks arm in arm on every road in the Congo with every known enemy of the United States. He is walking arm in arm with followers of the late Patrice Lumumba. He is walking with followers of others who are our enemies, and Tshombe's deputies in the Parliament are doing everything they can to wreck the parliamentary structure.

The Senator from Minnesota will be heard to speak in more definite and precise terms on the policy of the Government, because this is an attack upon a fundamental policy of the Government of the United States, and of John F. Kennedy, President of the United States.

The President has given personal attention to this matter. Secretary of State Rusk has given personal attention to it. Under Secretary of State George Ball last December gave one of the most brilliant expositions of U.S. policy toward the Congo that I have ever heard. This question has high priority in the Government of the United States, which I think is to the credit of the President and of the Secretary of State. I think it is to the credit of Assistant Secretary Williams. I think it is to the credit of Mr. Gullion, our Ambassador in the Congo. They have, through the cooperation of other peace-loving nations, been able to keep this part of the world from falling like a rotten apple into the hands of the Communists.

The struggle for freedom takes place in Africa as much as it is taking place in Asia, South America, and even here. One of the things that disturbs me is the recklessness of the charges being made.

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] made a speech the other day, and I spoke to the Senator from Arizona about it today, so I do not speak without his being notified. I heard him say on the Senate floor, with reference to Peru—which speech appears in the RECORD of Wednesday, August 1—that the leader of the Aprista Party in Peru, commonly known as APRA Party, was a Socialist and a fellow traveler of the Communists.

I was shocked. The one political party in Peru in which every one of its candidates has declared himself openly against Castro, against the Fidelistas, against the Communists, has been the APRA Party. Every other candidate has either been silent or has embraced them, including even the conservative candidate, Odria, a former dictator, or former president. I make no adverse comments against General Odria as an individual. I wish he or some duly constituted officer or political leader could have been elected President of Peru. I do not choose sides. I only say when Mr. Belaunde, one of the top three candidates, was on a radio program like our "Meet the Press," and a Peruvian journalist asked him, "Are you anti-Communist? Do you oppose the Communists? Are you against the Communists?" he said, "I am against no one." "Are you against Castro?" "No, not against Castro. I am against no one."

Yet every single candidate of the APRA Party took an oath to fight communism. They fought them in the streets, in the universities, in the trade unions. They fought them everywhere, and they backed the very man who is in Paris an exile, the great statesman, the hero-patriot of Peru, President Prado, who was the guest of the President of the United States less than a year ago here in Washington, D.C.

President Prado, of Peru, was the first Latin American statesman to come to our aid after Pearl Harbor. President Prado was the first to stand up against Cuba and Castro; and he was the first to break relations with him. President Prado fought communism everywhere.

Yet let me read what the Senator from Arizona said:

We must learn also to be careful who we befriend in the Latin countries. Certainly Haya de La Torre—

Who was APRA's presidential candidate in Peru—

is not one to whom we should extend the hand of help. He is a proved Socialist, a fellow traveler of Communists, and an opportunist.

He may be an opportunist. I do not know the man. I never met the man. He may once have been a Marxist. That I do not know. I will accept the Senator's word for it. But there are teachers in great Catholic universities who are former Communists, but who learned their errors and who stand up today as the fighters against this vicious form of tyranny.

There have been numerous other Americans who have broken with the Communist Party and who now stand up as towers of strength against this evil and monstrous force. They are praised by the FBI. They are praised by every sort of good men. But here is a man, head of the party in Peru, who took the fight to the streets, who took the fight to the universities, whose followers fought the Communists, who, as a candidate in every one of the congressional campaigns, said, "We are against Castro. We are against communism. We are against Khrushchev. We fight against every one of them."

Yet now they are attacked by the anti-Communists in our midst. Why? Why is it? Because Mr. Haya de la Torre and the APRA Party liberals believed in certain reforms. They did not believe in Communists running trade unions. They believed in effective trade unions, where there could be bargaining for better wages. That kind of person is looked upon as a radical, as a dangerous man.

In my opinion, that kind of party and person is one of the few hopes in some parts of the world for the maintenance of freedom.

The same thing in the Congo. When men become desperate, they search for any kind of support. I have never had the privilege of meeting Mr. Tshombe. I understand he is a personable, attractive, intelligent man. I deeply regret that differences have cropped up between us.

I think Mr. Tshombe is being led to believe that there is a great force of public opinion in this country and elsewhere which would put him in as Prime Minister or which would permit the secession of his province from the Congo. More than that, Mr. President, I think that this is a part of a continuing attack upon our State Department, which has plenty of trouble dealing with Mr. Khrushchev, much less dealing with Mr. Tshombe. I think this is part of a continuing attack upon the United Nations.

I wondered when the attack would be resumed. Let the word be out that there is one Senator in this body who is going to stand up for our participation in the United Nations. There are others. The

Senator from Utah [Mr. Moss] has already demonstrated his willingness to do so.

The vast majority of the American people want our participation in the United Nations. The vast majority of the American people want a United Nations police force. The vast majority of the American people are a lot more intelligent than some of their analysts and critics. The vast majority of the American people do not want to see the Congo or any other part of Africa stirred up, ending up in confusion, turmoil, violence, and disruption.

Most of the American people would not know Mr. Adoula from Mr. Tshombe if they were to see the two of them together. What is more, very few Members of Congress would.

But we do know that there has been a determined effort now for nearly 2 years on the part of Mr. Tshombe and his followers either to take over the Congo or to break away. In recent months, I repeat, this effort has lent itself to some strange alliances and to some very strange happenings.

I thank my friend from Utah, who has been so patient with me. I repeat, I hope he will be with me next week.

I intend to address myself to this subject. I did once before.

I remember when the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], and I held the floor of the Senate one afternoon speaking on this subject, answering point by point the charges then made that most of the officials of the Adoula government were Communist sympathizers or leftists. That was a crazy charge. It was dropped after we exposed it as being utter nonsense—not only utter nonsense, but also incredible nonsense. No one talked about that again. That charge was dropped.

Now we have something new to face. The new line is, "Get the United Nations out of the Congo and the boys will work it all out." This is like saying, "Get the police force out of a violent, angry, crime-ridden city and leave it to the mobs."

We are not about ready to do that.

I support the President of the United States; I am on his team in the Senate. I support his domestic policy. I support his foreign policy. I support his Congo policy.

I think President Kennedy will be known in the days ahead, as he is now, not only for what he has done for the Nation at home, but also, and more importantly, for what he has done abroad, because he has had insight, he has had courage, and he has had vision. He has not let all of the hobgoblins and the ghosts, all the rumors and the allegations, detour him from a straight course. He can depend upon the Senator from Minnesota to back him in his efforts to strengthen the United Nations, to give a sense of firmness and direction to our foreign policy. He can also depend upon the Senator from Minnesota to defend his work on the floor of the Senate.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Minnesota for his eloquent and vigorous defense of the foreign policy of this Government. Certainly it should be defended when questions are raised such as those raised today.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

FRYINGPAN-ARKANSAS PROJECT, COLORADO

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have discussed with the minority whip, the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], and with my colleague from California on this side [Mr. ENGLE], as well as with the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the matter to which I am about to refer. I wish to have the unfinished business, Calendar No. 1590, S. 1108, authorizing the conveyance of certain property in the city of San Diego to the regents of the University of California, temporarily laid aside, so that the Senate may proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1701, S. 284, to authorize the construction, operation, and maintenance by the Secretary of the Interior of the Fryingpan-Arkansas project, Colorado.

Mr. KUCHEL. Would the very able majority leader indicate whether subsequent to the disposition of the bill relating to the Fryingpan-Arkansas project, and the other bill, introduced by our colleague from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], it is his intention to have the Senate then return to the consideration of the bill he now proposes to lay aside temporarily?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. I say to both my colleagues from California that following consideration of the bill for the Fryingpan-Arkansas project, it is the intention of the leadership to have the Senate consider Calendar No. 1707, S. 3153, to guarantee electric consumers in the Pacific Northwest first call on electric energy generated at Federal plants in that region and to guarantee electric consumers in other regions reciprocal priority, and for other purposes.

Subsequent to that—I would guess on Tuesday or Wednesday of next week—the Senate again will return to consideration of the bill authorizing the conveyance of certain property in the city of San Diego to the regents of the University of California.

Mr. KUCHEL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1701.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 284) to authorize the construction, operation, and maintenance by the Secretary of the Interior of the Fryingpan-Arkansas project, Colorado.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in explanation for temporarily laying aside

the bill authorizing the conveyance of certain property in the city of San Diego to the regents of the University of California, I wish to say that there will be more speeches this afternoon and it would be a late hour before the Senate would be able to consider the bill. Hence the desire of the leadership to lay the bill aside and to take up the bill on the Fryingpan-Arkansas project, Colorado, which, at the conclusion of morning business on Monday next, will be the unfinished business.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY NEXT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its deliberations tonight it stand in adjournment to meet at 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TEXTILE IMPORTS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, leaders of the textile industry have recently announced that the Geneva agreement for the control of cotton textile imports is working very badly and that the Government is failing to achieve its announced goal of effective import limits.

When such statements are made by leaders of the industry, it appears to be appropriate to examine the provisions of the short-term cotton textile agreement, the actions taken thereunder, and the provisions of the long-term cotton textile arrangement and the actions which may possibly be taken thereunder.

I have, therefore, examined these documents and have, most regretfully, come to the conclusion that the present problems of market disruption arising on increased imports of cotton yarns and cotton textile products will not be alleviated but will rather be aggravated if the long-term cotton textile arrangement becomes effective on October 1, 1962.

The statements of spokesmen of the cotton textile industry are, indeed, supported by the Government import statistics. Imports of cotton yarn in the first half of 1962 established a record of 17,749,382 pounds. This 6-month volume of imports surpasses the record of cotton yarn imports for any entire year in the past.

Imports of cotton cloth for the 8 months commencing on the effective date of the short-term agreement, excluding imports from Japan, reached 87 percent of the fiscal 1961 base on which the short-term cotton textile arrangement was supposed to be effective in the limitation of imports for the period from October 1, 1961, to September 30, 1962. Imports from Japan which, under a bilateral agreement negotiated by our State Department, are limited to 275 million square yards for the calendar year 1962 had, by the end of May, already exceeded the expected 5-month level by 41 million square yards.

Acting under the short-term cotton textile agreements, our Government has successively initiated actions with seven or eight foreign countries to restrain and limit the imports coming into this country in excess of the level established in the short-term agreement.

But the short-term agreement expires September 30, 1962, and the excessive imports of cotton textiles, against which our Government is now taking action against various countries successively will become the base or the floor for cotton imports on October 1, 1962, if the long-term arrangement becomes effective.

This situation prompts me to present a review here of some of the steps which have been taken by Members of Congress and leaders of the industry in bringing the problems of the textile industry on imports to the attention of the administration and a further review of the actions taken by the administration in recognition of the urgent need to correct these problems.

Misconceptions concerning the effectiveness of the short-term cotton textile agreement and the long-term cotton textile arrangement have, unfortunately, been current in the industry, and, indeed, among some Members of the Congress because of exaggerated reports as to the effectiveness of the purported controls on cotton textile imports established by international trade negotiations.

We are now at a time when the Congress has before it a Trade Expansion Act which basically accepts the theory that international trade can best be governed by international trade agreements. It, therefore, is extremely important now to consider the degree to which our State Department has been effective in negotiating international trade agreements relating to cotton textile imports.

Early in 1961, a number of Members of the House of Representatives and a group of Senators with whom I was pleased to associate myself addressed communications to the President calling attention to the long continued distress of our domestic textile industry which in recent years has resulted in a tremendous liquidation of textile mills and the loss of several hundred thousand jobs in such mills.

Thereafter, the President appointed, on February 16, 1961, a committee of Cabinet members headed by Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges which, in due course, made a study of the textile import problem and reported to the President. On May 2, 1962, the President announced a 7-point program for the alleviation of the serious problems of the textile industry. At that time the President stated:

The problems of the textile industry are serious and deep rooted. They have been the subject of investigation at least as far back as 1935, when a Cabinet committee was appointed by President Roosevelt to investigate the conditions in this industry. Most recently these problems were the subject of a special study by the Interdepartmental Committee headed by Secretary of Com-

merce Luther H. Hodges. I believe it is time for action.

It is our second largest employer. Some 2 million workers are directly affected by conditions in the industry. There are another 2 million persons employed in furnishing requirements of the industry at its present level of production. Two years ago, the Office of Defense Mobilization testified that it was one of the industries essential to our national security. It is of vital importance in peacetime and it has a direct effect upon our total economy. All the studies have shown that unemployment in textile mills strikes hardest at those communities suffering most from depressed conditions.

In the sixth point of the President's program he directed the Secretary of State to call a conference of principal textile exporting and importing countries to seek an international understanding to provide a basis for trade which would avoid undue disruption of established industries. Thereafter, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball proceeded to arrange an international trade conference restricted entirely to cotton textiles.

Members of the House and Senate addressed a further communication to the President stating the unanimous opinion of themselves and the industry that the Secretary was proceeding under an erroneous understanding of the nature of the industry and the gravity of the problem. They pointed out particularly that his plan was restricted to cotton textiles excluding wool, silk, manmade textiles and apparel and was on a basis which would increase exports of cotton textiles from Japan to the United States and would assure every country of an automatic annual increase of textile exports to the United States.

Nevertheless, the Department of State proceeded with an international conference in Geneva which, in July 1961, brought forth the short-term cotton textile arrangement which was duly ratified by the participating nations.

This agreement became effective October 1, 1961, for a period of 1 year. It provided, among other things, that in the event unrestricted imports of cotton textiles were causing, or threatening to cause, disruption of the domestic market of an importing nation, that nation might request the exporting nation to restrain "at a specified level not lower than the level prevailing for the 12-month period ending 30 June 1961" its total exports of any category of cotton textiles and further provided that, in the event no agreement was reached within 30 days, the requesting country could decline to accept imports from such exporting nation at a level higher than the level of the said 12-month period. Thus there was introduced into the control of imports of cotton textiles into the United States the base period which has come to be known as the level of fiscal 1961.

Since the short-term agreement became effective, the United States has been compelled to request restraint of exports to the United States by several nations which were exporting goods to this country in excess of the prescribed level. Such restraints on imports are, of course, effective only for the life of the short-term agreement.

As one country was restrained in its exports, it became successively necessary for the United States to apply the restraint to exports from other countries, some of which were undoubtedly increasing their exports to the United States to replace the exports of the restrained country.

The rate of these excessive imports during the term of the short-term cotton textile agreement has already ranged in various categories of cotton textile products from 10 to 1,000 percent above the prescribed level. In one or more cases countries exporting to the United States have shipped cotton textiles into the United States although the country had no record of previous shipments of the commodity which would establish the base level during fiscal 1961. For example, exports of cotton textiles from Mexico to the United States have reached approximately 150 percent of the base level and Mexico has exported to the United States 897,979 pounds of carded yarn singles for which the country had no base level.

Although the domestic industry did not propose that the 12-month period ending June 30, 1961, be established as the level to which imports could be restrained, that period was fixed in the short-term agreement and the thought has erroneously become prevalent that this base period of fiscal 1961 is also applicable to restraints on cotton textile imports under the long-term arrangement.

The international trade conference which brought forth the short-term cotton textile agreement arranged for the creation of a provisional cotton textile committee to undertake the work of establishing a long-term cotton textile arrangement. This committee concluded its negotiations on February 9, 1962.

The long-term cotton textile arrangement was announced in a press release from the White House press secretary under date of February 15, 1962. On that date, the chairman of the House textile conference group, Hon. CARL VINSON of Georgia, addressed a communication to the President in behalf of that group in which he stated:

Although we have not yet seen the actual text of the international cotton textile arrangement concluded at Geneva on February 9, 1962, we understand that the United States will hold the level of imports of cotton textile products for a 5-year term at virtually the present level.

This communication also expressed the hope that the administration would move promptly on wool, manmade fiber, silk, and other textile fibers, and requested confirmation of the understanding of the arrangement expressed in the first paragraph of the letter which is above quoted.

The communication quoted above was, as noted therein, written without the benefit of detailed examination of the text of the long-term cotton textile arrangement but was based on reports made by representatives of the State Department.

In reply to this letter the President, under date of February 26, 1962, ad-

dressed a communication to the Honorable CARL VINSON in which he said, among other things:

All cotton textile products are now covered by a special international agreement reached at Geneva on July 17, 1961, authorizing the limitation of imports to the level of the 12 months ending June 30, 1961. This agreement expires September 30, 1962. The long-term agreement, which was just negotiated, will continue the same level of imports, with minor adjustments, for an additional 5 years.

The impression given to the President and to the Members of Congress as stated in these communications has prevailed in the industry, but is not borne out by the provisions of the long-term cotton textile arrangement which definitely does not establish the fiscal year ended June 30, 1961, as a base period level to which total cotton textile imports into this country may be restrained.

On the contrary, it provides, in annex B, that:

The level below which imports or exports of cotton textile products causing or threatening to cause market disruption may not be restrained under the provisions of article 3 shall be the level of actual imports or exports of such products during the 12-month period terminating 3 months preceding the month in which the request for consultation is made.

In other words, if the United States acted at the earliest possible moment under the long-term arrangement, namely, on the day on which it may become effective, October 1, 1962, then the level below which imports of cotton textiles from any country in any category could not be restrained would be the volume of such imports for the year which ended June 30, 1962. Under this formula there is no possibility that the volume of imports in the year ending June 30, 1961, may be established as the limit of such imports into the United States. This is not, as apparently represented to the President, to the Congress and to the industry, the same level of imports which is established in the short-term cotton textile agreement.

The result is that the exporting nations which have, during the period of the operation of the short-term cotton textile agreement, shipped excessive quantities of cotton textiles into the United States have established for the period ending June 30, 1962, a higher base level below which their imports may not be restrained under the long-term cotton textile arrangement.

Thus, the long-term cotton textile arrangement gives the benefit of a premium of increased allowable imports to the nations which have shipped excessive exports to the United States during the short-term cotton textile agreement.

In the foregoing discussion, October 1, 1962, has been considered as the effective date of the long-term cotton textile arrangement. It is of utmost importance now to realize that this arrangement has not yet been executed and that it will not become effective unless the participating nations ratify it before October 1, 1962, and may not become then effective.

Under the provisions of article 12, a majority of the ratifying nations at a meeting called 1 week prior to October 1, 1962, may postpone the effective date. Such postponement may be for a definite or indefinite period. A majority of the participating nations, by postponing the effective date for any reason satisfactory to them, may force renegotiation of the arrangement. Thus, if a majority of the nations are dissatisfied because of any action which may be taken on the section 22 case to impose an equalization fee to offset the cost to the U.S. mills of the differential in raw cotton costs adverse to domestic mills, on the OEP application under the national security provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act, on H.R. 11970, or any escape clause case, or for any other reason, they may nullify the arrangement by postponing indefinitely the effective date.

There have been some indications of reluctance on the part of some nations to ratify the long-term cotton textile arrangement. Monsieur Maurice Brasseur, Foreign Trade Minister of Belgium, in a public statement made in connection with the action of the President in restoring certain duties on glass and carpet products, has rather pointedly noted that Belgium has not ratified either the results of recent GATT negotiations or the long-term cotton textile arrangement. Various interests of Japan have been quoted in the press indicating that Japan may not ratify the long-term cotton textile arrangement if this country takes action eliminating or reducing the dual price system on cotton which establishes a differential for the benefit of foreign producers.

Even after ratification of the long-term cotton textile arrangement, any participating nation may withdraw on 60 days' notice for any reason satisfactory to itself.

After the United States has taken action, under the long-term cotton textile arrangement, to restrain exports to the United States of cotton textiles in any category from another participating nation to the level of the first 12 months of the 15 months preceding such request by the United States, the exporting nation remains unrestrained on its exports of cotton textiles in other categories. The exporting nation may thus increase the total volume of its exports of cotton textiles to the United States although restrained to a degree on exports of the commodities in one or more categories.

Restraint on the export of cotton textiles in any category by one exporting nation has no effect whatsoever on the exports of other nations shipping the same commodities to the United States. Thus, if country A is restrained in shipping its production of commodity X into the United States, then country B may ship without restraint any quantity of commodity X until the United States takes action to restrain it to the prescribed level. The result is that there is no practical control on the total volume of cotton imports into the United States.

Only by successive actions based on excessive imports in each category can

the total volume of exports from any single country to the United States be restrained. Only by successive actions against every exporting country on every category can the total volume of cotton textile imports into the United States be restrained. A more impractical method of restraint would be difficult to imagine.

Even after restraint has been imposed on exports of certain cotton textile commodities by a participating nation to the United States, that nation may, after the expiration of 2 years, increase its exports to the United States in such commodities by 5 percent annually. Thus, the volume of exports which may have caused disruption of our domestic market becomes the basis after 2 years for a 5-percent annual increase in imports into the United States, notwithstanding the condition of our domestic market.

One of the avowed purposes of the State Department in entering into international trade conferences for the control of trade in cotton textiles was to secure access to European markets for Japan and less-developed nations. Many of the participating nations still maintain quotas, require licenses, and otherwise restrict or prohibit exports from Japan and less-developed nations into their markets.

In the short-term cotton textile arrangement, paragraphs E and F of article I provide that countries maintaining quantitative restrictions on cotton textile imports shall, as from January 1, 1962, significantly increase access to their markets by countries, the imports of which were restricted when the arrangement became effective. Paragraph E provides "A specific statement of the new access will be forthcoming."

No such action significantly increasing access to their markets for Japanese cotton textiles has yet been taken by European nations.

In the long-term cotton textile arrangement, article 2 provides that countries applying import restrictions to cotton textiles from other participating nations shall increase access to their markets for such cotton textiles by percentages applied to their 1962 quotas to be set forth in annex A to the arrangement.

Annex A to the long-term cotton textile arrangement as published by our Government on February 15, 1962, contains only the statement:

The percentages in this annex will be communicated in due course.

So far as is known, such percentages of increased access to the restricted European markets have not yet been published.

It is significant that, notwithstanding the percentages by which volume of imports to such European markets may be increased over their 1962 quotas, there will, nevertheless, remain quota limitations on the total volume of imports from Japan and less-developed nations to such European markets.

The United States operates under the most-favored-nation clause and extends to Japan and, indeed, to all countries

of the world except those dominated by international communism, the same rates of duty and the same freedom of access to its markets which it extends to European nations.

The exclusion of textile products from Asia by European nations increased the pressure on the United States to absorb the exportable surpluses of such low-wage countries. This is a burden which the textile industry of the United States cannot indefinitely endure and survive.

A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, now the Committee on Commerce, after extensive hearings and study of the textile problem, has recommended that the survival of the domestic industry depends upon the establishment of flexible quotas on textile imports. It is a serious question whether the United States can continue to avoid the establishment of quotas on imports so long as European nations maintain quotas against Asiatic textiles, even though such quotas may be increased by some percentages.

Mr. President, let me point out the situation in which the United States will find itself in the weeks from now to October 1, 1962.

First. The pending case under section 22 for the establishment of an equalization fee to remove from domestic producers the burden of the dual-price system on cotton may remain undecided, as it has remained for more than 6 months.

Second. The application to the Office of Emergency Planning under the national security provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act which has been pending for more than a year may remain undecided.

Both of these cases are still pending, although the President in his letter of February 26, 1962, stated that he had already requested the Tariff Commission to complete its investigation on the section 22 case and to report as soon as practical, and was requesting the Office of Emergency Planning to make its recommendation without any unnecessary delay.

Third. The U.S. Government, particularly the Members of Congress, will not know until the last week of September 1962 what nations will ratify the long-term cotton textile arrangement and whether the nations which may ratify it will, by a majority vote, determine to postpone the effective date.

Fourth. The Congress will, in this period of time, take final action on H.R. 11970.

In view of the ineffectiveness of the negotiations to control cotton textile imports by international trade agreements, there is a serious question as to the extent to which Congress should, in the Trade Expansion Act, authorize the President, acting through the State Department, to negotiate international trade agreements governing imports into the United States, without clearly established criteria, guidelines, and safeguards for American industry.

The short-term and the long-term cotton textile arrangements emphasize

the need for the establishment by the Congress of a measure of control over international trade agreements, in order that the purpose and the intent of Congress may be respected and the industries and labor of this country may be safeguarded.

On August 2, a number of amendments to H.R. 11970 were submitted in the Senate by a group of Senators with whom I had the privilege of joining. These amendments would provide the guideline for trade policy, the lack of which has so often proved the undoing of American workers and industries. These amendments would accomplish the retention of the peril-point procedure and the escape-clause procedure. I commend these amendments to the careful study and consideration of Members of the Senate and to all other persons who have an interest in accomplishing an effective trade program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a series of documents identified as exhibits, A-L, to which I have made reference, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT A

THE AMERICAN COTTON
MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,
CHARLOTTE, N.C.,
July 25, 1962.

To ACMI MEMBERS.

GENTLEMEN: Official U.S. Government import statistics now show clearly that the Geneva arrangements for the control of cotton textile imports is working very badly. Furthermore, because current imports under the 1-year arrangement which ends September 30 will enter into the rolling base level for the 5-year arrangement which begins in October, it is clear that our Government must take strong and prompt action if its announced intention to effectively limit cotton products imports is to be achieved.

In recent weeks, your officers, staff, and a number of industry executives have been in virtually constant contact with policymaking officials in the White House and the executive departments concerned as well as with textile leaders in the Congress on this matter, and these activities are continuing.

LARGE EXCESS IMPORTS UNDER GENEVA ARRANGEMENT

The short-term Geneva arrangement limiting cotton textile imports covers the period October 1, 1961–September 30, 1962. Import statistics are now available on the first 8 months of the arrangement—that is, through May 31. Imports from all countries (excluding Japan, which is separately calculated) in the first 8 months of the Geneva short-term arrangement reached 91 percent of the annual base. Put another way, imports by the end of May under the arrangement were already as high as they should have been by the end of August. Clearly, therefore, the Government is falling in its objective to hold imports during the short-term arrangement year “at or about the level reached in the 12 months ending June 30, 1961,” the base period for the short-term arrangement.

Imports of cotton textiles from Japan are governed by the United States–Japan bilateral arrangement for the calendar year 1962. Under this arrangement, Japan is limited to 275 million square yards for the present calendar year. By the end of May, Japan had already exceeded the expected 5-month import level by 41 million square

yards. Obviously here, too, the Government is failing to achieve its announced goal of effective import limits.

Examination of the detailed import data figures shows clearly that the worst violations of the import arrangements are occurring in those categories of products like yarn and heavy fabrics where the cotton cost differential is most important.

This makes it all the more difficult to understand why the Tariff Commission decision in our section 22 case has been so long delayed. The record on this case closed in March. Imposition of the offset import fee on cotton textiles equivalent to the raw cotton export subsidy rate would cut back imports substantially and make it much easier to administer the Geneva and Japanese arrangements.

It is even more difficult to understand why the Office of Emergency Planning continues to delay a decision in our national security case, which has been pending since last October. If the Office of Emergency Planning found that the level of imports is threatening our national security—and the textile case is the most thoroughly documented ever presented under this provision of the trade agreements law—the President would immediately have the authority to impose import quotas on cotton products, without regard to the Geneva long-term arrangement, which has not yet been ratified. Furthermore, such a finding by the Office of Emergency Planning would immediately clothe the President with the power to cut back the excessive imports of woolsens, man-made fiber and silk textiles, which are currently completely uncontrolled.

Meanwhile the Congress continues to grapple with the question of foreign trade policy. The scene of activity has now shifted from the House to the Senate, particularly to the Senate Finance Committee of which Senator Byrd of Virginia is chairman.

The committee began hearings on the House-approved trade expansion bill on Monday with Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges as the leadoff witness.

Other Cabinet officers are among about 100 witnesses scheduled to be heard by mid-August. Under Secretary of State, George Ball, reportedly will appear on behalf of Secretary Dean Rusk.

Textile industry representatives are in Washington this week for a series of conferences with Senate leaders and executive department officials regarding the textile import situation in relation to trade legislation.

Every step open to the industry is being explored in the continuing effort to obtain a successful solution to the textile import problem.

Sincerely,

R. DAVE HALL,
President.

EXHIBIT B

[From the Daily News Record, July 23, 1962]

NEW BASE LEVELS FOR IMPORTS DUE IN LONG-RANGE PACT (By Dick Gorrell)

WASHINGTON.—Existing restraints on seven countries exporting textiles to the United States and the import base levels established under the short-term international textile and apparel arrangement will be scrapped when the long-term arrangement takes effect.

Furthermore, the provisions of the long-term arrangement are such that imports in excess of the present short-term base level will build bigger import quotas under the long-term arrangement.

The arrangement sets the base at the level of imports reached during the first 12 of the 15 months preceding the date of call for restraints.

Thus, a call for restraint on the first day of the long-term arrangement (scheduled to go into effect October 1) would make the base July 1, 1961-June 30, 1962.

Twenty-two of the 64 categories in the short-term arrangement were over base level at the end of May.

These 22 categories, therefore, already have larger base levels under the long-term arrangements than they have under the short-term arrangement. The current 1-year arrangement fixed the base of imports at the level they achieved in fiscal year 1961.

The higher base level already achieved by the 22 categories are in addition to the 5-percent yearly increase built into the long-term arrangement.

The categories in excess, quantity of imports through May, and percentage of base, are:

Carded yarn, singles: 17,028,820 pounds, 196 percent.

Combed yarn, plied: 582,979 pounds, 270 percent.

Corduroy: 28,153 square yards, 168 percent. Carded sheeting: 97,829,752 square yards, 104 percent.

Poplin and broadcloth, combed: 2,234,931 square yards, 140 percent.

Other printcloths, shirting, carded: 790,778 square yards, 532 percent.

Shirting not otherwise specified, carded: 333,480 square yards, 133 percent.

Twill and sateen, carded: 18,872,720 square yards, 105 percent.

Pillowcases, plain, carded: 1,223,686 units, 404 percent.

Pillowcases, plain, combed: 26,830 units, 117 percent.

Towels other than dish towels: 29,011,247 units, 112 percent.

Sheets, carded: 36,351 units, 651 percent. Braided and woven elastics: 79,621 pounds, 107 percent.

Knitshirts, except T-shirts and sweatshirts: 516,996 dozens, 125 percent.

Men's and boys' dress shirts, not knit: 363,185 dozens, 119 percent.

Men's and boys' workshirts, not knit: 16,065 dozens, 252 percent.

Raincoats, three-quarter length or over: 55,384 dozens, 104 percent.

Men's and boys' trousers, outer: 850,496 dozens, 111 percent.

Women's, misses' and children's trousers: 760,150 dozens, 181 percent.

Men's and boys' briefs and undershorts: 102,589 dozens, 147 percent.

Drawers, shorts, briefs, except men's and boys': 244,733 dozens, 1,042 percent.

Other knit or crocheted clothing: 497,185 pounds, 114 percent.

Total imports of cotton textiles and apparel through May were 91 percent of base.

Commerce Department officials say that imports have slowed down since then because of restraints imposed on seven countries—Israel, Hong Kong, Portugal, Colombia, Egypt, Spain, and Taiwan.

These seven countries accounted for about 70 percent of the 514 million square yards shipped in by all countries, excluding Japan, through May. Hong Kong alone sent in 221 million square yards to hit 109 percent of its base.

The restraints were imposed on these categories:

Carded yarn, singles (Egypt, Colombia, Taiwan, Israel, Portugal).

Carded gingham (Hong Kong).

Combined gingham (Portugal).

Carded sheetings (Hong Kong and Portugal).

Carded twill and sateen (Hong Kong).

Yarn-dyed fabrics, except gingham, combed (Portugal).

Carded fabrics not otherwise specified, carded (Hong Kong).

Knitshirts, except T-shirts and sweatshirts (Hong Kong).

Sweaters and cardigans (Hong Kong).

Raincoats, three-quarter length or over (Hong Kong).

Men's and boys' briefs and undershorts (Spain).

Drawers, shorts and briefs, except men's and boys' (Spain).

These restraints will have to be renewed if they are to be effective under the long-term arrangement, and thereby hangs another problem: Restraints cannot be imposed at a moment's notice. Consultations can run up to 60 days. "Critical circumstances" such as acute market disruption can bring the time down to about 3 to 10 days.

Commerce officials, however, are concerned about the possibility that some restrained goods are poised to come flooding into the United States as soon as the long-term agreement takes effect.

Considerable time would elapse before Government officials could find out about such a surge because there is a statistical reporting lag on imports.

The lag, at the extreme, could be 4 to 8 weeks, and this is the hole in the dike through which some countries may try to pass a flood of imports.

The United States, however, can avoid such a sudden surge of imports from the base because of the 3 months' difference between the date of a call for restraints and the end of the 12-month base such a call would create.

For example, if a country had sent in 10 units each month of its 12-month base, its quota would be 120 units.

Should the country then dramatically increase its imports and send in 270 units in the next 3 months, the United States could call for restraints and exclude the 270 units from the base.

Thus, the 120-unit base would apply and the exporting country's 3 months' shipments would have filled its quota for 27 months.

EXHIBIT C

[From the Daily News Record, July 27, 1962]

COTTON YARN IMPORTS IN HALF TOP ANY YEAR—17,497,382 POUNDS COME INTO COUNTRY DURING FIRST 6 MONTHS, TOPPING 1960 12-MONTH RECORD OF 15,140,680 POUNDS—VALUE, AT \$9,015,578, ALSO TOPS ANY YEAR

(By Michael Lipman)

NEW YORK.—U.S. cotton yarn imports for the first half of 1962 established a record of 17,497,382 pounds, surpassing any yearly imports in the past, according to figures compiled from Department of Commerce reports.

The latest mark eclipses the former record set in 1960 for 15,140,680 pounds. Last year imports fell to 13,904,620 pounds.

The volume mark comes just 1 month after a dollar value for a yearly period was established at \$7,631,284, topping the 1960 record of \$7,426,471.

Imports in June accounted for 2,831,535 pounds worth \$1,384,294, raising the latter total for 1962 to \$9,015,578.

Statistics list import totals for immediate consumption or for entry into bonded warehouses, according to two major categories: (1) Noncolored, noncombed, non-plied, and (2) bleached or dyed, single or plied, carded and combed.

The bulk of volume—1,961,277 pounds and better than half the import value in June, \$881,299, came under the former category, as has been the case since imports became so prominent.

Portugal alone shipped almost 8,500,000 pounds of yarn for the first 6 months, worth \$3,937,398. In the noncolored, noncombed,

nonplied category, Portugal accounted for about 6.75 million pounds, worth slightly over \$3 million.

Yarn imports for June 1962

	Pounds	Worth
Nonbleached, noncolored, non-combed, or nonplied:		
Mexico.....	100,394	\$41,501
Colombia.....	426,520	183,349
France.....	156,963	73,701
Portugal.....	227,724	106,020
Lebanon.....	6,979	2,909
Israel.....	239,419	108,235
Taiwan.....	310,000	137,687
Egypt.....	493,278	227,897
Total.....	1,916,277	881,299
Bleached or dyed, single and carded: Israel.....	7,225	3,786
Total.....	7,225	3,786
Bleached or dyed, single and combed:		
Colombia.....	7,114	9,408
United Kingdom.....	88	751
Belgium.....	4,101	4,923
France.....	1,000	1,319
Switzerland.....	12,497	23,132
Portugal.....	179,405	96,204
Greece.....	110,368	61,589
Israel.....	7,885	3,944
Egypt.....	211,402	123,717
Total.....	544,260	324,987
Bleached or dyed, plied and carded:		
Mexico.....	22,872	8,941
Colombia.....	1,571	1,723
East Germany.....	19,606	8,132
Portugal.....	72,047	30,430
Egypt.....	17,502	81,845
Total.....	290,598	130,121
Bleached or dyed, plied and combed:		
Colombia.....	15,401	9,532
United Kingdom.....	3,578	13,641
France.....	124	264
Switzerland.....	8,752	20,390
Italy.....	320	274
Total.....	28,175	44,101
Cumulative total.....	2,831,535	1,384,294

EXHIBIT D

[From the Daily News Record, July 16, 1962]

THE PULSE OF THE MARKET—COTTON CLOTH IMPORTS HIT 87 PERCENT OF GENEVA QUOTAS IN 8 MONTHS

(By Sig Scheifer)

NEW YORK.—U.S. imports of cotton fabrics during the first 8 months of the Geneva short-term quota agreements reached 87 percent of the total recorded during fiscal year 1961, according to figures compiled from Commerce Department reports.

Total yardage of cottons received by the United States from the nations covered by the Geneva agreement is 211.6 million yards from October 1, 1961, through May 31, 1962. This compares with 243.3 million yards imported from these nations during the base period July 1, 1960, through June 30, 1961.

These figures are exclusive of imports from Japan, which are covered in a separate agreement with the United States. Imports from Colombia, totaling 723,000 yards during the 8-month period, are also not included in the overall total because base year figures are unavailable.

Imports during May from the countries covered by the base year quotas totaled 26.3 million yards. Hong Kong continued as the leading shipper with 9.6 million yards in the latest month, followed by Taiwan with 3.7 million, Portugal with 3.5 million, and France with 2.4 million yards.

Three nations with substantial quotas have already exceeded their base year figures: Hong Kong with an excess of 76 percent to

date, Portugal up 17 percent over the base and Belgium-Luxembourg up 15 percent. In addition, Yugoslavia has already exceeded its base period tenfold, but the original figure was insignificant.

The Hong Kong overfulfillment included 63.1 million yards of carded sheetings in 8 months, against 34.3 million yards during fiscal 1961. Other categories which have been heavily exceeded by that country are carded twills and sateens, with 15.2 million yards against 13.7 million base, and miscellaneous carded fabrics imports at 30.4 million against 10.5 million base.

Fabric categories exceeded thus far by Portugal are combed ginghams with 3.7 million yards, compared with 1.7 million imported in the base period; carded sheetings with 5.3 million, up from 4 million; combed yarn-dyed cloths other than ginghams, with 1.7 million against 510,000, and miscellaneous carded fabrics with 1.7 million yards, against 1 million. However, carded ginghams and other yarn-dyed cloths are substantially off from the base period, so that the rise in combed colored yarn goods mostly represents a shift from carded to combed types.

Excess shipments from Belgium and Luxembourg result in a cumulative total of 3.2 million yards of miscellaneous carded cottons, up from 1.9 million in the base period. Yugoslav shipments consisted of 262,000 yards of carded sheetings, against none in the base period, and 316,000 yards of miscellaneous carded cloths, against 55,000 base.

All figures in the accompanying table are general imports by the United States, which includes all goods received, whether for consumption here, warehousing or re-export. Other imports previously reported for May comprised only cottons for domestic consumption.

U.S. general imports of cotton fabrics, square yards, under short-term Geneva agreement

Country of origin	Fiscal 1961 quota base	May 1962	Cumulative, October 1961 to May 1962
Hong Kong.....	64,888,178	9,595,490	114,272,027
United Arab Republic, Egypt.....	26,007,235	869,272	5,624,382
India.....	23,450,070	1,201,821	12,403,929
France.....	22,321,719	2,378,778	17,507,908
Spain.....	19,239,646	208,628	4,619,159
Taiwan.....	14,817,857	3,678,571	12,004,814
Portugal.....	14,096,394	3,466,150	10,440,968
Pakistan.....	13,129,358	1,082,840	4,332,764
Republic of Korea.....	10,516,813	1,566,459
Italy.....	7,189,020	569,968	4,717,471
West Germany.....	5,803,592	948,074	3,545,284
Switzerland.....	3,782,926	269,923	2,129,755
United Kingdom.....	3,098,041	279,267	2,141,674
Belgium and Luxembourg.....	3,489,847	683,167	4,015,506
Netherlands.....	3,234,552	540,778	2,824,947
Austria.....	2,053,373	252,536	1,630,536
Mexico.....	1,450,095	33,841	431,629
Brazil.....	1,323,739	2,847	135,464
Canada.....	1,025,622	128,959	329,046
Trinidad and Tobago.....	8,570,453	18,921	137,241
Yugoslavia.....	55,439	51,389	577,749
All others.....	1,035,850	6,351	135,797
Grand total.....	243,251,019	26,320,151	211,544,599

EXHIBIT E

[From the Daily News Record, July 31, 1962]

UNITED STATES ASKS SOME EXPORT RESTRAINTS BY MEXICO—ACTION IS ASKED ON SOME CATEGORIES OF COTTON GOODS IMPORTED INTO UNITED STATES—MEXICO SHIPS 157 PERCENT OF BASE LEVEL BEFORE MOVE BY WASHINGTON

(By Dick Gorrell)

WASHINGTON.—Mexico has been asked to restrain certain categories of imports to the United States, it was learned here Monday.

The Mexican Embassy confirmed the report. "There is something to it," a spokesman said.

Mexico had shipped in at least 5,667,409 square yard equivalents of cotton goods, or 157 percent of its base level under the international short-term arrangement, before the United States acted.

U.S. officials charged with administering the agreement, which millmen say is working very badly, refused to confirm or deny the report.

The Mexican Embassy would not say what categories the United States had asked to be restrained.

Mexico exports to this country 7 of the 22 categories which had exceeded base level at the end of May.

Two of these categories, carded yarn singles and carded sheetings, had reached significant levels at the end of May. Carded yarn singles imports from Mexico, for which the country has no base, had reached 897,979 pounds. Carded yarn sheetings had reached 319,740 square yards, or 78 percent of base.

Mexico is the eighth country asked to restrain imports under the short-term agreement.

Hickman Price, Jr., the Commerce Department's Assistant Secretary for Domestic Affairs and chairman of the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, was in an interdepartmental meeting and unavailable for comment. He turned aside a reporter's attempt to question him before the session started.

Reports that France, too, had been asked to restrain her imports and that Jamaica had been warned, were not confirmed.

The French Embassy said that if the United States has plans to ask for restraints, it was unknown to Embassy officials, and it doubted the report.

An Embassy spokesman said that as a practical matter U.S. officials were watching, with both eyes the levels of imports from Hong Kong, India, Spain, Portugal, and other low-wage areas. All of the countries mentioned, except India, have been placed under restraint.

France had reached 77 percent of her base level at the end of May. France's cotton textile exports to the United States amounted to 22,238,013 square yard equivalent.

A British Embassy official said that he had heard of no U.S. action toward Jamaica, since Government officials visited the island in June.

The official, who said he had been in frequent contact with the State Department since then, was asked about the report of restraints on Mexico and France.

"Until the official list is published, one doesn't know who has been asked, one just knows that people are being asked," he said.

Washington sources said after the Jamaica visit that there was little likelihood of Jamaica being asked to restrain cotton textile imports unless the May figures showed a variance of trend. From April to May Jamaica had gone from 58 percent of its base to 67 percent. Through the first 8 months of the short-term agreement Jamaica had sent in 5,658,987 square yard equivalent.

EXHIBIT F

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
June 22, 1961.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MR. PRESIDENT: On Monday Members of Congress met with Mr. Ball and received their first information on the details of the Under Secretary of State's proposed international negotiations on certain textile products. Our feeling is unanimous that the Under Secretary is proceeding on the basis

of an erroneous understanding as to the nature of the industry, and of the gravity of the textile and apparel import problem. It is the considered opinion of all of us in the Senate and House alike that Mr. Ball's program will insure the continued deterioration of the U.S. industry.

The State Department's plan has several basic defects which doom it to failure. These are (a) it pertains solely to cotton textiles, and excludes wool, silk, and manmade fiber textiles and apparel; and (b) it is built on the 1960 level of imports, except for a possible 30 percent rollback for Hong Kong; would increase Japan's exports to the United States, and assure every country an automatic annual increase in export potential of all textiles and apparel to the United States.

Your seven-point program for the textile industry, as we understood it here in the Congress, was forthright and included all of the industry's products. Mr. Ball has indicated that he considers it impossible to negotiate an international understanding on that basis. In effect, Mr. Ball has come to the conclusion that he cannot discharge the directive contained in point 6 of your May 2 announcement. We in the Congress prefer your program to the Under Secretary's.

Members of Congress in both Houses have followed carefully your public statements concerning your intentions in behalf of the textile industry. We understood you to mean that you were determined to achieve an overall solution of the industry's problems. In all candor, Mr. President, we must respectfully advise you of our considered opinion that Mr. Ball has devised a piecemeal and entirely inadequate program which is not in accord with your own pronouncements, and which can succeed only in embarrassing the administration in its programs relating to trade.

If you are convinced, Mr. President, that Mr. Ball's program is the only one that can be attempted, it is our advice that it would be better to abandon the effort now. His program leads to no real solution and will only compound the injury which we in the Congress feel must be remedied. We know that this is also your objective.

Sincerely and respectfully,

JOHN J. SPARKMAN, LISTER HILL, Alabama; JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas; PRESCOTT BUSH, Connecticut; HERMAN E. TALMADGE, RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia; EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, Illinois; HOMER E. CAPEHART, Indiana; FRANK CARLSON, Kansas; EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine; J. GLENN BEALL, JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, MARYLAND; LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, BENJAMIN A. SMITH, Jr., Massachusetts; JAMES O. EASTLAND, JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi; LEE METCALF, Montana; STYLES BRIDGES, NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire; CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey; KENNETH B. KEATING, New York; B. EVERETT JORDAN, SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina; MILTON R. YOUNG, North Dakota; HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania; JOHN O. PASTORE, CLAI-BORNE PELL, Rhode Island; STROM THURMOND, OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina; KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota; GEORGE D. AIKEN, WINSTON L. PROUTY, Vermont; A. WILLIS ROBERTSON, Virginia.

EXHIBIT G

PRESIDENT'S SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM OF
MAY 2, 1961

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS SECRETARY,
The White House.

The President today announced a program of assistance to the U.S. textile industry, designed to meet a wide range of the prob-

lems it faces as a result of rapid technological change, shifts in consumer preference, and increasing international competition. The program was developed by the Cabinet Committee, headed by Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges, which was formed by the President on February 16, 1961.

In announcing the program, the President said: "The problems of the textile industry are serious and deeprooted. They have been the subject of investigation at least as far back as 1935, when a Cabinet committee was appointed by President Roosevelt to investigate the conditions in this industry. Most recently these problems were the subject of a special study by the interdepartmental committee headed by Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges. I believe it is time for action."

"It is our second largest employer. Some 2 million workers are directly affected by conditions in the industry. There are another 2 million persons employed in furnishing requirements of the industry at its present level of production. Two years ago, the Office of Defense Mobilization testified that it was one of the industries essential to our national security. It is of vital importance in peacetime and it has a direct effect upon our total economy. All the studies have shown that unemployment in textile mills strikes hardest at those communities suffering most from depressed conditions."

"I propose to initiate the following measures:

"First, I have directed the Department of Commerce to launch an expanded program of research, covering new products, processes and markets. This should be done in cooperation with both union and management groups."

"Second, I have asked the Treasury Department to review existing depreciation allowances on textile machinery. Revision of these allowances, together with adoption of the investment incentive credit proposals contained in my message to the Congress of April 20, 1961, should assist in the modernization of the industry."

"Third, I have directed the Small Business Association to assist the cotton textile industry to obtain the necessary financing for modernization of its equipment."

"Fourth, I have directed the Department of Agriculture to explore and make recommendations to eliminate or offset the cost to the United States mills of the adverse differential in raw cotton costs between domestic and foreign textile producers."

"Fifth, I will shortly send to the Congress a proposal to permit industries seriously injured or threatened with serious injury as a result of increased imports to be eligible for assistance from the Federal Government."

"Sixth, I have directed the Department of State to arrange for calling an early conference of the principal textile exporting and importing countries. This conference will seek an international understanding which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption of established industries."

"Seventh, in addition to this program, an application by the textile industry for action under existing statutes, such as the escape clause or the national security provision of the Trade Agreements Extension Act, will be carefully considered on its merits."

"I believe this program will assist our textile industry to meet its basic problems, while at the same time recognizing the national interest in expansion of world trade and the successful development of less-developed nations. It takes into account the dispersion of the industry, the range of its products, and its highly competitive character. It is my hope that these measures will strengthen the industry and expand con-

sumption of its products without disrupting international trade and without disruption of the markets of any country."

EXHIBIT H

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE—ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN COTTON TEXTILES

The participating countries recognize the need to take cooperative and constructive action with a view to the development of world trade and that such action should be designed to facilitate economic expansion and in particular to promote the development of the less-developed countries by providing increasing access for their exports of manufactured products.

They take note, however, that in some countries situations have arisen which, in the view of these countries, cause or threaten to cause "disruption" of the market for cotton textiles. In using the expression "disruption" the countries concerned have in mind situations of the kind described in the "Decision of the Contracting Parties" of November 19, 1960, the relevant extract from which is annexed as appendix A to this agreement.

The participating countries desire to deal with these problems in such a way as to provide growing opportunities for exports of these products provided that the development of this trade proceeds in a reasonable and orderly manner so as to avoid disruptive effects in individual markets and on individual lines of production.

I. SHORT-TERM ARRANGEMENT

Pending a long-term solution the participating countries agree to deal with immediate problems relating to cotton textiles through international action designed, at the same time: (i) to significantly increase access to markets where imports are at present subject to restriction; (ii) to maintain orderly access to markets where restrictions are not at present maintained; and (iii) to secure from exporting countries, where necessary, a measure of restraint in their export policy so as to avoid disruptive effects in import markets.

Accordingly the participating countries agree to adopt the following short-term arrangement for the 12-month period beginning October 1, 1961.

A. A participating country, if unrestricted imports of cotton textiles are causing or threatening to cause disruption of its domestic market, may request any participating country to restrain, at a specified level not lower than the level prevailing for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1961, its total exports of any category (see appendix B) of cotton textiles causing or threatening to cause such disruption, and failing agreement within 30 days, the requesting country may decline to accept imports at a level higher than the specified level.¹ In critical circumstances, action may

¹ In Canada, there is no legislation whereby imports may be limited in a precise quantitative manner as envisaged in this paragraph. The provision available for limiting imports in order to avoid injury or a threat of injury to a domestic industry is contained in section 40 A(7)(c) of the Customs Act which authorizes the application of special values for duty purposes. Those special values cannot be used to achieve a precise level of imports. Accordingly, the participating countries recognize that, should Canada find it necessary to take action to limit imports pursuant to this arrangement, it would not be in a position to insure that imports would not fall below the minimum level as defined in this paragraph.

be taken provisionally by either country involved while the request is under discussion. Nothing in this arrangement shall prevent the negotiation of mutually acceptable bilateral arrangements on other terms.

It is intended by the participating countries that this procedure will be used sparingly, with full regard for their agreed objective of attaining and safeguarding maximum freedom of trade, and only to avoid disruption of domestic industry resulting from an abnormal increase in imports.

B. A country requested to restrain its exports to a specified level may exceed the specified level for any category by 5 percent provided that its total exports to the requesting country of the categories of products subject to restraint do not exceed the aggregate for all the categories.

C. If a requesting country determines that a shift in the pattern of imports within any category is producing undue concentration of imports of any particular item and that such concentration is causing or threatening disruption, the requesting country may, under the procedure set forth in paragraph A above, request the producing country to restrain its total exports of the said item during the 12 months beginning October 1, 1961 to a prescribed level not lower than that which prevailed during the year ending June 30, 1961.

D. Participants agree to take action to prevent circumvention or frustration of this short-term arrangement by nonparticipants, or by transshipment, or by substitution of directly competitive textiles. In particular, if the purposes of this arrangement are being frustrated or are in danger of being frustrated through the substitution of directly competitive textiles, the provisions of paragraph A above shall apply to such goods, to the extent necessary to prevent such frustration.

E. Participating countries presently maintaining quantitative restrictions on cotton textile imports shall, as from January 1, 1962, significantly increase access to their markets by countries, the imports of which are now restricted. A specific statement of the new access will be forthcoming.

F. This short-term arrangement shall be valid for a period of 12 months, beginning on October 1, 1961; however, the provisions of section E above shall enter into force not later than January 1, 1962.

G. In accordance with GATT provisions for joint consultations the parties to this arrangement shall meet as necessary to consider any problems arising out of the application of this agreement. Such consultations could, in particular, take place in the event that a country, the exports of which are under restraint as a result of action taken under paragraph A above, considers that experience shows that the level of restraint is inequitable.

II. LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENT

A. Participating countries agree to create a Provisional Cotton Textile Committee and to request the contracting parties to confirm the establishment of the Committee at the 19th session.

The Committee shall: (1) Undertake work looking toward a long-term solution to the problems in the field of cotton textiles on the basis of the guiding principles set out in the preamble to this agreement; (2) collect all useful data for this purpose; (3) at an early date, not later than April 30, 1962, make recommendations for such long-term solution.

B. The discussions and consultations to be undertaken by the Committee on the long-term problem shall be of the kind

provided for by the Market Disruption Committee at the 17th session of the contracting parties. The Committee shall, as appropriate, from time to time report to this Committee and to Committee III of the Expansion of Trade Programme on progress made and on its findings.

C. The Provisional Cotton Textile Committee referred to in this article shall meet on October 9, 1961, to initiate consideration of this long-term problem.

APPENDIX A—EXTRACT FROM THE CONTRACTING PARTIES' DECISION OF NOVEMBER 19, 1960

These situations (market disruption) generally contain the following elements in combination: (i) A sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular products from particular sources; (ii) these products are offered at prices which are substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the importing country (sic); (iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or threat thereof; (iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above do not arise from governmental intervention in the fixing or formation of prices or from dumping practices.

In some situations other elements are also present and the enumeration above is not, therefore, intended as an exhaustive definition of market disruption.

APPENDIX B—COTTON TEXTILE CATEGORIES

List of categories and units of amount

1. Cotton yarn, carded, singles, not ornamented, etc. (pounds).
2. Cotton yarn, plied, carded, not ornamented, etc. (pounds).
3. Cotton yarn, singles, combed, not ornamented, etc. (pounds).
4. Cotton yarn, plied, combed, not ornamented, etc. (pounds).
5. Gingham, carded yarn (square yards).
6. Gingham, combed yarn (square yards).
7. Velveteens (square yards).
8. Corduroy (square yards).
9. Sheeting, carded yarn (square yards).
10. Sheeting, combed yarn (square yards).
11. Lawns, carded yarn (square yards).
12. Lawns, combed yarn (square yards).
13. Violes, carded yarn (square yards).
14. Violes, combed yarn (square yards).
15. Poplin and broadcloth, carded yarn (square yards).
16. Poplin and broadcloth, combed yarn (square yards).
17. Typewriter ribbon cloth (square yards).
18. Print cloth type shirting, 80 by 80 type, carded yarn (square yards).
19. Print cloth type shirting, other than 80 by 80 type, carded yarn (square yards).
20. Shirting, carded yarn (square yards).
21. Shirting, combed yarn (square yards).
22. Twill and sateen, carded yarn (square yards).
23. Twill and sateen, combed yarn (square yards).
24. Yarn-dyed fabrics, except gingham, carded yarn (square yards).
25. Yarn-dyed fabrics, except gingham, combed yarn (square yards).
26. Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn (square yards).
27. Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn (square yards).
28. Pillowcases, plain, carded yarn (numbers).
29. Pillowcases, plain, combed yarn (numbers).
30. Dish towels (numbers).
31. Towels, other than dish towels (numbers).
32. Handkerchiefs (dozen).
33. Table damasks and manufactures of (pounds).
34. Sheets, carded yarn (numbers).

35. Sheets, combed yarn (numbers).
36. Bedspreads (numbers).
37. Braided and woven elastics (pounds).
38. Fishing nets (pounds).
39. Gloves and mittens (dozen).
40. Hose and half hose (dozen pairs).
41. Men's and boys' all white T shirts, knit or crocheted (dozen).
42. Other T shirts (dozen).
43. Knitshirts, other than T shirts and sweatshirts (including infants') (dozen).
44. Sweaters and cardigan (dozen).
45. Men's and boys' shirts, dress, not knit or crocheted (dozen).
46. Men's and boys' shirts, sport, not knit or crocheted (dozen).
47. Men's and boys' shirts, work, not knit or crocheted (dozen).
48. Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or over (dozen).
49. All other coats (dozen).
50. Men's and boys' trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit or crocheted (dozen).
51. Women's, misses', and children's trousers, slacks, and shorts (outer), not knit or crocheted (dozen).
52. Blouses, and blouses combined with skirts, trousers, or shorts (dozen).
53. Women's, misses', children's, and infants' dresses (including nurses' and other uniform dresses), not knit or crocheted (dozen).
54. Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, creepers, rompers, etc. (except blouse and shorts; blouse and trousers; or blouse, shorts, and skirt sets) (dozen).
55. Dressing gowns, including bathrobes and beachrobes, lounging gowns, dusters and housecoats, not knit or crocheted (dozen).
56. Men's and boys' undershirts (not T shirts) (dozen).
57. Men's and boys' briefs and undershorts (dozen).
58. Drawers, shorts, and briefs (except men's and boys' briefs), knit or crocheted (dozen).
59. All other underwear, not knit or crocheted (dozen).
60. Nightwear and pajamas (dozen).
61. Brassieres and other body-supporting garments (dozen).
62. Other knitted or crocheted clothing (units or pounds).
63. Other clothing, not knit or crocheted (units or pounds).
64. All other cotton-textile items (units or pounds).

To whatever extent this list of categories may present questions in the light of established listing practices of any participating country, such questions shall be resolved by consultation between the countries concerned or by the process of joint consultation referred to in paragraph G of the short-term arrangement.

EXHIBIT I

LONG-TERM COTTON TEXTILE ARRANGEMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE.

The President today released the text of the long-term cotton textile arrangement concluded at a meeting of the Cotton Textile Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade held in Geneva, Switzerland January 29-February 9, 1962.

Nineteen nations, representing the principal cotton textile exporting and importing nations of the free world participated in drafting the arrangements.

The arrangement is for a period of 5 years beginning October 1, 1962. It is similar to an earlier agreement covering a period between October 1, 1961 and October 1, 1962 which has enabled importing countries threatened by or subjected to market disruption in any of 64 categories of cotton

textiles to restrain imports to the level of fiscal year 1961.

Under the terms of the new arrangement, an importing nation threatened by or subjected to market disruption on any item or category of cotton textiles may freeze imports for 1 year to the level of the first 12 of the preceding 15 months. If this market condition persists, the freeze may be extended for yet another year. Following that, increases may be limited to 5 percent a year. In all cases the decision is made unilaterally by the importing nation.

Accompanying the agreement will be an undertaking by those nations which have maintained quantitative restraints on cotton textile imports to expand access to their markets in order to relieve pressures elsewhere.

The 6 years during which the current agreement and the proposed agreement will be in force will permit the American cotton textile industry to plan their production and to sharpen their competitive position with the confidence that foreign imports will not disrupt their activities. It marks the conclusion of another step in the seven step program announced by the President on May 2, 1961 for assistance to the American textile industry.

Both industry and labor advisers to the U.S. delegation in Geneva expressed satisfaction with the terms of the agreement. A text is attached.

LONG-TERM COTTON TEXTILE ARRANGEMENT¹

Recognizing the need to take cooperative and constructive action with a view to the development of world trade;

Recognizing further that such action should be designed to facilitate economic expansion and promote the development of less-developed countries possessing the necessary resources, such as raw materials and technical skills, by providing larger opportunities for increasing their exchange earnings from the sale in world markets of products which they can efficiently manufacture;

Noting, however, that in some countries situations have arisen which, in the view of these countries, cause or threaten to cause "disruption" of the market for cotton textiles;

Desiring to deal with these problems in such a way as to provide growing opportunities for exports of these products, provided that the development of this trade proceeds in a reasonable and orderly manner so as to avoid disruptive effects in individual markets and on individual lines of production in both importing and exporting countries;

Determined, in carrying out these objectives, to have regard to the Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed Countries adopted by ministers at their meeting during the 19th session of the contracting parties in November 1961;

The participating countries have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In order to assist in the solution of the problems referred to in the preamble to this arrangement, the participating countries are

¹ The negotiation of this arrangement was concluded in Geneva on an ad referendum basis on February 9, 1962, by representatives of the following governments: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, India, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (also representing Hong Kong), United States, and the member states of European Economic Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands).

of the opinion that it may be desirable to apply, during the next few years, special practical measures of international cooperation which will assist in any adjustment that may be required by changes in the pattern of world trade in cotton textiles. They recognize, however, that the measures referred to above do not affect their rights and obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as the GATT). They also recognize that, since these measures are intended to deal with the special problems of cotton textiles, they are not to be considered as lending themselves to application in other fields.

Article 2

1. Those participating countries still maintaining restrictions inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT on imports of cotton textiles from other participating countries agree to relax those restrictions progressively each year with a view to their elimination as soon as possible.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 3, no participating country shall introduce new import restrictions, or intensify existing import restrictions, on cotton textiles, insofar as this would be inconsistent with its obligations under the GATT.

3. The participating countries at present applying import restrictions to cotton textiles imported from other participating countries undertake to expand access to their markets for such cotton textiles so as to reach, by the end of the period of validity of the present arrangement, for the products remaining subject to restrictions at that date, taken as a whole, a level corresponding to the quotas opened in 1962, for such products, as increased by the percentage mentioned in annex A.

Where bilateral arrangements exist, annual increases shall be determined within the framework of bilateral negotiations. It would, however, be desirable that each annual increase should correspond as closely as possible to one-fifth of the overall increase.

4. The participating countries concerned shall administer their remaining restrictions on imports of cotton textiles from participating countries in an equitable manner and with due regard to the special needs and situation of the less-developed countries.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above, if, during the licensing period preceding the entry into force of this arrangement, a specific basic quota is nil or negligible, the quota for the succeeding licensing period will be established at a reasonable level by the participating importing country concerned in consultation with the participating exporting country or countries concerned. Such consultation would normally take place within the framework of the bilateral negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 above.

6. Participating countries shall, as far as possible, eliminate import restrictions on the importation, under a system of temporary importation for reexport after processing, of cotton textiles originating in other participating countries.

7. The participating countries shall notify the Cotton Textiles Committee as early as possible, and in any case not less than 1 month before the beginning of the licensing period, of the details of any quota or import restriction referred to in this article.

Article 3

1. If imports from a participating country or countries into another participating country of certain cotton textile products not subject to import restrictions should cause or threaten to cause disruption in the

market of the importing country, that country may request the participating country or countries whose exports of such products are, in the judgment of the importing country, causing or threatening to cause market disruption, to consult with a view to removing or avoiding such disruption. In its request the importing country will, at its discretion, indicate the specific level at which it considers that exports of such products should be restrained, a level which shall not be lower than the one indicated in annex B. The request shall be accompanied by a detailed, factual statement of the reasons and justification for the request; the requesting country shall communicate the same information to the Cotton Textiles Committee at the same time.

2. In critical circumstances, where an undue concentration of imports during the period specified in paragraph 3 below would cause damage difficult to repair, the requesting participating country may, until the end of the period, take the necessary temporary measures to limit the imports referred to in paragraph 1 above from the country or countries concerned.

3. If, within a period of 60 days after the request has been received by the participating exporting country or countries, there has been no agreement either on the request for export restraint or on any alternative solution, the requesting participating country may decline to accept imports for retention from the participating country or countries referred to in paragraph 1 above of the cotton textile products causing or threatening to cause market disruption, at a level higher than that specified in annex B, in respect of the period starting on the day when the request was received by the participating exporting country.

4. In order to avoid administrative difficulties in enforcing a given level of restraint on cotton textiles subject to measures taken under this article, the participating countries agree that there should be a reasonable degree of flexibility in the administration of these measures. Where restraint is exercised for more than one product the participating countries agree that the agreed level for any one product may be exceeded by 5 percent provided that the total exports subject to restraint do not exceed the aggregate level for all products so restrained on the basis of a common unit of measurement to be determined by the participating countries concerned.

5. If participating countries have recourse to the measures envisaged in this article, they shall, in introducing such measures, seek to avoid damage to the production and marketing of the exporting country and shall cooperate with a view to agreeing on suitable procedures, particularly as regards goods which have been, or which are about to be, shipped.

6. A participating country having recourse to the provisions of this article shall keep under review the measures taken under this article with a view to their relaxation and elimination as soon as possible. It will report from time to time, and in any case once a year, to the Cotton Textiles Committee on the progress made in the relaxation or elimination of such measures. Any participating country maintaining measures under this article shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation to any participating country or countries affected by such measures.

7. Participating importing countries may report the groups or categories to be used for statistical purposes to the Cotton Textiles Committee. The participating countries agree that measures envisaged in this article should only be resorted to sparingly, and should be limited to the precise products

or precise groups or categories of products causing or threatening to cause market disruption, taking full account of the agreed objectives set out in the preamble to this arrangement. Participating countries shall seek to preserve a proper measure of equity where market disruption is caused or threatened by imports from more than one participating country and when resort to the measures envisaged in this article is unavoidable.

Article 4

Nothing in this arrangement shall prevent the application of mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this arrangement. The participating countries shall keep the Cotton Textiles Committee fully informed on such arrangements, or the parts thereof, which have a bearing on the operation of this arrangement.

Article 5

The participating countries shall take steps to insure, by the exchange of information, including statistics on imports and exports when requested, and by other practical means, the effective operation of this arrangement.

Article 6

The participating countries agree to avoid circumvention of this arrangement by transshipment or rerouting, substitution of directly competitive textiles and actions by nonparticipants. In particular, they agree on the following measures:

(a) Transshipment: The participating importing and exporting countries agree to collaborate with a view to preventing circumvention of this arrangement by transshipment or rerouting and to take appropriate administrative action to avoid such circumvention. In cases where a participating country has reason to believe that imports shipped to it from another participating country and purporting to have originated in that country did not originate there, it may request that country to consult with it with a view to assisting in the determination of the real origin of the goods.

(b) Substitution of directly competitive textiles: It is not the intention of the participating countries to broaden the scope of this arrangement beyond cotton textiles but, when there exists a situation or threat of market disruption in an importing country in terms of article 3, to prevent the circumvention of this arrangement by the deliberate substitution for cotton of directly competitive fibers. Accordingly, if the importing participating country concerned has reason to believe that imports of products in which this substitution has taken place have increased abnormally, that is that this substitution has taken place solely in order to circumvent the provisions of this arrangement, that country may request the exporting country concerned to investigate the matter and to consult with it with a view to reaching agreement upon measures designed to prevent such circumvention. Such request shall be accompanied by a detailed, factual statement of the reasons and justification for the request. Failing agreement in the consultation within 60 days of such request, the importing participating country may decline to accept imports of the products concerned as provided for in article 3 and, at the same time, any of the participating countries concerned may refer the matter to the Cotton Textiles Committee which shall make such recommendations to the parties concerned as may be appropriate.

(c) Nonparticipants: The participating countries agree that, if it proves necessary to resort to the measures envisaged in article 3 above, the participating importing country

or countries concerned shall take steps to insure that the participating country's exports against which such measures are taken shall not be restrained more severely than the exports of any country not participating in this arrangement which are causing, or threatening to cause, market disruption. The participating importing country or countries concerned will give sympathetic consideration to any representations from participating exporting countries to the effect that this principle is not being adhered to or that the operation of this arrangement is frustrated by trade with countries not party to this arrangement. If such trade is frustrating the operation of this arrangement, the participating countries shall consider taking such action as may be consistent with their law to prevent such frustration.

Article 7

1. In view of the safeguards provided for in this arrangement the participating countries shall, as far as possible, refrain from taking measures which may have the effect of nullifying the objectives of this arrangement.

2. If a participating country finds that its interests are being seriously affected by any such measure taken by another participating country, that country may request the country applying such measure to consult with a view to remedying the situation.

3. If the participating country so requested fails to take appropriate remedial action within a reasonable length of time, the requesting participating country may refer the matter to the Cotton Textiles Committee which shall promptly discuss such matter and make such comments to the participating countries as it considers appropriate. Such comments would be taken into account should the matter subsequently be brought before the contracting parties under the procedures of article XXIII of the GATT.

Article 8

The Cotton Textiles Committee, as established by the contracting parties at their 19th session, shall be composed of representatives of the countries party to this arrangement and shall fulfill the responsibilities provided for it in this arrangement.

(a) The Committee shall meet from time to time to discharge its functions. It will undertake studies on trade in cotton textiles as the participating countries may decide. It will collect the statistical and other information necessary for the discharge of its functions and will be empowered to request the participating countries to furnish such information.

(b) Any case of divergence of view between the participating countries as to the interpretation or application of this arrangement may be referred to the Committee for discussion.

(c) The Committee shall review the operation of this arrangement once a year and report to the contracting parties. The review during the third year shall be a major review of the arrangement in the light of its operation in the preceding years.

(d) The Committee shall meet not later than 1 year before the expiry of this arrangement, in order to consider whether the arrangement should be extended, modified or discontinued.

Article 9

For purposes of this arrangement the expression "cotton textiles" include yarns, piecegoods, madeup articles, garments, and other textile manufactured products, in which cotton represents more than 50 percent (by weight) of the fiber content, with the exception of handloom fabrics of the cottage industry.

Article 10

For the purposes of this arrangement, the term "disruption" refers to situations of the kind described in the decision of the contracting parties of November 19, 1960, the relevant extract from which is reproduced in annex C.

Article 11

1. This arrangement is open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, to governments parties to the GATT or having provisionally acceded to that agreement, provided that if any such government maintains restrictions on the import of cotton textiles from other participating countries, that government shall, prior to its accepting this arrangement, agree with the Cotton Textiles Committee on the percentage by which it will undertake to increase the quotas other than those maintained under article XII or article XVIII of the GATT.

2. Any government which is not party to the GATT or has not acceded provisionally to the GATT may accede to this arrangement on terms to be agreed between that government and the participating countries. These terms would include a provision that any government which is not a party to the GATT must undertake, on acceding to this arrangement, not to introduce new import restrictions or intensify existing import restrictions, on cotton textiles, insofar as such action would, if that government had been a party to the GATT, be inconsistent with its obligations thereunder.

Article 12

1. This arrangement shall enter into force on October 1, 1962, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 below.

2. The countries which have accepted this arrangement shall, upon the request of one or more of them, meet within 1 week prior to October 1, 1962, and, at that meeting, if a majority of these countries so decide, the provisions of paragraph 1 above may be modified.

Article 13

Any participating country may withdraw from this arrangement upon the expiration of 60 days from the day on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the executive secretary of GATT.

Article 14

This arrangement shall remain in force for 5 years.

Article 15

The annexes to this arrangement constitute an integral part of this arrangement.

ANNEXES

Annex A

The percentages in this annex will be communicated in due course.

Annex B

1. (a) The level below which imports or exports of cotton textile products causing or threatening to cause market disruption may not be restrained under the provisions of article 3 shall be the level of actual imports or exports of such products during the 12-month period terminating 3 months preceding the month in which the request for consultation is made.

(b) Where a bilateral agreement on the yearly level of restraint exists between participating countries concerned covering the 12-month period referred to in paragraph (a), the level below which imports of cotton textile products causing or threatening to cause market disruption may not be restrained under the provisions of article 3 shall be the level provided for in the bilateral agreement in lieu of the level of actual imports or exports during the 12-month period referred to in paragraph (a).

Where the 12-month period referred to in paragraph (a) overlaps in part with the period covered by the bilateral agreement, the level shall be: (i) the level provided for in the bilateral agreement, or the level of actual imports or exports, whichever is higher, for the months where the period covered by the bilateral agreement and the 12-month period referred to in paragraph (a) overlap; and (ii) the level of actual imports or exports for the months where no overlap occurs.

2. Should the restraint measures remain in force for another 12-month period, the level for that period shall not be lower than the level specified for the preceding 12-month period, increased by 5 percent. In exceptional cases, where it is extremely difficult to apply the level referred to above, a percentage between 5 and 0 may be applied in the light of market conditions in the importing country and other relevant factors after consultation with the exporting country concerned.

3. Should the restraining measures remain in force for further periods, the level for each subsequent 12-month period shall not be lower than the level specified for the preceding 12-month period, increased by 5 percent.

Annex C

Extract From the Contracting Parties' Decision of November 19, 1960

These situations (market disruption) generally contain the following elements in combination: (i) A sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular products from particular sources; (ii) these products are offered at prices which are substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the importing country; (iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or threat thereof; (iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above do not arise from governmental intervention in the fixing or formation of prices or from dumping practices.

In some situations other elements are also present and the enumeration above is not, therefore, intended as an exhaustive definition of market disruption.

Annex D

For the purposes of applying article 9, the following list of the groups or subgroups of the S.I.T.C. is suggested. This list is illustrative and should not be considered as being exhaustive.

	SITC Rev.	BTN
I. Cotton yarns and fabrics...	651.3 .4 652	55.05 .06 .07 .08 .09 58.04A
II. Cotton made-up articles and special fabrics.....	ex 653.7 ex 654 ex 655 ex 656 ex 657	ex 46.02 ex 58.01-03 ex 58.05-10 ex 59.01-17 ex 60-01 ex 62.01-05 ex 65.01-02 ex 60.02-06 ex 61.01-11 ex 65.03-07
III. Cotton clothing.....	ex 841	

Annex E

Interpretative Notes

1. Ad. article 3, paragraph 3: In Canada, there is no legislation whereby imports may be limited in a precise quantitative manner as envisaged in this paragraph. The provision available for limiting imports in order to avoid injury or a threat of injury to a domestic industry is contained in section

40 A(7)(c) of the Customs Act which authorizes the application of special values for duty purposes. These special values cannot be used to achieve a precise level of imports. Accordingly, the participating countries recognize that, should Canada find it necessary to take action to limit imports pursuant to this arrangement, it would not be in a position to insure that imports would not fall below the minimum level as defined in this paragraph.

2. Ad. article 9: Notwithstanding the provisions of article 9, any country which is applying a criterion based on value will be free to continue to use that criterion for the purposes of article 9.

EXHIBIT J

LETTER FROM REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON
TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., February 15, 1962.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Although we have not yet seen the actual text of the International Cotton Textile Arrangement concluded at Geneva on February 9, 1962, we understand that the United States will hold the level of imports of cotton textile products for a 5-year term at virtually the present level.

As you know, we have been gravely alarmed by the erosion of the American textile industry. We have been distressed by American workers being thrown out of their jobs as a result of the flood of foreign textile imports.

It was therefore with great pleasure, Mr. President, that we learned of your program of May 2, 1961, for assistance to the U.S. textile industry.

We now wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you upon the noteworthy step which you have taken, as part of your program, in negotiating a long-term arrangement at Geneva between the United States and the 18 other principal cotton textile countries of the free world. This is, indeed, an important move in the right direction for cotton textiles, and we would hope that the administration would now promptly move on wool, manmade fiber, silk, and other textile fibers, which are in an even worse position, but which understandably could not be dealt with on this particular occasion.

Your confirmation that our understanding of the arrangement expressed in the first paragraph above is correct would be immensely gratifying to us and would act as a great stimulus to the American textile industry in modernization and advancement as a driving and fundamental force in our national economy. Last, we sincerely hope that the operation of the long-term arrangement will be carried out in such a way that its force is not modified or diluted by administrative judgment or action.

Respectfully yours,

CARL VINSON,
Chairman, House Textile Conference
Group.

EXHIBIT K

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 26, 1962.

HON. CARL VINSON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CARL: As you know, I have long shared the concern over the textile industry expressed by you and the other Congressmen who signed the letter of February 15.

Every segment of our economy must prosper if we are to achieve satisfactory growth rates and satisfactory employment levels.

Nine months ago I proposed seven measures to help overcome the handicaps faced by the industry.

First, I directed the Department of Commerce to launch an expanded program of research, covering new products, processes, and markets. I understand that the National Academy of Sciences was asked by the Department of Commerce to help explore this whole broad area and to report its findings and recommendations. A labor-management committee appointed by the Secretary of Commerce is advising and assisting in the development of recommendations and a report is scheduled for completion on March 5.

Second, existing depreciation allowances on textile machinery have been revised to permit more rapid replacement and to take into account obsolescence. This action is already proving helpful in speeding modernization of textile equipment.

Third, in accordance with my direction, the Small Business Administration has made available necessary financing for modernization of textile machinery, lending over \$6 million since this program was initiated.

Fourth, the Department of Agriculture submitted to me, and I transmitted to the Tariff Commission, a proposal for the imposition of an equalization fee to offset the cost to the U.S. mills of the adverse differential in raw cotton costs between domestic and foreign textile producers. The Tariff Commission has just concluded hearings upon this matter and I have already requested them to complete their investigation and report as soon as practicable.

Fifth, I have submitted to the Congress a trade expansion bill, which includes a proposal to permit plants and workers seriously injured or threatened with serious injury as a result of increased imports to receive assistance from the Federal Government. Hearings upon this legislation are scheduled to begin March 12.

Sixth, all cotton textile products are now covered by a special international agreement reached at Geneva on July 17, 1961, authorizing the limitation of imports to the level of the 12 months ending June 30, 1961. This agreement expires September 30, 1962. The long-term agreement, which was just negotiated, will continue the same level of imports, with minor adjustments, for an additional 5 years. It provides the tools with which we can prevent adverse effects upon the cotton textile industry from imports, and the tools will be used.

I concur in your evaluation of the importance of the long-term arrangement. Of course, adherence by the 19 governments involved must still be obtained, and the United States will exert every effort to obtain this adherence.

The rights of the United States under both the short-term arrangement and the long-term arrangement will be exercised in such a manner that their force will not be modified or diluted by administrative judgment or action. Representatives of the Departments involved have explained to you and others the way the arrangements will be administered and I assure you and your colleagues of my continuing interest. Under our plans for administering the arrangements the industry can plan production with complete confidence that its markets will not be disrupted by imports.

Finally, there is now pending before the Office of Emergency Planning an application by the textile industry for relief under the national security provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. Consideration of this case upon its merits is being expedited

and I am requesting the Office of Emergency Planning to make a recommendation to me without any unnecessary delay.

I have also requested the Departments involved to implement my program for the wool, manmade fiber, and silk divisions of the industry. Almost all of the points in the program announced on May 2, 1961, apply equally to each of these.

I appreciate very much your warm expressions of support.

Sincerely,

JOHN KENNEDY.

EXHIBIT L

LETTER FROM REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON TO MEMBERS OF THE TEXTILE CONFERENCE GROUP

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., February 27, 1962.

For members of the Textile Committee:

You will recall that on February 15, 1962, we addressed a letter to the President of the United States with regard to the textile industry.

I enclose the reply I have received from the President which explains every step that has been taken and will be taken insofar as the textile industry is concerned.

There is no compromise or equivocation in this reply. It is straightforward and contains every assurance that our textile industry will be adequately protected.

Let me call your attention to the last sentence of the sixth point wherein the President, in discussing the long-term agreement that is now being submitted to the 19 participating countries, states: "It provides the tools with which we can prevent adverse effects upon the cotton textile industry from imports, and the tools will be used." There is no equivocation in this phrase.

Let me also call your attention to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph of the second page, wherein the President states: "Under our plans for administering the arrangements the industry can plan production with complete confidence that its markets will not be disrupted by imports." There is no compromise or equivocation in this phrase.

And finally, let me call your attention to the last page of the President's letter, in which he states that almost all of the points in the program announced on May 2, 1961, apply equally to wool, manmade fiber, and silk divisions of the industry.

CARL VINSON,
Chairman,
House Textile Conference Group.

IMPORT QUOTAS AND EMBARGOES FOR PRESERVATION OF U.S. FISH- ERY RESOURCES

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, following the example of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], I, too, shall talk about the Trade Expansion Act; but I shall switch from the land to the sea—from cotton to fish.

For the distinguished senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and myself, I submit an amendment to H.R. 11970, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed and referred to the Committee on Finance. I also ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table, and without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment was referred to the Committee on Finance, as follows:

On page 19, line 16, strike out "or".

On page 19, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

"(3) engages or tolerates its nationals to engage in practices which are in conflict with recognized conservation principles and tend to defeat efforts by the United States including the respective States to conserve or protect fishery resources, or

"(4) takes any action, contrary to the principles of international law, to harass or otherwise interfere with United States flag fishing vessels engaged in lawful activities on the high seas."

On page 19, line 24, strike out "or" after the comma.

On page 20, line 3, strike out the period and insert "or".

On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:

"(C) take such action to adjust imports of products of such country or instrumentality as he deems necessary."

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, this amendment is offered to section 252(b) of chapter 6, title II, that portion of the trade bill which specifies the conditions under which the President can withhold or withdraw from a particular country the benefits of trade concessions given to all countries. The amendment offers two additional circumstances under which the President may take this action, and it supplements the authority given him under the present bill by adding the power to impose import quotas and embargoes, all intended to guarantee the preservation of our fishery resources.

Mr. President, I believe that the trade bill contains some of the most outstanding recommendations to come before this Congress. In many respects it is far-sighted and realistic. Its passage may be absolutely necessary if we are to survive the competition which is now ours from the rapidly expanding economies of Europe and Asia.

However, our fishery resources occupy a peculiar position in our foreign trade, as well as our domestic economy; and as a part of our new economic and foreign trade policy, we must support the very considerable efforts which have been and are being made by Federal and, particularly, State governments to conserve them. With increasing pressure on the world's stocks of fish, problems of conservation will increase over the coming years. We in the United States have participated for many years in efforts to conserve and develop these resources.

The United States is an important market for foreign fish products. Likewise, the United States is herself an important fishing Nation. Therefore, it is imperative that we not only allow trade concessions with other fishing nations, but we insist upon proper conservation of our fisheries and those international fisheries upon which we rely. The United States is the leader of the

free world, and we must lead in every field, including fishery resources conservation.

In considering any trade policy we must, therefore, insure that its consequences are compatible with our conservation goals.

That is the object of the senior Senator from Washington and myself in submitting the amendment. We should not, through inadvertence or for any other reason, give trade incentives to foreign governments to violate sound conservation practices, to overfish certain areas and stocks of fish and to use fishing gear and techniques which are contrary to proper conservation; nor can we give trade incentives to those countries which permit and encourage harassment to our fishermen and their vessels.

In its present form, section 262(b) permits the President to suspend or withdraw any trade concession to a nation which engages in an action that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. With the addition of this amendment, the President can take the same action when another country permits its citizens to engage in fishing activities which will defeat the efforts of our States and our Federal Government to conserve our fishery resources or when a foreign government allows its nationals to harass or interfere with our fishermen on the high seas while they are engaged in lawful activities. With this amendment the President can not only maintain present tariffs with regard to a specific country, which is engaging in practices which do violence to our conservation efforts, but if appropriate, he can also increase our present tariff, for example, on canned salmon and crab from 15½ percent ad valorem to 25 percent. This can be done without changing tariffs on fresh or frozen salmon and crab which may be considered an important source of supply. This amendment also gives the President flexible powers to adjust imports by any other action including the use of import quotas or embargoes.

Paragraph (c) of section 252 states that the President shall provide an opportunity for a hearing and public presentation of views on these problems. In the event a foreign country is violating principles of fishery and resources conservation, this provision, with the amendment, amply insures that any person shall have adequate opportunity to protest.

I cannot stress too strongly the necessity for the enactment of adequate measures to protect our fishing resources. It has been only within recent years that we have become fully aware of the desperate plight the industry is in.

This situation will be referred to, later this afternoon, by the chairman of the Commerce Committee, the senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], who heads the committee which has charge of legislative matters pertaining to fisheries. It will also be referred to by the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH], who only a few weeks ago delivered on this floor one of the most telling and best-reasoned

speeches pertaining to fisheries ever made in the Congress—a speech which excited wide attention, interest, and study among those concerned with fishing, not only in this Nation, but, indeed, so I am informed, in the entire world.

We have been at fault, in many instances, because of inertia and ignorance. However, our States, in cooperation with the Federal Government, are now embarked on sound and far-reaching fisheries conservation measures; and these efforts must be encouraged and expanded.

Japan, Canada, and the United States joined in a salmon conservation effort 10 years ago under the North Pacific Fisheries Convention. This convention may be dissolved in 1963, and all efforts made in the fields of research and conservation may be—and, in fact, would be—seriously affected by its dissolution.

U.S. salmon fishermen are prohibited by State regulations, and also by Federal regulations, from net fishing outside our territorial waters; further, they are prohibited from specific areas and from fishing altogether if it is discovered that sufficient numbers of salmon are not reaching the spawning grounds. This close regulation of our fishermen is necessary in order to sustain our salmon resource.

Canada and Russia, the latter not a member of the convention, have been in accord with us on this policy.

The Japanese, on the other hand, do not impose upon themselves conservation regulations of this type and, having few spawning streams of their own, have moved out into the high seas, particularly the Bering Sea, to take salmon contrary to sound conservation practices.

Years of careful studies and investigations have proved that extensive fishing on the high seas will eventually destroy the runs of salmon destined for spawning streams in Washington, Oregon, California, and Alaska, because there can be no separation and control by size and species, as required in a balanced fishery conservation program. An area in my own State of Alaska offers an outstanding example of what can happen to salmon runs which have been overfished on the high seas. Historically, the Bristol Bay area was known as one of the great red salmon producing areas of the world. But in the last 10 years the runs have been drastically reduced. Federal and, now, State conservation measures have been enforced during this period, but production figures reveal that these controls have not been effective; and Bristol Bay has been declared a disaster area three times in recent years. Research since 1952 has also shown that the salmon which spawn in Bristol Bay roam far west of 175° west longitude, the abstention line set by the North Pacific Fisheries Convention, east of which the Japanese cannot fish.

The Japanese, while agreeing to, and abiding by, certain restrictions imposed by the convention, have resisted application of these restrictions to their operations west of 175° west longitude; and, unfortunately, their interpretation is

seriously working against the salmon conservation efforts of the United States and Canada.

The Japanese not only fish for salmon on the high seas, but also, in their operations, use nylon monofilament nets which are forbidden to U.S. fishermen. These nylon monofilament nets are injurious to the fish; they have a relatively small mesh, and allow little escapement of immature salmon. These practices have vastly reduced the catch of our fishermen in all of the Pacific Coast States.

The amendment is directed also at protecting our halibut.

Canadian and American fishermen are not permitted to fish for halibut with drag and trawl gear, because such gear takes both mature and immature halibut, seriously affecting the stocks of halibut. At the annual meeting last November of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, the Japanese section was asked to join in a resolution recommending to the member governments that proper restraint be exercised, and that extension or expansion of trawl operations on the halibut grounds not be permitted until research now being done on the halibut stocks is completed, including assessment of effects of trawl-fishing operations on the halibut stocks.

But, Mr. President, I regret to say that the Japanese were not willing to agree to that resolution, which was so meaningful in terms of the interests of true conservation.

These halibut stocks have been developed, maintained, and expanded by efforts of Canada and the United States since 1923. Now the Japanese not only expect to reap the benefits of these efforts, but may, by not abstaining from trawling for halibut in certain areas, destroy the resource these efforts set about to conserve.

There is no need at this time to reiterate, nor would any advantage be gained by doing so, the alarm that my colleagues and I have expressed so frequently, on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, over the pressure—actual or threatened—on our fishing conservation efforts by the Russians in our North Pacific and Northwest Atlantic.

I believe that if the United States lowers tariffs on, or in any way negotiates to encourage increased importation of, fishery products of foreign countries, which have come into possession of those countries through practices which conflict with those of good conservation, we encourage both present practices of the latter kind and also their future expansion of them.

Moreover, the President needs, as a part of the expanding international trade program, authority to impose economic sanctions on countries which seek to interfere with or harass U.S. fishermen who are engaged in lawful pursuits on the high seas.

The United States recognizes territorial jurisdiction up to 3 marine miles offshore. We have never sought unilaterally to extend our own jurisdic-

tion beyond the 3-mile limit, and we do not recognize purported unilateral extensions by other nations of jurisdiction beyond that distance.

But our lack of recognition of various nations' claims beyond the 3-mile limit has not been effective in preserving the rights of our fishermen. Our shrimp fishermen from Gulf Coast States and our tuna fishermen from west coast States have been fired upon, their boats seized, and fines levied upon them; and we have had no practical means for protecting them. One incident may, and often does, lead to others. So long as we do nothing to protect our fishermen, so long as we do nothing to protect their rights on the high seas, we can only expect further oppressive acts against them at the hands of foreign authorities.

The longer this type of situation is allowed to continue, the more we are placing our fishermen in jeopardy, and the worse the situation becomes. We are encouraging chaos.

The solution is not to arm our fishing vessels; it is not to send fleets of armed U.S. patrol boats to the fishing grounds; it is not to declare war.

Economic force is, today, the most sensible and effective, and the only really practical solution.

Therefore, Mr. President, the amendment which I submit would protect, I reiterate, our fishery resources and our fishermen, so as to assure that our expanded trade program moves in a direction consistent with sound fishery conservation policies.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment lie on the table until the close of business on Wednesday, August 8 so that other Senators may have an opportunity to join in sponsoring the amendment, if they so desire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, of course, I associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Alaska as I join with him in the amendment.

It seems to me that the explosion of fisheries and the movements by other nations in the international fishing waters of the world call for us to do everything we can to take conservation measures in these particular fishing grounds.

While it is true, as the Senator from Alaska has pointed out, that we have in effect fishing agreements with some nations which provide for adequate conservation, there are many fishing grounds and many fisheries and much activity in the world today that are not subject to any such agreements. Probably more will come about voluntarily, but surely the United States, which has a deep interest in fisheries and international waters, and which is a country that practices conservation, should have authority to allow the President to do what he can to persuade and influence other nations to do the same, and, if necessary, do it through economic sanctions.

I am sure many Senators from States involved in fisheries will want to join with the Senator from Alaska and me in the amendment.

FISHERIES PROBLEMS

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I wish to speak about two bills which the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the distinguished Senator from Alaska, and I will introduce, which also affects the fisheries problems touched upon by the Senator from Alaska from time to time.

I, as well as other Senators, have called attention to the shocking decline of our U.S. fisheries. This decline has taken place while the governments of other nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain have taken action to expand and modernize their own fishing fleets.

Free world nations have done this with the assistance of \$115 million in American foreign aid and \$182 million in counterpart funds; Communist countries by allocating substantial portions of their budgets to construction of large and efficient fishing vessels and factory ships.

Our own fishing fleets, composed of small and ancient ships equipped with long outdated gear, are disintegrating.

The distinguished Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Frank Briggs, a former Member of this body, from Missouri, made a speech the other day to a fisheries group in Baltimore. He pointed out, as I, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH], and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], have pointed out, the disintegration and the outmoding of our fishing fleet which is leading to the decline in our fisheries. Mr. Briggs said that the average age of the large New England trawler is over 20 years, that many halibut vessels are well over 40 years old, and that those vessels are inefficient and costly to operate. What Mr. Briggs said is also true of vessels on the Pacific coast, not only the halibut fleet, but the tuna and the salmon fleets, and is true of our fishing fleets throughout the United States.

The U.S. fisheries catch each year declines while that of other nations increases. A few years ago our commercial catch was exceeded only by Japan. Today we are topped also by Soviet Russia, Communist China, and Peru.

Two of these foreign fleets, those of Soviet Russia and Japan, are fishing at our very doorstep, and with far larger, more numerous, new and better equipped ships.

Soviet and Japanese fleets are operating en masse in west coast areas once dominated by our own sturdy fishermen of Washington, Alaska, Oregon, and northern California.

A virtual armada of Soviet fishing vessels is operating at Georges Bank off Cape Cod, and in waters south of Nova Scotia between Georges Bank and the Grand Banks, for three centuries the traditional fishing preserves of New England's industrious fishermen.

On May 25, my esteemed colleague, Senator BENJAMIN A. SMITH of Massachusetts, ably and eloquently described the massive intrusion of Soviet vessels at Georges Bank, right in our own front yard so to speak.

A similar intrusion—call it an invasion if you prefer—has taken place in the Gulf of Alaska which bounds the southern coast of our 49th State, and also in the Eastern Bering Sea which laps Alaska's western shores.

On July 15 there were 61 Russian fishing vessels in the Gulf of Alaska. The fleet included three factory ships, 37 trawlers, and 21 other vessels, among them 250 to 350 foot refrigerator carriers, cargo vessels, and support ships.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. BARTLETT. To the best of the Senator's knowledge, have the Russians ever fished in the Gulf of Alaska previously?

Mr. MAGNUSON. Not to my knowledge, and not to the knowledge of Alaskans. This is a new intrusion in our fishing waters similar to that which took place at Georges Bank.

Mr. BARTLETT. And, as the Senator has said, they have come down there with very large and modern fishing ships. Is that correct?

Mr. MAGNUSON. All of them are modern. I have seen pictures of one of their refrigerator ships, which was beautifully done, and had modern quarters and refrigeration and other modern machinery. They freeze many thousands of fish, freeze them, and pack them for market.

Mr. BARTLETT. Let me add, as a contribution to what the Senator is saying, that I think it is important that the country learn the facts which the Senator is now disclosing. The Russian fishing fleet off the waters of Alaska is now so large that I was advised not long ago—I think it was by a professor in the Fisheries School of the University of Washington—that the Russians have inaugurated steamship passenger service to take fishermen from Vladivostok to the fishing fleet. I think the capacity of the ship is 300. They take back men who have been on the fishing grounds a long while.

As the Senator knows, under the U.S. flag there is not a single passenger ship in the Alaska trade. Yet the Russians have one to service this fishing fleet.

Mr. MAGNUSON. That points out what we are talking about—the neglect of the whole fishing problem, as well as the maritime needs of the United States.

What is more important, 9 of the 61 ships could not be identified as to function. I think it is safe to say I know what it was. No Russian fishing boat travels without having aboard several oceanographers or sufficient equipment to chart all of the coastline of the United States and that of other countries.

Each of these ships probably is being used for that sort of scientific work, for the military know-how which the Russians seek to gain with respect to the whole world.

The Soviet fleet in Bering Sea in May of this year totaled 206 vessels of which 5 were huge factory ships, 166 trawlers, 29 refrigerated transports and the remainder tankers and tugs. Two-thirds of this fleet were operating in Bristol Bay and north of Unimak Island. Those are fine fishing grounds.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. BARTLETT. Those are grounds traditionally regarded as belonging to Alaskans.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Which Americans have always fished, with conservation measures.

Some of these Soviet ships have now left this area, but the total number of foreign fishing vessels there has not diminished as Japanese fishing vessels have moved in. In mid-July there were still more than 200 foreign fishing vessels in the eastern Bering Sea—the American side, as we might call it—about equally divided between Japanese and Russian ships.

Experts in our Bureau of Commercial Fisheries estimate that the Soviet and Japanese vessels in the eastern Bering Sea, which includes Bristol Bay, this season will take 2 billion pounds of bottom fish from that area alone. They took 1 billion pounds last season. It is estimated they will take 2 billion pounds this season. I suppose it will be 3 billion pounds next season.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. BARTLETT. Considering the tremendous catch of bottom fish by the Russians—and, as we know, the Japanese are very aggressively engaged in this same bottom fishing—I ask the Senator if he would agree with me that research has not proceeded to the point that it can give us an idea as to whether the fishery resource in that region can support such massive taking. These fishermen may now be fishing out everything there is, leaving nothing behind for seed.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I think we are safe in saying that they do so. I know the Japanese have done that. They have scraped the bottom without any thought of conservation, looking for the giant crab and the other fish. We have seen many instances in which female crabs have been injured and thrown back to die. We have seen many instances in which, as the Senator from Alaska knows, nets have been found floating, filled with dead fish, as the nets have gotten away.

Mr. BARTLETT. Nets made of very small mesh.

Mr. MAGNUSON. The nets are of small mesh. When the fish disintegrate and mold, thus getting out of the net, the net keeps going on and on, catching

other groups of fish. When those rot, the net starts off for another catch.

Mr. BARTLETT. The American fisherman is not allowed to fish on the high seas at all with nets, is he?

Mr. MAGNUSON. He is not allowed to do so.

Mr. BARTLETT. The Japanese do so as much as 7 miles at sea. They take everything that can be scooped up from the ocean.

Mr. MAGNUSON. This emphasizes the importance of the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Alaska and myself to the trade bill.

Mr. President, the 2 billion pounds of fish taken from that area is 16 times our own catch of bottom fish along the entire Pacific coast. It is 40 percent of our total catch of all fish in all waters, salt or fresh, including North Dakota.

No estimate has yet been made of the catch by foreign ships in the Gulf of Alaska, but one Soviet refrigerated trawler there recently reported a catch of from 40 to 50 tons of ocean perch per day. In addition to bottom fish the foreign fleets in the Gulf of Alaska are taking large quantities of king crab and shrimp.

As I previously stated, the Soviet fleet in Eastern Bering Sea is not now as large as it was several months ago. Perhaps the departing vessels took aboard all the fish that could be economically handled, processed or stored aboard. But whatever the reason, the withdrawal is only temporary.

Dispatches from Russia proclaim that the Bering and Bristol Bay fleets are to be strengthened.

These dispatches announced completion of five more large ships for use in these North Pacific waters, one a mother ship displacing 17,140 tons that will carry a crew of 270 persons, one a 5,500-ton refrigerated transport, one a giant freezer trawler of 3,170 gross tons which carries a 102-man crew, and two 2,495-ton fast refrigerated vessels with modern radio-navigation equipment.

Now let us see what is happening along our Atlantic coast. The most recent report from Georges Bank listed 169 Soviet ships operating there. Four of these were huge mother ships over 500 feet in length. These include the one I told Senators I had seen in the moving picture. It looks like the *United States* or the *Queen Mary*. As I said, 4 of these were huge mother ships over 500 feet in length, 14 were king-sized stern-ramp freezer trawlers, 150 vessels were conventional trawlers and gillnetters, and one was an oceangoing tug. Close by south of Nova Scotia and between Georges Bank and the Grand Banks were 15 other Soviet fishing vessels.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. I think the same situation prevails on the east coast, as the Senator has mentioned with reference to the Bering Sea, since the ships come and go in what appears to be a temporary operation. The ships

take their catches, then later return, but the fleets have additional fishing vessels.

Mr. MAGNUSON. The overall increase has been greater each year.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MAGNUSON. The Soviet mother ships are refrigerated cargo vessels, floating factories and warehouses combined, which take the catch from other ships, freeze or salt and then store edible portions, and then run the remainder through reduction plants aboard ship to utilize what our fishermen would consider waste.

The Russians have at least 8 17,000-ton mother ships in operation and 11 more under construction. Under construction also are mother ships displacing 19,500 metric tons, or 21,000 tons avoirdupois. These enormous ships have stern ramps similar to factory trawlers.

The latter not only catch fish, bringing up as much as 75,000 pounds at a single haul, but fillet and freeze them on board ship. Their storage capacity per ship is approximately half a million pounds of processed fillets.

Soviet Russia has three classes of stern-ramp freezer trawlers in operation, all of which have been observed on Georges Bank. These are the *Pushkin* class, 280 feet long and weighing 2,450 gross tons; the *Leskov* class, several feet longer and 2,890 tons; and the *Maiakovski* class, displacing 3,600 tons. In addition to its present fleet of *Leskov* class trawlers, Soviet Russia has 14 more on order in Polish yards.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. As the Senator has pointed out, many of the fishing vessels for the Russian fleet are being built in Polish yards.

Mr. MAGNUSON. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. During the past week I spoke with a friend of mine who recently returned from Copenhagen. He told me the Danish yards are also building trawlers of the latest design for the Russian fleet. At one Danish yard these vessels are being built each in 19 working days. This compares to an original requirement of 74 working days for building those ships. The yard is now constructing the ships on a full-scale production basis. It is no wonder, with new vessels such as these, that the Soviet fishing fleets are going ahead of us further and further every day.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, what the Senator says is correct. I could go on and on with more detail of the Soviet fleet, and, of course, I could stand here all day to talk about the modernization of the Japanese fleet.

Mr. President, five ships of the giant *Maiakovski* class have been completed, but the number under construction is not known. Russia also is building 15,000-ton factory ships for canning fish at sea.

The 14 Soviet stern-ramp freezer trawlers most recently reported at Georges Bank were 3 less than had been there several weeks before. This could mean that the missing three had reached their half-million-pound storage capacity and returned home.

The Soviets are building a great number of ships for Communist China, which has now surpassed us in fishing.

The point of our discussion today, Mr. President, is to point out the contrast, and the reason for the introduction of the two measures by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the distinguished Senator from Alaska, and myself.

Mr. President, I have discussed the composition of these Russian fishing fleets operating near our shores in some detail. I have done this to indicate the competition that our Pacific Northwest and New England fishermen must face in their slow, dinky, old-fashioned craft, mostly of pre-World War II vintage and with an average age of 25 years.

The United States has no mother ships, no factory ships, no stern-ramp trawlers, no refrigerated transport ships, no large fisheries vessels of any kind. No modern U.S. fishing fleet exists, nor what other nations would consider a modern fishing vessel.

The result is that foreign fishing vessels are taking over adjacent seas almost up to the 3-mile limit.

A question that confronts Congress is, What are we going to do about it?

The foreign fleets have a legal right under international law to fish where they do. We have the same right to fish these waters but because of the obsolescence of our declining fishing fleets we are simply being crowded out of our own frontyards.

Mr. President, the problem is not a regional problem. It is more than a New England problem or a Pacific Northwest problem. It is a national problem. It is an economic problem, a problem that affects employment and our Nation's welfare, and a problem that could affect our national security.

Each year the Russian fishing fleets move further south. This is the first year the Russians have fished in the Gulf of Alaska. Last year they sent only exploratory vessels there. It is the second year they have fished on Georges Bank. It is the second year they have fished in Bristol Bay and the third in Bering Sea areas just above Bristol Bay. In each case exploratory ships preceded the fishing fleets. It is a standard Soviet procedure.

My colleagues in Congress from the States of North and South Carolina may find it of interest that last month Russian exploratory ships were cruising the coastal waters of those two States, observing and evaluating offshore stocks of menhaden. If the Russians follow their usual pattern they will be fishing there a year or two from now.

Again, what can we do about it? What can Congress do about it?

As I view it, we have two alternatives.

One is to let our New England and Pacific Northwest fisheries industries—and the other fisheries along our coasts that Soviet fleets ultimately will invade—wither away and die as they are commencing to do now.

This would mean abandoning an important and historic segment of our economy and the 500,000 U.S. citizens who gain their livelihood from it.

It would mean turning over to ambitious aliens the rich fisheries resources at our very doorstep, resources that as our population grows will be required to augment our protein food supply.

It would mean the potential loss of an important adjunct to our Navy in the event of a national emergency. During World War II our Navy took over a total of 285 American fishing vessels for use as minesweepers, tenders, degaussing craft, and patrol vessels. It would not find many boats in our present fishing fleets capable of such duty today. They are too old and decrepit.

In brief it would mean a bloodless surrender of a priceless heritage that has come down to us from our earliest colonial days.

I am not prepared for such a surrender, and I do not believe the Congress would countenance such surrender.

The only recourse as I see it is for the Congress to turn to the other alternative: Congressional action that will enable our fishermen to compete in some measure with the Russian and Japanese fleets in the North Pacific and the Russian fleets in the North Atlantic. This they cannot do now in the face of the massive foreign inroads on our traditional fishing grounds and the advances in construction of new foreign fishing vessels.

As my colleagues in the Senate and House are aware, the Congress in recent years has made some effort to assist our fishing industries but it has not been enough. Indeed it has been small in comparison with what other countries are doing, even young and small nations such as Israel, which is constructing 3 deep-sea trawlers at a cost of \$1.8 to \$2.7 million each; Taiwan; Ghana, which has acquired 6 large, modern, oceangoing ships; and the Ivory Coast, with 60 new ships in the past 5 years.

Congress in 1956 established a loan fund of \$13 million for financing fishing operations and for repair of vessels and gear. This is a revolving fund operation. Since the enactment loans have been authorized totaling \$12,785,000. Payments on the principal as of June 30 totaled \$4,840,000 and an additional \$1,100,000 had been received as interest on the loans. The loans have been good loans.

In 1960 a subsidy of not to exceed one-third the cost of new construction was provided for operators in a fishery suffering injury from which escape-clause relief had been recommended by the Tariff Commission but subsequently denied, or for a fishery found by the Secretary of the Interior to be injured or threatened with injury by reason of increased imports.

For this purpose Congress appropriated \$750,000 in 1961 and again in 1962, but contracts for this assistance have totaled only \$560,000.

In 1960 also Public Law 86-577 provided for insuring mortgages in connection with the building or reconstruction of fishing boats. The Department of the Interior under this law has entered into insurance contracts totaling \$1,327,000.

These laws have been helpful to certain segments of our fishing industry, but they have not been adequate to meet the need for large, modern vessels with the latest technological equipment and gear, ships which can process their catches and freeze them on the spot, ships which can ride out any weather.

Other free world nations have had a similar need to modernize their fishing fleets, have recognized this need and have taken concrete steps to meet it.

Great Britain, through its White Fish Authority and its herring industry board, has been and is investing millions of pounds annually in the rehabilitation of its fishing industry.

During the past 7 years the White Fish Authority has extended the equivalent of \$79 million in loans and \$32.9 million in grants for the purchase of new vessels, engines, and gear, and for the reconditioning of old vessels. Total assistance for this purpose during this period has been \$111,900,000.

Great Britain's Herring Fishery Board has paid handsome subsidies to herring fishermen since May 1957 amounting to the equivalent of approximately \$4,200,000 annually. The board buys all herring not sold for other purposes for reduction to oil and meal and, in addition, has made substantial grants for the construction of processing factories.

The fisheries industry of Canada has been the recipient of Government aid in one form or another for a number of years and with excellent results. The industry can look to the Government for a subsidy of 40 percent of the cost of new vessels, plus an interest-free loan for most of the balance, and additional help is also made available for modernization of gear. Canada's fisheries fleets now contain large and efficient vessels of most modern design and her fleet is supported by the finest research ships in this hemisphere.

Today there is scarcely a country fronting on an ocean which has not modernized or is taking steps to modernize its fishing fleet.

Recently, for example—and this is ironical—a U.S. loan of \$5 million in Chile was approved by the Inter-American Development Bank. The loan will help finance a Chilean program that calls for the construction of 18 fishing vessels and the purchase of machinery and processing equipment.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. BARTLETT. Does the Senator see any sense to what he has described when our fishing industry is in such a deplorable state?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I do not, particularly when we have such a study as I have presented showing what is happening all over. Surely we encourage other people to fish, but meanwhile our fleet is declining. We could not even compete with Chile. Chile is building ships with loans from us.

Mr. BARTLETT. With our money.

Mr. MAGNUSON. With our money.

Mr. BARTLETT. I recall that a few years ago exploration of the shrimp beds in western Alaska was sought. It was a time when some people thought those waters might produce 100 million pounds of shrimp, or one-quarter of all the shrimp consumed in the United States each year. There was urgent need in one particular place for a shrimp biologist. None was available because all of them had been sent abroad to help other nations—competing nations—improve their fisheries, their methods of fishing, and their methods of sending them here.

Mr. MAGNUSON. There is one other point which I failed to mention today. Despite the fact that the American consumption of fish per capita has more than tripled in the past 15 years, instead of our industry moving along and expanding three times what it was 15 years ago, to take care of our own domestic consumption, it has decreased.

Of course some of that is due to the technological advances that have been made in the processing and freezing of fish, but our fishing fleets have not taken advantage of the great progress that has been made in other areas. It seems to me that, as pointed out by the Senator from Alaska, if Government investments in fisheries are good for other countries, U.S. investments in U.S. fisheries will be good for the United States.

With this thought in mind, my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH] and my distinguished colleague from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT] have joined me in two bills to extend a measure of assistance to our beleaguered fisheries industries and to correct existing inequities in the construction of American fishing vessels.

One of these bills would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct two large, modern, stern-ramp trawlers, one for service on the west coast, one on the east coast. These trawlers would have scientific facilities suitable for use as research vessels and for the development of advanced technology for the production, preparation, processing, and preservation of fisheries products, including those from areas distant from ports and subject to severe climatic difficulties.

In other words, these would be prototype vessels for American fisheries fleets of the future.

The Secretary of the Interior would have the option of chartering these ships or operating them himself, but charters would be subject to certain conditions and stipulations.

The bill expressly requires that any disposal of fishery products caught and processed must be done with due regard to the possible impact on the domestic fisheries industry and in a manner to

avoid adverse effects upon domestic prices or current market demands.

The object of the bill is to help our own fisheries industry compete against the massive foreign fishing fleets now operating off our shores.

The other bill would amend the act of June 12, 1960, to bring its subsidy provisions more in line with present shipbuilding costs, provide additional funds for this purpose remove certain restrictions on the eligibility of fishery operators to take advantage of the statute, and to extend the period covered by the act to June 30, 1972.

The 1960 act provides construction subsidies up to 33½ percent to segments of the industry which have suffered injury from which escape-clause relief has been recommended by the Tariff Commission but subsequently denied. This drastic limitation would be repealed and eligibility for such subsidies would be broadened.

The construction subsidy for wooden vessels would be increased from 33½ percent of construction costs to 35 percent, and for metal ships from 33½ percent to 50 percent.

Authorization for such subsidies in the aggregate would be increased from \$2,500,000 annually to \$12,500,000.

Why are such subsidies needed?

The reason is that construction costs of vessels in this country are much higher than in the countries which are competing most actively against us and that by statute U.S. fishing vessels must be constructed in the United States and be owned by U.S. citizens.

This is a law which dates back to almost the beginning of this Republic—in fact to 1792—and which Congress has resisted, properly, I think, every effort to change. Under these circumstances, if the fishing industry means something to America—as I am sure it does—Congress must come to its aid by strengthening the fleet, or the industry will go down the drain.

Enactment of these bills will inaugurate the revitalizing and modernization of a historic industry that is vital to our economy, and in times of peril important to our national defense.

Enactment, I am confident, will return dividends to the United States many times over the moderate expenditures contemplated and will represent a sound investment in our Nation's future.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my remarks there be printed in the RECORD the address by Assistant Secretary of the Interior Frank P. Briggs at the National Shell Fisheries Association Convention in Baltimore, Md., on July 31.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FISHERIES IN A CHANGING WORLD

The place of the U.S. fisheries in relation to the fisheries of the world—is an intriguing one indeed. It gives us pause to assess our position, to analyze our strengths and weaknesses, and collectively to formulate vigorous programs that will meet our problems realistically in these changing and challenging times.

When the word "oyster" is mentioned to me, I invariably recall the story told by Benjamin Franklin. When still a lad, Franklin said to his mother, "I have imbibed an acephalous molluscous." Supposing he had swallowed something poisonous his mother forced him to take a large dose of castor oil. When he got over the effects of the medicine he said, "I had eaten nothing but an oyster." Then his mother thrashed him for deceiving her. Then and there Benjamin vowed never again to use big words when little words would do. I have always tried to follow his example.

We are living today in a changing world. It is a world which in some respects seems to be growing smaller. With jet airplane transport to any part of the world available and with space travel just around the corner, one can but feel that what we do and think here in our part of the world is sure to have a profound effect upon other peoples living many thousands of miles away.

On the other hand, as we look to this changing world, we get the feeling that the world is growing larger, at least its problems are.

Consider the expanding population of the world, estimated to double within the next 40 years from 3 billion to about 6 billion souls. All of this means more mouths to feed, more bodies to clothe, more families to house, more children to educate, and more people to keep occupied in some gainful way.

With these thoughts in mind, it does seem appropriate that we reflect today on the role of fisheries in this rapidly changing world.

The fishing industry of the United States, like that of all other fishing nations in the world, is a food-producing industry. It is one of the basic industries of our country and is producing not only a valuable protein food but, in fact, as an industry, it produces jobs for people and is a source of new wealth in our national economy.

What role will the fishing industry play in the rapidly changing world of the future? Without question we face increasingly serious competition in our fisheries from great fishing nations of the world harvesting these resources on common fishing grounds.

Such areas as the Grand Banks of the northwest Atlantic and the rich tropical fishing grounds of both the Atlantic and Pacific are being fished by many nations today. In the future we can look for even greater competition on the fishing grounds.

We face competition within our own country from other protein food sources and, in a broader sense, we can expect increased competition at the marketplace from high-quality diversified fisheries products from other countries of the world.

I think we must recognize that the time is past when tariff barriers will prevent foreign fisheries products from freely sharing our markets.

Whether or not the commercial fishing industry of this country will influence the future depends upon our production of quantities of high-quality and diversified fisheries products presented attractively and distributed widely to the consuming public in every section of the United States and, in fact, in all countries of the world. This is the challenge.

When we view the U.S. fisheries alone, without respect to the rest of the world, we can see that some segments of the industry are already meeting the problems of the jet age. During this past year our fishermen took more than 5 billion pounds of fish, shellfish, and other aquatic products—about 200 million more pounds than in 1960.

The landings had an ex-vessel value to the fishermen of about \$364 million—\$10 million more than in the previous year.

The 1961 catch was the Nation's second largest, totaling only 2 percent below the record 5.3 billion pounds taken in 1956.

Prices were up during 1961. In December of last year they were 7.8 percent higher than in the same month of 1960. Late in the year the price of fish meal and the ex-vessel price of tuna were up substantially.

The year 1961 showed a half-pound increase in the per capita consumption of fish and fish products in the United States, the first significant rise in many years.

On the face of it this sounds good, industrywide. But is it?

The answer is: Not nearly good enough.

When you compare our progress in the fisheries during the last decade with that of other nations, it is apparent that we have been traveling at a horse-and-buggy pace while other countries have been moving with jet-age speed.

Despite a moderate increase in catch during the past decade, the United States has failed to hold its relative position as a fishing nation.

Red China, Russia, and Peru have moved ahead of the United States in volume of fish and shellfish taken, relegating us to fifth place in 1960 for the first time in history. Figures show us to be in fifth place again in 1961.

Japan, of course, is the traditional leader among fish-catching nations.

While the U.S. catch in 1961 was 9 percent more than in 1950, the combined catch of other nations was up over 100 percent.

There are many reasons why this country is lagging behind other nations in the production of fishery products. We don't, at least at this moment, have the urgent need for animal protein, in fact we have huge surpluses of some foods.

By comparison, Russia, with its faltering agricultural production, consumes nearly all her tremendous fish catch at home.

With our agricultural abundance and the American tradition of eating meat, we have not been aggressive in supplementing our food supplies with seafoods from the oceans and inland waters. We have come to rely heavily on imports for our fish products needs. A little over a decade ago our fishermen supplied nearly 80 percent of our market for both edible and inedible fishery products. Last year the percentage had shrunk to slightly better than 50 percent.

Another major problem of the fishing industry in meeting competition from foreign producers is the age and obsolescence of our fleet and the decline in the number of fishing vessels. Since World War II vessel construction in many of the fisheries has been at a virtual standstill.

The average age of the large New England trawlers is over 20 years, and there are many halibut vessels that are well over 40 years. These old vessels are inefficient and costly to operate.

In contrast to our decrepit vessels, Russia and many other nations have growing fleets of modern, efficient vessels, many of them huge factory ships utilizing the very latest in technological advances.

During the recent meetings of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries in Moscow, which Director McKernan and I attended, we were privileged to see a Russian display of models of their latest types of fishing vessels. These fishing boat models were perfect replicas of the new kinds of vessels and new kinds of fishing gear which Russia is developing with great imagination and foresight. These models showed not only the great Pushkin-type factory trawler, which is being used in both the North Atlantic and North Pacific, but even showed in detail the great pump-type fishing boats used in the Caspian Sea

for hilsa, a herring-like fish. Obviously, with developments like these, we must place greater emphasis on new methods for harvesting and cultivating our fish and shellfish resources if we are going to regain our place in world fish production.

As I mentioned, it is often said that the world is shrinking, meaning that distance is no longer an important factor. The oceans are shrinking as well. The world-ranging fishing fleets of Russia, Japan, and other countries have made this so.

During the past few years large concentrations of Russian fishing vessels have become a common sight on Georges Bank off the coast of New England, an area once considered pretty much of a private preserve by American fishermen.

Just a few weeks ago some employees of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries were welcomed aboard a Russian vessel not far off the Carolina coast, the second Soviet ship sighted recently in that area. This latest Russian vessel reportedly was looking for menhaden.

Across the Nation on our other coast Japanese and Soviet fishing operations are steadily expanding in the Bering Sea.

Rich stocks of shrimp, red rockfish, cod, flatfish, pollock, and crabs have formed the basis for this industry.

It has been estimated that the combined trawl fleets of Russia and Japan took 1 billion pounds in 1960 and 2 billion pounds in 1961. It is anticipated that these foreign operations will continue to expand, and may eventually extend farther down the coast of North America. We have kept the fleets under observation so that we will know the number of vessels participating and areas fished.

The waters off Alaska probably contain a greater untapped reservoir of fish resources than any other region off the United States.

To allow these valuable resources adjacent to our coastline to be harvested by other nations seems to me to be wasteful and unwise.

I mentioned a moment ago the tremendous increase in our imports of fishery products.

Our exports, on the other hand, are very low.

We import about nine times as much fish and fish products as we export.

This means we are not only losing our domestic markets but we are lagging in the race for foreign markets as well. With passage of the President's new trade bill imminent I believe it behooves the fishing industry to take aggressive steps to regain lost markets and to seek new ones, especially among the Common Market nations.

Recently, a gentleman from New Bedford came in my office and talked with me about the possibility for developing a scallop market in Denmark and other countries of northern Europe. When I was in Europe recently, I noted that the people in these countries eat great quantities of fish; in fact, they eat a great deal more fish than we do. I have since heard that this man has in fact established an office in northern Europe and is aggressively developing markets to sell sea scallops. This is the kind of aggressive action we must have in fisheries and the kind of action which I believe will keep American fisheries strong and prosperous.

Despite our shortcomings, I am optimistic about the future. I sense an awakening in the fisheries, a feeling that the time has come to start moving again.

As the shad is a harbinger of spring, so too do a number of things herald a change for the better in the fisheries.

One such development is the way the tuna segment of the commercial fisheries industry has pulled itself up by the power block.

Not so many years ago the tuna industry was in serious economic difficulties. What saved it was the adaptation of new technologies to tuna fishing operations. The use of the power block and the conversion of bait boats to purse seiners have been the salvation of the tuna industry, and have made it competitive worldwide. This industry generally is in sound condition now and the prospects for the future appear bright. Other segments of the commercial fishing industry could well borrow a page from the tuna fishermen's book.

While I am not unmindful of the problems you oyster growers have been having with MSX and other adversities, I believe there is cause for optimism in the oyster industry, too. Recent research findings show promise of changing the outlook for your industry back to one of promise. The development of methods for chemical predator control, and artificial culture of shellfish are progressing to the point where they will soon be available to industry.

As most of you here know, we have reached this stage only after many years of basic research. These methods would not have been possible without a rather deep understanding of the life history, physiology and ecology of oysters and their enemies, and it does take time to amass such knowledge.

A tropical Atlantic research program on the high seas will begin next year. This probably will be the most intensive examination of a large body of water ever undertaken. Extending from the lower part of the bulge of Africa all the way across the Atlantic to South America, this survey is expected to yield significant scientific knowledge about this vast area of the ocean. Many scientists believe that the tropical Atlantic Ocean is one of the richest areas in the world's ocean and can produce huge quantities of tuna and other fishes; in fact, it is very possible that further development of the fisheries in this area for the developing countries of Africa and South America may well have a major effect in raising the health standards of these people and improving our own image in these countries.

Fish and fisheries products, properly prepared, are good food anywhere.

You are aware that in a fiercely competitive situation such as we have in the world fisheries, the successful competitor must have modern tools, in addition to research findings, tools which will put him on a par with his opponents. In the fishing industry these tools are the vessels and the gear that the fisherman uses to catch the fish. As I have mentioned, many of our fishermen are woefully weak in this respect, especially as regards vessels. The cost of building fishing vessels in this country has been largely responsible. Foreign-built vessels cannot be used in the fisheries here. This places a heavy competitive handicap on our fishermen because a wooden vessel can be built in some foreign countries for a third less than it can be built in our own yards; a steel vessel for as little as half, or less.

We in the Department of the Interior are now working with staff members of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee in an effort to arrive at some recommendations which will more nearly equalize the competitive position of our fishermen. The present Vessel Construction Differential Subsidy Act is limited in application to the New England trawl fishery. It also carries a limitation on the amount of the subsidy of one-third the cost of construction. This law has not worked completely satisfactorily to date and needs changing to more realistically meet the needs of all the fishing industry. We are hopeful that something constructive will come out of

our present efforts with the two committees. Time is critical because no applications can be accepted under the present act after June 12, 1963.

When I mention an awakening in the fisheries I believe a large part of this is due to President Kennedy's vigorous support of science in general and the marine sciences in particular.

Actually oceanography has been with us for a long time but not until comparatively recently, after it had been highlighted in a number of Presidential statements, has it taken on the glamour and drive that will make it one of the important national programs in the immediate future.

The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is playing a leading role in this interagency undertaking. Strongly accelerated programs are planned for the future with new vessels, new laboratories, and the recruitment of more outstanding scientists to carry on this important work that will be of such great benefit to the fishing industry and to the Nation.

In this broad look at the fisheries, I do not want to imply that the Federal Government can be expected to solve all problems needed to make our fishing industry better able to meet foreign competition. As I said earlier, this must be a cooperative effort involving the Federal Government, the States, and the industry.

Industry's part is very important. Without your desire to meet foreign competition effectively, all public efforts will be diluted and ineffectual.

Industry must discard old wornout practices. It must carefully review its methods and operations and eliminate outmoded and costly techniques. It must apply to its businesses all applicable new knowledge. Each segment must review the operations of other segments and adopt good ideas and practices to their own operations.

State agencies have an important part to play in the development of a stronger fishing industry. They must adequately support research into all aspects of commercial fisheries which are within the realm of State responsibility. There are many excellent State research laboratories. Scientists at those laboratories have made important contributions to knowledge of our commercial fisheries. These institutions should be given adequate funds to continue and expand their work.

The laws and regulations controlling fishing, which are under State jurisdiction, need careful and extensive review to allow new knowledge of the resources and more efficient methods to be applied. State agencies should recognize this need and recommend appropriate changes as new conditions and methods come into use.

A strong cooperative effort on the part of all organizations connected with the American fishing industry will enable us to meet the challenge of the future. The job will not be easy nor the solutions quick. But if we face our problems squarely and earnestly try to solve them together we will win.

In fact, we must win.

The world needs food. Fish and shellfish are an excellent source of animal protein, the most essential element in our diets. Feeding the exploding population of the world is becoming one of the most important problems facing humanity. Our Nation must do its share. This industry certainly must do an ever better job of harvesting, marketing, and feeding.

This changing world of ours needs this industry just as badly as this industry today needs more recognition and more support from the present floundering economy.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I welcome the opportunity today of sponsoring with my distinguished

colleagues in the Senate, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], these two bills to help the American fishing industry. Both Senators have for many years been in the forefront in facing the problems which confront the American fisheries.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. I yield.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I do not know how many Members of the Senate know this, but when the Senator from Massachusetts speaks about my being in the forefront on this effort, along with the Senator from Alaska, I must call attention to the fact that the Senator from Massachusetts has been in the fishing business all his life. His family was born to it. No one knows better what is happening to the fisheries in Massachusetts and in New England than does the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. When he speaks on this subject he not only speaks for the Senator from Alaska and myself, but he speaks also from intimate knowledge of the business.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. I thank the Senator from Washington for his remarks.

The key to the problems which plague our fisheries today is a lack of modern technology. And there is no area where this is more important than in vessel construction. Our fishermen do not have the new boats which they need in order to compete with their leading foreign competitors. In fact, most of our fisheries are now in such dire shape that the fishermen cannot even keep their present equipment in operation.

On both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, fishing fleets that once made us the world's second greatest fisheries producer have now dwindled to a fraction of their former size. We have our distinguished colleague from Alaska speak so ably of the problems that face the fisheries of the Northwest Pacific. At the end of World War II, the fleet in my hometown, Gloucester, numbered over 400 boats. Now it is a quarter of that size and it is still going down. The Boston fleet has dropped in half since 1945. The number of tuna vessels operating out of San Diego has declined from 800 to 210 vessels in a decade.

The remaining vessels in these areas are often old, uncomfortable, expensive to maintain, and dangerous to work on. Insurance rates are excessively high and the working conditions are so bad that young workers will not go into the industry.

Yet, when our fishermen go out in these vessels they find themselves competing with foreign fleets using the most modern equipment available. The distinguished Senator from Washington has fully described some of the foreign fleets which are fishing on both of our coasts.

This spring, only 15 miles from the shores of Cape Cod, fishermen from my home State of Massachusetts encountered a huge Soviet fishing fleet of over

100 vessels. The Russians used modern stern-chute trawlers and huge factory ships to process their catch immediately with a minimum of waste and spoilage. Our fishermen brought their catches in over the sides of their vessels and took them back to port on ice as they and their grandfathers had been doing for over 100 years.

The Russians are not the only country using modern fishing equipment. New England fishermen now compete with a dozen or more countries in our traditional fishing grounds in the North Atlantic. Almost without exception, these fleets use equipment that is far superior to ours. Our next door neighbor, Canada, alone has built more than 300 new trawlers in recent years.

American fishermen also face this competition in the Pacific Ocean. As Senator MAGNUSON well knows—and as he has so well stated—Japanese and Soviet fleets equal to, if not better than, the ships off Cape Cod are pushing deeper and deeper into our fishing grounds in the North Pacific. Japanese fishing fleets now roam the entire Pacific Ocean and are preparing to move into the South Atlantic where, through the use of factory ships, they will be able to sell their catches directly in European markets.

Our fishermen, then, must have modern vessels in order to meet this competition from abroad and to survive economically. The bills which we are introducing today will help provide them with this equipment in two ways. First, it will give them a part of the capital they need to buy new vessels. Secondly, it will provide them with the means to test and evaluate the most advanced freezing, canning, and other processing equipment available to the industry.

The first bill will amend the Vessel Subsidy Act to permit the Government to pay up to 50 percent of the construction cost of a new steel-hulled fishing vessel and up to 35 percent for a wooden ship. It will also extend the provisions of this bill to the entire fishing industry.

If our fishermen were allowed to shop freely for new vessels, the American fishing fleet would not be in its present sorry condition. Our fishermen, however, are hampered in buying the vessels they need by a law dating back to 1792 which forbids them to land fish in this country which are taken in a foreign built boat. No other industry in the United States operates under a restriction such as this one.

We are, in effect, making the American fishermen subsidize the American boatyards by forcing them to buy their vessels here. Because of this, we should give the fishermen the full difference between the best price they can get abroad and what they must pay for a vessel built in this country.

The Vessel Subsidy Act is now limited to 33½ percent on steel-hulled vessels, and only 7 percent of the industry—those catching ground fish—are eligible for it. The price differential, however, between American and foreign boatyards is as high as 40 to 50 percent for these vessels. And nearly all parts of the in-

dustry, not just the ground fishermen, are hurt by the restriction on buying vessels abroad.

By raising and extending the subsidy, this bill will now give to all American fishermen the privilege of buying their vessels at rates equivalent to those they would get in a free market.

The second bill will authorize funds for the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to build two stern-chute trawlers for testing and evaluation purposes. One will operate in the Atlantic Ocean and will carry modern freezing and storage equipment. The other will operate in the Pacific Ocean and will be equipped with processing and canning machinery.

No fishing vessels of this type have ever been built in an American shipyard. Yet, our fishermen must have equipment of this caliber if they are to keep our share of the world's markets and meet the foreign competition which faces them on all sides.

This bill will give both the American fishermen and boatyards a laboratory in which to test advanced fishing methods. Provision is made for full participation by private industry in the operation of the trawlers. This is particularly important as these vessels will serve no useful purpose unless the industry is able to put their machinery and ideas into widespread use.

These two bills will by no means solve all the problems of the American fisheries. They will, however, give the industry a base from which to begin its recovery. They will also provide Congress with an opportunity to discuss and investigate other ways of helping the fisheries in this area.

Congress cannot afford to let the American fishing industry die. The fisheries were the backbone of American commerce in our early years. They are still a billion dollar industry employing nearly one-half million people. But in their present condition, they have been unable to keep their share of the American market, much less compete outside our shores.

They need and deserve this help badly. I hope these bills will mark the beginning of a brand new program of Government and industry cooperation to revive our fisheries.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. I yield.

Mr. BARTLETT. The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts have just made timely, logical, hard-hitting speeches on an important subject which needs the increasing attention which I fully believe it has been receiving since the rather historic speech which the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH] made in the Senate only a few weeks ago.

I think the words he used today ought to stand out and be carefully considered by those who have to report on the bills; namely, that U.S. fishermen are required to subsidize American boatyards, although no other industry is placed under such a restriction.

Speaking for myself, I am honored to be able to join with the Senator from

Washington and the Senator from Massachusetts in sponsoring these bills.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. I thank the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I suggest to the Senator from Massachusetts that although the Committee on Commerce has held hearings on a number of occasions along the Pacific coast and in the Middle Atlantic area, we have not gone to the New England area in the past few years. I think it would be desirable—and I shall so recommend to the committee in a discussion of these bills—that we get some firsthand information on this subject from the area of the Senator from Massachusetts. We hope that the Senator from Massachusetts will be present to aid and guide us with his vast knowledge in the field of fisheries.

Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts. The junior Senator from Massachusetts wishes to thank the able Senator from Washington and to state that he will be most happy to work and cooperate with the Committee on Commerce in any hearings of the type the Senator has proposed.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

ST. AUGUSTINE QUADRICENTENNIAL COMMISSION

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House on Senate Joint Resolution 91.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURRICK in the chair) laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 91) to establish the St. Augustine Quadricentennial Commission, and for other purposes, which were, on page 2, line 8, strike out all after "States" down through and including "President" in line 10; on page 3, line 14, after "resolution" insert "Provided, however, That no employee whose position would be subject to the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, if said Act were applicable to such position, shall be paid a salary at a rate in excess of the rate payable under said Act for positions of equivalent difficulty or responsibility. Such rates of compensation may be adopted by the Commission as may be authorized by the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, as of the same date such rates are authorized for positions subject to said Act. The Commission shall make adequate provision for administrative review of any determination to dismiss any employee"; on page 3, line 21, strike out all after "may" down through and including "agencies," in line 22, and on page 4, strike out lines 19 through 21, inclusive.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I understand there is no objection to the proposal of the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. BARTLETT. That is correct. The motion was agreed to.

ASSISTANCE TO SCHOOLS IN FEDERALLY IMPACTED AREAS

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this morning I became deeply concerned when I learned that efforts are being made to turn the program for assistance to schools in federally impacted areas into a full-fledged general Federal aid to education program.

The present program of Federal aid to impacted school districts is a good program and is entirely justified. It extends Federal funds to school districts whose school population has mushroomed by reason of Federal activities in the area such as military bases and other Federal installations of a substantial nature. This is a good policy, and it is only right that the Federal Government assist in financing the construction of additional classrooms and other necessary expense required solely because of the heavy concentration of Federal workers who frequently live on military installations and do not otherwise contribute to local and State governments in paying taxes so necessary to the operation of the schools.

However, I am amazed to learn that a subcommittee of the other body is proposing that this worthwhile and justified program be extended through a requirement that only 3 percent of the schoolchildren living in the district have parents employed in work connected with the Federal Government. This is a substantial change from the present requirement that a heavily populated area must show that at least 6 percent of its schoolchildren are living in the district because of the employment of their parents in Federal work. It is obvious that a great many more school districts would qualify if the law were changed in this way. However, no one has been found yet who will even make an estimate as to how many new school districts would qualify for Federal money under the change or how much in additional appropriations would be required to finance such a program.

Most of our larger cities probably would be eligible for Federal funds under the new formula, considering the Federal employees who work in post offices, social security, small business, agricultural programs, internal revenue, Federal aviation, veterans administration, the Federal courts, marshals, attorneys, and the countless other offices of the Federal Government in most cities. In one sweep, Federal school assistance for countless millions of dollars would be extended to an untold number of additional school districts. The new formula ignores entirely the basic principle behind the present program for assistance to schools in federally impacted areas; that the parents of these children are usually not on the tax rolls of the local school districts since great numbers of them do not own their homes within the district, or perhaps are living in the area for a year or two, with their children attending the schools, before the parents purchase their homes and otherwise begin paying taxes locally for the support of the schools. The new for-

mula embraces the children of regular Federal employees, most of whom are established residents of the school district, and perhaps have been for many years. They participate in local affairs and are taxpaying citizens of the community. They are in an entirely different category.

For a good many years, efforts have been made in Congress to enact a general bill extending Federal aid to education. I have opposed Federal aid to education. In my opinion, the Senate unfortunately approved a Federal aid to education bill. The bill which passed the Senate is now pending before a committee of the other body. I hope it will not pass.

I have opposed legislation to provide Federal aid to education because I feel that it is the responsibility and prerogative of State and local governments to establish, operate, and maintain their public schools, without any Federal encroachment. A reasonable and limited assistance program extending aid to schools which have been required to expand their plant and school program extensively because of Federal installations is one thing, but a general Federal aid to education program is quite another.

I have consistently opposed general Federal aid to education. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the Senate passed a Federal aid to education bill, which now is pending before one of the House committees. I sincerely hope that bill will not be enacted; but it seems that proponents of this legislation are proposing to use the side door, to take one step at a time, and ultimately to secure by this indirect method—a Federal aid to education program.

Mr. President, another grave point is involved. Only time will verify the true facts; but it has been estimated that new Federal programs approved by the 87th Congress thus far have increased the annual expense of the Federal Government over \$15 billion. This does not include programs which are now being considered by the Congress, but which have not yet been enacted. Just yesterday, a House committee approved legislation proposing to grant pay increases in excess of \$1.2 billion annually for the employees of the Federal Government. Mr. President, I refer to that measure, in particular, as an illustration of the trend. And other expensive programs are under consideration.

Earlier this year, Congress approved an increase in the national debt ceiling, authorizing a national debt of \$308 billion. This is a temporary limit; but if the Congress continues to increase Federal expenditures, it will be necessary again to increase the debt ceiling.

And all this is occurring, Mr. President, at a time when leaders of industry and economists are recommending a reduction in taxes, to stimulate our economy. It just does not make sense.

As one Member of the Senate and as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I serve notice now that all appropriation requests coming before our committee will be very carefully considered by me with a fine-toothed comb.

Those presenting appropriation requests certainly must be prepared to justify them. In some way we must make further reductions in the mounting expenses of the Federal Government. We must change the trend toward expanding these programs. In some way we must provide ourselves with a chance to return to the idea of a balanced budget, or otherwise the mounting national debt which we shall leave to our children and to our grandchildren will be an obstacle in their path which could challenge our form of Government.

Mr. President, the move to extend the aid to schools in impacted areas should be opposed. Any proposal of that sort should be defeated, not only as an unwarranted extension of the program, but also because of the huge added annual Federal expenditures involved, which thus would be added to a budget which already is unbalanced.

Mr. President, I think the Senator from Wisconsin for yielding to me.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield, so that I may comment on the last point he made? I think it is extremely interesting.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Is the Senator from Mississippi saying that serious consideration is being given to a proposal in the House for a vast increase in the amount of Federal aid to schools in impacted areas?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Today, there has been a news item in regard to that matter. Of course I do not know all the details; but such a move is a flag in the wind, indicating the many attempts to add new, vast expenses to our already heavily burdened Federal budget.

Mr. PROXMIRE. That is certainly true; and I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his comments. As one who favors—not opposes but favors—aid to education, I certainly agree wholeheartedly with the Senator from Mississippi that it would be very unwise for us to embark on such a policy—and to do so through “the side door,” as the Senator from Mississippi has described it, but adding so greatly to the present amount of Federal aid extended to schools in impacted areas.

Although I think aid to impacted areas is desirable, I realize that the program can be abused. As I stated only yesterday, it is very likely that the program already has been expanded too greatly; a further expansion would cause the program to include many of our large cities—the cost to the Federal Government would be enormous, and the result would be most unfair.

So I join the Senator from Mississippi in opposing such an expansion of the program. Although he and I voted differently on the primary bill for Federal aid to education, we are wholeheartedly together in opposing such a drain on the funds of the Federal Government.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield briefly to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Massachusetts in the chair).

Does the Senator from Mississippi yield to the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I, too, read in the press, this morning, that a House subcommittee had voted to expand this program by extending the aid to schools in districts in which only 3 percent of the schoolchildren have parents who are employed in work connected with the Federal Government, whereas the present requirement is that at least 6 percent of the children must come in that category before such Federal aid can be provided. It seems to me that such an expansion of the program would be totally in contravention of the congressional policy in regard to extending such aid. I, too, favor Federal aid to education, particularly for areas which do not have sufficient funds to provide proper education for their children. However, certainly we should not embark upon a complete departure from the policy previously decided upon.

I am frank to state that I do not know all the details in connection with the action taken by the House subcommittee; but, on the basis of what I know now, I would be opposed to it.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Kentucky.

Of course, Mr. President, I am not attempting to criticize in advance any Member of the House of Representatives or any committee of the House of Representatives. But certainly such an extension of the program would result in a tremendous drain on the funds of the Federal Government. Aid to impacted areas has certainly been considered by the Congress over a long period of time; and, as we know, some program of that kind is absolutely necessary. But an extension of it, particularly down to 3 percent, would result in its application to many of our large cities, with the result that the program would lose its original purpose, and would become extremely expensive; and, in addition, the original policy of the program would be contravened. So, as the Senator has said, it would be a great mistake.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for yielding to me.

OUR MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA MISCHIEVOUS

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, yesterday the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] made one of the most significant speeches I have heard for a long time on our policy in providing military assistance to South American countries. He pointed out how this program has been increasing at a rapid rate, and how it is now a substantial burden on the American taxpayers, and also is, in effect, feeding the arms race among the countries in Latin America for no really sensible purpose.

This morning I was very happy to read in the New York Times—one of the most influential newspapers in our Nation—an article written by James Reston, the head of the New York Times Washington bureau. The article very sub-

stantially supports the views expressed by the Senator from Alaska.

I should like to read part of the article written by Mr. Reston, for he states the case most succinctly:

These expenditures have not, however, relieved the United States of its burden of defending the hemisphere. On the contrary, with the revolutionary advances in military technology, the burden remains on Washington, and most of the arms in Latin America are effective, not in defending the hemisphere from outside aggression, but merely for fighting internal wars and local political uprisings—

Of the kind which occurred recently in Peru—

nor have most of the other goals of the military assistance program been realized. It has not produced standardization of weapons in the hemisphere; the Latin Americans have bought planes and ships wherever they could get them, often with funds causing economic hardship Washington had to try to repair.

It has not modernized the armies and reduced their size in Latin America, or "democratized" the Latin American military leaders, as it was hoped it might, through bringing them to American military establishments for training. And instead of increasing the desire for a unified defense of the hemisphere, there is reason to believe that shipments of arms to one country have increased the desire for similar arms in neighboring countries, and therefore encouraged the arms race Senator HUMPHREY feared.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the entire article written by James Reston, which was published today in the New York Times, printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THOSE MILITARY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, August 2.—The military revolution in Peru has had at least one good result. It is forcing a reexamination of the U.S. Government's military assistance programs to the Latin-American countries.

Ironically, Fidel Castro beat back the U.S.-supported invasion of Cuba by Cuban refugees last year, not only with Communist arms, but with planes supplied by the United States to the Batista regime.

It was a U.S. Sherman tank that smashed through the iron gates of the Pizarro Palace in Peru the other day to depose the constitutional regime of President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche. And the officer who led the attack on the palace, according to Juan de Oni of the New York Times in Lima, was Col. Gonzalo Briceno, who was trained at the U.S. Ranger school at Fort Benning, Ga.

No doubt U.S. aid has maintained order and defended democratic regimes in some Latin-American countries in the last decade, but there has been just enough of the Peru pattern to provoke a growing reaction against continued military aid to Latin America both on Capitol Hill and within the executive branch of the Kennedy administration.

REVOLT IN THE SENATE

Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY, the Democratic whip, has been warning for years that Washington's assistance programs have been encouraging an arms race in Latin America among countries that cannot maintain a decent standard of living for their people. Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, who heads

the Latin-American Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has started an inquiry, not only into the military assistance program, but into the relationships between U.S. military officers and the Governments of Latin-American countries where they are stationed. And Senator ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, called today for "an end to this unsuitable and fruitless" program of arms assistance.

This is probably too drastic a remedy, for there is serious trouble in Venezuela and elsewhere. Also, the military in Latin America will get arms somewhere else, no matter what Washington says and no matter how much their people starve. But there is a case for review and revision, if not abolition, of the program.

When the United States had to keep 100,000 men in Latin America during the last war, it was argued that Washington should provide arms to the Latin Americans so that they could help defend the hemisphere and relieve us of this responsibility.

Since then, the United States has provided military assistance to Latin America as follows (fiscal years): 1952, \$200,000; 1953, \$11,200,000; 1954, \$34,500,000; 1955, \$31,800,000; 1956, \$30,400,000; 1957, \$43,900,000; 1958, \$47,900,000; 1959, \$54 million; 1960, \$53,700,000; 1961, \$91,600,000. And the sum for the current fiscal year is \$63,600,000 and the plan for next, \$84 million.

These expenditures have not, however, relieved the United States of its burden of defending the hemisphere. On the contrary, with the revolutionary advances in military technology, the burden remains on Washington, and most of the arms in Latin America are effective, not in defending the hemisphere from outside aggression, but merely for fighting internal wars and local political uprisings.

Nor have most of the other goals of the military assistance program been realized. It has not produced standardization of weapons in the hemisphere: The Latin Americans have bought planes and ships wherever they could get them, often with funds causing economic hardship Washington had to try to repair.

It has not modernized the armies and reduced their size in Latin America, or democratized the Latin American military leaders, as it was hoped it might, through bringing them to American military establishments for training. And instead of increasing the desire for a unified defense of the hemisphere, there is reason to believe that shipments of arms to one country has increased the desire for similar arms in neighboring countries and therefore encouraged the arms race Senator HUMPHREY feared.

BLAME UNCLE SAM

If the military revolt in Peru, then, has encouraged a review of Washington's assumptions about aid to Latin America it will be all to the good. The United States has set out to transform and democratize Latin America, which is something even the Lord hasn't been able to do in over 100 years. Every political and economic problem there under the present policy is Washington's problem, and when the military go on acting as they always have, Washington feels irritated and rejected.

Meanwhile, the whole problem of defense in the hemisphere has changed. Some of the Latin American nations can use our weapons for antisubmarine patrol, but nobody even talks about "hemispheric defense" now. It is conceded that subversion is the problem, that our arms are now intended to maintain internal order, that President Kennedy has formally authorized their use in this way. The trouble is that everybody wants to maintain "order," the bad guys as well as the good guys—both with our weapons.

PRESENT LOW INVENTORIES AN ECONOMIC BRIGHT SPOT

Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. President, many persons have discussed the stagnation of the economy and the difficulties it has faced, particularly the serious difficulty of the high level of unemployment, which has persisted, almost without change, since February.

There was some optimism, several days ago, about the figures which were released, indicating that July unemployment is estimated, not at 5.5 percent, but at 5.3 percent. Actually, the figure is 5.34 percent; and it declined from 5.47 percent, a month ago.

As chairman of the Statistics Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, I think I can say—and I think most economists would agree—that that change in unemployment is not significant; this kind of statistical shift does not add up to much. So we still have a serious and substantial unemployment problem.

Nevertheless, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that we do have some bright spots and some most encouraging elements in our economy. One is the fact that the gross national product has increased at a very substantial rate over the past year. Another is that the automobile industry is going along very well. Another is that personal income remains extremely high, and is climbing.

One of the most encouraging developments is that inventories—which in the past have been closely associated, as I shall indicate, with the depths of the recessions we have had—have greatly moderated.

While we have moved ahead economically over the past several months, inventories have not increased as they have done in nearly all cases before in a period of expansion.

The Wall Street Journal, in a recent excellent article, described this and stated in the course of the analysis:

Economists, pondering how soon the next recession will occur and how severe it will be, detect a generally overlooked bright spot in the economy:

The Nation's manufacturers are taking unusual care to keep their inventories in close balance with sales.

"Companies are keeping much sharper watch on inventories in the present recovery than during past business expansions," declares Norris O. Johnson, vice president and senior economist of New York's First National City Bank.

The article continues by stating:

The relatively trim condition of manufacturers' inventories will tend to limit the length and severity of any approaching slump, many analysts say. When recessions hit, companies are forced to readjust their stocks to a reduced level of sales. Such cutbacks have weighed heavily on general business activity during past recessions.

For example, during the last recession, which occurred in 1960-61, the rate of investment in business inventories, on an annual basis, declined by \$14.4 billion, economists note. That accounted for over three-quarters of the total decline of private domestic investment during the recession, from a \$79.1 billion to a \$60.1 billion rate.

Mr. President, recent hearings by the Joint Economic Committee on inventory accumulation showed exactly that, that a substantial proportion of the recessions that we have had, particularly in the last 10 or 12 years, could be accounted for by shifts in inventory policy on the part of industry.

This Wall Street Journal article emphasizes and underlines how true that is.

At the present time, we do not have to worry so much about that. It should be a distinctly stabilizing force in any recession.

For example, the Wall Street Journal article has a table suggesting why economists are cheered by the position of inventories. It compares the relation of manufacturing inventories and sales on June 30 with comparable data at the outsets of past recessions. The ratio is obtained by dividing 1 month's sales into inventory on hand and figures are seasonally adjusted.

On that basis, it shows that for June of this year, as compared with past periods when recessions began, the inventory-to-sales ratio is substantially better. As a matter of fact, inventories for June were only 1.72 times the June sales reported this past week. That is lower than the comparable ratio in the months that preceded any of the four recessions of the postwar period.

Incidentally, the ratio was the highest just before the most serious recession we had in recent years, which was the recession beginning in July 1957.

So this is very, very encouraging information for the economy. I think it is one of the many elements which indicate it may not be wise or necessary or desirable to have a tax cut under present circumstances.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have been referring, written by Mr. Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., which appeared in the Wall Street Journal, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LEAN INVENTORIES—INDUSTRY'S TIGHT REIN ON STOCKS WOULD EASE IMPACT OF A RECESSION—MORE CAPACITY, LEVEL PRICES, NEW COMPUTERS, HELP GEAR SUPPLIES TO SALES PACE—WHIRLPOOL'S FASTER REFLEXES

(By Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.)

Economists, pondering how soon the next recession will occur and how severe it will be, detect a generally overlooked bright spot in the economy:

The Nation's manufacturers are taking unusual care to keep their inventories in close balance with sales.

"Companies are keeping much sharper watch on inventories in the present recovery than during past business expansions," declared Norris O. Johnson, vice president and senior economist of New York's First National City Bank.

Inventories of steel consumers are now estimated roughly at 12 million tons. That's a sharp 33 percent below the 18-million-ton level of May 1960 at the threshold of the last recession.

The May 1960 level was equal to 2.17 times the amount of steel the industry produced during that month. The current level is only 1.77 times steel output in June.

Appliance makers also are watching inventories closely. At the end of June, the supply of laundry appliances, refrigerators, freezers, ranges, dishwashers, and room air conditioners in factory and distributor warehouses totaled some 3,468,000 units, or 2.8 months' supply at the June sales rate.

The May 1960 appliance supply: 3,811,000 units, or 4.1 months' stock in terms of the 1960 month's sales.

A RECESSION CUSHION

The relatively trim condition of manufacturers' inventories will tend to limit the length and severity of any approaching slump, many analysts say. When recessions hit, companies are forced to readjust their stocks to a reduced level of sales. Such cutbacks have weighed heavily on general business activity during past recessions.

For example, during the last recession, which occurred in 1960-61, the rate of investment in business inventories, on an annual basis, declined by \$14.4 billion, economists note. That accounted for over three-quarters of the total decline of private domestic investment during the recession, from a \$79.1 billion to a \$60.1 billion rate.

Because companies are keeping closer tabs on their stocks today, however, many experts believe the rate of such inventory investment may decline no more than \$7 billion or \$8 billion, on an annual basis, during any immediate setback of the dimensions they foresee.

"Because of today's healthy inventory situation, the amplitude of a new recession will be substantially reduced," predicts a top economist at the National Industrial Conference Board, a nonprofit business research group.

LOW INVENTORY-SALES RATIO

The table below suggests why economists are cheered by the position of inventories. It compares the relation of manufacturing inventories and sales on June 30 with comparable data at the outsets of past recessions. Dollars are in billions. The ratio is obtained by dividing 1 month's sales into inventory on hand, and figures are seasonally adjusted.

Period	Inventory	Sales	Inventory-sales ratio
June 1962.....	\$56.9	\$33.0	1.72
May 1960.....	55.0	31.0	1.77
July 1957.....	54.1	29.0	1.87
July 1953.....	45.5	25.9	1.76
November 1948.....	32.1	18.0	1.78

As the table shows, inventories at latest report were only 1.72 times the June sales reported this week. This is lower than the comparable ratio in the months that preceded any of the four recessions of the postwar period.

The inventory-sales ratio was highest in July 1957 just before the severest of the postwar slumps. In that setback, the Nation's industrial output—a key measure of business activity—fell 14 percent. In the 1960-61 downturn, when inventories were held closer to sales, production declined only 7 percent.

A CAUTIOUS BUILDUP

The record shows that manufacturers have been slower to build up their stocks in the current expansion than during previous recoveries. The June 30 inventory level of \$56.9 billion is only 6 percent above the level of February 1961, at the pit of the last recession. It's smaller than the rise in any postwar recovery and far below the 40 percent average rate of inventory buildup for the four recoveries.

There are several outstanding reasons for the present trim condition of manufacturers' inventories, analysts agree.

The sharp growth of production capacity in many industries is cited as one major factor. In June such basic industries as metals, textiles, chemicals, and petroleum were operating at only 76 percent of capacity, it is estimated. That compares with some 81 percent of capacity in these industries in use in May 1960, before the 1960-61 setback. And it's far under the 86 percent rate of July 1957 and the 93 percent rate of July 1953.

BIG CAPACITY, FAST DELIVERY

The expanded capacity to produce things enables manufacturers to deliver goods more swiftly than in earlier years. Knowing this, many customers are content to order goods as needed, without fear of long delays in delivery.

"We know we can get steel in 6 to 8 weeks, at most, so we don't worry about keeping a big supply on hand, as we once did," reports Leon Menz, procurement administrator of American Machine & Foundry Co. "Several years ago, it often took up to 3 months to get delivery."

Joseph B. Lanterman, president of Amsted Industries, Inc., a Chicago-based steel user, adds, "Just 2 years ago, one of our subsidiaries, a large buyer of steel bars, would keep 3 to 6 months' supply of steel in the yard; today, the maximum inventory is between 45 and 60 days." The executive observes "a general trend toward faster deliveries from all types of suppliers."

Many officials note, in addition, that prices are generally more stable now than a few years ago. For this reason, companies often feel there is no need to carry large inventories as a hedge against price increases.

"With steel prices remaining level, and even declining in some cases, you can bet we're not hedging-buying against price boosts," remarks AMF's Mr. Menz. "We once carried extra-large steel stocks because we knew prices would be going up and up."

Manufacturers are keeping a closer watch on the size of their stocks in order to hold down storage expense and other inventory costs. American Optical Co., for example, has made substantial economies by carrying trimmer inventories, a spokesman says. American Optical's \$93.6 million sales last year were supported by inventories totaling only \$32.1 million, he reports. Three years before, the optical equipment maker's sales of \$79.3 million required inventories about equal to last year's \$32.1 million.

HELP FROM COMPUTERS

The increasing use of data processing equipment for inventory control has enabled many firms to carry slimmer stocks.

Whirlpool Corp., for example, several months ago installed a Radio Corp. of America computer that gives the company's executives detailed data on inventories of 78 distributors within 24 hours. Previously, this information, in less detail, wasn't available for 4 days.

"If a sharp break in sales should come in the months ahead, our inventories will be adjusted to the new level much faster," says an official of the big appliance producer.

Clark Garrison, Jr., marketing director of International Business Machines Corp.'s data processing division, says, "Inventory control is one of the most widely-used and fastest-growing computer applications in manufacturing."

Faster, fuller information about industry-wide sales helps prevent over-stocking, many officials say. The National Electrical Manufacturers Association, for example, now gives weekly appliance industry sales reports to its member firms. In the early post-war years, NEMA issued such reports only once a month and fewer appliances were covered.

PERSISTENTLY SERIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on a related subject, the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Goldberg, has indicated that he is deeply concerned by the new attitude on the part of labor unions. In the past, as he has indicated, labor leaders have said they might be interested in a 35-hour week, or even a 32-hour week, but this attitude has been mainly ritualistic, just going through the motions. Now they are really serious about it.

The fact is that the rank and file of labor are fed up with unemployment. In many areas the unemployment problem is extremely difficult, and they want some answers.

Some economists theorize that a tax cut could help, but other analysts seem to think it may not be effective in reducing unemployment.

Certainly, when we recognize that we are in the 18th month of a recovery period and unemployment is still close to 5 percent of the labor force—a very high level—we can see why the rank and file and labor leaders are concerned, and should be concerned, about unemployment.

Unfortunately, top officials in Government are thinking exclusively in terms of a tax cut as a solution. Mr. Goldberg is one of the ablest men we have had in high office in a long time. Even Mr. Goldberg is putting too much emphasis on fiscal policy, tax reduction, and Government spending, and failing, as I am afraid too many people in our Government are failing, to recognize that this is a long-range type of unemployment; that we are now, on the basis of past analysis, close to the peak of a recovery period, and yet we have heavy unemployment.

If we are going to reduce unemployment, we cannot reduce it by a policy basically designed to temporarily stimulate the economy. The effort should be directed at fundamentally improving the situation.

I call to the attention of Senators who read the Record the fact we had very, very heavy unemployment during the 1930's. Since World War II, unemployment, while serious, has been comparably less. There are many reasons for that, but one particularly important reason is that there are 14 million people in this country over 65 years of age who are not working and who are not in need of work because most of them are receiving social security benefits.

When we adopted the social security measure, we took out of the work force those who would normally be employed, a vast majority of people over 65. I think one of the most constructive measures which this Congress has passed—and it has not been fully recognized—is reduction of the retirement age from 65 to 62. There is no question that hundreds of thousands of people will eventually leave the work force because they can retire at 62.

I suggest we give serious consideration to giving a further voluntary opportunity for people to leave the work force, if they wish to do so, at 60 instead of

62. We can do it without increasing the cost of social security. We can do it exactly as we did it when we reduced the retirement age from 65 to 62, by reducing the benefits they would receive if they retired earlier.

In my judgment, such a move would permanently help to relieve the unemployment problem, and do it on a voluntary basis, by permitting those who wished to do so to continue to work and get higher benefits.

One other type of relief I could suggest, and that is to recognize that a very, very large proportion of our unemployed are dropouts from high school. This is a great human tragedy in America. Young men and women of the age of 16 and 16½, before they can graduate leave high school. Perhaps they get an odd job for a while. Too many of them are unemployed. The former president of Harvard University, James Conant, has estimated that in some areas 50 to 70 percent of these young people are out of work.

He has also said that in communities where those young people stay in school there is relatively little unemployment of young people of that age. When there is a dovetailing of management, labor, and education authorities, so that those young people who are not interested in book learning and who are not interested in going to college can concentrate on developing skills and receiving vocational education in high school, it works out very well.

Therefore, it seems to me our Federal Government should do all it can to persuade the States to increase the age at which these young people can voluntarily leave education from 16, which is common throughout our country, to the age of 17. That one action on the part of the States throughout the country would enormously help the unemployment problem. It would greatly reduce it, not only in an obvious numerical way, by putting young people who would otherwise be idle in school, but also in a more constructive way if they could take vocational education when they did not intend to continue their education.

It would mean that when they left high school they would be able to get the kinds of jobs for which we now need people. There are many skilled jobs going begging, because there are not the people with the necessary skills to fill them.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times, written by John D. Pomfret and entitled "Goldberg Fears Plea To Cut Hours," may be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

GOLDBERG FEARS PLEA TO CUT HOURS—FORESEES STRIKES IF UNIONS PRESS FOR SHORT WEEK TO HELP MAKE MORE JOBS

(By John D. Pomfret)

WASHINGTON, August 2.—Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg fears that a continued high level of unemployment will cause

unions to go after a shorter workweek in earnest.

This is the main present danger in the industrial relations field, the Secretary thinks. An intensive drive by labor for shorter hours would mean more strikes and would cause economic difficulties, he believes.

Mr. Goldberg senses a shift in labor's mood about shorter hours in recent months. Formerly, calls by union leaders for cuts in the workweek were ritualistic, but lately these appeals have taken on an air of urgency.

No one, Mr. Goldberg noted in an interview, is asserting that it is onerous to work 40 hours a week. The appeals are based on the need to reduce unemployment, not to increase free time.

MEMBERS PRESS UNIONS

The Secretary thinks that unemployment has been underestimated as a factor in determining the industrial relations climate. Unions are under pressure from their members to do something to create more jobs, he said.

But, the Secretary said, the added costs of a shorter workweek would create serious difficulties in maintaining stable prices. Thus he repeated a theme he has voiced from a number of platforms of union conventions.

"This points up the absolute necessity of bringing unemployment down to minimum levels if we are to have stability in labor relations and are to produce goods that are competitive abroad," Mr. Goldberg said.

To cut unemployment, which was 5.3 percent of the work force in July, Mr. Goldberg favors some specific measures such as area redevelopment and retraining programs. He also favors more general remedies such as a permanent tax cut, investment incentives and other steps to stimulate increased economic demand.

Mr. Goldberg believes that the general climate of industrial relations in the country is good, but that there are important industries in which the collective bargaining machinery sorely needs overhauling. These Mr. Goldberg identified as construction, maritime, airlines, and railroads.

Mr. Goldberg said that new forms of collective bargaining had to be evolved in those industries. But he said that they should not be government forms.

The kind of models he has in mind, Mr. Goldberg said, are the union-management committees to study joint problems set up in the steel industry after the strike in 1959 and the longstanding use of impartial third parties to resolve disputes in the garment industry.

"We should encourage the parties to use their own procedures," Mr. Goldberg said. "If those don't work, they should be encouraged to bring in impartial third parties."

Thus in the construction industry, it might be possible to broaden and adapt to the negotiation of labor contracts procedures already established to deal with disputes over work jurisdiction, Mr. Goldberg suggested.

TRANSPORT PROBLEM COMPLEX

The industrial relations problems of the transportation industry are difficult, the Secretary said, because they involve both jurisdictional arguments and manning controversies provoked by technological change.

The core of the airlines' labor controversy has been a dispute between two unions as to which should have jurisdiction over the third seat in the jet cockpit once crews are cut from four men to three.

Mr. Goldberg is well on the way to resolve this issue. He has achieved a settlement on Trans World Airlines and agreement on a settlement procedure on Pan American World Airways. His efforts to end a flight engineers' strike against Eastern Air Lines, which began on June 23, have so far been unsuccessful.

The principal problem on the railroads is a reduction in manpower requirements being pressed by the carriers and resisted by the unions.

An initial step to overhaul the collective bargaining system in this industry, Mr. Goldberg said, might be to try to recreate the attitude that existed on both sides in 1926 when they worked out the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, which then was passed by Congress.

FAVORS NEW MACHINERY

In the maritime industry, where labor relations have been exacerbated by a continuous jurisdictional war between unions and by controversies over manpower requirements, Mr. Goldberg thinks the key is the creation of machinery to bridge the conflict between the unions.

Significantly, Mr. Goldberg is not prone to see final solutions in new laws. He thinks that more flexibility could profitably be introduced into laws dealing with labor disputes that create emergencies. But the principal changes he would promote are those to be worked out by labor and management by collective bargaining.

Mr. Goldberg has been involved to a greater or lesser degree in trying to help resolve 31 labor disputes since he gave up his job as general counsel for the United Steelworkers of America to become Labor Secretary 18 months ago.

One of the main reasons he has been so often involved, Mr. Goldberg said, is so that President Kennedy will not have to be.

"A President is too busy and should not be burdened with these matters," Mr. Goldberg said. "Nor should he risk his prestige too often by intervening. He should use his prestige sparingly, reserving it for the critical situations."

PLEASED BY STEEL PACT

Mr. Goldberg regards the peaceful, early and noninflationary settlement last spring between the steel industry and the United Steelworkers of America as "a major achievement of this administration."

The "second guessers" who belittle the importance of President Kennedy's efforts "overlook one fact—there was a breakoff in negotiations," Mr. Goldberg said.

"Those of us who are experienced in steel know that's an ominous sign," he said. "In the absence of quick movement there would have been a buildup of propaganda. If the company had dug in at 4 or 5 cents, which was an impossible settlement for the union, the situation could very well have drifted into a strike. And at the point the break-off occurred, the company was convinced that the union wasn't going to settle for less than 15 or 16 cents, which the company regarded as completely unreasonable."

HOUSE BILL DAIRY PLAN HAS REAL MERIT

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, I wish to speak much more briefly on a couple of other subjects.

The farm bill, as it left the House of Representatives, contained a provision for the voluntary retirement of dairy production, which would have permitted farmers to reduce production and to be paid \$2.50 a hundred pounds for such reduction of production.

There is a lot of support in my State for this proposal. It has certain difficulties in regard to administration, but it also has merit.

A recent editorial in the Wisconsin Agriculturist, an outstandingly fine farm publication, warmly supports this dairy

proposal. While it is not in the farm bill which came from the committee, I hope that the conferees will give serious consideration to the provision and that the plan can be given at least a trial until June of next year, to see if it works, to provide a basis for determining how we can work out appropriate dairy programs in the next session of Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial entitled "Dairy Plan Has Real Merit," may be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DAIRY PLAN HAS REAL MERIT

Any editor who writes about farm programs right now takes a long chance. The odds are that the bill now in Congress will be changed before this paper is mailed.

The present bill in the House of Representatives would extend the present feed grain and wheat programs for 1963. This seems to be the best we can hope for this year.

One section of the House bill would spell out a completely new dairy program. The program would run from October 1 this year to June 30 of next year.

Under the program producers could voluntarily cut back their milk production by 10 to 25 percent of their 1961 marketings. Government would give surplus reduction payments of up to \$2.50 per hundred for this cut.

This program has real merit. It's voluntary. Each producer could decide to go along or stay out. It would save Government money. It costs the Government about \$4.20 per hundred pounds of milk to buy and store surpluses.

Producers could make additional income by cooperating. Most of them would find it more profitable to cut back production for \$2.50 per hundred than to produce the hundred pounds and sell it at present prices.

No one knows, of course, but our guess is that a substantial number of dairy farmers would cooperate. If they did, it would materially reduce dairy surplus.

The program is sound. It deserves a chance.

TITO FURTHER CURBS ECONOMIC FREEDOM

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, Mr. Paul Underwood, of the New York Times, has published a series of articles with respect to what is going on in Yugoslavia, and especially with respect to what has been going on since the Congress acted to approve a foreign aid bill which provided for the possibility, at least, of a \$10 million development loan for Yugoslavia.

Mr. Underwood, in a recent dispatch from Belgrade, reports:

President Tito's regime is cutting down still further the tiny area in which private business is permitted to function in Communist Yugoslavia's economy.

Under new regulations, private taxis will be eliminated within a year. Private trucking and hauling will also be banned within 12 months.

Craftsmen will not be permitted to engage in general production, but will be limited to performing services. Private craftsmen, moreover, will be barred from working on building projects financed with public funds.

The article goes on to indicate that Tito is tightening the screws even further against economic freedom. I think the article well supplements previous articles I have put into the RECORD, written by Mr. Underwood, reporting from Yugoslavia, indicating that Tito was tightly limiting the area of freedom of expression, of freedom of the press in Yugoslavia.

I ask unanimous consent that the article, "Yugoslavia Widens Curbs on Private Businesses," may be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

YUGOSLAVIA WIDENS CURBS ON PRIVATE BUSINESSES—NEW LAWS TO BAN TAXIS AND TRUCKING CONCERNS—MOVE FOLLOWS OFFICIAL CRITICISM

(By Paul Underwood)

BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA, July 20.—President Tito's regime is cutting down still further the tiny area in which private business is permitted to function in Communist Yugoslavia's economy.

Under new regulations, private taxis will be eliminated within a year. Private trucking and hauling will also be banned within 12 months.

Craftsmen will not be permitted to engage in general production but will be limited to performing services. Private craftsmen, moreover, will be barred from working on building projects financed with public funds.

In addition, a new law gives authorities the right "to interfere in time to prevent negative trends in private crafts, either by tightening the conditions for the performance of craft services or by reducing the number of services they—craftsmen—are allowed to perform."

The new regulations are contained in two measures recently enacted by Parliament. One dealt with craft workshops. The other constituted a code on road transport.

The laws were approved following criticism in the official press last winter of the activities of some people in the private sector of the economy. Private craftsmen were accused of dodging taxes and trading in stolen articles. Worst of all from the Communist standpoint, they were accused of evading regulations limiting their activities and building up sizable businesses.

In Yugoslavia, as in all Communist-ruled countries, the official ideal is a completely socialized system of craft shops, with no private businesses of any kind. However, realization of this aim would require greater public investment in the craft area of the economy than the Tito regime believes worthwhile at this stage of development.

As an alternative, the regime has allowed private craftsmen to continue to function provided they employ no more than five persons. They also are subject to heavy taxes, in some cases amounting to as much as 75 percent of their income.

As of December 1959, the latest date for which official statistics are available, there were 116,000 registered private craft shops in Yugoslavia, with a total of 149,000 workers. Most of the craftsmen were engaged in repair and service work. However, a few had been successful in setting up small manufacturing businesses, making consumer goods that are in short supply.

The manufacturing group is the one the new regulations are designed to put out of business.

The move against private taxis and trucks, part of the new road transport law, gives local authorities the power to ban private

operators any time they see fit within a year.

The Belgrade city administration has declared that private operators will be banned in the capital "as soon as possible" but has not yet set a date. New taxis will have to be purchased for socialized transport enterprises to take the place of the private taxis.

As of the end of last year, according to official statistics, private owners operated about 600 taxis, 3,325 trucks, and 2 buses in the whole of Yugoslavia.

More than a third of the taxis are in the capital. Most of them are ancient vehicles nearing complete breakdown. A ride in one is usually an adventure. Their departure will end another picturesque aspect of life in Belgrade.

FRANTIC PACE OF SPACE SPENDING ENDANGERS SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER

MR. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on July 26 I appeared before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics to protest the lack of alternatives which are available to Members of Congress who at least would like to consider the possibility of limiting the enormous increase in spending with respect to the man-on-the-moon project. We are all in favor of it. Certainly this Senator is. However, I think when we are confronted with a tremendous increase, from \$1.7 billion to \$3.7 billion in 1 year, we at least ought to be provided by NASA with alternatives to determine what would be the effects if we should go a little slower and should provide only a 100-percent increase, thereby saving \$300 million.

There has been testimony given by competent officials of NASA that because the program is going so fast it will be necessary to spend \$7 billion more on this moon project than if it went somewhat more slowly. I think the Congress cannot act intelligently unless it is given this kind of information and unless it is in a position to assess the effect of the program, particularly with respect to scientific manpower of this country.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my statement given before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics may be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, JULY 26, 1962

I am appearing before this committee at my own request because I am deeply concerned about the impact of the huge increase in spending for space recently authorized by Congress, and projected future space budgets, on our Nation's other vital needs and goals. Let me emphasize at the outset that I do not question the importance of our space effort. I support it warmly. I favor the manned lunar program enthusiastically. The significant question is not whether our Nation should undertake a space program—of course, it should—but rather at what rate we should carry on such a program and what goals we should establish for our space effort, in relation to the other vital needs and goals of our Nation.

This committee and the Senate Space Committee, as well as the Appropriations subcommittees that deal with space have done an excellent job of examining the complex details of our present space programs and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration budget for 1963. I want to draw attention, however, to the long-range implications of the space effort, and the many problems that can be foreseen. These problems may be of great magnitude because, as this committee well knows, the space program's sheer size—in terms of dollars and resources, both human and material—makes it without question the largest undertaking of the U.S. Government since the total involvement of our economy and Nation in World War II.

Already the massive cost and rate of growth of our space program are putting serious strains on our Nation's scientific and defense capabilities, and on scientific education. Our entire space effort can have staggering effects on our education system, our supply of scientific manpower, our industrial defense capability, and on the American taxpayer. Comprehensive, detailed study of these effects should be undertaken immediately.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration already is draining our limited supply of scientific and engineering personnel, thus reducing the manpower available for work in defense, industry, and education. This crucial problem of scientific manpower should be recognized now, and steps should be taken at once to solve it.

A recent article in the Washington Post entitled "Moon Aims Strain Manpower Supply," noted that NASA will need approximately 13,000 more scientists and engineers in the next few years in order to carry out its projected program. The article went on to say: "There is now danger that space program recruiters will begin to entice scientists and engineers away from other government agencies and laboratories and then from universities." Yet at the same time private industry and the universities will be demanding more scientific manpower in order to carry out their functions. The question I am asking is this: Where are all these extra scientists and engineers going to come from? From our graduating university classes? Hardly. The proportion of scientists and engineers in graduating classes has been declining for several years and the industrial and especially defense demand for these graduates has greatly increased.

To try to get an answer to this question, I wrote to Dr. Howard A. Meyerhoff, Executive Director of the Scientific Manpower Commission. He replied: "I have been working on the scientific and engineering manpower problem for nearly 10 years, and even if I apply my imagination to my knowledge, I frankly do not know where these people are (going to come) from, unless we are prepared to cut back sharply on the use of competent teachers in our institutions of learning, and on research and development in industry, and in other government agencies." And then Dr. Meyerhoff came to this conclusion: " * * * NASA's manpower requirements have not been integrated and therefore have not been seen in perspective in relation to other overall needs in education, industry, and government." This is what one competent authority has to say about how the huge expenditures for our space program are going to affect our supply of scientific manpower.

A specific aspect of our mushrooming space effort that concerns me is NASA's increasing tendency to dispense with advertised competitive bidding in the award of space procurement contracts. I recognize that certain aspects of the space program may be difficult to operate under the sound

discipline of advertised competitive bidding. But this is by no means the case universally. It has been shown time and time again that competitive bidding is the most effective way to reduce costs and is the fairest to all companies concerned. Departures from this procedure should be as infrequent as possible, and should only occur when clearly and absolutely necessary.

The use of so-called competitive negotiation rather than advertised competitive bidding, while probably preferable to sole source procurement, nonetheless lacks both of the main virtues of formal competition. It does not allow all interested firms to compete. And it does not impose the same solid cost discipline. While I recognize the urgency with which our space program is viewed, I cannot believe that the need for speed is so great that NASA should virtually ignore competitive bidding. With all the urgency of military procurement, the Defense Department has a far better record on competitive bidding.

Procurement practices and our Nation's scientific manpower are two specific aspects of the larger general problem of viewing our space program in the context of our Nation's priorities and needs. Several eminent scientists have spoken out against placing an excessive emphasis on a space program. For example, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., chairman of the MIT corporation, perhaps the Nation's greatest institution of scientific learning, and first science adviser to President Eisenhower said recently: "The United States must decide whether it can justify billions of dollars for man in space when its educational system is so inadequately supported." And further, he warned: "The Nation must seek to determine whether it is now proceeding too rapidly in this area and whether it can manage the present man-in-space program without weakening other important national programs, including defense."

Along the same lines, a distinguished member of the House, Congressman CHER HOLIFIELD, chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, stated on a television program last month, in speaking of our space program: "I have seen what I think (are) very worthwhile programs in applied science, which have direct benefit to the people of America, put on the shelf for the pursuit of some fantastic objective which may or may not be attained 10 or 15 years from now. And, in the meantime, the people are denied the benefits which are just around the corner."

It is plain that the massive size and rapid growth rate of our space effort are having the effect of diverting resources away from the fulfillment of other vital needs and goals which merit high national priority. The task of properly evaluating the relative priorities of these goals must be shouldered by Congress—particularly through its control of appropriations. I believe that Congress can fulfill this responsibility by more carefully evaluating the enormous expenditure increases that are programmed for space, and by cutting back judiciously to bring these programs back into balance with other national priorities.

Certain specific figures may illustrate what I mean. In the hearings on the NASA budget before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, NASA officials stated that, due to the acceleration of the timetable for placing a man on the moon, the cost for the moon project was increased by \$7 billion. This is a fantastic amount of money which will be spent simply to meet a somewhat earlier deadline. It is a significant part of the many tens of billions of dollars that will be spent on our space programs in the coming decade. The question that should be asked is whether each of these massive expenditures genuinely represents the best

possible use for these funds, collected from American taxpayers, in the general public interest.

As I said before, I do not object to our effort to land men on the moon. Some protests against the usefulness of this undertaking have been voiced, but I reject them. Man's ambition has brought him to the brink of a great adventure in space, and our country should indeed work hard to be first with a manned lunar landing. But our space program should be kept in balance with other national goals. If huge costs are to be incurred, if billions of dollars are to be spent, we should explore the implications of this commitment in advance, with our eyes open, taking every possible step to judge the value of what we will be getting for our investment.

The significant question is not whether we should undertake a space program—of course we should—but rather at what rate such a program is carried on, and what specific goals are set for it.

I urge this committee to examine our space program carefully and set up priorities, both within the program and in relation to other national programs. I think that we must evaluate which projects in our space program ought to receive top priority and eliminate the projects which do not receive such a rating. I myself intend to offer amendments to cut back the NASA appropriation in the Senate. In view of the staggering effects which the presently projected space program could have upon education, health, scientific manpower, and even defense, I propose these four specific recommendations:

1. The committee should request NASA to make alternative proposals to show how a slower expansion of funds for the space program would affect the man-to-the-moon timetable and other NASA goals.
2. NASA should provide a justification for the timing of the lunar effort in addition to its item-by-item cost justification.
3. Procedures should be established to oversee NASA's recruiting of scientific manpower.
4. NASA should be requested to conform to competitive bidding procedures to the fullest possible extent and should clearly explain the reasons for any exception.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, if there is no further business, I move, pursuant to the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 24 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned, pursuant to the previous order, until Monday, August 6, 1962, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate August 3, 1962:

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Jesse W. Curtis, Jr., of California, to be U.S. district judge for the southern district of California. (New position.)

COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY

Subject to qualifications provided by law, the following for permanent appointment to the grades indicated in the Coast and Geodetic Survey:

To be captains

Fair J. Bryant
Charles W. Clark

To be commanders

Hubert W. Keith, Jr. Steven L. Hollis, Jr.
Dewey G. Rushford Hal P. Demuth

To be lieutenant commander

James P. Randall

IN THE COAST GUARD

The following named persons to be captains in the U.S. Coast Guard:

Harold D. Sealestad	John P. Fox
Henry P. Kniskern, Jr.	James N. Schrader
Cornelius G. Houtsma	Harry F. Frazer
Edward C. Allen, Jr.	Julian J. Shingler
Paul Pollatt	Francis J. Swan
Arthur B. Engel	Warner K. Thompson, Jr.
James A. Hyslop	William R. Riedel
Joseph Change	James H. McDowell
Benjamin D. Shoemaker, Jr.	John R. Silliman
Frederick A. Reicker	Louis B. Kendall
Willis A. Bruso	Jesse E. Eastman
Raymond A. Tuttle	Gorwan W. Larsen
Charles E. Leising, Jr.	Robert B. Scott
Jesse O. Thompson	Charles P. McFaull
Cortlandt W. Quinby	Ralph M. West
Lloyd L. Stoltz	Charles E. Sharp
Raymond J. Fugina	Gilbert Hinchcliffe
Benjamin P. Clark	William C. Mahoney
Thomas R. Sargent III	Lynn Parker
Edwin B. Ing	Louis A. Grundler
Donald V. Reardon	Byron I. Reynolds
Winslow H. Buxton	Robert Flockhart
Robert W. Goehring	Leslie G. Haverland
William A. McFaull	George W. Nantau
William E. Pratt	Emery H. Joyce
Harry L. Morgan	James L. Thompson
Vitus G. Niebergall	Donald G. Elliot
John D. McCubbin	Newton W. Winberg
Lawrence D. Connor	Edward J. Worrel, Jr.
Ross P. Bullard	Herbert J. Kelly
Archibald H. McComb, Jr.	Frederick K. Arzt
James B. McCarty, Jr.	William S. Vaughn
Leonard E. Penso	Edward W. Kirkpatrick
Orvan R. Smeder	Mark L. Hocking
George C. Steinman	Clement B. Cozad
Victor Pfeiffer	Joseph Mazzotta
Arthur M. Vrooman	Lionel H. DeSanty
William L. Morrison	Thomas N. Kelley
David W. Sinclair	William R. Sayer

The following named persons to be commanders in the U.S. Coast Guard:

Donald M. Reed	Harry G. Kosky
Carl L. Parrott	Neale O. Westfall
Frederick J. Hancox	Edward P. Sawyer
Robert A. Adams	Burton V. Weston, Jr.
William M. Benkert	Manson E. Meekins
Robert A. Schulz	Gordon L. Bates
Warren E. Rast	Carleton W. Wahl
Curtis J. Kelly	Walter J. Felton
Austin F. Hubbard	Bruce H. Jensen
William J. Zinck	David Block
Richard E. Hoover	Harold J. McCormack
William N. Banks	Earl B. Cooper
Keith Low	Rayner C. Burke
Daniel J. Scalabrini	William H. Monger
Edward R. Tharp	Joseph E. Gould
Wilfrid N. Derby, Jr.	Robert W. Smith
Alden E. Lewis	James P. Flessas
Robert T. Norris	Robert A. Adamson
Frank B. Carter	David Gershowitz
Frank M. Fisher, Jr.	Dono W. Moore
John J. Doherty	Eric G. Grundy
David L. Davies, Jr.	Jay P. Dayton
Donald A. Caswell	Richard H. Hagadorn
Lewis F. Lovell	Robert J. Carson
Edward M. F. Kirchner	Hugh C. McCaffrey
Lloyd M. Logan	Merle L. Harbourt
Albert S. Frevola	Edwin W. Coleman
Edwin J. Brummeler	John D. Roberts
William H. Campbell	Raymond J. Evans
Edwin S. Radford	Scott P. Berryman
Andrew J. Grogard	Willis G. Partridge
Alfred J. Unger	William G. Blandford
John M. Nagy	Stanley G. Perret
Jason S. Kobler	John R. Allums
Robert E. Foley	Norman E. Dion
James D. Doyle	Daniel J. Garrett
James E. Fleming	John R. Mackey

Ottis H. Abney
Curtis H. Jurgens
Allen E. Armstrong
Charles D. Budd
Howard A. Linse
Harry H. Chaplin
James McMenamin
Bertrand S. Dean
Donby J. Mathieu

David W. DeFreest
Robert L. Lawlis
James W. Dodson
George D. Winstein
William W. Richter
John A. Corso
William H. St. George
Robert J. Bloxson
Joseph W. Finnegan

The following-named persons to be lieutenant commanders in the U.S. Coast Guard:

Thomas J. Hynes
Malcolm E. Clark
Charles M. Mayes
Dan Rayacich
David P. Bates, Jr.
Rudolph E. Lenczyk
William L.

Faulkenberry
Donald C. Davis
John H. Bruce
James H. MacDonald
Donald E. Vaughn
Thomas W. Powers
Archibald B. How
Herbert H. Sharpe,
Jr.

Michael B. Lemly
Glenn M. Loboudger
John E. V. A. Murray
Vincent A. Bogucki
Robert A. Lee
Lloyd W. Goddu, Jr.
Donald J. McCann
Edward D. Cassidy
John B. Hayes
Robert L. Davis, Jr.
Glenn R. Taylor
Walter F. Guy
Dudley C. Goodwin, Jr.
Warren S. Petterson
William C. Wallace
Henry G. Cassel
Hardy M. Willis
Raymond M. Miller
Clarence G. Porter
Carroll T. Newman
Walton D. Alley, Jr.
Bruce H. Edwards
William A. Mayberry
Rollin T. Young
Cornelius G. Farley
Francis L. Brittan
Philip A. Hogue
Eugene Carlson, Jr.
John W. Yager
Thomas W. Wolfe
Gerard J. Perron
Elliot S. Shafer

The following-named persons to be lieutenants in the U.S. Coast Guard:

Rudolph V. Cassani
Anthony A. Alloggio
John R. O'Connor
Ernest L. Murdock
Paul Nichiporuk
James E. Thompson
Eugene P. Baumann
Louis H. Mense
William P. Kozlovsky
Mark J. Millea, Jr.
Edwin L. Parker
Paul E. Schroeder
Ralph W. Judd
William T. Sheppard
James C. Morrow
James I. Doughty
Ernest J. Mayer, Jr.
Richard G. Kerr
James F. Culbertson
John M. Wilkinson
William J. Tillo
Gerald J. Budridge
Dwight T. Ramsay
Walter E. Mason, Jr.
Charles L. Clark
William F. Boucher
James L. Howard

Francis H. Nolin
Kenneth A. Long
Richard B. Wise
Alfred F. Bridgman, Jr.
George T. Seaman
John R. Kirkland
Henry Lohmann
Milton Y. Suzlich
Carlton W. Swickley
Arthur E. Ladley, Jr.
Jack E. Coulter
Richard T. Brower
Raymond J. Copin
Guy W. Mizell
Clyde E. Robbins
Verne E. Cox
Robert B. Bacon
Philip J. Danahy
Joseph A. McDonough,
Jr.
William C. Nolan
Clyde T. Lusk, Jr.
George H. Wagner
Billy E. Richardson
Thomas R. Tyler
Albert C. Tingley, Jr.
James A. Wilson

Norman G. Cubberly
Charles F. Hahn
John E. Moseley
William A. Publicover
Albert E. Reif, Jr.
Rex R. Morgan
Victor R. Robillard
Arnold M. Danielsen
Donald M. Thompson,
Jr.

John P. Skillings
James L. Fear
James M. Fournier
Robert T. Getman
Robert R. Houvener
Henry M. Helgesen
Sidney C. Tharrington, Jr.

Norman A. Toon
Michael T. Brock
Merrill K. Wood
David B. Flanagan
Henry Haugen
David L. Green
Martin J. Kaiser
Alban Landry
Francis D. Forbes
Charles B. Glass
William N. Spence
Ira L. Krams
Kenneth W. Forslund
Irvin W. Lindemuth
James E. Ferguson
Joseph L. Coburn, Jr.
Richard Nielsen, Jr.
Richard Rounseville
Leon T. Dankiewicz
Robert L. Cook
Carmen J. Blondin
Bobby F. Hollingsworth

Leo Jordan
Charles A. Biondo
Howard M. Veillette
Arthur E. Gerken
Richard N. Abrahams
Charles F. McFadden

The following-named persons to be lieutenants (junior grade) in the U.S. Coast Guard:

William R. Bell
Marcus W. Lonsberry
Garet T. Bush III
Paul E. Pakos
Charles S. Loosmore
Geoffrey T. Potter
Jack C. Goldthorpe
William G. Walker
Robert R. Wells
Ronald M. Polant
Charles S. Mincks
James T. Montonye
Stephen J. T. Masse
James W. Miller II
Stanley E. Bielski
John R. Edwards
Thomas J. Cunningham,
Jr.

Frank J. Iarossi
David L. Pepple
John T. Howell
Gerald R. Foster
Joseph E. Vorbach
Donald L. Hoffer
Andrew H. Sims, Jr.
Roger A. Andersen
Bruce C. Skinner
Dean A. Franken-
hauser
Richard H. Belter
James W. Coste, Jr.
David R. Garner
Floyd W. White, Jr.
Ralph D. Sanford
John E. Cummings
John Deck III
Peter A. Bunch
John W. Gerometta

Howard B. Thorsen
Robert E. Larson
Charles A. Millradt
Jimmie D. Woods
John W. Sheedy
Charles Leddy
Edward W. Murphy
Thomas C. Lutton
John J. Dirschel, Jr.
Joseph N. Andrassy
George E. Walton
Norman R. West
William J. Bickford
Henry Suski
Richard L. Brown
Frederick F. Herzberg,
Jr.

Herbert H. H. Kothe
Stephen J. Dasovich
Donald L. Gordon
Daniel B. Charter, Jr.
Robert L. Johanson
Alan D. Freed
Daniel C. Olson, Jr.
Kenneth R. Depperman

Ira E. Thompson
Ralph W. Eustis
Edward F. Lewis
Edmund J. Spillane,
Jr.
John B. Jones-Bate-
man, Jr.
Robert H. Overton III
Kenneth D. Albritton
John M. Duke, Jr.
John R. Butler
Edward R. Baumgart-
ner
Charles H. Leckrone
Gennaro S. Duca
Ralph W. H. Bartels
Jackson C. Arney
Robert F. Ingraham
Richard T. Hess
Walter W. McDougall

James L. McDonald
Thomas F. Marucci
Richard L. Andrews
Gerald W. Seelman
Harold F. Norton, Jr.
Robert E. Shenkle
William B. Hewitt
John D. Campbell
William B. Howland
Bruce A. Patterson
George E. Kriete-
meyer
Otto R. Kossmann
Anthony C. Beardsley
Albert J. Allison III
Robert B. Workman,
Jr.

Donald L. Millroy
Robert J. Imbrie
Frank W. Olson
Gerald H. McManus
Edmond G. Case
William M.
Devereaux
Ronald F. Miscavich
Peter C. F. Lauridsen,
Jr.
William P. Leahy, Jr.
John E. Irwin
Edouard W. LaCroix,
Jr.
Thomas N. Morrow,
Jr.
Robert Reynard
Richard W. Folker
Lawrence E. Meyer
Walter S. Rich
James G. Heydenreich

Robert F. Melsheimer
Bryson S. Randolph
Ronald G. Barnes
John W. Klotz
Jason M. Bowen
Joel D. Sipes
Paul A. Welling
James E. Foels
Frank J. Roplak, Jr.

Clarence C. Atkins,
Jr.
William N. Schobert
James A. Chappell
Robert D. Brown
Stewart A. Walker
John H. Holmnd III
Robert H. Thornton

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for promotion in the Regular Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284 and 3305:

To be colonels, Medical Corps

Angen, Willard F., O23596.
Bauer, Frank L., O26430.
Campbell, Robert P., O24633.
Carbonell, Arthur J., O24626.
Cavender, Savino W., O31005.
Christianson, Charles S., O56824.
Collins, William A. Jr., O58178.
Crosby, William H. Jr., O24639.
Crozier, Dan, O26408.
Dein, Harry L., O58752.
Dunnington, William G., O61059.
Eaker, Alan B., O43146.
Elsner, David G., O30984.
Geppert, Leo J., O26406.
Hoeffler, Hugh B., O51983.
Holmes, Robert H., O85572.
Hughes, Frederic J., Jr., O26370.
Hume, Wayne S., O59422.
Jesurun, Harold M., O26439.
Kiehl, Paul V., O26397.
Lane, Thomas H., O51992.
LeGolyan, Paul C., O24634.
Moore, William S., O30992.
Opsahl, Harold E., O61057.
Orbison, James A., O26405.
Orr, Kenneth D., O31042.
Parker, Henry S., O24317.
Perlmutter, Nick, O60731.
Pickhardt, Woodrow L., O39497.
Rice, John S., O24326.
Sandifer, Samuel H., O25158.
Sargent, Carlton W., O26991.
Smith, Max L., O38853.
Smith, William S., O30968.
Smith, William T., O24341.
Sprinz, Helmut, O30919.
Tillotson, James K., O52001.
Vita, Frank J., O59664.
Vogel, Edward H., Jr., O24321.
Vorder, Bruegge Colin F., O26958.

To be colonels, Dental Corps

Avery, S. Kingdon, O23684.
Brown, Pearson W., O23610.
Caldwell, Jack B., O22316.
Chipp, James E., O22743.
Christensen, John P., O22257.
Clapp, Stacy W., Jr., O30990.
DeGon, Kenneth C., O23676.
Evans, Pierre O., O23351.
Farrell, Clement A., O30988.
Farrell, Richard J., O25168.
Francis, Garnet P., Jr., O30876.
Goodall, Henry A., O30977.
Haskins, Harold P., O23347.
Hazard, David C., O24335.
Jessel, James R., O78074.
Moser, Ernest H., O30960.
Murphy, James M., O23609.
Orsinger, William O., O23343.
Parrot, George H., Jr., O23675.
Quarantillo, Edward P., O31002.
Rogers, Roger P., O38858.
Sexson, Julius C., O24630.
Smith, Edwin H., Jr., O24629.
Snyder, Harry G., O38854.
Talbot, Raymond J., O23608.
Tornstrom, Clifford H., O43138.
Walsh, Robert L., O23677.

To be colonels, Veterinary Corps

Batchelder, George D., O38852.
Fechner, Walter W., O31033.

Kuhn, George A., O84813.
Lockwood, Mulford C., O38857.
McFadden, Glenn M., O31004.
Murphy, Leslie C., O31021.
Seeley, Alpheus H., O26373.
Sibert, Herbert F., O30922.
Yager, Robert H., O22761.

To be colonels, Medical Service Corps

Adams, Oscar H., O40131.
Benade, Leo E., O37433.
Blythe, Vernon E., O40133.
Boeckman, Franklin P., O31247.
Burns, John E., O31205.
Bush, Chester K., O79643.
Butchkosky, John, O83548.
Carter, James A., O31315.
Coats, James G., O31260.
Cochran, Ernest E., Jr., O31162.
Cooley, George M., O83544.
Cousins, Owen DeF., O43222.
DiFusco, Manrico P., O80276.
Doyle, John F., O40127.
Ferguson, Harry A., O31251.
Freeman, Richard R., O56189.
Frey, Clarence Van P., O40134.
Gamble, Robert H. D., O31203.
Gelse, Gerald E., O43167.
Gersoni, Charles S., O56185.
Grove, Lee A., O56187.
Haase, Frederick J., O31320.
Hastings, William O., O31248.
Henderson, Clyde W., O31324.
Hunt, Albert B., O31285.
Hunt, John M., Jr., O31089.
Ingram, James L., O31201.
Irving, Glenn C., O43197.
Johnston, George W., O31184.
Jones, David W., O43631.
Kegerrels, John B., O31242.
LaCombe, James L., O31284.
Lawford, Frank K., O37395.
LeMire, Joseph A. W., O37386.
Lewis, Converse R., Jr., O43203.
Lindberg, Robert B., O43205.
McAlpine, Arthur R., O56188.
Monnen, Millard C., O37387.
Montague, Ernest K., O56890.
Morrison, Manley G., O37389.
Mudgett, Louis E., O31069.
Nagy, Ernest A., O83546.
O'Reilly, George T., O40120.
Peake, Ben F., O31168.
Pendlyshok, Charles A., O31304.
Rustigian, Barj A., O31068.
Sanders, Arvey C., O43236.
Sheridan, John W., O43156.
Steed, Oliver H., O43177.
Stillman, Frank E., Jr., O83547.
Stith, Marlon C., O37385.
Strode, Alfred C., O40129.
Tatch, David, O31116.
Taylor, Emerson B., O22794.
Trenholm, John H., O37427.
Walker, Herman A., O37402.
Watson, Bascomb R., O84033.
Weir, Roy I., Jr., O38874.
Whittemore, Frederick W., Jr., O43255.
Wilkin, Wendell R., O52080.
Wilson, George H., O21007.
Zurcher, John J., 3d, O38888.

The following-named officers for promotion in the Regular Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284 and 3299:

To be colonel, Army Nurse Corps

Jensen, Emilie K., N00060.

The following-named officers for promotion in the Regular Army of the United States, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284 and 3299:

To be captains

Berry, David T., O73607.
Whiting, Jon K., O81761.

The following-named officers for promotion in the Regular Army of the United

States, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284 and 3299:

To be first lieutenants

Abernethy, Robert B., O89402.
Ady, Samuel J., O91544.
Alfredson, George H., O94984.
Alves, Robert G., O89912.
Anderson, Edward, Jr., O89407.
Anderson, Harold E., O88323.
Andrew, Ronald J., O89408.
Andrews, William R., O91742.
Archibald, Thomas, O91746.
Baker, Edwin J., Jr., O89410.
Barker, Robert L., O89412.
Barnett, James R., O89413.
Barrowman, Thomas J., O89414.
Barton, David C., O89176.
Bennett, John S., Jr., O90048.
Berriman, Edward T., Jr., O92618.
Bohach, John L., Jr., O92162.
Boyd, Claude D., 3d, O94913.
Braden, Richard P., O88339.
Brailsford, Marvin D., O89753.
Bratton, Vernon W., Jr., O92419.
Braun, Thomas R., O91168.
Brennan, Robert G., Jr., O89186.
Brewster, Horace B., O89422.
Brooks, Edwin C., O94570.
Brubach, Charles F., O89424.
Buchert, Kenneth D., O89426.
Buzan, Thomas G., O94999.
Cahill, Ralph D., O89428.
Caliboso, Robert M., O89430.
Camp, Billy J., O89431.
Cantarella, James J., Jr., O89433.
Cartwright, Edward L., Jr., O89435.
Casale, James E., O93032.
Caswell, Kenneth A., O91789.
Catron, George R., O85981.
Chamberlain, Craig R., O92637.
Chen, Robert, O88618.
Chichwak, William J., O89437.
Childs, Leo M., O91567.
Chunco, William R., O94742.
Clifton, Jack H., O89438.
Cline, Corwyn M., O89828.
Cloud, Leon B., O89439.
Cobel, Larry P., O89441.
Connor, George H., Jr., O89194.
Cook, William J., Jr., O89445.
Coombs, Robert M., O89444.
Corley, Thaman N., O89045.
Cottingham, David C., O89447.
Crawford, Robert C., O92314.
Crocker, Donald J., O89449.
Crockett, William A., O89450.
Cromwell, George E., Jr., O89451.
Crysel, James W., O92177.
Daly, Charles F., O94286.
Davenport, William C., O91805.
Davidson, Dean A., O89456.
Davidson, James D., O89457.
Davis, Peter A., O89459.
Denney, J. Thomas H., O89891.
Devitt, John M., O89464.
Dorf, John H., O92316.
Duckworth, Charles H., O89466.
Dukes, Donald L., O86091.
Durbin, Jerome A., O89051.
Edinger, Jerry D., O89470.
Edwards, Robert R., O89471.
Elam, Fred E., O89473.
Emery, Douglas E., O95016.
Everitt, Larry E., O89478.
Falk, Richard H., O89479.
Feteroff, Robert J., O89481.
Fisher, Thomas P., O90585.
Flora, John G., O89950.
Follett, Franklin P., O95021.
Foster, Alton Le R., Jr., O89485.
Freihube, Garry R., O94857.
Fry, Charles H., O94928.
Furno, Jimmie F., O94584.
Gatanas, Mark D., O89489.
Gergulis, John G., O92348.
Gilmore, Ralph J., Jr., O92349.
Goines, Roy L., O89491.

Goldsmith, Walter B., Jr., O89334.
Gray, Ronald E., O92656.
Gray, Ted J., O89492.
Green, Thomas G., O89493.
Greenwood, Henry V., O92657.
Griffith, Jack H., Jr., O89495.
Gronos, Melvin J., O92367.
Grundborg, Kenneth D., O90011.
Hagan, William M., O89496.
Hall, Charles A., O90021.
Hall, William N., O92660.
Harris, Franklin N., O89499.
Harris, Henry L., O92385.
Harrod, Robert L., O89500.
Hawn, Darryl R., O92387.
Hayes, Ralph E., O90047.
Henriques, Richmond B., O89504.
Henry, Pierre E., O95037.
Herrington, Roscoe B. P., O92404.
Hoffman, James R., O91872.
Hofrichter, Francis P., O89508.
Holder, Henry G., O94590.
Hopkins, John R., O89510.
Howard, Jimmie B., O94309.
Hunter, Howard W., Jr., O91248.
Huntington, William L., O88750.
Huse, Warren D., O93434.
Jennings, Ivan R., O89517.
Jones, William J., Jr., O92075.
Joost, Jack S., O89519.
Jorgensen, Kermit V., O89520.
Kahn, William, O94940.
Katsuyoshi, Kenneth H., O89522.
Kelley, Jack T., O95052.
Kerr, James E., O92685.
Kieffer, George W., O92696.
Kilday, John B., O89525.
Kimura, Kenneth K., O89527.
Kinell, Carl E., O87202.
Kirk, William M., Jr., O94869.
Lacquement, Richard A., O89533.
Landry, Larry J., O89534.
Lang, Neil B., O89535.
Langdale, Daniel T., O89241.
Lazdowski, Walter P., O92702.
Lazzaro, Gerald J., O89537.
Leary, Paul E., O94314.
Lee, David W., O90292.
Lee, George B., O89089.
Lee, James G., O89538.
Lew, James R., O93052.
Liddle, Jack W., O90330.
Lille, Warren T., O95064.
Line, Edward D., O95063.
Lowry, Robert C., O89542.
Lyell, Richard L., O92470.
Lynch, Thomas H., Jr., O90400.
Lyon, Paul W., O91914.
Markham, William E., O92725.
Marshall, Wesley B., O89102.
Martin, Robert G., O89103.
Marwitz, Carl E., O89548.
May, Billy W., O89551.
May, Karl E., O92482.
Mays, Jack M., O91922.
Mayville, William C., O89552.
McCullough, Sharpe, Jr., O89553.
McFarland, James W., O89554.
McKenzie, George R., O94109.
Mehrtens, Frederick J., Jr., O95070.
Meisel, John L., O92734.
Melton, Kenneth F., O89557.
Merrill, William B., 3d, O87853.
Miller, Wayne R., O94324.
Miner, James F., O88837.
Moore, Charles L., O92739.
Mosley, Howard R., O92100.
Motz, Aubrey, 3d, O89562.
Muery, Donald H., O89564.
Mullenix, Ronald O., O92742.
O'Connell, Thomas R., O94326.
Ostick, Charles T., O89569.
Otero, Carlos A., O89570.
Overby, Gordon J., O88868.
Parnell, William C., 3d, O95078.
Parsley, Benjamin L., O91350.
Peppers, John S., O88469.

Peterson, Humphrey LaV., Jr., O94330.
 Place, Darman C., O89573.
 Polk, Burley R., O95083.
 Polk, John A., O89574.
 Pruitt, Fleming, S., Jr., O89130.
 Rabon, Jim D., O89279.
 Reed, David B., 3d, O93082.
 Rego, Chris F., O89583.
 Reynolds, Joseph C., O90422.
 Richardson, Charles W., Jr., O94952.
 Rickard, Wayne R., O89585.
 Riley, Donald A., O89136.
 Rippetoe, Joe F., O89588.
 Risley, Dannie J., O94639.
 Rose, Terrol L., O89590.
 Scherz, James P., O86724.
 Schlaak, Thomas M., O89594.
 Schooff, Maury W., O92004.
 Schuetz, Terry L., O89595.
 Scott, Engle W., O89598.
 Scott, Hugh J., O89599.
 Seller, Robert B., O89601.
 Self, Charles R., O86744.
 Shaul, Charles D., O89602.
 Sherman, William M., O89604.
 Siebert, Edward M., O89606.
 Skillings, James A., O92562.
 Smith, Vernelle T., O94501.
 Speedie, John C., Jr., O89612.
 Stafford, Benjamin A., O89615.
 Stahlman, John R., O94316.
 Stang, Arthur C., 3d, O93082.
 Steed, John H., O94894.
 Stout, Louis E., O89618.
 Stowe, Wain W., O89619.
 Straight, Kaye R., O94897.
 Strong, Edward M., O94350.
 Sullivan, Gordon R., O92127.
 Talbott, Peter B., O88505.
 Tanner, Junius L., O88967.
 Teska, Thomas E., O89624.
 Thompson, Wesley W., Jr., O90082.
 Thurgood, Leon C., O89625.
 Thurston, Joe B., Jr., O91708.
 Timperley, Bruce S., O89626.
 Tracy, Lawrence L., O94795.
 Tudor, Robert W., O95109.
 Ulm, Donald S., O94149.
 Van Dine, Peter W. H., O94506.
 Van Eynde, Donald F., O89631.
 Van Horn, James E., O93533.
 Waghelstein, John D., O94902.
 Walkup, Larry R., O92035.
 Wallace, Richard B., Jr., O94150.
 Wanasek, Robert E., O89634.
 Ware, William M., O95115.
 Warner, Carl L., O89635.
 Webster, Grady F., O89636.
 Welch, Jerry F., O90069.
 Whaley, Max, O89639.
 White, Walter S., Jr., O94662.
 Whitlaw, Nathaniel O., Jr., O90604.
 Whitley, Wade H., 2d, O89640.
 Wicker, Rush R., Jr., O90605.
 Wicksell, Harry H., Jr., O89641.
 Willard, Hugh D., O89644.
 Williams, Stanley J., O89646.
 Wilson, Bruce E., O89647.
 Wilson, James R., O87974.
 Wolpert, Robert A., O93102.
 Wolstenholme, Donald E., O93542.
 Wood, William A., O92050.
 Wright, Jackie V., O89649.
 Yeomans, William A., O94907.
 Zingle, Paul R., O89653.
 Zorn, Burl A., O93105.

To be first lieutenants, Women's Army Corps

Estock, Barbara J., L602.
 Morris, Sarah L., L598.

To be first lieutenants, Medical Service Corps

Baker, George D., O91546.
 Coleman, Jerry B., O92300.
 Fulton, Robert B., O89487.
 Goodman, Dorris C., O88700.
 Grider, Donald A., O89064.
 Hahn, Ruediger, O95030.

Howard, Vance F., O88745.
 Jones, Ronald C., O92683.
 Mereness, Fenton R., Jr., O92738.
 Pritchard, Bob E., O91670.
 Sinnott, George W., O89608.
 Wilkins, Gerald W., O89643.

To be first lieutenants, Army Nurse Corps

Clifton, Mary R., N3064.
 Corbett, Mary J., N3079.
 Kucha, Deloros H., N3043.
 Reinbold, Rita R., N3068.

The following-named person for re-appointment as a temporary brigadier general in the Army of the United States and for reappointment as colonel in the Regular Army of the United States, from the temporary disability retired list, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 1211, 3442, and 3447:

Rothschild, Jacquard H., O18077.

The following-named person for appointment in the Regular Army by transfer in the grade specified, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, 3288, and 3290:

To be second lieutenant, Medical Service Corps

Osborne, Edward J. (Arty), O90359.

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army by transfer in the grades specified, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, and 3288:

To be captain

Kramer, Stanley H. (MSC), O89395.

To be first lieutenant

Locklear, James P. (MSC), O88792.
 The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States, in the grades and corps specified, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, 3288, 3289, 3290, 3291, 3294, and 3311:

To be major, Medical Corps

Blunt, James W., O1705079.

To be captains, Dental Corps

Ahlvin, Reno A., Jr., O5500228.
 Brown, Allen W., Jr., O4056099.
 Morton, Charles B., O4070685.
 Saari, James T., O2284865.
 Solow, Jerome J., O4025510.
 Tong, Edmund Y. S., O5500537.
 Webb, Derril L., O4043844.

To be captains, Medical Corps

Baker, Raymond D., O4073569.
 Benincaso, Frank V., O4033644.
 Clark, John D., O4037918.
 DeJong, David C., O2295408.
 Eisenberg, Robert S., O5707172.
 Kirshman, Herbert S., O5217317.
 Kistler, Henry E., Jr., O4009419.
 Mologne, Lewis A., O2288740.
 Schneider, Daniel J., O2291533.
 Terry, Nathaniel V., O5202448.
 Tisdale, Samuel A., Jr., O2273713.
 Townsend, Horace D., O2295346.
 Zwilling, William F., O4053510.

To be first lieutenants, Army Nurse Corps

Gilbrech, Carmen E., N902173.
 McKenzie, Nancy J., N5407133.
 Sinclair, Janie A., N2293573.

To be first lieutenants, Dental Corps

Cheney, Daniel K., O2304951.
 Dupont, Albert A., O5004112.
 Morgan, James K., O2305011.
 Schwartz, Roy S., O5501788.

To be first lieutenants, Medical Corps

Fuqua, William B., O2300698.
 Hano, Jessie E., O2305172.
 Terrell, Dudley J., O5300192.

To be first lieutenants, Veterinary Corps

Bellamy, Albert D., O4045413.
 Blanchard, Decatur D., Jr., O2225732.
 Carraway, Claude W., Jr., O2305962.
 Kovatch, Robert M., O2300776.

To be second lieutenants, Army Nurse Corps

Beam, Ida M., N5411401.
 Brice, Betty, N5411351.
 Lebel, Rita A., N5407492.
 Wickman, Sally M., N5004911.

To be second lieutenant, Medical Service Corps

Johnson, Walter F., III, O5215773.

To be second lieutenant, Women's Army Corps

Perkins, Suzanne M., L2300866.

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States, in the grades specified under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, and 3288:

To be captains

Bills, Arthur D., O4039449.
 Culbertson, Roger A., O1925295.
 Howell, Ernest R., O1887104.
 Lampkin, George W., O1939654.
 Moser, John W., O4010625.
 Seeberg, Richard S., O4057491.
 Stottle, Leslie J., Jr., O1881981.
 Zanghi, Joseph A., O1890471.

To be first lieutenants

Baker, Mark W., III, O5204166.
 Bezemek, Ludwig A., O4062194.
 Boyle, James A., Jr., O5300030.
 Bullard, Monte R., O5505602.
 Bunting, Roger C., O5700454.
 Carmichael, Roderick L., III, O5307728.
 Dmytryck, Paul J., O5001497.
 Dyer, Peter M., O5302986.
 Fekete, Alexander J., Jr., O4069051.
 Harrington, Regis A., Jr., O4057452.
 Higgins, Paul J., O4065393.
 Korf, Calvin L., O5307489.
 Kromer, William S., O5402472.
 Luna, Wilbur V., O5702895.
 Manganaro, S. Joseph, O5507775.
 McKie, Robert H., Jr., O4063031.
 McMahon, Robert W., O5005339.
 Mooney, Peter X., O5302831.
 Nyfeler, George L., Jr., O5405084.
 Parsons, Ralph W., O5301792.
 Potts, William E., O5305011.
 Raffaele, John, O4067048.
 Rogers, Jerome J., O5700681.
 Stengel, Charles W., Jr., O5502755.
 Suszynski, Joseph F., O5305564.
 Vossen, Francis C., O4074863.

To be second lieutenants

Benson, Richard D., O5704137.
 Blair, Robert H., O5213421.
 Boucher, Arthur G., O5005357.
 Boyd, William L., O5309634.
 Bradley, William A., Jr., O5306385.
 Burgin, Charles M., O5405545.
 Davis, Don M., O5309021.
 Dorsey, James J., O5405881.
 Kenney, Donald R., O5006679.
 LeJeune, David W., O5409724.
 MacStravic, James A., O5009463.
 Mumford, Jay C., O5704705.
 Pitts, Riley L., O5511070.
 Purdy, John D., O4031006.
 Sasai, Calvin Y., O5800205.
 Schumaker, John R., O5704910.
 Seavey, Richard W., O4084538.
 Shafer, Harold S., O5703872.
 Smith, Wade C., O5312056.
 Willard, Jack T., Jr., O5211877.

The following-named distinguished military students for appointment in the Medical Service Corps, Regular Army of the United

States, in the grade of second lieutenant, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, 3288, and 3290:

Andrew, Franklin H., Murray, David B. Jr.
Bonine, Robert W. Skrzypek, George J.
Cunningham, Clyde R. Starke, William R.
Gill, Joseph E. Wilford, Dan S.
McCauley, Charles L. Wilford, Ned B.

The following named distinguished military students for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States in the grade of second lieutenant, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, and 3288:

Alling, Edward H. Everett, John R.
Anderson, Sigurd W. Falcone, John P., Jr.
Andrews, Darlington F. Fanning, Charles J.
Anz, Allen G. Fedorochko, William, Jr.
Archibald, Robert C. Fitzgerald, William R.
Arnold, Douglas L. Pollis, Frederick L.
Barnett, Ronald V. Gardner, Lloyd K.
Barylak, Bohdan A. Garnett, Thomas H., Jr.
Bates, Phillip H. Gilbert, Ralph W., Jr.
Boudreaux, John S. Gilbert, Richard S.
Bresley, Kenneth V. Gniadzowski, Francis
Brown, Robert L. Gordon, Richard M.
Butler, Gary W. Grant, William M., Jr.
Byars, Joe D. Grasseschi, Thomas A.
Channon, James B. Gray, Beltron E.
Chaplin, Robert D., III Grev, Ellsworth C.
Childers, Phillip D. Grinder, John T., Jr.
Chirico, Carl F., Jr. Hamer, Martin E.
O5217279 Havener, Gary W.
Clarke, Henry L. Hess, Hunter C.
Coburn, John G. Higgins, Paul R.
Conn, Samuel H., Jr. Hildebrandt, John E.
Cornell, Joseph S., Jr. Jacquet, Richard J.
Cridder, Stephen B. Jeffress, Charles E.
Danzelzer, David A. Jones, Thomas A.
Davies, David M. Jones, Wendell O.
DeGiullo, Anthony P. Joyner, James L.
Dickens, Homer Q., Jr. Juergens, William A.
Dopp, Daniel L. Keller, Kenneth F.
Eden, Charles K. Kerner, Richard C.
Egan, Martin D. Knudsen, Peter K.
Ellis, James T. Ladd, Richard B.
Englund, Douglas M.

Lawrence, William G. Raley, Thomas S.
Leonard, Allan L., III Ries, Thomas A.
Lubavs, Konstantins A. Riley, Miles, Jr.
MacMurdy, William Robinson, Stephen M.
L., Jr. Sandow, Dennis J.
Mallard, Ernest L., Jr. Sayler, John G.
Marshall, Thomas W. Schram, Robert E.
Martin, Edward P. Slominski, Michael H.
McCoy, James B. Smith, Jimmy T.
McDaniel, Richard A. Speake, Robert C.
McDevitt, James Spirek, Dennis G.
McKinney, John T., Standarder, Norman R.
Melzheimer, Gerald A. Staton, James H.
Jr. Sturdivant, Robert D.
Miller, Jack V. Thomas, Edward M.
Miller, Robert B. Vincent, Norman L.
Mize, William F., Jr. Welch, James R.
Moore, Bobby L. O5413356
Morgan, Walter E. West, Kenneth M.
Morrison, Kenneth H. Whipple, William B., Jr.
Murray, George P. Whittington, Robert D., III
Myers, Wayne L. Williams, Stewart D.
Oakley, Raymond C. Williamson, William R.
Olson, John W. Wyatt, Robert L.
Parker, Johnny D. Youngblood,
Perry, Stephen O., Jr. Lawrence J., Jr.
Peyton, Mark T.
Pipplin, Carlen
Price, Thomas W.

John C. Goodman, O'Fallon.
William M. Lee, Mount Vernon.

KANSAS

Robert W. Domme, Topeka.

NEW YORK

Olive E. Westcott, Cleveland.

NORTH CAROLINA

Bessie W. Finch, Asheboro.
Thomas M. Dunn, Laurinburg.
Atlas T. White, St. Pauls.
Eunice E. Ludlum, Shallotte.

OKLAHOMA

Dwight L. Crawford, Ames.
Mildred M. Carr, Catoosa.
Frankie M. Horn, Sapulpa.

PENNSYLVANIA

Harold L. Adams, Berwick.
John P. McLaughlin, Levittown.
Francis C. Bordner, Kutztown.
David W. Mabry, Mertztown.

SOUTH CAROLINA

William C. Fortner, Easley.

TEXAS

John H. Lambert, Abernathy.
Carroll D. Brice, Bruni.
Dora G. Glibreath, Deer Park.
Thomas H. Finger, D'Hanis.
Harold D. Miller, Earth.
Edmond F. Jackson, Honey Grove.
Thomas B. Baker, Kenedy.
Lloyd J. Kuykendall, Kopperl.
Ruby L. Hart, Nash.
Jack C. Christian, Tenaha.
Billy D. Dockery, Trenton.
Clifford E. Cummins, Windom.

UTAH

Claude E. Scovill, Orangeville.

WEST VIRGINIA

Helen M. Kessler, Benwood.
James A. McGee, Elkins.
John W. Zimmerman, Hico.
A. Leo Morgan, Ronceverte.

WISCONSIN

Robert A. Ruben, Fountain City.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate August 3, 1962:

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

Norbert A. Schlei, of California, to be an Assistant Attorney General.

POSTMASTERS

HAWAII

Kenneth K. Miyahira, Kapaa.
Edward Y. Shimabukuro, Kaunakakai.
Chieko I. Shimabukuro, Papaaloa.

ILLINOIS

James E. Case, Arcola.
William B. Karstetter, Glasford.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

Tax Reduction and the Need for Reduction of Federal Expenditures

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, August 3, 1962

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD two statements I have made concerning tax reduction, and the need for reduction of Federal expenditures in this fiscal year; and to postpone proposals for new spending programs.

The first statement was made on July 1, in the course of the television and radio program "Let's Look at Congress," of Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, my distinguished Republican colleague from New York.

The second statement was made on July 9. This statement amplifies the necessity of reducing current appropriations for fiscal year ending June 30,

1963, and postponing administration requests for new spending programs.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INTERVIEW OF HON. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, REPUBLICAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY BY SENATOR KENNETH B. KEATING, REPUBLICAN, NEW YORK, ON TELEVISION AND RADIO PROGRAM "Let's Look at Congress," SUNDAY, JULY 1, 1962

Senator KEATING. This is Senator KEN KEATING welcoming you to another "Let's Look at Congress" program. My guest today is a distinguished colleague who in 1960 was voted by a poll of newsmen the ablest Republican in the Senate. He is former Ambassador to India and my dear friend, the Honorable JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, of Kentucky. JOHN, it's nice to have you here to talk to the people of New York.

Senator COOPER. KEN, I'm glad to be with you.

Senator KEATING. You have a lot of friends in New York?

Senator COOPER. Well, I like New York. I have friends there—yes.

Senator KEATING. What do you think will be the biggest campaign issue this fall?

Senator COOPER. I think the biggest campaign issue—the one that will have more influence than any other—is the state of the

economy. People out of work are going to continue to wonder how long they are going to be out of work. Businessmen are going to wonder about their business. Consumers and everyone will wonder about continued high prices but generally, whether our economy is going to pick up or whether it's going to stagnate. If it stagnates, it must go down, I think.

Senator KEATING. How do you feel about a tax cut at this time?

Senator COOPER. KEN, this is what I believe. We know there is great uncertainty in the country today. A part of that uncertainty grows out of the uncertainty of the administration about its fiscal policy. It's evident from the record that we will have had three deficits—in 1961 about \$4 billion (of course, part of that might be attributed to the Eisenhower administration), a deficit in 1962 of, I think, \$7 billion, and now it's agreed we'll have a deficit in 1963, unless something is done, of \$4 to \$5 billion.

It seems to me deficit financing has failed as a measure to spur the economy. If we must have a deficit, it is preferable to have it come about as the result of a tax cut, because a tax cut will stimulate the economy. I believe that the Congress should enact a tax cut this year. If the administration doesn't propose it, I think at least the Republican Party ought to agree on one and urge it in the Finance Committee and in